A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents
by
James D. Richardson
Part 4 out of 14
In this connection the query presents itself whether the system proposed
by the bill will not, when put into complete operation, practically
transfer the entire care, support, and control of 4,000,000 emancipated
slaves to agents, overseers, or taskmasters, who, appointed at
Washington, are to be located in every county and parish throughout the
United States containing freedmen and refugees. Such a system would
inevitably tend to a concentration of power in the Executive which would
enable him, if so disposed, to control the action of this numerous class
and use them for the attainment of his own political ends.
I can not but add another very grave objection to this bill. The
Constitution imperatively declares, in connection with taxation, that
each State _shall_ have at least one Representative, and fixes the rule
for the number to which, in future times, each State shall be entitled.
It also provides that the Senate of the United States _shall_ be
composed of two Senators from each State, and adds with peculiar force
"that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate." The original act was necessarily passed in the
absence of the States chiefly to be affected, because their people were
then contumaciously engaged in the rebellion. Now the case is changed,
and some, at least, of those States are attending Congress by loyal
representatives, soliciting the allowance of the constitutional right
for representation. At the time, however, of the consideration and the
passing of this bill there was no Senator or Representative in Congress
from the eleven States which are to be mainly affected by its
provisions. The very fact that reports were and are made against the
good disposition of the people of that portion of the country is an
additional reason why they need and should have representatives of their
own in Congress to explain their condition, reply to accusations,
and assist by their local knowledge in the perfecting of measures
immediately affecting themselves. While the liberty of deliberation
would then be free and Congress would have full power to decide
according to its judgment, there could be no objection urged that the
States most interested had not been permitted to be heard. The principle
is firmly fixed in the minds of the American people that there should be
no taxation without representation. Great burdens have now to be borne
by all the country, and we may best demand that they shall be borne
without murmur when they are voted by a majority of the representatives
of all the people. I would not interfere with the unquestionable right
of Congress to judge, each House for itself, "of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of its own members;" but that authority can not be
construed as including the right to shut out in time of peace any State
from the representation to which it is entitled by the Constitution.
At present all the people of eleven States are excluded--those who
were most faithful during the war not less than others. The State of
Tennessee, for instance, whose authorities engaged in rebellion, was
restored to all her constitutional relations to the Union by the
patriotism and energy of her injured and betrayed people. Before the war
was brought to a termination they had placed themselves in relations
with the General Government, had established a State government of their
own, and, as they were not included in the emancipation proclamation,
they by their own act had amended their constitution so as to abolish
slavery within the limits of their State. I know no reason why the State
of Tennessee, for example, should not fully enjoy "all her
constitutional relations to the United States."
The President of the United States stands toward the country in
a somewhat different attitude from that of any member of Congress.
Each member of Congress is chosen from a single district or State;
the President is chosen by the people of all the States. As eleven
States are not at this time represented in either branch of Congress, it
would seem to be his duty on all proper occasions to present their just
claims to Congress. There always will be differences of opinion in the
community, and individuals may be guilty of transgressions of the law,
but these do not constitute valid objections against the right of a
State to representation. I would in no wise interfere with the
discretion of Congress with regard to the qualifications of members; but
I hold it my duty to recommend to you, in the interests of peace and the
interests of union, the admission of every State to its share in public
legislation when, however insubordinate, insurgent, or rebellious its
people may have been, it presents itself, not only in an attitude of
loyalty and harmony, but in the persons of representatives whose loyalty
can not be questioned under any existing constitutional or legal test.
It is plain that an indefinite or permanent exclusion of any part of the
country from representation must be attended by a spirit of disquiet and
complaint. It is unwise and dangerous to pursue a course of measures
which will unite a very large section of the country against another
section of the country, however much the latter may preponderate. The
course of emigration, the development of industry and business, and
natural causes will raise up at the South men as devoted to the Union as
those of any other part of the land; but if they are all excluded from
Congress, if in a permanent statute they are declared not to be in full
constitutional relations to the country, they may think they have cause
to become a unit in feeling and sentiment against the Government. Under
the political education of the American people the idea is inherent and
ineradicable that the consent of the majority of the whole people is
necessary to secure a willing acquiescence in legislation.
The bill under consideration refers to certain of the States as though
they had not "been fully restored in all their constitutional relations
to the United States." If they have not, let us at once act together to
secure that desirable end at the earliest possible moment. It is hardly
necessary for me to inform Congress that in my own judgment most of
those States, so far, at least, as depends upon their own action, have
already been fully restored, and are to be deemed as entitled to enjoy
their constitutional rights as members of the Union. Reasoning from the
Constitution itself and from the actual situation of the country, I feel
not only entitled but bound to assume that with the Federal courts
restored and those of the several States in the full exercise of their
functions the rights and interests of all classes of people will,
with the aid of the military in cases of resistance to the laws,
be essentially protected against unconstitutional infringement or
violation. Should this expectation unhappily fail, which I do not
anticipate, then the Executive is already fully armed with the powers
conferred by the act of March, 1865, establishing the Freedmen's Bureau,
and hereafter, as heretofore, he can employ the land and naval forces of
the country to suppress insurrection or to overcome obstructions to the
laws.
In accordance with the Constitution, I return the bill to the Senate,
in the earnest hope that a measure involving questions and interests so
important to the country will not become a law, unless upon deliberate
consideration by the people it shall receive the sanction of an
enlightened public judgment.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., _March 27, 1866_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I regret that the bill, which has passed both Houses of Congress,
entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their
civil rights and furnish the means of their vindication," contains
provisions which I can not approve consistently with my sense of duty to
the whole people and my obligations to the Constitution of the United
States. I am therefore constrained to return it to the Senate, the House
in which it originated, with my objections to its becoming a law.
By the first section of the bill all persons born in the United States
and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
declared to be citizens of the United States. This provision comprehends
the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the
people called gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks,
people of color, negroes, mulattoes, and persons of African blood. Every
individual of these races born in the United States is by the bill made
a citizen of the United States. It does not purport to declare or confer
any other right of citizenship than Federal citizenship. It does not
purport to give these classes of persons any status as citizens of
States, except that which may result from their status as citizens of
the United States. The power to confer the right of State citizenship is
just as exclusively with the several States as the power to confer the
right of Federal citizenship is with Congress.
The right of Federal citizenship thus to be conferred on the several
excepted races before mentioned is now for the first time proposed to be
given by law. If, as is claimed by many, all persons who are native born
already are, by virtue of the Constitution, citizens of the United
States, the passage of the pending bill can not be necessary to make
them such. If, on the other hand, such persons are not citizens, as may
be assumed from the proposed legislation to make them such, the grave
question presents itself whether, when eleven of the thirty-six States
are unrepresented in Congress at the present time, it is sound policy
to make our entire colored population and all other excepted classes
citizens of the United States. Four millions of them have just emerged
from slavery into freedom. Can it be reasonably supposed that they
possess the requisite qualifications to entitle them to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States? Have the
people of the several States expressed such a conviction? It may also be
asked whether it is necessary that they should be declared citizens in
order that they may be secured in the enjoyment of the civil rights
proposed to be conferred by the bill. Those rights are, by Federal as
well as State laws, secured to all domiciled aliens and foreigners, even
before the completion of the process of naturalization; and it may
safely be assumed that the same enactments are sufficient to give like
protection and benefits to those for whom this bill provides special
legislation. Besides, the policy of the Government from its origin to
the present time seems to have been that persons who are strangers to
and unfamiliar with our institutions and our laws should pass through
a certain probation, at the end of which, before attaining the coveted
prize, they must give evidence of their fitness to receive and to
exercise the rights of citizens as contemplated by the Constitution of
the United States. The bill in effect proposes a discrimination against
large numbers of intelligent, worthy, and patriotic foreigners, and in
favor of the negro, to whom, after long years of bondage, the avenues to
freedom and intelligence have just now been suddenly opened. He must of
necessity, from his previous unfortunate condition of servitude, be less
informed as to the nature and character of our institutions than he who,
coming from abroad, has, to some extent at least, familiarized himself
with the principles of a Government to which he voluntarily intrusts
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Yet it is now proposed,
by a single legislative enactment, to confer the rights of citizens upon
all persons of African descent born within the extended limits of the
United States, while persons of foreign birth who make our land their
home must undergo a probation of five years, and can only then become
citizens upon proof that they are "of good moral character, attached to
the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the same."
The first section of the bill also contains an enumeration of the rights
to be enjoyed by these classes so made citizens "in every State and
Territory in the United States." These rights are "to make and enforce
contracts; to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property," and to have
"full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." So, too, they are
made subject to the same punishment, pains, and penalties in common with
white citizens, and to none other. Thus a perfect equality of the white
and colored races is attempted to be fixed by Federal law in every State
of the Union over the vast field of State jurisdiction covered by these
enumerated rights. In no one of these can any State ever exercise any
power of discrimination between the different races. In the exercise of
State policy over matters exclusively affecting the people of each State
it has frequently been thought expedient to discriminate between the
two races. By the statutes of some of the States, Northern as well
as Southern, it is enacted, for instance, that no white person shall
intermarry with a negro or mulatto. Chancellor Kent says, speaking of
the blacks, that--
Marriages between them and the whites are forbidden in some of the
States where slavery does not exist, and they are prohibited in all the
slaveholding States; and when not absolutely contrary to law, they are
revolting, and regarded as an offense against public decorum.
I do not say that this bill repeals State laws on the subject of
marriage between the two races, for as the whites are forbidden to
intermarry with the blacks, the blacks can only make such contracts as
the whites themselves are allowed to make, and therefore can not under
this bill enter into the marriage contract with the whites. I cite this
discrimination, however, as an instance of the State policy as to
discrimination, and to inquire whether if Congress can abrogate all
State laws of discrimination between the two races in the matter of real
estate, of suits, and of contracts generally Congress may not also
repeal the State laws as to the contract of marriage between the two
races. Hitherto every subject embraced in the enumeration of rights
contained in this bill has been considered as exclusively belonging to
the States. They all relate to the internal police and economy of the
respective States. They are matters which in each State concern the
domestic condition of its people, varying in each according to its own
peculiar circumstances and the safety and well-being of its own
citizens. I do not mean to say that upon all these subjects there are
not Federal restraints--as, for instance, in the State power of
legislation over contracts there is a Federal limitation that no State
shall pass a law impairing the obligations of contracts; and, as to
crimes, that no State shall pass an _ex post facto_ law; and, as to
money, that no State shall make anything but gold and silver a legal
tender; but where can we find a Federal prohibition against the power
of any State to discriminate, as do most of them, between aliens and
citizens, between artificial persons, called corporations, and natural
persons, in the right to hold real estate? If it be granted that
Congress can repeal all State laws discriminating between whites and
blacks in the subjects covered by this bill, why, it may be asked, may
not Congress repeal in the same way all State laws discriminating
between the two races on the subjects of suffrage and office? If
Congress can declare by law who shall hold lands, who shall testify, who
shall have capacity to make a contract in a State, then Congress can by
law also declare who, without regard to color or race, shall have the
right to sit as a juror or as a judge, to hold any office, and, finally,
to vote "in every State and Territory of the United States." As respects
the Territories, they come within the power of Congress, for as to them
the lawmaking power is the Federal power; but as to the States no
similar provision exists vesting in Congress the power "to make rules
and regulations" for them.
The object of the second section of the bill is to afford discriminating
protection to colored persons in the full enjoyment of all the rights
secured to them by the preceding section. It declares--
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right
secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or
penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason
of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white
persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
This section seems to be designed to apply to some existing or future
law of a State or Territory which may conflict with the provisions of
the bill now under consideration. It provides for counteracting such
forbidden legislation by imposing fine and imprisonment upon the
legislators who may pass such conflicting laws, or upon the officers or
agents who shall put or attempt to put them into execution. It means an
official offense, not a common crime committed against law upon the
persons or property of the black race. Such an act may deprive the black
man of his property, but not of the _right_ to hold property. It means
a deprivation of the right itself, either by the State judiciary or
the State legislature. It is therefore assumed that under this section
members of State legislatures who should vote for laws conflicting with
the provisions of the bill, that judges of the State courts who should
render judgments in antagonism with its terms, and that marshals and
sheriffs who should, as ministerial officers, execute processes
sanctioned by State laws and issued by State judges in execution of
their judgments could be brought before other tribunals and there
subjected to fine and imprisonment for the performance of the duties
which such State laws might impose. The legislation thus proposed
invades the judicial power of the State. It says to every State court or
judge, If you decide that this act is unconstitutional; if you refuse,
under the prohibition of a State law, to allow a negro to testify; if
you hold that over such a subject-matter the State law is paramount, and
"under color" of a State law refuse the exercise of the right to the
negro, your error of judgment, however conscientious, shall subject
you to fine and imprisonment. I do not apprehend that the conflicting
legislation which the bill seems to contemplate is so likely to occur as
to render it necessary at this time to adopt a measure of such doubtful
constitutionality.
In the next place, this provision of the bill seems to be unnecessary,
as adequate judicial remedies could be adopted to secure the desired end
without invading the immunities of legislators, always important to be
preserved in the interest of public liberty; without assailing the
independence of the judiciary, always essential to the preservation of
individual rights; and without impairing the efficiency of ministerial
officers, always necessary for the maintenance of public peace and
order. The remedy proposed by this section seems to be in this respect
not only anomalous, but unconstitutional; for the Constitution
guarantees nothing with certainty if it does not insure to the several
States the right of making and executing laws in regard to all matters
arising within their jurisdiction, subject only to the restriction that
in cases of conflict with the Constitution and constitutional laws of
the United States the latter should be held to be the supreme law of the
land.
The third section gives the district courts of the United States
exclusive "cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the
provisions of this act," and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
courts of the United States of all civil and criminal cases "affecting
persons who are denied or can not enforce in the courts or judicial
tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights
secured to them by the first section." The construction which I have
given to the second section is strengthened by this third section, for
it makes clear what kind of denial or deprivation of the rights secured
by the first section was in contemplation. It is a denial or deprivation
of such rights "in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State." It
stands, therefore, clear of doubt that the offense and the penalties
provided in the second section are intended for the State judge who, in
the clear exercise of his functions as a judge, not acting ministerially
but judicially, shall decide contrary to this Federal law. In other
words, when a State judge, acting upon a question involving a conflict
between a State law and a Federal law, and bound, according to his own
judgment and responsibility, to give an impartial decision between the
two, comes to the conclusion that the State law is valid and the Federal
law is invalid, he must not follow the dictates of his own judgment, at
the peril of fine and imprisonment. The legislative department of the
Government of the United States thus takes from the judicial department
of the States the sacred and exclusive duty of judicial decision, and
converts the State judge into a mere ministerial officer, bound to
decide according to the will of Congress.
It is clear that in States which deny to persons whose rights are
secured by the first section of the bill any one of those rights all
criminal and civil cases affecting them will, by the provisions of the
third section, come under the exclusive cognizance of the Federal
tribunals. It follows that if, in any State which denies to a colored
person any one of all those rights, that person should commit a crime
against the laws of a State--murder, arson, rape, or any other
crime--all protection and punishment through the courts of the State are
taken away, and he can only be tried and punished in the Federal courts.
How is the criminal to be tried? If the offense is provided for and
punished by Federal law, that law, and not the State law, is to govern.
It is only when the offense does not happen to be within the purview of
Federal law that the Federal courts are to try and punish him under any
other law. Then resort is to be had to "the common law, as modified and
changed" by State legislation, "so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States." So that over this
vast domain of criminal jurisprudence provided by each State for the
protection of its own citizens and for the punishment of all persons who
violate its criminal laws, Federal law, whenever it can be made to
apply, displaces State law. The question here naturally arises, from
what source Congress derives the power to transfer to Federal tribunals
certain classes of cases embraced in this section. The Constitution
expressly declares that the judicial power of the United States "shall
extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made
under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a
party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and
citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different
States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
states, citizens, or subjects." Here the judicial power of the United
States is expressly set forth and defined; and the act of September 24,
1789, establishing the judicial courts of the United States, in
conferring upon the Federal courts jurisdiction over cases originating
in State tribunals, is careful to confine them to the classes enumerated
in the above-recited clause of the Constitution. This section of the
bill undoubtedly comprehends cases and authorizes the exercise of powers
that are not, by the Constitution, within the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States. To transfer them to those courts would be an
exercise of authority well calculated to excite distrust and alarm on
the part of all the States, for the bill applies alike to all of
them--as well to those that have as to those that have not been engaged
in rebellion.
It may be assumed that this authority is incident to the power granted
to Congress by the Constitution, as recently amended, to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the article declaring that--
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
It can not, however, be justly claimed that, with a view to the
enforcement of this article of the Constitution, there is at present any
necessity for the exercise of all the powers which this bill confers.
Slavery has been abolished, and at present nowhere exists within the
jurisdiction of the United States; nor has there been, nor is it likely
there will be, any attempt to revive it by the people or the States.
If, however, any such attempt shall be made, it will then become the
duty of the General Government to exercise any and all incidental powers
necessary and proper to maintain inviolate this great constitutional law
of freedom.
The fourth section of the bill provides that officers and agents of the
Freedmen's Bureau shall be empowered to make arrests, and also that
other officers may be specially commissioned for that purpose by the
President of the United States. It also authorizes circuit courts of the
United States and the superior courts of the Territories to appoint,
without limitation, commissioners, who are to be charged with the
performance of _quasi_ judicial duties. The fifth section empowers the
commissioners so to be selected by the courts to appoint in writing,
under their hands, one or more suitable persons from time to time to
execute warrants and other processes described by the bill. These
numerous official agents are made to constitute a sort of police,
in addition to the military, and are authorized to summon a _posse
comitatus_, and even to call to their aid such portion of the land
and naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, "as may be
necessary to the performance of the duty with which they are charged."
This extraordinary power is to be conferred upon agents irresponsible to
the Government and to the people, to whose number the discretion of the
commissioners is the only limit, and in whose hands such authority might
be made a terrible engine of wrong, oppression, and fraud. The general
statutes regulating the land and naval forces of the United States, the
militia, and the execution of the laws are believed to be adequate for
every emergency which can occur in time of peace. If it should prove
otherwise, Congress can at any time amend those laws in such manner as,
while subserving the public welfare, not to jeopard the rights,
interests, and liberties of the people.
The seventh section provides that a fee of $10 shall be paid to each
commissioner in every case brought before him, and a fee of $5 to his
deputy or deputies "for each person he or they may arrest and take
before any such commissioner," "with such other fees as may be deemed
reasonable by such commissioner," "in general for performing such other
duties as may be required in the premises." All these fees are to be
"paid out of the Treasury of the United States," whether there is a
conviction or not; but in case of conviction they are to be recoverable
from the defendant. It seems to me that under the influence of such
temptations bad men might convert any law, however beneficent, into an
instrument of persecution and fraud.
By the eighth section of the bill the United States courts, which sit
only in one place for white citizens, must migrate with the marshal and
district attorney (and necessarily with the clerk, although he is not
mentioned) to any part of the district upon the order of the President,
and there hold a court, "for the purpose of the more speedy arrest and
trial of persons charged with a violation of this act;" and there the
judge and officers of the court must remain, upon the order of the
President, "for the time therein designated."
The ninth section authorizes the President, or such person as he may
empower for that purpose, "to employ such part of the land or naval
forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary
to prevent the violation and enforce the due execution of this act."
This language seems to imply a permanent military force, that is to be
always at hand, and whose only business is to be the enforcement of this
measure over the vast region where it is intended to operate.
I do not propose to consider the policy of this bill. To me the details
of the bill seem fraught with evil. The white race and the black race of
the South have hitherto lived together under the relation of master and
slave--capital owning labor. Now, suddenly, that relation is changed,
and as to ownership capital and labor are divorced. They stand now each
master of itself. In this new relation, one being necessary to the
other, there will be a new adjustment, which both are deeply interested
in making harmonious. Each has equal power in settling the terms, and
if left to the laws that regulate capital and labor it is confidently
believed that they will satisfactorily work out the problem. Capital, it
is true, has more intelligence, but labor is never so ignorant as not to
understand its own interests, not to know its own value, and not to see
that capital must pay that value.
This bill frustrates this adjustment. It intervenes between capital and
labor and attempts to settle questions of political economy through the
agency of numerous officials whose interest it will be to foment discord
between the two races, for as the breach widens their employment will
continue, and when it is closed their occupation will terminate.
In all our history, in all our experience as a people living under
Federal and State law, no such system as that contemplated by the
details of this bill has ever before been proposed or adopted. They
establish for the security of the colored race safeguards which go
infinitely beyond any that the General Government has ever provided for
the white race. In fact, the distinction of race and color is by the
bill made to operate in favor of the colored and against the white race.
They interfere with the municipal legislation of the States, with the
relations existing exclusively between a State and its citizens, or
between inhabitants of the same State--an absorption and assumption of
power by the General Government which, if acquiesced in, must sap and
destroy our federative system of limited powers and break down the
barriers which preserve the rights of the States. It is another step,
or rather stride, toward centralization and the concentration of all
legislative powers in the National Government. The tendency of the
bill must be to resuscitate the spirit of rebellion and to arrest the
progress of those influences which are more closely drawing around the
States the bonds of union and peace.
My lamented predecessor, in his proclamation of the 1st of January,
1863, ordered and declared that all persons held as slaves within
certain States and parts of States therein designated were and
thenceforward should be free; and further, that the executive government
of the United States, including the military and naval authorities
thereof, would recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons.
This guaranty has been rendered especially obligatory and sacred by the
amendment of the Constitution abolishing slavery throughout the United
States. I therefore fully recognize the obligation to protect and
defend that class of our people whenever and wherever it shall become
necessary, and to the full extent compatible with the Constitution of
the United States.
Entertaining these sentiments, it only remains for me to say that I will
cheerfully cooperate with Congress in any measure that may be necessary
for the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen, as well as those
of all other classes of persons throughout the United States, by
judicial process, under equal and impartial laws, in conformity with the
provisions of the Federal Constitution.
I now return the bill to the Senate, and regret that in considering the
bills and joint resolutions--forty-two in number--which have been thus
far submitted for my approval I am compelled to withhold my assent from
a second measure that has received the sanction of both Houses of
Congress.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., _May 15, 1866_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I return to the Senate, in which House it originated, the bill, which
has passed both Houses of Congress, entitled "An act for the admission
of the State of Colorado into the Union," with my objections to its
becoming a law at this time.
First. From the best information which I have been able to obtain
I do not consider the establishment of a State government at present
necessary for the welfare of the people of Colorado. Under the existing
Territorial government all the rights, privileges, and interests of the
citizens are protected and secured. The qualified voters choose their
own legislators and their own local officers, and are represented in
Congress by a Delegate of their own selection. They make and execute
their own municipal laws, subject only to revision by Congress--an
authority not likely to be exercised unless in extreme or extraordinary
cases. The population is small, some estimating it so low as 25,000,
while advocates of the bill reckon the number at from 35,000 to 40,000
souls. The people are principally recent settlers, many of whom are
understood to be ready for removal to other mining districts beyond
the limits of the Territory if circumstances shall render them more
inviting. Such a population can not but find relief from excessive
taxation if the Territorial system, which devolves the expenses of the
executive, legislative, and judicial departments upon the United States,
is for the present continued. They can not but find the security of
person and property increased by their reliance upon the national
executive power for the maintenance of law and order against the
disturbances necessarily incident to all newly organized communities.
Second. It is not satisfactorily established that a majority of the
citizens of Colorado desire or are prepared for an exchange of a
Territorial for a State government. In September, 1864, under the
authority of Congress, an election was lawfully appointed and held for
the purpose of ascertaining the views of the people upon this particular
question. Six thousand one hundred and ninety-two votes were cast, and
of this number a majority of 3,152 was given against the proposed
change. In September, 1865, without any legal authority, the question
was again presented to the people of the Territory, with the view of
obtaining a reconsideration of the result of the election held in
compliance with the act of Congress approved March 21, 1864. At this
second election 5,905 votes were polled, and a majority of 155 was given
in favor of a State organization. It does not seem to me entirely safe
to receive this, the last-mentioned, result, so irregularly obtained, as
sufficient to outweigh the one which had been legally obtained in the
first election. Regularity and conformity to law are essential to the
preservation of order and stable government, and should, as far as
practicable, always be observed in the formation of new States.
Third. The admission of Colorado at this time as a State into the
Federal Union appears to me to be incompatible with the public interests
of the country. While it is desirable that Territories, when
sufficiently matured, should be organized as States, yet the spirit of
the Constitution seems to require that there should be an approximation
toward equality among the several States composing the Union. No State
can have less or more than two Senators in Congress. The largest State
has a population of 4,000,000; several of the States have a population
exceeding 2,000,000, and many others have a population exceeding
1,000,000. A population of 127,000 is the ratio of apportionment of
Representatives among the several States.
If this bill should become a law, the people of Colorado, 30,000 in
number, would have in the House of Representatives one member, while New
York, with a population of 4,000,000, has but thirty-one; Colorado would
have in the electoral college three votes, while New York has only
thirty-three; Colorado would have in the Senate two votes, while New
York has no more.
Inequalities of this character have already occurred, but it is believed
that none have happened where the inequality was so great. When such
inequality has been allowed, Congress is supposed to have permitted it
on the ground of some high public necessity and under circumstances
which promised that it would rapidly disappear through the growth and
development of the newly admitted State. Thus, in regard to the several
States in what was formerly called the "Northwest Territory," lying east
of the Mississippi, their rapid advancement in population rendered it
certain that States admitted with only one or two Representatives in
Congress would in a very short period be entitled to a great increase
of representation. So, when California was admitted, on the ground of
commercial and political exigencies, it was well foreseen that that
State was destined rapidly to become a great, prosperous, and important
mining and commercial community. In the case of Colorado, I am not aware
that any national exigency, either of a political or commercial nature,
requires a departure from the law of equality which has been so
generally adhered to in our history.
If information submitted in connection with this bill is reliable,
Colorado, instead of increasing, has declined in population. At an
election for members of a Territorial legislature held in 1861, 10,580
votes were cast; at the election before mentioned, in 1864, the number
of votes cast was 6,192; while at the irregular election held in 1865,
which is assumed as a basis for legislative action at this time, the
aggregate of votes was 5,905. Sincerely anxious for the welfare and
prosperity of every Territory and State, as well as for the prosperity
and welfare of the whole Union, I regret this apparent decline of
population in Colorado; but it is manifest that it is due to emigration
which is going on from that Territory into other regions within the
United States, which either are in fact or are believed by the
inhabitants of Colorado to be richer in mineral wealth and agricultural
resources. If, however, Colorado has not really declined in population,
another census or another election under the authority of Congress would
place the question beyond doubt, and cause but little delay in the
ultimate admission of the Territory as a State if desired by the people.
The tenor of these objections furnishes the reply which may be expected
to an argument in favor of the measure derived from the enabling act
which was passed by Congress on the 21st day of March, 1864. Although
Congress then supposed that the condition of the Territory was such as
to warrant its admission as a State, the result of two years' experience
shows that every reason which existed for the institution of a
Territorial instead of a State government in Colorado at its first
organization still continues in force.
The condition of the Union at the present moment is calculated to
inspire caution in regard to the admission of new States. Eleven of the
old States have been for some time, and still remain, unrepresented
in Congress. It is a common interest of all the States, as well those
represented as those unrepresented, that the integrity and harmony of
the Union should be restored as completely as possible, so that all
those who are expected to bear the burdens of the Federal Government
shall be consulted concerning the admission of new States; and that
in the meantime no new State shall be prematurely and unnecessarily
admitted to a participation in the political power which the Federal
Government wields, not for the benefit of any individual State or
section, but for the common safety, welfare, and happiness of the whole
country.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., _June 15, 1866_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
The bill entitled "An act to enable the New York and Montana Iron Mining
and Manufacturing Company to purchase a certain amount of the public
lands not now in market" is herewith returned to the Senate, in which it
originated, with the objections which induce me to withhold my approval.
By the terms of this bill the New York and Montana Iron Mining and
Manufacturing Company are authorized, at any time within one year after
the date of approval, to _preempt_ two tracts of land in the Territory
of Montana, not exceeding in the aggregate twenty sections, and not
included in any Indian reservation or in any Government reservation for
military or other purposes. Three of these sections may be selected from
lands containing _iron ore and coal_, and the remainder from _timber_
lands lying near thereto. These selections are to be made under
regulations from the Secretary of the Interior and be subject to his
approval. The company, on the selection of the lands, may acquire
immediate possession by permanently marking their boundaries and
publishing description thereof in any two newspapers of general
circulation in the Territory of Montana. Patents are to be issued on
the performance, within two years, of the following conditions:
First. The lands to be surveyed at the expense of the company, and each
tract to be "as nearly in a square form as may be practicable."
Second. The company to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Secretary of
the Interior that they have erected and have in operation in one or more
places on said lands iron works capable of manufacturing at least 1,500
tons of iron per annum.
Third. The company to have paid for said lands the minimum price of
$1.25 per acre.
It is also provided that the "patents shall convey no title to any
mineral lands except iron and coal, or to any lands held by right of
possession, or by any other title, _except Indian title_, valid at
the time of the selection of the said lands." The company are to have
the privileges of _ordinary preemptors_ and be subject to the same
restrictions as such preemptors with reference to wood and timber on the
lands, with the exception of so much as may be necessarily used in the
erection of buildings and in the legitimate business of manufacturing
iron.
The parties upon whom these privileges are conferred are designated in
the bill as "The New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing
Company." Their names and residence not being disclosed, it must be
inferred that this company is a corporation, which, under color of
corporate powers derived from some State or Territorial legislative
authority, proposes to carry on the business of mining and manufacturing
iron, and to accomplish these ends seeks this grant of public land in
Montana. Two questions thus arise, viz, whether the privileges the bill
would confer should be granted to any person or persons, and, secondly,
whether, if unobjectionable in other respects, they should be conferred
upon a corporation.
The public domain is a national trust, set apart and held for the
general welfare upon principles of equal justice, and not to be bestowed
as a special privilege upon a favored class. The proper rules for the
disposal of public land have from the earliest period been the subject
of earnest inquiry, grave discussion, and deliberate judgment. The
purpose of _direct_ revenue was the first object, and this was attained
by public sale to the highest bidder, and subsequently by the right of
private purchase at a fixed minimum. It was soon discovered that the
surest and most speedy means of promoting the wealth and prosperity of
the country was by encouraging actual settlement and occupation, and
hence a system of preemption rights, resulting most beneficially, in all
the Western Territories. By progressive steps it has advanced to the
homestead principle, securing to every head of a family, widow, and
single man 21 years of age and to every soldier who has borne arms for
his country a landed estate sufficient, with industry, for the purpose
of independent support.
Without tracing the system of preemption laws through the several
stages, it is sufficient to observe that it rests upon certain just
and plain principles, firmly established in all our legislation. The
object of these laws is to encourage the expansion of population and
the development of agricultural interests, and hence they have been
invariably restricted to settlers. Actual residence and cultivation are
made indispensable conditions; and, to guard the privilege from abuses
of speculation or monopoly, the law is rigid as to the mode of
establishing claims by adequate testimony, with penalties for perjury.
Mining, trading, or any pursuit other than culture of the soil is
interdicted, mineral lands being expressly excluded from preemption
privileges, excepting those containing coal, which, in quantities not
exceeding 160 acres, are restricted to individuals in actual possession
and commerce, with an enhanced minimum of $20 per acre.
For a quarter of a century the quantity of land subject to agricultural
preemption has been limited so as not to exceed a quarter section, or
160 acres; and, still further to guard against monopoly, the privilege
of preemption is not allowed to any person who owns 320 acres of land in
any State or Territory of the United States, nor is any person entitled
to more than one preemptive right, nor is it extended to lands to which
the Indian usufruct has not been extinguished. To restrict the
privilege within reasonable limits, credit to the ordinary preemptor on
_offered_ land is not extended beyond twelve months, within which time
the minimum price must be paid. Where the settlement is upon _unoffered_
territory, the time for payment is limited to the day of public offering
designated by proclamation of the President; while, to prevent
depreciation of the land by waste or destruction of what may constitute
its value, penal enactments have been made for the punishment of persons
depredating upon public timber.
Now, supposing the New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing
Company to be entitled to all the preemption rights which it has been
found just and expedient to bestow upon natural persons, it will be seen
that the privileges conferred by the bill in question are in direct
conflict with every principle heretofore observed in respect to the
disposal of the public lands.
The bill confers preemption right to _mineral lands_, which, excepting
coal lands, at an enhanced minimum, have heretofore, as a general
principle, been carefully excluded from preemption. The object of the
company is not to cultivate the soil or to promote agriculture, but is
for the sole purpose of mining and manufacturing iron. The company is
not limited, like ordinary preemptors, to one preemptive claim of a
quarter section, but may preempt two bodies of land, amounting in
the aggregate to twenty sections, containing 12,800 acres, or eighty
ordinary individual preemption rights. The timber is not protected, but,
on the contrary, is devoted to speedy destruction; for even before the
consummation of title the company are allowed to consume whatever may be
necessary in the erection of buildings and the business of manufacturing
iron. For these special privileges, in contravention of the land policy
of so many years, the company are required to pay only the minimum price
of $1.25 per acre, or one-sixteenth of the established minimum, and are
granted a credit of two years, or twice the time allowed ordinary
preemptors on offered lands.
Nor is this all. The preemption right in question covers three sections
of land containing iron ore and _coal_. The act passed on the 1st of
July, 1864, made it lawful for the President to cause tracts embracing
coal beds or coal fields to be offered at public sale in suitable legal
subdivisions to the highest bidder, after public notice of not less than
three months, at a minimum price of $20 per acre, and any lands not thus
disposed of were thereafter to be liable to private entry at said
minimum. By the act of March 3, 1865, the right of preemption to coal
lands is granted to any citizen of the United States who at that date
was engaged in the business of coal mining on the public domain for
purposes of commerce; and he is authorized to enter, according to legal
subdivisions, at the minimum price of $20 per acre, a quantity of land
not exceeding 160 acres, to embrace his improvements and mining
premises. Under these acts the minimum price of three sections of coal
lands would be thirty-eight thousand four hundred dollars ($38,400).
By the bill now in question these sections containing _coal and iron_
are bestowed on this company at the nominal price of $1.25 per acre, or
two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400), thus making a gratuity or
gift to the New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing Company
of thirty-six thousand dollars ($36,000).
On what ground can such a gratuity to this company be justified,
especially at a time when the burdens of taxation bear so heavily upon
all classes of the people?
Less than two years ago it appears to have been the deliberate judgment
of Congress that tracts of land containing coal beds or coal fields
should be sold, after three months' notice, to the bidder at public
auction who would give the highest price over $20 per acre, and that
a citizen engaged in the business of actual coal mining on the public
domain should only secure a tract of 160 acres, at private entry, upon
payment of $20 per acre and formal and satisfactory proof that he in all
respects came within the requirements of the statute. It can not be that
the coal fields of Montana have depreciated nearly twenty fold in value
since July, 1864. So complete a revolution in the land policy as is
manifested by this act can only be ascribed, therefore, to an
inadvertence, which Congress will, I trust, promptly correct.
Believing that the preemption policy--so deliberately adopted, so long
practiced, so carefully guarded with a view to the disposal of the
public lands in a manner that would promote the population and
prosperity of the country--should not be perverted to the purposes
contemplated by this bill, I would be constrained to withhold my
sanction even if this company were, as natural persons, entitled to the
privileges of ordinary preemptors; for if a corporation, as the name and
the absence of any designation of individuals would denote, the measure
before me is liable to another fatal objection.
Why should incorporated companies have the privileges of individual
preemptors? What principle of justice requires such a policy? What
motive of public welfare can fail to condemn it? Lands held by
corporations were regarded by ancient laws as held in mortmain, or by
"dead hand," and from the time of Magna Charta corporations required
the royal license to hold land, because such holding was regarded as in
derogation of public policy and common right. Preemption is itself a
special privilege, only authorized by its supposed public benefit in
promoting the settlement and cultivation of vacant territory and in
rewarding the enterprise of the persons upon whom the privilege is
bestowed. "Preemption rights," as declared by the Supreme Court of the
United States, "are founded in an enlightened public policy, rendered
necessary by the enterprise of our citizens. The adventurous pioneer,
who is found in advance of our settlements, encounters many hardships,
and not unfrequently dangers from savage incursions. He is generally
poor, and it is fit that his enterprise should be rewarded by the
privilege of purchasing the spot selected by him, not to exceed 160
acres."
It may be said that this company, before they obtain a patent, must
prove that within two years they "have erected and have in operation
in one or more places on the said lands iron works with a capacity for
manufacturing at least 1,500 tons of iron per annum." On the other hand,
they are to have possession for two years of more than 12,000 acres of
the choice land of the Territory, of which nearly 2,000 acres are to
contain _iron ore and coal_ and over 10,000 acres to be of _timber_
land selected by themselves. They will thus have the first and exclusive
choice. In fact, they are the only parties who at this time would have
any privilege whatever in the way of obtaining titles in that Territory.
Inasmuch as Montana has not yet been organized into a land district, the
general preemption laws for the benefit of individual settlers have not
yet been extended to that country, nor has a single acre of public
land in the Territory yet been surveyed. With such exclusive and
extraordinary privileges, how many companies would be willing to
undertake furnaces that would produce 5 tons per day in much less time
than two years?
It is plain the pretended consideration on which the patent is to issue
bears no just proportion to that of the ordinary preemptor, and that
this bill is but the precursor of a system of land distribution to a
privileged class, unequal, unjust, and which ought not to receive the
sanction of the General Government. Many thousand pioneers have turned
their steps to the Western Territories, seeking, with their wives and
children, homesteads to be acquired by sturdy industry under the
preemption laws. On their arrival they should not find the timbered
lands and the tracts containing iron ore and coal already surveyed and
claimed by corporate companies, favored by the special legislation of
Congress, and with boundaries fixed even in advance of the public
surveys--a departure from the salutary provision requiring a settler
upon unsurveyed lands to limit the boundaries of his claim to the lines
of the public survey after they shall have been established. He receives
a title only to a legal subdivision, including his residence and
improvements. The survey of the company may not accord with that which
will hereafter be made by the Government, while the patent that issues
will be descriptive of and confer a title to the tract as surveyed by
the company.
I am aware of no precedent for granting such exclusive rights to a
manufacturing company for a nominal consideration. Congress have made
concessions to railway companies of alternate sections within given
limits of the lines of their roads. This policy originated in the belief
that the facilities afforded by reaching the parts of the country remote
from the great centers of population would expedite the settlement and
sale of the public domain. These incidental advantages were secured
without pecuniary loss to the Government, by reason of the enhanced
value of the reserved sections, which are held at the double minimum.
Mining and manufacturing companies, however, have always been
distinguished from public-improvement corporations. The former are, in
law and in fact, only private associations for trade and business on
individual account and for personal benefit. Admitting the proposition
that railroad grants can stand on sound principle, it is plain that such
can not be the case with concessions to companies like that contemplated
by this measure. In view of the strong temptation to monopolize the
public lands, with the pernicious results, it would seem at least of
doubtful expediency to lift corporations above all competition with
actual settlers by authorizing them to become purchasers of public lands
in the Territories for any purpose, and particularly when clothed with
the special benefits of this bill. For myself, I am convinced that the
privileges of ordinary preemptors ought not to be extended to
incorporated companies.
A third objection may be mentioned, as it exemplifies the spirit in
which special privileges are sought by incorporated companies.
Land subject to Indian occupancy has always been scrupulously guarded by
law from preemption settlement or encroachment under any pretext until
the Indian title should be extinguished. In the fourth section of this
act, however, lands held by "Indian title" are excepted from prohibition
against the patent to be issued to the New York and Montana Iron Mining
and Manufacturing Company.
The bill provides that the patent "shall convey no title to any mineral
lands _except iron and coal_, or to any lands held by right of
possession, or by any other title, _except Indian title_, valid at
the time of the selection of the said lands." It will be seen that by
the first section lands in "Indian reservations" are excluded from
individual preemption right, but by the fourth section the patent may
cover any Indian title except a _reservation_; so that no matter what
may be the nature of the Indian title, unless it be in a reservation,
it is unprotected from the privilege conceded by this bill.
Without further pursuing the subject, I return the bill to the Senate
without my signature, and with the following as prominent objections to
its becoming a law:
First. That it gives to the New York and Montana Iron Mining and
Manufacturing Company preemption privileges to iron and coal lands on a
large scale and at the ordinary minimum--a privilege denied to ordinary
preemptors. It bestows upon the company large tracts of _coal_ lands at
one-sixteenth of the minimum price required from ordinary preemptors.
It also relieves the company from restrictions imposed upon ordinary
preemptors in respect to _timber lands_; allows double the time for
payment granted to preemptors on offered lands; and these privileges are
for purposes not heretofore authorized by the preemption laws, but for
trade and manufacturing.
Second. Preemption rights on such a scale to private corporations are
unequal and hostile to the policy and principles which sanction
preemption laws.
Third. The bill allows this company to take possession of land, use it,
and acquire a patent thereto before the Indian title is extinguished,
and thus violates the good faith of the Government toward the aboriginal
tribes.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., _July 16, 1866_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
A careful examination of the bill passed by the two Houses of Congress
entitled "An act to continue in force and to amend 'An act to establish
a bureau for the relief of freedmen and refugees, and for other
purposes'" has convinced me that the legislation which it proposes would
not be consistent with the welfare of the country, and that it falls
clearly within the reasons assigned in my message of the 19th of
February last, returning, without my signature, a similar measure which
originated in the Senate. It is not my purpose to repeat the objections
which I then urged. They are yet fresh in your recollection, and can be
readily examined as a part of the records of one branch of the National
Legislature. Adhering to the principles set forth in that message, I now
reaffirm them and the line of policy therein indicated.
The only ground upon which this kind of legislation can be justified is
that of the war-making power. The act of which this bill is intended
as amendatory was passed during the existence of the war. By its own
provisions it is to terminate within one year from the cessation of
hostilities and the declaration of peace. It is therefore yet in
existence, and it is likely that it will continue in force as long
as the freedmen may require the benefit of its provisions. It will
certainly remain in operation as a law until some months subsequent to
the meeting of the next session of Congress, when, if experience shall
make evident the necessity of additional legislation, the two Houses
will have ample time to mature and pass the requisite measures. In the
meantime the questions arise, Why should this war measure be continued
beyond the period designated in the original act, and why in time of
peace should military tribunals be created to continue until each
"State shall be fully restored in its constitutional relations to the
Government and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United
States"?
It was manifest, with respect to the act approved March 3, 1865, that
prudence and wisdom alike required that jurisdiction over all cases
concerning the free enjoyment of the immunities and rights of
citizenship, as well as the protection of person and property, should
be conferred upon some tribunal in every State or district where the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings was interrupted by the
rebellion, and until the same should be fully restored. At that time,
therefore, an urgent necessity existed for the passage of some such
law. Now, however, war has substantially ceased; the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings is no longer interrupted; the courts, both State
and Federal, are in full, complete, and successful operation, and
through them every person, regardless of race and color, is entitled to
and can be heard. The protection granted to the white citizen is already
conferred by law upon the freedman; strong and stringent guards, by way
of penalties and punishments, are thrown around his person and property,
and it is believed that ample protection will be afforded him by due
process of law, without resort to the dangerous expedient of "military
tribunals," now that the war has been brought to a close. The necessity
no longer existing for such tribunals, which had their origin in the
war, grave objections to their continuance must present themselves to
the minds of all reflecting and dispassionate men. Independently of the
danger, in representative republics, of conferring upon the military,
in time of peace, extraordinary powers--so carefully guarded against
by the patriots and statesmen of the earlier days of the Republic,
so frequently the ruin of governments founded upon the same free
principles, and subversive of the rights and liberties of the
citizen--the question of practical economy earnestly commends itself to
the consideration of the lawmaking power. With an immense debt already
burdening the incomes of the industrial and laboring classes, a due
regard for their interests, so inseparably connected with the welfare of
the country, should prompt us to rigid economy and retrenchment, and
influence us to abstain from all legislation that would unnecessarily
increase the public indebtedness. Tested by this rule of sound political
wisdom, I can see no reason for the establishment of the "military
jurisdiction" conferred upon the officials of the Bureau by the
fourteenth section of the bill.
By the laws of the United States and of the different States competent
courts, Federal and State, have been established and are now in full
practical operation. By means of these civil tribunals ample redress is
afforded for all private wrongs, whether to the person or the property
of the citizen, without denial or unnecessary delay. They are open to
all, without regard to color or race. I feel well assured that it will
be better to trust the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizen
to tribunals thus established, and presided over by competent and
impartial judges, bound by fixed rules of law and evidence, and where
the right of trial by jury is guaranteed and secured, than to the
caprice or judgment of an officer of the Bureau, who it is possible
may be entirely ignorant of the principles that underlie the just
administration of the law. There is danger, too, that conflict of
jurisdiction will frequently arise between the civil courts and these
military tribunals, each having concurrent jurisdiction over the person
and the cause of action--the one judicature administered and controlled
by civil law, the other by the military. How is the conflict to be
settled, and who is to determine between the two tribunals when it
arises? In my opinion, it is wise to guard against such conflict by
leaving to the courts and juries the protection of all civil rights
and the redress of all civil grievances.
The fact can not be denied that since the actual cessation of
hostilities many acts of violence, such, perhaps, as had never been
witnessed in their previous history, have occurred in the States
involved in the recent rebellion. I believe, however, that public
sentiment will sustain me in the assertion that such deeds of wrong are
not confined to any particular State or section, but are manifested over
the entire country, demonstrating that the cause that produced them
does not depend upon any particular locality, but is the result of
the agitation and derangement incident to a long and bloody civil war.
While the prevalence of such disorders must be greatly deplored, their
occasional and temporary occurrence would seem to furnish no necessity
for the extension of the Bureau beyond the period fixed in the original
act.
Besides the objections which I have thus briefly stated, I may urge upon
your consideration the additional reason that recent developments in
regard to the practical operations of the Bureau in many of the States
show that in numerous instances it is used by its agents as a means of
promoting their individual advantage, and that the freedmen are employed
for the advancement of the personal ends of the officers instead of
their own improvement and welfare, thus confirming the fears originally
entertained by many that the continuation of such a Bureau for any
unnecessary length of time would inevitably result in fraud, corruption,
and oppression. It is proper to state that in cases of this character
investigations have been promptly ordered, and the offender punished
whenever his guilt has been satisfactorily established.
As another reason against the necessity of the legislation contemplated
by this measure, reference may be had to the "civil-rights bill," now a
law of the land, and which will be faithfully executed so long as it
shall remain unrepealed and may not be declared unconstitutional by
courts of competent jurisdiction. By that act it is enacted--
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to
be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right in every
State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts;
to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
By the provisions of the act full protection is afforded through the
district courts of the United States to all persons injured, and whose
privileges, as thus declared, are in any way impaired; and heavy
penalties are denounced against the person who willfully violates the
law. I need not state that that law did not receive my approval; yet its
remedies are far more preferable than those proposed in the present
bill--the one being civil and the other military.
By the sixth section of the bill herewith returned certain proceedings
by which the lands in the "parishes of St. Helena and St. Luke, South
Carolina," were sold and bid in, and afterwards disposed of by the tax
commissioners, are ratified and confirmed. By the seventh, eighth,
ninth, tenth, and eleventh sections provisions by law are made for the
disposal of the lands thus acquired to a particular class of citizens.
While the quieting of titles is deemed very important and desirable, the
discrimination made in the bill seems objectionable, as does also the
attempt to confer upon the commissioners judicial powers by which
citizens of the United States are to be deprived of their property in a
mode contrary to that provision of the Constitution which declares that
no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." As a general principle, such legislation is unsafe,
unwise, partial, and unconstitutional. It may deprive persons of their
property who are equally deserving objects of the nation's bounty as
those whom by this legislation Congress seeks to benefit. The title to
the land thus to be portioned out to a favored class of citizens must
depend upon the regularity of the tax sales under the law as it existed
at the time of the sale, and no subsequent legislation can give
validity to the right thus acquired as against the original claimants.
The attention of Congress is therefore invited to a more mature
consideration of the measures proposed in these sections of the bill.
In conclusion I again urge upon Congress the danger of class
legislation, so well calculated to keep the public mind in a state of
uncertain expectation, disquiet, and restlessness and to encourage
interested hopes and fears that the National Government will continue to
furnish to classes of citizens in the several States means for support
and maintenance regardless of whether they pursue a life of indolence or
of labor, and regardless also of the constitutional limitations of the
national authority in times of peace and tranquillity.
The bill is herewith returned to the House of Representatives, in which
it originated, for its final action.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., _July 28, 1866_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
I herewith return, without my approval, the bill entitled "An act
erecting the Territory of Montana into a surveying district, and for
other purposes."
The bill contains four sections, the first of which erects the Territory
into a surveying district and authorizes the appointment of a
surveyor-general; the second constitutes the Territory a land district;
the third authorizes the appointment of a register and receiver for said
district; and the fourth requires the surveyor-general to--
select and survey eighteen alternate odd sections of nonmineral timber
lands within said district for the New York and Montana Iron Mining and
Manufacturing Company, incorporated under the laws of the State of New
York, which lands the said company shall have immediate possession of on
the payment of _$1.25_ per acre, and shall have a patent for the same
whenever, within two years after their selection, they shall have
furnished evidence satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior that
they have erected and have in operation on the said lands iron works
with a capacity for manufacturing 1,500 tons of iron per annum:
_Provided_, That the said lands shall revert to the United States in
case the above-mentioned iron works be not erected within the specified
time: _And provided_, That until the title to the said lands shall have
been perfected the timber shall not be cut off from more than one
section of the said lands.
To confer the special privileges specified in this fourth section
appears to be the chief object of the bill, the provisions of which are
subject to some of the most important objections that induced me to
return to the Senate with my disapproval the bill entitled "An act to
enable the New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing Company
to purchase a certain amount of the public lands not now in market."
That bill authorized the same corporation to select and survey in the
Territory of Montana, in square form, twenty-one sections of land, three
of which might contain coal and iron ore, for which the minimum rate of
$1.25 per acre was to be paid. The present bill omits these sections of
mineral lands, and directs the surveyor-general to select and survey the
timber lands; but it contains the objectionable feature of granting
to a private mining and manufacturing corporation exclusive rights and
privileges in the public domain which are by law denied to individuals.
The first choice of timber land in the Territory is bestowed upon a
corporation foreign to the Territory and over which Congress has no
control. The surveyor-general of the district, a public officer who
should have no connection with any purchase of public land, is made the
agent of the corporation to select the land, the selections to be made
in the absence of all competition; and over 11,000 acres are bestowed
at the lowest price of public lands. It is by no means certain that
the substitution of alternate sections for the compact body of lands
contemplated by the other bill is any less injurious to the public
interest, for alternate sections stripped of timber are not likely
to enhance the value of those reserved by the Government. Be this as
it may, this bill bestows a large monopoly of public lands without
adequate consideration; confers a right and privilege in quantity
equivalent to seventy-two preemption rights; introduces a dangerous
system of privileges to private trading corporations; and is an unjust
discrimination in favor of traders and speculators against individual
settlers and pioneers who are seeking homes and improving our Western
Territories. Such a departure from the long-established, wise, and just
policy which has heretofore governed the disposition of the public funds
[lands] can not receive my sanction. The objections enumerated apply to
the fourth section of the bill. The first, second, and third sections,
providing for the appointment of a surveyor-general, register, and
receiver, are unobjectionable if any necessity requires the creation
of these offices and the additional expenses of a new surveying land
district. But they appear in this instance to be only needed as a part
of the machinery to enable the "New York and Montana Iron Mining and
Manufacturing Company" to secure these privileges; for I am informed by
the proper Department, in a communication hereto annexed, that there is
no public necessity for a surveyor-general, register, or receiver in
Montana Territory, since it forms part of an existing surveying and land
district, wherein the public business is, under present laws, transacted
with adequate facility, so that the provisions of the first, second, and
third sections would occasion needless expense to the General
Government.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
PROCLAMATIONS.
ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
_To all whom it may concern_:
An exequatur, bearing date the 13th day of October, 1864, having been
issued to Esteban Rogers, recognizing him as consul _ad interim_ of the
Republic of Chile for the port of New York and its dependencies and
declaring him free to exercise and enjoy such functions, powers, and
privileges as are allowed to consuls by the law of nations or by the
laws of the United States and existing treaty stipulations between the
Government of Chile and the United States; but as it is deemed advisable
that the said Esteban Rogers should no longer be permitted to continue
in the exercise of said functions, powers, and privileges:
These are therefore to declare that I no longer recognize the said
Esteban Rogers as consul _ad interim_ of the Republic of Chile for
the port of New York and its dependencies and will not permit him to
exercise or enjoy any of the functions, powers, or privileges allowed to
a consular officer of that nation; and that I do hereby wholly revoke
and annul the said exequatur heretofore given and do declare the same
to be absolutely null and void from this day forward.
In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent and
the seal of the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.
[SEAL.]
Given under my hand, at Washington, this 12th day of February, A.D.
1866, and of the Independence of the United States of America the
ninetieth.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
_To all whom it may concern_:
An exequatur, bearing date the 7th day of October, 1864, having been
issued to Claudius Edward Habicht, recognizing him as consul of Sweden
and Norway at New York and declaring him free to exercise and enjoy such
functions, powers, and privileges as are allowed to consuls by the law
of nations or by the laws of the United States and existing treaty
stipulations between the Government of Sweden and Norway and the United
States; but as it is deemed advisable that the said Claudius Edward
Habicht should no longer be permitted to continue in the exercise of
said functions, powers, and privileges:
These are therefore to declare that I no longer recognize the said
Claudius Edward Habicht as consul of Sweden and Norway at New York and
will not permit him to exercise or enjoy any of the functions, powers,
or privileges allowed to a consular officer of that nation; and that I
do hereby wholly revoke and annul the said exequatur heretofore given
and do declare the same to be absolutely null and void from this day
forward.
In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent and
the seal of the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.
[SEAL.]
Given under my hand, at Washington, the 26th day of March, A.D. 1866,
and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninetieth.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
_To all whom it may concern_:
An exequatur, bearing date the 1st day of July, 1865, having been issued
to S.M. Svenson, recognizing him as vice-consul of Sweden and Norway at
New Orleans and declaring him free to exercise and enjoy such functions,
powers, and privileges as are allowed to vice-consuls by the law of
nations or by the laws of the United States and existing treaty
stipulations between the Government of Sweden and Norway and the United
States; but as it is deemed advisable that the said S.M. Svenson should
no longer be permitted to continue in the exercise of said functions,
powers, and privileges:
These are therefore to declare that I no longer recognize the said S.M.
Svenson as vice-consul of Sweden and Norway at New Orleans and will
not permit him to exercise or enjoy any of the functions, powers, or
privileges allowed to a consular officer of that nation; and that I do
hereby wholly revoke and annul the said exequatur heretofore given and
do declare the same to be absolutely null and void from this day
forward.
In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent and
the seal of the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.
[SEAL.]
Given under my hand, at Washington, the 26th day of March, A.D. 1866,
and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninetieth.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas by proclamations of the 15th and 19th of April, 1861, the
President of the United States, in virtue of the power vested in him by
the Constitution and the laws, declared that the laws of the United
States were opposed and the execution thereof obstructed in the States
of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals
by law; and
Whereas by another proclamation, made on the 16th day of August, in the
same year, in pursuance of an act of Congress approved July 13, 1861,
the inhabitants of the States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Florida (except the inhabitants of that part of the
State of Virginia lying west of the Alleghany Mountains and of such
other parts of that State and the other States before named as might
maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and the Constitution or might be
from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States
engaged in the dispersion of insurgents) were declared to be in a state
of insurrection against the United States; and
Whereas by another proclamation, of the 1st day of July, 1862, issued in
pursuance of an act of Congress approved June 7, in the same year, the
insurrection was declared to be still existing in the States aforesaid,
with the exception of certain specified counties in the State of
Virginia; and
Whereas by another proclamation, made on the 2d day of April, 1863, in
pursuance of the act of Congress of July 13, 1861, the exceptions named
in the proclamation of August 16, 1861, were revoked and the inhabitants
of the States of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, and Virginia
(except the forty-eight counties of Virginia designated as West Virginia
and the ports of New Orleans, Key West, Port Royal, and Beaufort, in
North Carolina) were declared to be still in a state of insurrection
against the United States; and
Whereas the House of Representatives, on the 22d day of July, 1861,
adopted a resolution in the words following, namely:
_Resolved by the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United
States_, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the
country by the disunionists of the Southern States now in revolt against
the constitutional Government and in arms around the capital; that in
this national emergency Congress, banishing all feelings of mere passion
or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that
this war is not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for
any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or
interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States,
but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to
preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the
several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are
accomplished the war ought to cease.
And whereas the Senate of the United States, on the 25th day of July,
1861, adopted a resolution in the words following, to wit:
_Resolved_, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon
the country by the disunionists of the Southern States now in revolt
against the constitutional Government and in arms around the capital;
that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of
mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole
country; that this war is not prosecuted upon our part in any spirit
of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor
purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established
institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof and to
preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of
the several States unimpaired; that as soon as these objects are
accomplished the war ought to cease.
And whereas these resolutions, though not joint or concurrent in form,
are substantially identical, and as such may be regarded as having
expressed the sense of Congress upon the subject to which they relate;
and
Whereas by my proclamation of the 13th day of June last the insurrection
in the State of Tennessee was declared to have been suppressed, the
authority of the United States therein to be undisputed, and such United
States officers as had been duly commissioned to be in the undisturbed
exercise of their official functions; and
Whereas there now exists no organized armed resistance of misguided
citizens or others to the authority of the United States in the States
of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Florida, and the laws can
be sustained and enforced therein by the proper civil authority, State
or Federal, and the people of said States are well and loyally disposed
and have conformed or will conform in their legislation to the condition
of affairs growing out of the amendment to the Constitution of the
United States prohibiting slavery within the limits and jurisdiction of
the United States; and
Whereas, in view of the before-recited premises, it is the manifest
determination of the American people that no State of its own will has
the right or the power to go out of, or separate itself from, or be
separated from, the American Union, and that therefore each State ought
to remain and constitute an integral part of the United States; and
Whereas the people of the several before-mentioned States have, in the
manner aforesaid, given satisfactory evidence that they acquiesce in
this sovereign and important resolution of national unity; and
Whereas it is believed to be a fundamental principle of government that
people who have revolted and who have been overcome and subdued must
either be dealt with so as to induce them voluntarily to become friends
or else they must be held by absolute military power or devastated so as
to prevent them from ever again doing harm as enemies, which last-named
policy is abhorrent to humanity and to freedom; and
Whereas the Constitution of the United States provides for constituent
communities only as States, and not as Territories, dependencies,
provinces, or protectorates; and
Whereas such constituent States must necessarily be, and by the
Constitution and laws of the United States are, made equals and placed
upon a like footing as to political rights, immunities, dignity, and
power with the several States with which they are united; and
Whereas the observance of political equality, as a principle of right
and justice, is well calculated to encourage the people of the aforesaid
States to be and become more and more constant and persevering in their
renewed allegiance; and
Whereas standing armies, military occupation, martial law, military
tribunals, and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of _habeas
corpus_ are in time of peace dangerous to public liberty, incompatible
with the individual rights of the citizen, contrary to the genius and
spirit of our free institutions, and exhaustive of the national
resources, and ought not, therefore, to be sanctioned or allowed except
in cases of actual necessity for repelling invasion or suppressing
insurrection or rebellion; and
Whereas the policy of the Government of the United States from the
beginning of the insurrection to its overthrow and final suppression has
been in conformity with the principles herein set forth and enumerated:
Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do
hereby proclaim and declare that the insurrection which heretofore
existed in the States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and
Florida is at an end and is henceforth to be so regarded.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, this 2d day of April, A.D. 1866, and of
the Independence of the United States of America the ninetieth.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
_To all whom it may concern_:
Whereas the exequatur of Claudius Edward Habicht, recognizing him as
consul of Sweden and Norway at New York, and that of S.M. Svenson as
vice-consul of Sweden and Norway at New Orleans were formally revoked on
the 26th day of March last; and
Whereas representations have been made to me since that date which have
effectually relieved those gentlemen from the charges of unlawful and
unfriendly conduct heretofore entertained against them:
Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of
the United States of America, do hereby annul the revocation of the
exequaturs of the said Claudius Edward Habicht and S.M. Svenson and
restore to them the right to exercise the functions and privileges
heretofore granted as consular officers of the Government of Sweden
and Norway.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed my name and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, this 30th day of May, A.D. 1866, and of
the Independence of the United States the ninetieth.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas it has become known to me that certain evil-disposed persons
have, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, begun
and set on foot and have provided and prepared, and are still engaged in
providing and preparing, means for a military expedition and enterprise,
which expedition and enterprise is to be carried on from the territory
and jurisdiction of the United States against colonies, districts, and
people of British North America, within the dominions of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with which said colonies,
districts, and people and Kingdom the United States are at peace; and
Whereas the proceedings aforesaid constitute a high misdemeanor,
forbidden by the laws of the United States as well as by the law of
nations:
Now, therefore, for the purpose of preventing the carrying on of the
unlawful expedition and enterprise aforesaid from the territory and
jurisdiction of the United States and to maintain the public peace as
well as the national honor and enforce obedience and respect to the laws
of the United States, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
do admonish and warn all good citizens of the United States against
taking part in or in any wise aiding, countenancing, or abetting said
unlawful proceedings; and I do exhort all judges, magistrates, marshals,
and officers in the service of the United States to employ all their
lawful authority and power to prevent and defeat the aforesaid unlawful
proceedings and to arrest and bring to justice all persons who may be
engaged therein.
And, pursuant to the act of Congress in such case made and provided,
I do furthermore authorize and empower Major-General George G. Meade,
commander of the Military Division of the Atlantic, to employ the land
and naval forces of the United States and the militia thereof to arrest
and prevent the setting on foot and carrying on the expedition and
enterprise aforesaid.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, this 6th day of June, A.D. 1866, and of
the Independence of the United States the ninetieth.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas a war is existing in the Republic of Mexico, aggravated by
foreign military intervention; and
Whereas the United States, in accordance with their settled habits and
policy, are a neutral power in regard to the war which thus afflicts the
Republic of Mexico; and
Whereas it has become known that one of the belligerents in the said
war, namely, the Prince Maximilian, who asserts himself to be Emperor in
Mexico, has issued a decree in regard to the port of Matamoras and other
Mexican ports which are in the occupation and possession of another of
the said belligerents, namely, the United States of Mexico, which decree
is in the following words:
The port of Matamoras and all those of the northern frontier which have
withdrawn from their obedience to the Government are closed to foreign
and coasting traffic during such time as the empire of the law shall not
be therein reinstated.
ART. 2. Merchandise proceeding from the said ports, on arriving at any
other where the excise of the Empire is collected, shall pay the duties
on importation, introduction, and consumption, and, on satisfactory
proof of contravention, shall be irremissibly confiscated. Our minister
of the treasury is charged with the punctual execution of this decree.
Given at Mexico, the 9th of July, 1866.
And whereas the decree thus recited, by declaring a belligerent blockade
unsupported by competent military or naval force, is in violation of the
neutral rights of the United States as defined by the law of nations as
well as of the treaties existing between the United States of America
and the aforesaid United States of Mexico:
Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do
hereby proclaim and declare that the aforesaid decree is held and will
be held by the United States to be absolutely null and void as against
the Government and citizens of the United States, and that any attempt
which shall be made to enforce the same against the Government or the
citizens of the United States will be disallowed.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, the 17th day of August, A.D. 1866, and
of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas by proclamations of the 15th and 19th of April, 1861, the
President of the United States, in virtue of the power vested in him
by the Constitution and the laws, declared that the laws of the United
States were opposed and the execution thereof obstructed in the States
of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals
by law; and
Whereas by another proclamation, made on the 16th day of August, in the
same year, in pursuance of an act of Congress approved July 13, 1861,
the inhabitants of the States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Florida (except the inhabitants of that part of the
State of Virginia lying west of the Alleghany Mountains, and except also
the inhabitants of such other parts of that State and the other States
before named as might maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and the
Constitution or might be from time to time occupied and controlled by
forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of insurgents)
were declared to be in a state of insurrection against the United
States; and
Whereas by another proclamation, of the 1st day of July, 1862, issued in
pursuance of an act of Congress approved June 7, in the same year, the
insurrection was declared to be still existing in the States aforesaid,
with the exception of certain specified counties in the State of
Virginia; and
Whereas by another proclamation, made on the 2d day of April, 1863, in
pursuance of the act of Congress of July 13, 1861, the exceptions named
in the proclamation of August 16, 1861, were revoked and the inhabitants
of the States of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, and Virginia
(except the forty-eight counties of Virginia designated as West Virginia
and the ports of New Orleans, Key West, Port Royal, and Beaufort, in
North Carolina) were declared to be still in a state of insurrection
against the United States; and
Whereas by another proclamation, of the 15th day of September, 1863,
made in pursuance of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1863, the
rebellion was declared to be still existing and the privilege of the
writ of _habeas corpus_ was in certain specified cases suspended
throughout the United States, said suspension to continue throughout
the duration of the rebellion or until said proclamation should, by
a subsequent one to be issued by the President of the United States,
be modified or revoked; and
Whereas the House of Representatives, on the 22d day of July, 1861,
adopted a resolution in the words following, namely:
_Resolved by the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United
States_, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon
the country by the dis-unionists of the Southern States now in revolt
against the constitutional Government and in arms around the capital;
that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feelings of
mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole
country; that this war is not waged upon our part in any spirit of
oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor
purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established
institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity,
equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as
soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease.
And whereas the Senate of the United States, on the 25th day of July,
1861, adopted a resolution in the words following, to wit:
_Resolved_, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon
the country by the disunionists of the Southern States now in revolt
against the constitutional Government and in arms around the capital;
that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of
mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole
country; that this war is not prosecuted upon our part in any spirit
of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor
purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established
institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof and to
preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of
the several States unimpaired; that as soon as these objects are
accomplished the war ought to cease.
And whereas these resolutions, though not joint or concurrent in form,
are substantially identical, and as such have hitherto been and yet are
regarded as having expressed the sense of Congress upon the subject to
which they relate; and
Whereas the President of the United States, by proclamation of the 13th
of June, 1865, declared that the insurrection in the State of Tennessee
had been suppressed, and that the authority of the United States therein
was undisputed, and that such United States officers as had been duly
commissioned were in the undisturbed exercise of their official
functions; and
Whereas the President of the United States, by further proclamation,
issued on the 2d day of April, 1866, did promulgate and declare that
there no longer existed any armed resistance of misguided citizens or
others to the authority of the United States in any or in all the States
before mentioned, excepting only the State of Texas, and did further
promulgate and declare that the laws could be sustained and enforced in
the several States before mentioned, except Texas, by the proper civil
authorities, State or Federal, and that the people of the said States,
except Texas, are well and loyally disposed and have conformed or will
conform in their legislation to the condition of affairs growing out of
the amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting
slavery within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States;
And did further declare in the same proclamation that it is the manifest
determination of the American people that no State, of its own will, has
a right or power to go out of, or separate itself from, or be separated
from, the American Union; and that, therefore, each State ought to
remain and constitute an integral part of the United States;
And did further declare in the same last-mentioned proclamation that
the several aforementioned States, excepting Texas, had in the manner
aforesaid given satisfactory evidence that they acquiesce in this
sovereign and important resolution of national unity; and
Whereas the President of the United States in the same proclamation did
further declare that it is believed to be a fundamental principle of
government that the people who have revolted and who have been overcome
and subdued must either be dealt with so as to induce them voluntarily
to become friends or else they must be held by absolute military power
or devastated so as to prevent them from ever again doing harm as
enemies, which last-named policy is abhorrent to humanity and to
freedom; and
Whereas the President did in the same proclamation further declare
that the Constitution of the United States provides for constituent
communities only as States, and not as Territories, dependencies,
provinces, or protectorates;
And further, that such constituent States must necessarily be, and by
the Constitution and laws of the United States are, made equals and
placed upon a like footing as to political rights, immunities, dignity,
and power with the several States with which they are united;
And did further declare that the observance of political equality, as
a principle of right and justice, is well calculated to encourage the
people of the before named States, except Texas, to be and to become
more and more constant and persevering in their renewed allegiance; and
Whereas the President did further declare that standing armies,
military occupation, martial law, military tribunals, and the suspension
of the writ of _habeas corpus_ are in time of peace dangerous to public
liberty, incompatible with the individual rights of the citizen,
contrary to the genius and spirit of our free institutions, and
exhaustive of the national resources, and ought not, therefore, to be
sanctioned or allowed except in cases of actual necessity for repelling
invasion or suppressing insurrection or rebellion;
And the President did further, in the same proclamation, declare that
the policy of the Government of the United States from the beginning
of the insurrection to its overthrow and final suppression had been
conducted in conformity with the principles in the last-named
proclamation recited; and
Whereas the President, in the said proclamation of the 13th of June,
1865, upon the grounds therein stated and hereinbefore recited, did then
and thereby proclaim and declare that the insurrection which heretofore
existed in the several States before named, except in Texas, was at an
end and was henceforth to be so regarded; and
Whereas subsequently to the said 2d day of April, 1866, the insurrection
in the State of Texas has been completely and everywhere suppressed and
ended and the authority of the United States has been successfully and
completely established in the said State of Texas and now remains
therein unresisted and undisputed, and such of the proper United States
officers as have been duly commissioned within the limits of the said
State are now in the undisturbed exercise of their official functions;
and
Whereas the laws can now be sustained and enforced in the said State of
Texas by the proper civil authority, State or Federal, and the people
of the said State of Texas, like the people of the other States before
named, are well and loyally disposed and have conformed or will conform
in their legislation to the condition of affairs growing out of the
amendment of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting slavery
within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States; and
Whereas all the reasons and conclusions set forth in regard to the
several States therein specially named now apply equally and in all
respects to the State of Texas, as well as to the other States which
had been involved in insurrection; and
Whereas adequate provision has been made by military orders to enforce
the execution of the acts of Congress, aid the civil authorities, and
secure obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States
within the State of Texas if a resort to military force for such purpose
should at any time become necessary:
Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do
hereby proclaim and declare that the insurrection which heretofore
existed in the State of Texas is at an end and is to be henceforth so
regarded in that State as in the other States before named in which the
said insurrection was proclaimed to be at an end by the aforesaid
proclamation of the 2d day of April, 1866.
And I do further proclaim that the said insurrection is at an end and
that peace, order, tranquillity, and civil authority now exist in and
throughout the whole of the United States of America.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, this 20th day of August, A.D. 1866, and
of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
A PROCLAMATION.
Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, has been pleased to vouchsafe to us
as a people another year of that national life which is an indispensable
condition of peace, security, and progress. That year has, moreover,
been crowned with many peculiar blessings.
The civil war that so recently closed among us has not been anywhere
reopened; foreign intervention has ceased to excite alarm or
apprehension; intrusive pestilence has been benignly mitigated; domestic
tranquillity has improved, sentiments of conciliation have largely
prevailed, and affections of loyalty and patriotism have been widely
renewed; our fields have yielded quite abundantly, our mining industry
has been richly rewarded, and we have been allowed to extend our
railroad system far into the interior recesses of the country, while
our commerce has resumed its customary activity in foreign seas.
These great national blessings demand a national acknowledgment.
Now, therefore, I, Andrew Johnson. President of the United States, do
hereby recommend that Thursday, the 29th day of November next, be set
apart and be observed everywhere in the several States and Territories
of the United States by the people thereof as a day of thanksgiving and
praise to Almighty God, with due remembrance that "in His temple doth
every man speak of His honor." I recommend also that on the same solemn
occasion they do humbly and devoutly implore Him to grant to our
national councils and to our whole people that divine wisdom which
alone can lead any nation into the ways of all good.
In offering these national thanksgivings, praises, and supplications we
have the divine assurance that "the Lord remaineth a king forever; them
that are meek shall He guide in judgment and such as are gentle shall He
learn His way; the Lord shall give strength to His people, and the Lord
shall give to His people the blessing of peace."
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
[SEAL.]
Done at the city of Washington, this 8th day of October, A.D. 1866, and
of the Independence of the United States the ninety-first.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS.
[From the Daily National Intelligencer, April 9, 1866.]
EXECUTIVE MANSION, _April 7, 1866_.
It is eminently right and proper that the Government of the United
States should give earnest and substantial evidence of its just
appreciation of the services of the patriotic men who when the life of
the nation was imperiled entered the Army and Navy to preserve the
integrity of the Union, defend the Government, and maintain and
perpetuate unimpaired its free institutions.
_It is therefore directed_--
First. That in appointments to office in the several Executive
Departments of the General Government and the various branches of
the public service connected with said Departments preference shall
be given to such meritorious and honorably discharged soldiers and
sailors--particularly those who have been disabled by wounds received
or diseases contracted in the line of duty--as may possess the proper
qualifications.
Second. That in all promotions in said Departments and the several
branches of the public service connected therewith such persons shall
have preference, when equally eligible and qualified, over those who
have not faithfully and honorably served in the land or naval forces
of the United States.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
_Washington, April 13, 1866_.
On the 14th of April, 1865, great affliction was brought upon the
American people by the assassination of the lamented Abraham Lincoln,
then President of the United States. The undersigned is therefore
directed by the President to announce that in commemoration of that
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