A Lie Never Justifiable
by
H. Clay Trumbull
Part 1 out of 3
A LIE NEVER JUSTIFIABLE
A Study in Ethics
BY
H. CLAY TRUMBULL
1856
PREFACE.
That there was need of a book on the subject of which this treats,
will be evidenced to those who examine its contents. Whether this book
meets the need, it is for those to decide who are its readers.
The circumstances of its writing are recited in its opening chapter. I
was urged to the undertaking by valued friends. At every step in its
progress I have been helped by those friends, and others. For much
of that which is valuable in it, they deserve credit. For its
imperfections and lack, I alone am at fault.
Although I make no claim to exhaustiveness of treatment in this
work, I do claim to have attempted a treatment that is exceptionally
comprehensive and thorough. My researches have included extensive and
varied fields of fact and of thought, even though very much in those
fields has been left ungathered. What is here presented is at least
suggestive of the abundance and richness of the matter available in
this line.
While not presuming to think that I have said the last word on this
question of the ages, I do venture to hope that I have furnished fresh
material for its more intelligent consideration. It may be that, in
view of the data here presented, some will settle the question finally
for themselves--by settling it right.
If the work tends to bring any considerable number to this practical
issue, I shall be more than repaid for the labor expended on it; for
I have a profound conviction that it is the question of questions in
ethics, now as always.
H. CLAY TRUMBULL.
PHILADELPHIA,
August 14,1893
CONTENTS.
I.
A QUESTION OF THE AGES.
Is a Lie Ever Justifiable?--Two Proffered Answers.--Inducements
and Temptations Influencing a Decision.--Incident in Army Prison
Life.--Difference in Opinion.--Killing Enemy, or Lying to
Him.--Killing, but not Lying, Possibility with God.--Beginning of this
Discussion.--Its Continuance.--Origin of this Book.
II.
ETHNIC CONCEPTIONS.
Standards and Practices of Primitive Peoples.--Sayings and Doings of
Hindoos.--Teachings of the Mahabharata.--Harischandra and
Viswamitra, the Job and Satan of Hindoo Passion-Play.--Scandinavian
Legends.--Fridthjof and Ingeborg.--Persian Ideals.--Zoroastrian Heaven
and Hell.--"Home of Song," and "Home of the Lie."--Truth the Main
Cardinal Virtue with Egyptians.--No Hope for the Liar.--Ptah, "Lord
of Truth."--Truth Fundamental to Deity.--Relatively Low Standard
of Greeks.--Incidental Testimony of Herodotus.--Truthfulness of
Achilles.--Plato.--Aristotle.--Theognis.--Pindar.--Tragedy of
Philoctetes.--Roman Standard.--Cicero.--Marcus Aurelius.--German
Ideal.--Veracity a Primitive Conception.--Lie Abhorrent among Hill
Tribes of India.--Khonds.--Sonthals.--Todas.--Bheels.--Sowrahs.--
Tipperahs.--Arabs.--American Indians.--Patagonians.--Hottentots.--
East Africans.--Mandingoes.--Dyaks of Borneo,--"Lying Heaps."--Veddahs
of Ceylon.--Javanese.--Lying Incident of Civilization.--Influence of
Spirit of Barter.--"Punic Faith."--False Philosophy of Morals.
III.
BIBLE TEACHINGS.
Principles, not Rules, the Bible Standard.--Two Pictures of
Paradise.--Place of Liars.--God True, though Men Lie.--Hebrew
Midwives.--Jacob and Esau.--Rahab the Lying Harlot.--Samuel at
Bethlehem.--Micaiah before Jehoshaphat and Ahab.--Character
and Conduct.--Abraham.--Isaac.--Jacob.--David.--Ananias and
Sapphira.--Bible Injunctions and Warnings.
IV.
DEFINITIONS.
Importance of a Definition.--Lie Positive, and Lie Negative.--Speech
and Act.--Element of Intention.--Concealment Justifiable, and
Concealment Unjustifiable.--Witness in Court.--Concealment that is
Right.--Concealment that is Sinful.--First Duty of Fallen Man.--Brutal
Frankness.--Indecent Exposure of Personal Opinion.--Lie Never
Tolerable as Means of Concealing.--False Leg or Eye.--Duty of
Disclosure Conditioned on Relations to Others.--Deception Purposed,
and Resultant Deception.--Limits of Responsibility for Results of
Action.--Surgeon Refusing to Leave Patient.--Father with Drowning
Child.--Mother and Wife Choosing.--Others Self-Deceived concerning
Us.--Facial Expression.--"A Blind Patch."--Broken Vase.--Closed
Shutters in Midsummer.--Opened Shutters.--Absent Man's Hat in
Front Hall.--When Concealment is Proper.--When Concealment is
Wrong.--Contagious Diseases.--Selling a Horse or Cow.--Covering
Pit.--Wearing Wig.--God's Method with Man.--Delicate Distinction.--
Truthful Statements Resulting in False Impressions.--Concealing
Family Trouble.--Physician and Inquiring Patient.--Illustrations
Explain Principle, not Define it.
V.
THE PLEA OF "NECESSITY."
Quaker and Dry-goods Salesman.--Supposed Profitableness of
Lying.--Plea for "Lies of Necessity."--Lying not Justifiable between
Enemies in War-time.--Rightfulness of Concealing Movements and Plans
from Enemy.--Responsibility with Flag of Truce.--Difference
between Scout and Spy.--Ethical Distinctions Recognized by
Belligerents.--Illustration: Federal Prisoner Questioned by
Confederate Captors.--Libby Prison Experiences.--Physicians and
Patients.--Concealment not Necessarily Deception.--Loss of
Reputation for Truthfulness by Lying Physicians.--Loss of
Power Thereby.--Impolicy of Lying to Insane.--Dr. Kirkbride's
Testimony.--Life not Worth Saving by Lie.--Concealing One's Condition
from Robber in Bedroom.--Questions of Would-be Murderer.--"Do Right
though the Heavens Fall."--Duty to God not to be Counted out of
Problem.--Deserting God's Service by Lying.--Parting Prayer.
VI.
CENTURIES OF DISCUSSION.
Wide Differences of Opinion.--Views of Talmudists.--Hamburger's
Testimony.--Strictness in Principle.--Exceptions in Practice.--Isaac
Abohab's Testimony.--Christian Fathers not Agreed.--Martyrdom Price
of Truthtelling.--Justin Martyr's Testimony.--Temptations of
Early Christians.--Words of Shepherd of Hermas.--Tertullian's
Estimate.--Origen on False Speaking.--Peter and Paul at Antioch.--
Gregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great.--Deceit in Interests of
Harmony.--Chrysostom's Deception of Basil.--Chrysostom's Defense
of Deceit.--Augustine's Firmness of Position.--Condemnation of
Lying.--Examination of Excuses.--Jerome's Weakness and Error.--Final
Agreement with Augustine.--Repetition of Arguments of Augustine and
Chrysostom.--Representative Disputants.--Thomas Aquinas.--Masterly
Discussion.--Errors of Duns Scotus.--John Calvin.--Martin Luther.--
Ignatius Loyola.--Position of Jesuits.--Protestants Defending Lying.
--Jeremy Taylor.--Errors and Inconsistencies.--Wrong Definitions.--
Misapplication of Scripture.--Richard Rothe.--Character, Ability,
and Influence. in Definition of Lie.--Failure to Recognize.--Error
Love to God as Only Basis of Love to Man.--Exceptions in Favor of
Lying.--Nitzsch's Claim of Wiser and Nobler Methods than Lying in
Love.--Rothe's Claim of Responsibility of Loving Guardianship--No
Countenance of Deception in Example of Jesus.--Prime Error of Rothe.
--Opinions of Contemporary Critics.--Isaac Augustus Dorner.--
Character and Principles.--Keen Definitions.--High Standards.--
Clearness and Consistency.--Hans Lassen Martensen.--Logic Swayed by
Feeling.--Right Premises and Wavering Reasonings.--Lofty Ideals.--
Story of Jeanie Deans.--Correct Conclusions.--Influence of Personal
Peculiarities on Ethical Convictions.--Contrast of Charles Hodge and
James H. Thornwell.--Dr. Hodge's Correct Premises and Amiable
Inconsistencies.--Truth the Substratum of Deity.--Misconceptions of
Bible Teachings.--Suggestion of Deception by Jesus Christ.--Error as
to General Opinion of Christians.--Dr. Hodge's Conclusions Crushed
by his Premises.--Dr. Thornwell's Thorough Treatment of Subject.--
Right Basis.--Sound Argument.--Correct Definitions.--Firmness for
Truth.--Newman Smyth's Manual.--Good Beginning and Bad Ending.--
Confusion of Terms.--Inconsistencies in Argument.--Loose Reasoning.
--Dangerous Teachings.--James Martineau.--Fine Moral Sense.--Conflict
between Feeling and Conviction.--Safe Instincts.--Thomas Fowler.--
Higher Expediency of Veracity.--Importance to General Good.--Leslie
Stephen.--Duty of Veracity Result of Moral Progress.--Kant and
Fichte.--Jacobi Misrepresented.--False Assumptions by Advocates of Lie
of Necessity.--Enemies in Warfare not Justified in Lying.--Testimony
of Cicero.--Macaulay on Lord Clive's Treachery.--Woolsey on
International Law.--No Place for Lying in Medical Ethics.--Opinions
and Experiences of Physicians.--Pliny's Story of Roman Matron.--Victor
Hugo's Sister Simplice.--Words of Abbe Sicard.--Tact and
Principle.--Legal Ethics.--Whewell's View.--Opinion of Chief-Justice
Sharswood.--Mistakes of Dr. Hodge.--Lord Brougham's Claim.--False
Charge against Charles Phillips.--Chancellor Kent on Moral
Obligations in Law and in Equity.--Clerical Profession Chiefly
Involved.--Clergymen for and against Lying.--Temptation to Lies of
Love.--Supreme Importance of Sound Principle.--Duty of Veracity to
Lower Animals.--Dr. Dabney's View.--Views of Dr. Newman Smyth.--Duty
of Truthfulness an Obligation toward God.--Lower Animals not Exempt
from Principle of Universal Application.--Fishing.--Hunting.--Catching
Horse.--Professor Bowne's Psychological View.--No Place for Lying
in God's Universe.--Small Improvement on Chrysostom's Argument for
Lying.--Limits of Consistency in Logical Plea.--God, or Satan.
VII.
THE GIST OF THE MATTER.
One All-Dividing Line.--Primal and Eternal Difference.--Lie Inevitably
Hostile to God.--Lying Separates from God.--Sin _per se_.--Perjury
Justifiable if Lying be Justifiable.--Lying--Lying Defiles Liar,
apart from Questions of Gain in Lying.--Social Evils Resultant from
Lying.--Confidence Essential to Society.--Lying Destructive of
Confidence.--Lie Never Harmless.
INDEXES.
TOPICAL INDEX. SCRIPTURAL INDEX.
I.
A QUESTION OF THE AGES.
Whether a lie is ever justifiable, is a question that has been in
discussion, not only in all the Christian centuries, but ever since
questions concerning human conduct were first a possibility. On
the one hand, it has been claimed that a lie is by its very nature
irreconcilable with the eternal principles of justice and right; and,
on the other hand, it has been asserted that great emergencies may
necessitate a departure from all ordinary rules of human conduct, and
that therefore there may be, in an emergency, such a thing as the "lie
of necessity."
It is not so easy to consider fairly a question like this in the hour
when vital personal interests pivot on the decision, as it is in a
season of rest and safety; yet, if in a time of extremest peril the
unvarying duty of truthfulness shines clearly through an atmosphere of
sore temptation, that light may be accepted as diviner because of its
very power to penetrate clouds and to dispel darkness. Being forced to
consider, in an emergency, the possible justification of the so-called
"lie of necessity," I was brought to a settlement of that question in
my own mind, and have since been led to an honest endeavor to bring
others to a like settlement of it. Hence this monograph.
In the summer of 1863 I was a prisoner of war in Columbia, South
Carolina. The Federal prisoners were confined in the common jail,
under military guard, and with no parole binding them not to attempt
an escape. They were subject to the ordinary laws of war. Their
captors were responsible for their detention in imprisonment, and it
was their duty to escape from captivity, and to return to the army of
the government to which they owed allegiance, if they could do so by
any right means. No obligations were on them toward their captors,
save those which are binding at all times, even when a state of war
suspends such social duties as are merely conventional.
Only he who has been a prisoner of war in a Southern prison in
midsummer, or in a Northern prison in the dead of winter, in time of
active hostilities outside, can fully realize the heart-longings of a
soldier prisoner to find release from his sufferings in confinement,
and to be again at his post of duty at the front, or can understand
how gladly such a man would find a way, consistent with the right, to
escape, at any involved risk. But all can believe that plans of escape
were in frequent discussion among the restless Federal prisoners in
Columbia, of whom I was one.
A plan proposed to me by a fellow-officer seemed to offer peculiar
chances of success, and I gladly joined in it. But as its fuller
details were considered, I found that a probable contingency would
involve the telling of a lie to an enemy, or a failure of the
whole plan. At this my moral sense recoiled; and I expressed my
unwillingness to tell a lie, even to regain my personal liberty or
to advantage my government by a return to its army. This opened an
earnest discussion of the question whether there is such a thing as a
"lie of necessity," or a justifiable lie. My friend was a pure-minded
man of principle, ready to die for his convictions; and he looked at
this question with a sincere desire to know the right, and to conform
to it. He argued that a condition of war suspended ordinary social
relations between the combatants, and that the obligation of
truth-speaking was one of the duties thus suspended. I, on the other
hand, felt that a lie was necessarily a sin against God, and therefore
was never justifiable.
My friend asked me whether I would hesitate to kill an enemy who was
on guard over me, or whom I met outside, if it were essential to our
escape. I replied that I would not hesitate to do so, any more than I
would hesitate at it if we were over against each other in battle.
In time of war the soldiers of both sides take the risks of a
life-and-death struggle; and now that we were unparoled prisoners it
was our duty to escape if we could do so, even at the risk of our
lives or of the lives of our captors, and it was their duty to
prevent our escape at a similar risk. My friend then asked me on what
principle I could justify the taking of a man's life as an enemy, and
yet not feel justified in telling him a lie in order to save his life
and secure our liberty. How could it be claimed that it was more of a
sin to tell a lie to a man who had forfeited his social rights, than
to kill him. I confessed that I could not at that time see the reason
for the distinction, which my moral sense assured me was a real one,
and I asked time to think of it. Thus it was that I came first to face
a question of the ages, Is a lie ever justifiable? under circumstances
that involved more than life to me, and when I had a strong inducement
to see the force of reasons in favor of a "lie of necessity."
In my careful study, at that time, of the principles involved in this
question, I came upon what seemed to me the conclusion of the whole
matter. God is the author of life. He who gives life has the right to
take it again. What God can do by himself, God can authorize another
to do. Human governments derive their just powers from God. The powers
that be are ordained of God. A human government acts for God in the
administering of justice, even to the extent of taking life. If a
war waged by a human government be righteous, the officers of that
government take life, in the prosecution of the war, as God's agents.
In the case then in question, we who were in prison as Federal
officers were representatives of our government, and would be
justified in taking the lives of enemies of our government who
hindered us as God's agents in the doing of our duty to God and to our
government.
On the other hand, God, who can justly take life, cannot lie. A lie
is contrary to the very nature of God. "It is impossible for God to
lie."[1] And if God cannot lie, God cannot authorize another to lie.
What is unjustifiable in God's sight, is without a possibility of
justification in the universe. No personal or social emergency can
justify a lie, whatever may be its apparent gain, or whatever harm may
seem to be involved in a refusal to speak it. Therefore we who were
Federal prisoners in war-time could not be justified in doing what
was a sin _per se_, and what God was by his very nature debarred
from authorizing or approving. I could see no way of evading
this conclusion, and I determinedly refused to seek release from
imprisonment at the cost of a sin against God.
[Footnote 1: Heb. 6: 18]
At this time I had no special familiarity with ethics as a study, and
I was unacquainted with the prominence of the question of the "lie
of necessity" in that realm of thought. But on my return from army
service, with my newly awakened interest in the subject, I came to
know how vigorous had been its discussion, and how varied had been the
opinions with reference to it, among philosophic thinkers in all
the centuries; and I sought to learn for myself what could be known
concerning the principles involved in this question, and their
practical application to the affairs of human life. And now, after all
these years of study and thought, I venture to make my contribution
to this phase of Christian ethics, in an exhibit of the facts and
principles which have gone to confirm the conviction of my own
moral sense, when first I was called to consider this question as a
question.
II.
ETHNIC CONCEPTIONS.
The habit of lying is more or less common among primitive peoples, as
it is among those of higher cultivation; but it is of interest to note
that widely, even among them, the standard of truthfulness as a duty
is recognized as the correct standard, and lying is, in theory at
least, a sin. The highest conception of right observable among
primitive peoples, and not the average conformity to that standard in
practice, is the true measure of right in the minds of such peoples.
If we were to look at the practices of such men in times of
temptation, we might be ready to say sweepingly with the Psalmist, in
his impulsiveness, "I said in my haste, All men are liars!"[1] But if
we fixed our minds on the loftiest conception of truthfulness as an
invariable duty, recognized by races of men who are notorious as
liars, we should see how much easier it is to have a right standard
than to conform to it.
[Footnote 1: Psa. 116: II.]
A careful observer of the people of India, who was long a resident
among them,[1] says: "More systematic, more determined, liars, than
the people of the East, cannot, in my opinion, be found in the world.
They often utter falsehoods without any apparent reason; and even when
truth would be an advantage, they will not tell it.... Yet, strange to
say, some of their works and sayings represent a falsehood as almost
the unpardonable sin. Take the following for an example: 'The sin of
killing a Brahman is as great as that of killing a hundred cows; and
the sin of killing a hundred cows is as great as that of killing a
woman; the sin of killing a hundred women is as great as that of
killing a child in the womb; and the sin of killing a hundred
[children] in the womb is as great as that of telling a lie.'"
[Footnote 1: Joseph Roberts, in his _Oriental Illustrations_, p. 580.]
The Mahabharata is one of the great epics of ancient India. It
contains a history of a war between two rival families, or peoples,
and its text includes teachings with reference to "everything that it
concerned a cultivated Hindoo to know." The heroes in this recorded
war, between the Pandavas and the Kauravas, are in the habit of lying
without stint; yet there is evidence that they recognized the sin of
lying even to an enemy in time of war, and when a decisive advantage
might be gained by it. At a point in the combat when Yudhishthira, a
leader of the Pandavas, was in extremity in his battling with Drona, a
leader of the Kauravas, the divine Krishna told Yudhishthira that, if
he would tell Drona (for in these mythical contests the combatants
were usually within speaking distance of each other) that his loved
"son Aswatthanea was dead, the old warrior would immediately lay down
his arms and become an easy prey." But Yudhishthira "had never been
known to tell a falsehood," and in this instance he "utterly refused
to tell a lie, even to secure the death of so powerful an enemy." [1]
Although it came about that Drona was, as a matter of fact, defeated
by treachery, the sin of lying, even in time of war, and to an enemy,
is clearly brought out as a recognized principle of both theory and
action among the ancient Hindoos.
[Footnote 1: See Wheeler's _History of India_, I., 321.]
There is a famous passion-play popular in Southern India and Ceylon,
which illustrates the Hindoo ideal of truthfulness at every risk or
cost. Viswamitra, the tempter and accuser as represented in the Vedas,
appears in the council of the gods, face to face with Indra. The
question is raised by Indra, who is the most virtuous sovereign on
earth. He asks, "What chief of mortals is there, who has never told
a lie?" Harischandra, king of Ayodiah (Oude) is named as such a
man. Viswamitra denies it. It is agreed (as in the testing of Job,
according to the Bible story) that Viswamitra may employ any means
whatsoever for the inducing of Harischandra to lie, unhindered by
Indra or any other god. If he succeeds in his effort, he shall secure
to himself all the merit of the good deeds of Harischandra; but if
Harischandra cannot be induced to lie, Viswamitra must add half his
merit to that of Harischandra.[1]
[Footnote 1: Arichandra, the Martyr of Truth: A Tamil Drama translated
into English by Muta Coomara Swamy; cited in Conway's _Demonology and
Devil Lore_, II., 35-43.]
First, Viswamitra induces Harischandra to become the custodian of a
fabulous treasure, with a promise to deliver it up when called
for. Then he brings him into such a strait that he must give up to
Viswamitra all his possessions, including that treasure and his
kingdom, in order to retain his personal virtue. After this,
Viswamitra demands the return by Harischandra of the gold which
has been already surrendered, claiming that its surrender was not
according to the contract. In this emergency Viswamitra suggests, that
if Harischandra will only deny that he owes this amount to his enemy
the debt shall at once be canceled. "Such a declaration I can never
make," says Harischandra. "I owe thee the gold, and pay it I will."
From this time forward the efforts of Viswamitra are directed to
the inducing of Harischandra to say that he is not in debt to his
adversary; but in every trial Harischandra refuses to tell a lie.
His only son dies in the desert. He and his wife are in poverty
and sorrow; while all the time he is told that his kingdom and his
treasures shall be restored to him, if he will tell only one lie. At
last his wife is condemned to death on a false accusation, and he is
appointed, by the sovereign of the land where she and he have been
sold as slaves, to be her executioner. She calls on him to do his
duty, and strike off her head. Just then Viswamitra appears to him,
saying: "Wicked man, spare her! Tell a lie even now, and be restored
to your former state!"
Harischandra's answer is: "Even though thou didst offer to me
the throne of Indra, I would not tell a lie." And to his wife,
Chandravati, he says encouragingly: "This keen saber will do its duty.
Thou dead, thy husband dies too--this selfsame sword shall pierce my
breast.... Yes, let all men perish, let all gods cease to exist, let
the stars that shine above grow dim, let all seas be dried up, let
all mountains be leveled to the ground, let wars rage, blood flow in
streams, let millions of millions of Harischandras be thus persecuted;
yet let truth be maintained, let truth ride victorious over all, let
truth be the light,--truth alone the lasting solace of mortals and
immortals."
As Harischandra strikes at the neck of Chandravati, "the sword,
instead of harming her, is transformed into a necklace of pearls,
which winds itself around her. The gods of heaven, all sages, and all
kings, appear suddenly to the view of Harischandra," and Siva, the
first of the gods, commends him for his fidelity to truth, and tells
him that his dead son shall be brought again to life, and his kingdom
and treasures and honors shall be restored to him. And thus the story
of Harischandra stands as a rebuke to the Christian philosopher who
could suppose that God, or the gods, would co-work with a man who
acted on the supposition that there is such an anomaly in the universe
as "a lie of necessity."
The old Scandinavian heroes were valiant in war, but they held that
a lie was not justifiable under any pressure of an emergency. Their
Valhalla heaven was the home of those who had fought bravely; but
there was no place for liars in it. A fine illustration of their
conception of the unvarying duty of truthfulness is given in the saga
of Fridthjof. Fridthjof, heroic son of Thorstein, loved Ingeborg,
daughter of his father's friend, King Bele. Ingeborg's brother Helge,
successor to his father's throne, opposed the match, and shut her up
within the sacred enclosure of the god Balder. Fridthjof ventured
within the forbidden ground, in order to pledge to her his manly
troth. The lovers were pure in purpose and in act, but, if their
interview were known, they would both be permanently harmed in
reputation and in standing. A rumor of their secret meeting was
circulated, and Fridthjof was summoned before the council of heroes to
answer to the charge. If ever a lie were justifiable, it would seem to
be when a pure woman's honor was at stake, and when a hero's happiness
and power for good pivoted on it. Fridthjof tells to Ingeborg the
story of his sore temptation when, in the presence of the council,
Helge challenges his course.
"'Say, Fridthjof, Balder's peace hast thou not broken, Not seen my
sister in his house while Day Concealed himself, abashed, before
your meeting? Speak! yea or nay!' Then echoed from the ring Of
crowded warriors, 'Say but nay, say nay! Thy simple word we'll
trust; we'll court for thee,--Thou, Thorstein's son, art good
as any king's. Say nay! say nay! and thine is Ingeborg!' 'The
happiness,' I answered, 'of my life On one word hangs; but fear
not therefore, Helge! I would not lie to gain the joys of Valhal,
Much less this earth's delights. I've seen thy sister, Have spoken
with her in the temple's night, But have not therefore broken
Balder's peace!' More none would hear. A murmur of deep horror The
diet traversed; they who nearest stood Drew back, as I had with
the plague been smitten."[1]
[Footnote 1: Anderson's _Viking Tales of the North_, p. 223.]
And so, because Fridthjof would not lie, he lost his bride and became
a wanderer from his land, and Ingeborg became the wife of another;
and this record is to this day told to the honor of Fridthjof,
in accordance with the standard of the North in the matter of
truth-telling.
In ancient Persia, the same high standard prevailed. Herodotus says of
the Persians: "The most disgraceful thing in the world, they think,
is to tell a lie; the next worse, to owe a debt; because, among other
reasons, the debtor is obliged to tell lies."[1] "Their sons are
carefully instructed, from their fifth to their twentieth year, in
three things alone,--to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the
truth."[2] Here the one duty in the realm of morals is truth-telling.
In the famous inscription of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, on the Rock
of Behistun,[3] there are repeated references to lying as the chief of
sins, and to the evil time when lying was introduced into Persia, and
"the lie grew in the provinces, in Persia as well as in Media and in
the other provinces." Darius claims to have had the help of "Ormuzd
and the other gods that may exist," because he "was not wicked, nor a
liar;" and he enjoins it on his successor to "punish severely him who
is a liar or a rebel."
[Footnote 1: Rawlinson's _Herodotus_, Bk. I., sec. 139.]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., Bk. I., sec. 136.]
[Footnote 3: Sayce's _Introduction to Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther_, pp.
120-137.]
The Zoroastrian designation of heaven was the "Home of Song;"
while hell was known as the "Home of the Lie."[1] There was in the
Zoroastrian thought only two rival principles in the universe,
represented by Ormuzd and Ahriman, as the God of truth, and the father
of lies; and the lie was ever and always an offspring of Ahriman, the
evil principle: it could not emanate from or be consistent with the
God of truth. The same idea was manifest in the designation of the
subordinate divinities of the Zoroastrian religion. Mithra was the god
of light, and as there is no concealment in the light, Mithra was also
god of truth. A liar was the enemy of righteousness.[2]
[Footnote 1: Mueller's _Sacred Books of the East_, XXXI., 184.]
[Footnote 2: Mueller's _Sacred Books of the East_, XXIII., 119 f.,
124 f., 128, 139. See reference to Jackson's paper on "the ancient
Persians' abhorrence of falsehood, illustrated from the Avesta," in
_Journal of Am. Oriental Soc_., Vol. XIII., p. cii.]
"Truth was the main cardinal virtue among the Egyptians," and
"falsehood was considered disgraceful among them."[1] Ra and Ma were
symbols of Light and Truth; and their representation was worn on the
breastplate of priest and judge, like the Urim and Thummim of the
Hebrews.[2] When the soul appeared in the Hall of Two Truths, for
final judgment, it must be able to say, "I have not told a falsehood,"
or fail of acquittal.[3] Ptah, the creator, a chief god of the
Egyptians, was called "Lord of Truth."[4] The Egyptian conception of
Deity was: "God is the truth, he lives by truth, he lives upon
the truth, he is the king of truth."[5] The Egyptians, like the
Zoroastrians, seemed to count the one all-dividing line in the
universe the line between truth and falsehood, between light and
darkness.
[Footnote 1: Wilkinson's _Ancient Egyptians_, I., 299; III., 183-185.]
[Footnote 2: Exod. 39: 8-21; Lev. 8: 8.]
[Footnote 3: Bunsen's _Egypt's Place in Universal History_, V., 254.]
[Footnote 4: Wilkinson's _Anc. Egyp_., III., 15-17.]
[Footnote 5: Budge's _The Dwellers on the Nile_, p. 131.]
Among the ancient Greeks the practice of lying was very general,
so general that writers on the social life of the Greeks have been
accustomed to give a low place relatively to that people in its
estimate of truthfulness as a virtue. Professor Mahaffy says on this
point: "At no period did the nation ever attain that high standard
which is the great feature in Germanic civilization. Even the Romans,
with all their coarseness, stood higher in this respect. But neither
in Iliad nor in Odyssey is there, except in phrases, any reprobation
of deceit as such." He points to the testimony of Cicero, concerning
the Greeks, who "concedes to them all the high qualities they choose
to claim save one--that of truthfulness."[1] Yet the very way in which
Herodotus tells to the credit of the Persians that they allowed
no place for the lie in their ethics[2] seems to indicate his
apprehension of a higher standard of veracity than that which was
generally observed among his own people. Moreover, in the Iliad,
Achilles is represented as saying: "Him I hate as I do the gates of
Hades, who hides one thing in his heart and utters another;" and it
is the straightforward Achilles, rather than "the wily and shiftful
Ulysses," who is the admired hero of the Greeks.[3] Plato asserts, and
argues in proof of his assertion, that "the veritable lie ... is hated
by all gods and men." He includes in the term "veritable lie," or
"genuine lie," a lie in the soul as back of the spoken lie, and he
is sure that "the divine nature is incapable of a lie," and that in
proportion as the soul of a man is conformed to the divine image,
the man "will speak, act, and live in accordance with the truth."[4]
Aristotle, also, while recognizing different degrees of veracity,
insists that the man who is in his soul a lover of truth will be
truthful even when he is tempted to swerve from the truth. "For the
lover of truth, who is truthful where nothing is at stake [or where it
makes no difference], will yet more surely be truthful where there is
a stake [or where it does make a difference]; for he will [then] shun
the lie as shameful, since he shuns it simply because it is a lie."[5]
And, again, "Falsehood abstractly is bad and blamable, and truth
honorable and praiseworthy; and thus the truthful man being in
the mean is praiseworthy, while the false [in either extreme,
of overstating or of understating] are both blamable, but the
exaggerating man more so than the other."[6]
[Footnote 1: Mahaffy's _Social Life in Greece_, pp. 27, 123. See also
Fowler's _Principles of Morals_, II., 219-221.]
[Footnote 2: _Hist_., Bk. I., sec. 139.]
[Footnote 3: Professor Fowler seems to be quite forgetful of this
fact. He speaks of Ulysses as if he had precedence of Achilles in the
esteem of the Greeks. See his _Principles of Morals_, II., 219.]
[Footnote 4: Plato's _Republic_, II., 382, a, b.]
[Footnote 5: Aristotle's _Eth. Nic_., IV., 13, 1127, a, b.]
[Footnote 6: _Ibid_., IV.]
Theognis recognizes this high ideal of the duty and the beauty of
truthfulness, when he says: "At first there is a small attractiveness
about a lie, but in the end the gain it brings is both shameful and
harmful. That man has no fair glory, in whose heart dwells a lie, and
from whose mouth it has once issued."[1]
[Footnote 1: Theognis, 607.]
Pindar looks toward the same standard when he says to Hiero,
"Forge thy tongue on the anvil of truth;"[1] and when he declares
emphatically, "I will not stain speech with a lie."[2] So, again, when
his appeal to a divinity is: "Thou that art the beginning of lofty
virtue, Lady Truth, forbid thou that my poem [or composition] should
stumble against a lie, harsh rock of offense."[3] In his tragedy of
the Philoctetes, Sophocles makes the whole play pivot on the remorse
of Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, over his having lied to Philoctetes
(who is for the time being an enemy of the Greeks), in order to secure
through him the killing of Paris and the overthrow of Troy. The lie
was told at the instigation of Ulysses; but Neoptolemus repents its
utterance, and refuses to take advantage of it, even though the fate
of Troy and the triumph of Greek arms depend on the issue. The plain
teaching of the tragedy is that "the purposes of heaven are not to
be served by a lie; and that the simplicity of the young son of
truth-loving Achilles is better in the sight of heaven, even when
it seems to lead to failure, than all the cleverness of guileful
Ulysses."[4]
[Footnote 1: Pythian Ode, I, 86.]
[Footnote 2: Olympian Ode, 4, 16.]
[Footnote 3: Bergk's _Pindar_, 183 [221].]
[Footnote 4: Professor Lamberton]
It is admitted on all hands that the Romans and the Germans had a high
ideal as to the duty of truthfulness and the sin of lying.[1] And so
it was in fact with all peoples which had any considerable measure of
civilization in former ages. It is a noteworthy fact that the duty of
veracity is often more prominent among primitive peoples than among
the more civilized, and that, correspondingly, lying is abhorred as a
vice, or seems to be unknown as an expedient in social intercourse.
This is not always admitted in the theories of writers on morals, but
it would seem to be borne out by an examination into the facts of
the case. Lecky, in his study of "the natural history of morals,"[2]
claims that veracity "usually increases with civilization," and he
seeks to show why it is so. But this view of Lecky's is an unfounded
assumption, in support of which he proffers no evidence; while Herbert
Spencer's exhibit of facts, in his "Cyclopaedia of Descriptive
Sociology," seems to disprove the claim of Lecky; and he directly
asserts that "surviving remnants of some primitive races in India have
natures in which truthfulness seems to be organic; that not only to
the surrounding Hindoos, higher intellectually and relatively advanced
in culture, are they in this respect far superior, but they are
superior to Europeans."[3]
[Footnote 1: See Fowler's _Principles of Morals_, II., 220; also
Mahaffy's _Social Life in Greece_, p. 27. Note, for instance, the high
standard as to truthfulness indicated by Cicero, in his "Offices,"
III., 12-17, 32. "Pretense and dissimulation ought to be banished
from the whole of life." "Reason ... requires that nothing be done
insidiously, nothing dissemblingly, nothing falsely." Note, also,
Juvenal, Satire XIII., as to the sin of a lie purposed, even if not
spoken; and Marcus Aurelius in his "Thoughts," Book IX.: "He ... who
lies is guilty of impiety to the same [highest] divinity." "He, then,
who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety, inasmuch as he acts
unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch
as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he
disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he
fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary
to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect
of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth."]
[Footnote 2: _History of European Morals_, I., 143.]
[Footnote 3: See Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II., 234 ff.;
also his _Inductions of Ethics_, p. 405 f.]
Among those Hill Tribes of India which have been most secluded, and
which have retained the largest measure of primitive life and customs,
fidelity to truth in speech and act is still the standard, and a lie
is abhorrent to the normal instincts of the race. Of the Khonds of
Central India it is said that they, "in common with many other wild
races, bear a singular character for truthfulness and honesty;"[1] and
that especially "the aborigine is the most truthful of beings."[2]
"The Khonds believe that truthfulness is one of the most sacred of
duties imposed by the gods."[3] "They are men of one word."[4] "The
truth is by a Sonthals held sacred." [5] The Todas "call falsehood one
of the worst of vices."[6] Although it is said by one traveler that
the Todas "practice dissimulation toward Europeans, yet he recognizes
this as a trait consequent on their intercourse with Europeans."[7]
The Bheels, which were said to be "a race of unmitigated savages,
without any sense of natural religion." [8] and "which have preserved
their rude habits and manners to the present day," are "yet imbued
with a sense of truth and honor strangely at contrast with their
external character."[9] Bishop Heber says that "their word is more to
be depended on than that of their conquerors."[10] Of the Sowrahs it
is said: "A pleasing feature in their character is their complete
truthfulness. They do not know how to tell a lie."[11] Indeed, as Mr.
Spencer sums up the case on this point, there are Hill Tribes in India
"originally distinguished by their veracity, but who are rendered less
veracious by contact with the whites. 'So rare is lying among these
aboriginal races when unvitiated by the 'civilized,' that of those in
Bengal, Hunter singles out the Tipperahs as 'the only Hill Tribe in
which this vice is met with.'"[12]
[Footnote 1: Glasfurd, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., V., 32.]
[Footnote 2: Forsyth, _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 3: Macpherson, cited in _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 4: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 5: Sherwill, cited in _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 6: Harkness, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., V., 31.]
[Footnote 7: Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II., 234.]
[Footnote 8: Marshman, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., V., 31.]
[Footnote 9: Wheeler, cited in _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 10: Cited in _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 11: Shortt, cited in _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 12: Spencer's _Principles of Sociology_, II., 234 ff.]
The Arabs are more truthful in their more primitive state than where
they are influenced by "civilization," or by dealings with those from
civilized communities.[1] And the same would seem to be true of the
American Indians.[2] Of the Patagonians it is said: "A lie with them
is held in detestation." [3] "The word of a Hottentot is sacred;" and
the good quality of "a rigid adherence to truth," "he is master of in
an eminent degree."[4] Dr. Livingstone says that lying was known to
be a sin by the East Africans "before they knew aught of Europeans or
their teaching."[5] And Mungo Park says of the Mandingoes, among the
inland Africans, that, while they seem to be thieves by nature,"
one of the first lessons in which the Mandingo women instruct their
children is _the practice of truth_." The only consolation of a mother
whose son had been murdered, "was the reflection that the poor boy, in
the course of his blameless life, _had never told a lie_."[6] Richard
Burton is alone among modern travelers in considering lying natural to
all primitive or savage peoples. Carl Bock, like other travelers,
testifies to the unvarying truthfulness of the Dyaks in Borneo,[7] and
another observant traveler tells of the disgrace that attaches to a lie
in that land, as shown by the "lying heaps" of sticks or stones along
the roadside here and there. "Each heap is in remembrance of some man
who has told a stupendous lie, or failed in carrying out an engagement;
and every passer-by takes a stick or a stone to add to the accumulation,
saying at the time he does it, 'For So-and-so's lying heap.' It goes on
for generations, until they sometimes forget who it was that told the
lie, but, notwithstanding that, they continue throwing the stones."[8]
What a blocking of the paths of civilization there would be if a "lying
heap" were piled up wherever a lie had been told, or a promise had
been broken, by a child of civilization!
[Footnote 1: Denham, and Palgrave, cited in _Cycl. of Des. Social_.,
V., 30,31.]
[Footnote 2: See Morgan's _League of the Iroquois_, p. 335; also
Schoolcraft, and Keating, on the Chippewas, cited in _Cycl. of
Descrip. Sociol_., VI., 30.]
[Footnote 3: Snow, cited in _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 4: Kolben, and Barrow, cited in _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_.,
IV., 25.]
[Footnote 5: _Cycl. of Descrip. Sociol_., IV., 26.]
[Footnote 6: _Cycl. of Descrip. Social_., IV., 27.]
[Footnote 7: _Head Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209. See also Boyle, cited
in Spencer's _Cycl. of Descrip. Social_., III., 35.]
[Footnote 8: St. John's _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, I., 88
f.]
The Veddahs of Ceylon, one of the most primitive of peoples, "are
proverbially truthful."[1] The natives of Java are peculiarly free
from the vice of lying, except in those districts which have had most
intercourse with Europeans.[2]
[Footnote 1: Bailey, cited in Spencer's _Cycl. of Descrip. Social_.,
III., 32.]
[Footnote 2: Earl, and Raffles, cited in _Ibid_., p. 35.]
It is found, in fact, that in all the ages, the world over, primitive
man's highest ideal conception of deity has been that of a God who
could not tolerate a lie; and his loftiest standard of human action
has included the readiness to refuse to tell a lie under any
inducement, or in any peril, whether it be to a friend or to an enemy.
This is the teaching of ethnic conceptions on the subject. The lie
would seem to be a product of civilization, or an outgrowth of the
spirit of trade and barter, rather than a natural impulse of primitive
man. It appeared in full flower and fruitage in olden time among the
commercial Phoenicians, so prominently that "Punic faith" became a
synonym of falsehood in social dealings.
Yet it is in the face of facts like these that a writer like Professor
Fowler baldly claims, in support of the same presupposed theory as
that of Lecky, that "it is probably owing mainly to the development of
commerce, and to the consequent necessity, in many cases, of absolute
truthfulness, that veracity has come to take the prominent position
which it now occupies among the virtues; though the keen sense of
honor, engendered by chivalry, may have had something to do in
bringing about the same result."[1]
[Footnote 1: _Principles of Morality_, II., 220.]
III.
BIBLE TEACHINGS.
In looking at the Bible for light in such an investigation as this,
it is important to bear in mind that the Bible is not a collection of
specific rules of conduct, but rather a book of principles
illustrated in historic facts, and in precepts based on those
principles,--announced or presupposed. The question, therefore, is
not, Does the Bible authoritatively draw a line separating the truth
from a lie, and making the truth to be always right, and a lie to
be always wrong? but it is, Does the Bible evidently recognize an
unvarying and ever-existing distinction between a truth and a lie, and
does the whole sweep of its teachings go to show that in God's sight
a lie, as by its nature opposed to the truth and the right, is always
wrong?
The Bible opens with a picture of the first pair in Paradise, to whom
God tells the simple truth, and to whom the enemy of man tells a lie;
and it shows the ruin of mankind wrought by that lie, and the author
of the lie punished because of its telling.[1] The Bible closes with a
picture of Paradise, into which are gathered the lovers and doers of
truth, and from which is excluded "every one that loveth and doeth a
lie;"[2] while "all liars" are to have their part "in the lake that
burneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death."[3] In the
Old Testament and in the New, God is represented as himself the Truth,
to whom, by his very nature, the doing or the speaking of a lie is
impossible,[4] while Satan is represented as a liar and as the "father
of lies."[5]
[Footnote 1: Gen. 2, 3.]
[Footnote 2: Rev. 22.]
[Footnote 3: Rev. 21: 5-8.]
[Footnote 4: Psa. 31:5; 146:6; John 14:6; Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29;
Titus 1:2; Heb. 6:18; 1 John 5:7.]
[Footnote 5: John 8:44.]
While the human servants of God, as represented in the Bible
narrative, are in many instances guilty of lying, their lies are
clearly contrary to the great principle, in the light of which the
Bible itself is written, that a lie is always wrong, and that it
cannot have justification in God's sight. The idea of the Bible record
is that God is true, though every man were a liar.[1] God is uniformly
represented as opposed to lies and to liars, and a lie in his sight is
spoken of as a lie unto him, or as a lie against him. In the few cases
where the Bible narrative has been thought by some to indicate an
approval by the Lord of a lie, that was told, as it were, in his
interest, an examination of the facts will show that they offer no
exception to the rule that, by the Bible standard, a lie is never
justifiable.
[Footnote 1: Rom. 3:4.]
Take, for example, the case of the Hebrew midwives, who lied to the
officials of Pharaoh, when they were commanded to kill every Hebrew
male child;[1] and of whom it is said that "God dealt well with the
midwives;... and ... because the midwives feared God,... he made them
houses."[2] Here it is plain that God commended their fear of him,
not their lying in behalf of his people, and that it was "because
the midwives feared God" not because they lied, "that he made them
houses." It was their choice of the Lord above the gods and rulers of
Egypt that won them the approval of the Lord, even though they were
sinners in being liars; as in an earlier day it was the approval of
Jacob's high estimate of the birthright, and not the deceits practiced
by him on Esau and his father Isaac, that the Lord showed in
confirming a blessing to Jacob.[3]
[Footnote 1: Exod. 1: 15-19.]
[Footnote 2: Exod. I: 20, 21.]
[Footnote 3: Gen. 25: 27-34; 27; 1-40; 28: 1-22]
So, also, in the narrative of Rahab, the Canaanitish young woman, who
concealed the Israelitish spies sent into her land by Joshua, and lied
about them to her countrymen, and who was commended by the Lord for
her faith in this transaction.[1] Rahab was a harlot by profession and
a liar by practice. When the Hebrew spies entered Jericho, they went
to her house as a place of common resort. Rahab, on learning who they
were, expressed her readiness, sinner as she was, to trust the God of
Israel rather than the gods of Canaan; and because of her trust she
put herself, with all her heathen habits of mind and conduct, at
the disposal of the God of Israel, and she lied, as she had been
accustomed to lie, to her own people, as a means of securing safety
to her Hebrew visitors. Because of her faith, which was shown in this
way, but not necessarily because of her way of showing her faith, the
Lord approved of her spirit in choosing his service rather than the
service of the gods of her people. The record of her approval is, "By
faith Rahab the harlot perished not with them that were disobedient,
having received the spies with peace."[2]
[Footnote 1: Josh. 2: 1-21.]
[Footnote 2: Heb. II: 31.]
It would be quite as fair to claim that God approved of Rahab's
harlotry, in this case, as to claim that he approved of her lying.
Rahab was a harlot and a liar, and she was ready to practice in both
these lines in the service of the spies. She was not to be commended
for either of those vices; but she was to be commended in that, with
all her vices, she was yet ready to give herself just as she was, and
with her ways as they were, to Jehovah's side, in the crisis hour of
conflict between him and the gods of her people. It was the faith that
prompted her to this decision that God commended; and "by faith" she
was preserved from destruction when her people perished.
Another case that has been thought to imply a divine approval of an
untrue statement, is that of Samuel, when he went to Bethlehem to
anoint David as Saul's successor on the throne of Israel, and, at the
Lord's command, said he had come to offer a sacrifice to God.[1] But
here clearly the narrative shows no lie, nor false statement, made or
approved. Samuel, as judge and prophet, was God's representative in
Israel. He was accustomed to go from place to place in the line of his
official ministry, including the offering at times of sacrifices of
communion.[2] When, on this occasion, the Lord told Samuel of his
purpose of designating a son of Jesse to succeed Saul on the throne,
and desired him to go to Bethlehem for further instructions, Samuel
was unnecessarily alarmed, and said, in his fear, "How can I go? if
Saul hear it, he will kill me." The Lord's simple answer was, "Take
an heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord. And
call Jesse to the sacrifice, and I will shew thee what thou shalt do:
and thou shalt anoint unto me him whom I name unto thee."
[Footnote 1: 1 Sam. 16: 1-3.]
[Footnote 2: 1 Sam. 7: 15-17; 9: 22-24; 11: 14,15; 20:29.]
In other words, the Lord said to Samuel, I want you to go to
Bethlehem as my representative, and offer a sacrifice there. Say this
fearlessly. In due time I will give you other directions; but do not
borrow trouble on account of them. Do your duty step by step. Speak
out the plain truth as to all that the authorities of Bethlehem have
any right to know; and do not fear any harm through my subsequent
private revelations to you. In these directions of the Lord there is
no countenance of the slightest swerving from the truth by Samuel;
nor is there an authorized concealment of any fact that those to whom
Samuel was sent had any claim to know.
Still another Bible incident that has been a cause of confusion to
those who did not see how God could approve lying, and a cause of
rejoicing to those who wanted to find evidence of his justification
of that practice, is the story of the prophet Micaiah, saying before
Jehoshaphat and Ahab that the Lord had put a lying spirit into the
mouths of all the false prophets who were at that time before
those kings.[1] Herbert Spencer actually cites this incident as an
illustration of the example set before the people of Israel, by their
God, of lying as a means of accomplishing a desired end.[2] But just
look at the story as it stands!
[Footnote 1: 1 Kings 22: 1-23; 2 Chron. 18: 1-34.]
[Footnote 2: _The Inductions of Ethics_, p. 158.]
Four hundred of Ahab's prophets were ready to tell him that a campaign
which he wanted to enter upon would be successful. Micaiah, an honest
prophet of the Lord, was sent for at Jehoshaphat's request, and was
urged by the messenger to prophesy to the same effect as Ahab's
prophets. Micaiah replied that he should give the Lord's message,
whether it was agreeable or not to Ahab. He came, and at first he
spoke satirically as if he agreed with the other prophets in deeming
the campaign a hopeful one. It was as though he said to the king, You
want me to aid you in your plans, not to give you counsel from the
Lord; therefore I will say, as your prophets have said, Go ahead, and
have success. It was evident, however, to Ahab, that the prophet's
words were not to be taken literally, but were a rebuke to him in
Oriental style, and therefore he told the prophet to give him the
Lord's message plainly. Then the prophet gave a parable, or a message
in Oriental guise, showing that these four hundred prophets of Ahab
were speaking falsely, as if inspired by a lying spirit, and that, if
Ahab followed their counsel, he would go to his ruin.
To cite this parable as a proof of Jehovah's commendation of lying is
an absurdity. Jehovah's prophet Micaiah was there before the
king, telling the simple truth to the king. And, in order to meet
effectively the claim of the false prophets that they were inspired,
he related, as it were, a vision, or a parable, in which he declared
that he had seen preparations making in heaven for their inspiring by
a lying spirit. This was, as every Oriental would understand it, a
parliamentary way of calling the four hundred prophets a pack of
liars; and the event proved that all of them were liars, and that
Micaiah alone, as Jehovah's prophet, was a truth-teller. What folly
could be greater than the attempt to count this public charge against
the lying prophets as an item of evidence in proof of the Lord's
responsibility for their lying--which the Lord's prophet took this
method of exposing and rebuking!
There are, indeed, various instances in the Bible story of lies told
by men who were in favor with God, where there is no ground for
claiming that those lies had approval with God. The men of the Bible
story are shown as men, with the sins and follies and weaknesses of
men. Their conduct is to be judged by the principles enunciated in the
Bible, and their character is to be estimated by the relation which
they sustained toward God in spite of their human infirmities.
Abraham is called the father of the faithful,[1] and he was known as
the friend of God.[2] But he indulged in the vice of concubinage,[3]
in accordance with the loose morals of his day and of his
surroundings; and when he was down in Egypt he lied through his
distrust of God, apparently thinking that there was such a thing as
a "lie of necessity," and he brought upon himself the rebuke of an
Egyptian king because of his lying.[4] But it would be folly to claim
that God approved of concubinage or of lying, because a man whom he
was saving was guilty of either of these vices. Isaac also lied,[5]
and so did Jacob;[6] but it was not because of their lies that these
men had favor with God. David was a man after God's own heart[7] in
his fidelity of spirit to God as the only true God, in contrast with
the gods of the nations round about Israel; but David lied,[8] as
David committed adultery.[9] It would hardly be claimed, however, that
either his adultery or his lying in itself made David a man after
God's own heart. So all along the Bible narrative, down to the time
when Ananias and Sapphira, prominent among the early Christians, lied
unto God concerning their very gifts into his treasury, and were
struck dead as a rebuke of their lying.[10]
[Footnote 1: Josh. 24:3; Isa. 51: 2; Matt. 3: 9; Rom. 4:12; Gal. 3:9]
[Footnote 2: 2 Chron. 20: 7; Isa. 41: 8; Jas. 2: 23.]
[Footnote 3: Gen. 16: 1-6.]
[Footnote 4: Gen. 12: 10-19.]
[Footnote 5: Gen. 26: 6-10.]
[Footnote 6: Gen. 27: 6-29.]
[Footnote 7: 1 Sam. 11: 1-27]
[Footnote 8: 1 Sam. 21: 1,2.]
[Footnote 9: 2 Sam. 11: 1-27.]
[Footnote 10: Acts 5: 1-11.]
The whole sweep of Bible teaching is opposed to lying; and the
specific injunctions against that sin, as well as the calls to the
duty of truth-speaking, are illustrative of that sweep. "Ye shall not
steal; neither shall ye deal falsely, nor lie one to another,"[1] says
the Lord, in holding up the right standard before his children. "A
lying tongue" is said to be "an abomination" before the Lord.[2] "A
faithful witness will not lie: but a false witness breatheth out
lies,"[3] says Solomon, in marking the one all-dividing line of
character; and as to the results of lying he says, "He that breatheth
out lies shall not escape,"[4] and "he that breatheth out lies shall
perish."[5] And he adds the conclusion of wisdom, in view of the
supposed profit of lying, "A poor man is better than a liar;"[6] that
is, a truth-telling poor man is better than a rich liar.
[Footnote 1: Lev. 19:11.]
[Footnote 2: Prov. 6:16, 17.]
[Footnote 3: Prov. 14:5.]
[Footnote 4: Prov. 19:5.]
[Footnote 5: Prov. 19:9.]
[Footnote 6: Prov. 19:22.]
The inspired Psalms are full of such teachings: "The wicked are
estranged from the womb: they go astray as soon as they be born,
speaking lies."[1] "They delight in lies."[2] "The mouth of them that
speak lies shall be stopped."[3] "He that speaketh falsehood shall not
be established before mine [the Psalmist's] eyes."[4] And the Psalmist
prays, "Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips."[5] In the New
Testament it is much the same as in the Old. "Lie not one to another;
seeing that ye have put off the old man with his doings,"[6] is the
apostolic injunction; and again, "Speak ye truth each one with his
neighbor: for we are members one of another."[7] There is no place for
a lie in Bible ethics, under the earlier dispensation or the later.
[Footnote 1: Psa. 58:3.]
[Footnote 2: Psa. 62:4.]
[Footnote 3: Psa. 63:11.]
[Footnote 4: Psa. 101: 7.]
[Footnote 5: Psa. 120: 2.]
[Footnote 6: Col. 3: 9.]
[Footnote 7: Eph. 4: 25.]
IV.
DEFINITIONS.
It would seem to be clear that the Bible, and also the other sacred
books of the world, and the best moral sense of mankind everywhere,
are united in deeming a lie incompatible with the idea of a holy
God, and consistent only with the spirit of man's arch-enemy--the
embodiment of all evil. Therefore he who, admitting this, would find a
place in God's providential plan for a "lie of necessity" must begin
with claiming that there are lies which are not lies. Hence it is of
prime importance to define a lie clearly, and to distinguish it from
allowable and proper concealments of truth.
A lie, in its stricter sense, is the affirming, by word or by action,
of that which is not true, with a purpose of deceiving; or the
denying, by word or by action, of that which is true, with a purpose
of deceiving. But the suppressing or concealing of essential facts,
from one who is entitled to know them, with a purpose of deceiving,
may practically amount to a lie.
Obviously a lie may be by act, as really as by word; as when a man
is asked to tell the right road, and he silently points in the wrong
direction. Obviously, also, the intention or purpose of deceiving is
in the essence of the lie; for if a man says that which is not true,
supposing it to be true, he makes a misstatement, but he does not lie;
or, again, if he speaks an untruth playfully where no deception is
wrought or intended, as by saying, when the mercury is below zero,
that it is "good summer weather," there is no lie in the patent
untruth.
So far all are likely to be agreed; but when it comes to the question
of that concealment which is in the realm of the lie, as distinct from
right and proper concealment, there is more difficulty in making
the lines of distinction clear to all minds. Yet those lines can be
defined, and it is important that they should be.
A witness on the stand in a court of law is bound by his oath, or his
affirmation, to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth," in the testimony that he gives in response to the questions
asked of him. If, therefore, in the course of his testimony, he
declares that he received five dollars for his share in a certain
transaction, when in reality he received five hundred dollars, his
concealment of the fact that he received a hundred times as much as he
admits having received, is practically a lie, and is culpable as such.
Any intentional concealment of essential facts in the matter at issue,
in his answers to questions asked of him as a witness, is a lie in
essence.
But a person who is not before a court of justice is not necessarily
bound to tell all the facts involved to every person whom he
addresses, or who desires to have him do so; and therefore, while a
concealment of facts which ought to be disclosed may be equivalent to
a lie, there is such a thing as the concealment of facts which is not
only allowable, but which is an unmistakable duty. And to know
when concealment is right, and when it is wrong, is to know when
concealment partakes of the nature of a lie, and when it is a totally
different matter.
Concealment, so far from being in itself a sin, is in itself right; it
is only in its misuse that it becomes reprehensible in a given case.
Concealment is a prime duty of man; as truly a duty as truth-speaking,
or chastity, or honesty. God, who cannot lie to his creatures,
conceals much from his creatures. "The secret things belong unto the
Lord our God: but the things that are revealed belong unto us and to
our children for ever,"[1] says the author of Deuteronomy; and the
whole course of God's revelation to man is in accordance with this
announced principle of God's concealment of that which ought to be
concealed. He who is himself the revelation of God says to his chosen
disciples, even when he is speaking his latest words to them before
his death: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear
them now;"[2] and he conceals what, as yet, it is better for them
should remain concealed.
[Footnote 1: Deut. 29: 29.]
[Footnote 2: John 16:12.]
There is a profound meaning in the suggestion, in the Bible story of
man's "fall," that, when man had come to the knowledge of good and
evil, the first practical duty which he recognized as incumbent upon
himself, was the duty of concealment;[1] and from that day to this
that duty has been incumbent on him. Man has a duty to conceal his
besetting impurities of thought and inclinations to sin; to conceal
such of his doubts and fears as would dishearten others and weaken
himself by their expression; to conceal his unkindnesses of spirit and
his unjust prejudices of feeling; to conceal, in fact, whatever of his
innermost personality is liable to work harm by its disclosure, and to
a knowledge of which his fellows have no just claim. In the world as
it is, there is more to be concealed than to be disclosed in every
individual life; and concealment rather than disclosure is the rule of
personal action.
[Footnote 1: Gen. 3:6, 7.]
Absolute and unrestricted frankness in social intercourse would be
brutal. The speaking of the whole truth at all times and to everybody
could have neither justification nor excuse between man and man. We
have no right to tell our fellows all that we think of them, or
fear for them, or suspect them of. We have no right to betray the
confidences of those who trust us, or to disclose to all the fact that
we have such confidences to conceal. We have no right to let it be
generally known that there are such peculiar struggles within us as
make our lives a ceaseless battle with temptations and fears and
doubts. There is such a thing as an indecent exposure of personal
opinions, and as a criminal disclosure of the treasures of the inner
life.[1] How to conceal aright that which ought to be concealed, is
one of the vital questions of upright living.
[Footnote 1: See 2 Kings 20: 12-19.]
The duty of right concealment stands over against the sin of lying.
Whatever ought to be concealed, should be concealed, if concealment
is a possibility without sinning. But the strongest desire for
concealment can never justify a lie as a means of concealment; and
concealment at the cost of a lie becomes a sin through the means
employed for its securing. On the other hand, when disclosure is a
duty, concealment is sinful, because it is made to stand in the way of
the performance of a duty. Concealment is not in itself wrong, but it
may become wrong through its misuse. Lying is in itself wrong, and it
cannot be made right through any seeming advantage to be gained by it.
Concealment which is right in one instance may be wrong in another
instance, the difference being in the relations of the two parties in
the case. A man who has lost a leg or an eye may properly conceal
from others generally the fact of his loss by any legitimate means of
concealment. His defect is a purely personal matter. The public has
no claim upon him for all the facts in the premises. He may have an
artificial limb or an artificial eye, so constructed as to conceal his
loss from the ordinary observer. There is nothing wrong in this. It
is in the line of man's primal duty of concealment. But if a man
thus disabled were applying for a life-insurance policy, or were an
applicant for re-enlistment in the army, or were seeking employment
where bodily wholeness is a requisite, it would be his duty to
make known his defect; and the concealment of it from the parties
interested would be in the realm of the lie.
So, again, if a man were proposing marriage, or were entering into
confidential relations with a partner in business, or were seeking
financial aid from a bank, he would have no right to conceal from the
party interested many a fact which he could properly conceal from the
public.
A man who would be justified in concealing from the general public
his mental troubles, or his business embarrassments, or his spiritual
perplexities, could not properly conceal the essential facts in the
case from his chosen adviser in medicine, or in law, or in matters of
religion. It is a man's duty to disclose the whole truth to him who
has a right to know the whole truth. It is a man's right, and it may
become his duty, to conceal a measure of the truth from one who is not
entitled to know that portion of the truth, so far as he can properly
make concealment. But as a lie is never justifiable, it is never a
proper means of concealment; and if concealment be, in any case, a
mode of lying, it is as bad as any other form of lying.
But concealment, even when it is of facts that others have no right to
know, may cause others to be deceived, and deliberate deceit is one
form of a lie. How, then, can concealment that is sure to result in
deception be free from the sin that invariably attaches to a lie in
any form, or of any nature whatsoever?
Concealment which is for the _purpose_ of deception, is one thing;
concealment which is only for the purpose of concealment, but which is
sure to _result_ in deception, is quite another thing. The one is not
justifiable, the other may be. In the one case it is a man's purpose
to deceive his fellow-man; in the other case it is simply his purpose
to conceal what his fellow-man has no right to know, and that
fellow-man receives a false impression, or deceives himself, in
consequence.
We may, or we may not, be responsible for the obvious results of our
action; and the moral measure of any action depends on the measure of
our responsibility in the premises. A surgeon, who is engaged in an
important and critical operation, is told that he is wanted elsewhere
in a case of life and death. If he sees it to be his duty to continue
where he is because he cannot safely leave this case at this time, he
obviously is not responsible for results which come because of his
absence from the side of the other sufferer. A man is by a river bank
when a boy is sinking before his eyes. If the man were to reach out
his arms to him, the boy might be saved. But the man makes no movement
in the boy's behalf, and the boy drowns. It might seem as though that
man were responsible for that boy's death; but when it is known that
the man is at that moment occupied in saving the life of his own son,
who is also struggling in the water, it will have to be admitted that
the father is not responsible for the results of his inaction in
another sphere than that which is for the moment the sphere of his
imperative duty.
If a wife and mother has to choose between her loving ministry to her
sick husband and to her sick child, and she chooses that which she
sees to be the more important duty of the hour, she is not responsible
for any results that follow from her inability to be in two places at
the same time. A man with a limited income may know that ten families
are in need of money, while he can give help to only two of them. Even
though others starve while he is supplying food to all whom he can
aid, he is not responsible for results that flow from his decision to
limit his ministry to his means.
In all our daily life, our decision to do the one duty of the hour
involves our refusal to do what is not our duty, and we have no
responsibility for the results which come from such a refusal. So in
the matter of the duty of concealment, if a man simply purposes the
concealment from another of that which the other has no right to know,
and does not specifically affirm by word or act that which is not
true, nor deny by act or word that which is true, he is in no degree
responsible for the self-deception by another concerning a point which
is no proper concern of that other person.
Others are self-deceived with reference to us in many things, beyond
our responsibility or knowledge. We may be considered weaker or
stronger, wiser or more simple, younger or older, gladder or sadder,
than we are; but for the self-deception on that point by the average
observer we are not responsible. We may not even be aware of it. It
is really no concern of ours--or of our neighbor's. It is merely an
incident of human life as it is. We may have an aching tooth or
an aching heart, and yet refrain from disclosing this fact in the
expression of our face. In such a case we merely conceal what is our
own possession from those who have no claim to know it. Even though
they deceive themselves as to our condition in consequence of our
looks, we are not responsible for their self-deception, because they
are not possessed of all the facts, nor have they any right to them,
nor yet to a fixed opinion in the case.
If a man were to have a patch put on his coat, he might properly have
it put on the under side of the coat instead of the outer side, thus
making what is called "a blind patch," for the purpose of concealing
the defect in his garment. Even though this course might result in a
false impression on the mind of the casual observer, the man would not
be blameworthy, as he would be if he had pursued the same course with
a purpose of deceiving a purchaser of the coat. So, again, in the
case of a mender of bric-a-brac: it would be right for him to
cement carefully the parts of a broken vase for the mere purpose of
concealing its damaged condition from the ordinary eye, but not for
the purpose of deceiving one who would be a purchaser.
A man whose city house is closed from the public in the summer season,
because of his absence in the country, has a perfect right to come
to that house for a single night, without opening the shutters and
lighting up the rooms in intimation of his presence. He may even keep
those shutters closed while his room is lighted, for the express
purpose of concealing the fact of his presence there, and yet not be
responsible for any false impression on the minds of passers-by, who
think that the proprietor is still in the country, and that the city
house is vacant. On the other hand, if the house be left lighted up
all through the night, with the shutters open, while the inmates are
asleep, for the very purpose of concealing from those outside the fact
that no one in the house is awake and on guard, the proprietor is not
responsible for any self-deception which results to those who have no
right to know the facts in the case.
And so, again, in the matter of having a man's hat or coat on the rack
in the front hall, while there are only women in the house, the sole
purpose of the action may be the concealment of the real condition of
affairs from those who have no claim to know the truth, and not the
deliberate deception of any party in interest. In so far as the
purpose is merely the concealment from others of the defenseless
condition of the house the action is obviously a proper one,
notwithstanding its liability to result in false impressions on the
minds of those who have no right to an opinion in the case.
While a man would be justified in concealing, without falsehood, the
fact of a bodily lack or infirmity on his part which concerned himself
alone, he would not be justified in concealing the fact that he was
sick of a contagious disease, or that his house was infected by
a disease that might be given to a caller there. Nor would he be
justified in concealing a defect in a horse or a cow in order to
deceive a man into the purchase of that animal as a sound one, any
more than he would be justified in slightly covering an opening in the
ground before his house, so as to deceive a disagreeable visitor into
stumbling into that hole.
It would be altogether proper for a man with a bald head to conceal
his baldness from the general public by a well-constructed wig. It
would likewise be proper for him to wear a wig in order to guard his
shining pate against flies while at church in July, or against danger
from pneumonia in January, even though wide-awake children in the
neighboring pews deceived themselves into thinking that he had a fine
head of natural hair. But if that man were to wear that wig for the
purpose of deceiving a young woman, whom he wished to marry, as to his
age and as to his freedom from bodily defects, it would be quite a
different matter. Concealment for the mere purpose of concealment may
be, not only justifiable, but a duty. Concealment for the purpose of
deception is never justifiable.
It would seem that this is the principle on which God acts with
reference to both the material and the moral universe. He conceals
facts, with the result that many a man is self-deceived, in his
ignorance, as to the size of the stars, and the cause of eclipses, and
the processes of nature, and the consequences of conduct, in many an
important particular. But man, and not God, is responsible for man's
self-deception concerning points at which man can make no claim to a
right to know all the truth.
It is true that this distinction is a delicate one, but it is a
distinction none the less real on that account. A moral line, like a
mathematical line, has length, but neither breadth nor thickness.
And the line that separates a justifiable concealment which causes
self-deception on the part of those who are not entitled to know the
whole truth in the matter, and the deliberate concealment of truth for
the specific purpose of deception, is a line that runs all the way
up from the foundations to the summit of the universe. This line of
distinction is vital to an understanding of the question of the duty
of truth-speaking, and of the sin of lying.
An effort at right concealment may include truthful statements which
are likely, or even sure, to result in false impressions on the mind
of the one to whom they are addressed, and who in consequence deceives
himself as to the facts, when the purpose of those statements is
not the deception of the hearer. A husband may have had a serious
misunderstanding with his wife that causes him pain of heart, so that
his face gives sign of it as he comes out of the house in the morning.
The difficulty which has given him such mental anxiety is one which he
ought to conceal. He has no right to disclose it to others. Yet he has
no right to speak an untruth for the purpose of concealing that which
he ought to conceal.
It may be that the mental trouble has already deprived him of sleep,
and has intensified his anxiety over a special business matter that
awaits his attention down town, and that all this shows in his face.
If so, these facts are secondary but very real causes of his troubled
look, as he meets a neighbor on leaving his house, who says to him:
"You look very much troubled this morning. What's the matter with
you?" Now, if he were to say in reply, "Then my looks belie me; for I
have no special trouble," he would say what was not true. But he might
properly say, "I think it is very likely. I didn't sleep well last
night, and I am very tired this morning. And I have work before me
to-day that I am not easy about." Those statements being literally
true, and being made for the purpose of concealing facts which his
questioner has no right to know, their utterance is justifiable,
regardless of the workings of the mind of the one who hears them. They
are made in order to conceal what is back of them, not in order to
deceive one who is entitled to know those primary facts.
If, again, a physician in attendance on a patient sees that there
is cause for grave anxiety in the patient's condition, and deems
it important to conceal his fears, so far as he can without
untruthfulness, he may, in answer to direct questions from his
patient, give truthful answers that are designed to conceal what he
has a right to conceal, without his desiring to deceive his patient,
and without his being responsible for any self-deception on his
patient's part that results from their conversation. The patient may
ask, "Doctor, am I very sick?" The doctor may answer truthfully, "Not
so sick as you might be, by a good deal." He may give this answer with
a cheerful look and tone, and it may result in calming the patient's
fears.
If, however, the patient goes on to ask, "But, doctor, do you think
I'm going to die?" the doctor may respond lightly, "Well, most of us
will die sooner or later, and I suppose you are not to be exempt from
the ordinary lot of mortals." "But," continues the patient, "do you
think I am going to die of this disease?" Then the doctor can say,
seriously and truthfully, "I'm sure I don't know. The future is
concealed from me. You may live longer than I do. I certainly hope
you are not going to die yet awhile, and I'm going to do all I can to
prevent it." All this would be justifiable, and be within the limits
of truthfulness. Concealment of the opinions of the physician as to
the patient's chances of life, and not the specific deception of the
patient, is the object of these answers.
In no event, however, would the physician be justified in telling a
lie, any more than he would be in committing any other sin, as a means
of good. He is necessarily limited by the limits of right, in the
exercise of his professional skill, and in the choice of available
means. He is in no wise responsible for the consequences of his
refusal to go beyond those limits.
Concealment may be, or may not be, of the nature of deception.
Concealment is not right when disclosure is a duty. Concealment of
that which may properly be concealed is not in itself wrong. Efforts
at concealment must, in order to be right, be kept within the limits
of strict truthfulness of statement. Concealment for the purpose of
deception is in the realm of the lie. Concealment for the mere purpose
of concealment may be in the realm of positive duty--in the sight of
God and for the sake of our fellows.
It is to be borne in mind that the definitions here given do not pivot
on the specific illustrations proffered for their explanation. If, in
any instance, the illustration seems inapt or imperfect, it may
be thrown aside, and reference made to the definition itself. The
definition represents the principle involved; the illustration is only
a suggestion of the principle.
V.
THE PLEA OF "NECESSITY."
The story is told of an old Quaker, who, after listening for a time
to the unstinted praises, by a dry-goods salesman, of the various
articles he was trying to dispose of, said quietly: "Friend, it is a
great pity that lying is a sin, since it seems so necessary in thy
business." It has been generally supposed that this remark of the old
Quaker was a satirical one, rather than a serious expression of regret
over the clashing of the demands of God's nature with the practical
necessities of men. Yet, as a matter of fact, there are moral
philosophers, and writers on Christian ethics, who seem to take
seriously the position assumed by this Quaker, and who argue
deliberately that there are such material advantages to be secured
by lying, in certain emergencies, that it would be a great pity to
recognize any unvarying rule, with reference to lying, that would
shut off all possibility of desired gain from this practice under
conditions of greatest urgency.
It is claimed that lying proffers such unmistakable advantages in time
of war, and of sickness, and in dealings with would-be criminals
and the insane, and other classes exempt from ordinary social
consideration, that lying becomes a necessity when the gain from it is
of sufficient magnitude. Looked at in this light, lying is not sinful
_per se_, but simply becomes sinful by its misuse or untimeliness; for
if it be sinful _per se_, no temporary or material advantage from its
exercise could ever make it other than sinful.
If, indeed, the rightfulness of lying is contingent on the results
to be hoped for or to be feared from it, the prime question with
reference to it, in a moral estimate of its propriety, is the limit of
profit, or of gain, which will justify it as a necessity. But with all
that has been written on this subject in the passing centuries, the
advocates of the "lie of necessity" have had to contend with the moral
sense of the world as to the sinfulness of lying, and with the fact
that lying is not merely a violation of a social duty, but is contrary
to the demands of the very nature of God, and of the nature of man
as formed in the image of God. And it has been the practice of such
advocates to ignore or to deny the testimony of this moral sense of
the race, and to persist in looking at lying mainly in the light of
its social aspects.
That the moral sense of the race is against the admissibility of the
rightfulness of lying, is shown by the estimate of this sin as a sin
in the ethnic conceptions of it, even among peoples who indulge freely
in its practice, as well as in the teachings of the sacred books of
the ages. And, moreover, it is _not_ the fact, as is often claimed,
that lying is generally admitted to be allowable between enemies in
war time, or by a physician to his patient, or by a sane man to one
who is insane, or in order to the prevention of crime, or for the
purpose of securing some real or supposed advantage in any case.
The right to conceal from the enemy one's weakness, or one's plans,
by any exhibit of "quaker guns," or of mock fortifications, or of
movements and counter-movements, or of feints of attack, or of surplus
watchfires, in time of warfare, is recognized on all sides. But the
right to lie to or to deceive the enemy by sending out a flag of
truce, as if in desire for a peaceful conference, and following it up
with an attack on his lines in an unsuspecting moment, is not admitted
in any theory of "civilized warfare." And while a scout may creep
within the enemy's lines, and make observations of the enemy's
weakness and strength of position, without being open to any charge of
dishonorable conduct,--if he comes disguised as a soldier of the
other side than his own, or if he claims to be a mere civilian or
non-combatant, he is held to be a "spy," and as such he is denied a
soldier's death, and must yield his life on the gallows as a deceiver
and a liar.
The distinction between justifiable concealment for the mere purpose
of concealment, and concealment for the express purpose of deceiving,
is recognized as clearly in warfare as in peaceful civil life; and the
writer on Christian ethics who appeals to the approved practices of
warfare in support of the "lie of necessity" can have only the plea of
ignorance as an excuse for his baseless argument.
An enemy in warfare has no right to know the details of his opponent's
plans for his overcoming; but his opponent has no right to lie to
him, by word or action, as a means of concealment; for a lie is never
justifiable, and therefore is never a necessity. And this is admitted
in the customs of honorable warfare. Illustrations of this distinction
are abundant. A Federal officer, taken prisoner in battle, was brought
before a Confederate officer for examination. He was asked his name,
his rank, his regiment, his brigade, his division, and his corps. To
all these questions he gave truthful answers promptly; for the enemy
had a right to information at these points concerning a prisoner of
war. But when the question came, "What is the present strength of your
corps?" he replied, "Two and a half millions." "That cannot be true,"
said the Confederate officer. "Do you expect me to tell you the truth,
Colonel, in such a matter?" he responded, in reminder of the fact that
it was proper for him to conceal facts which the other had no right to
know; and his method of concealment was by an answer that was intended
to conceal, but not to deceive.
In Libby Prison, during war time, the attempt to prevent written
messages being carried out by released prisoners was at first made by
the careful examination of the clothing and persons of such prisoners;
but this proved to be ineffectual. Then it was decided to put every
outgoing prisoner on his word of honor as a soldier in this matter;
and that was effectual. A true soldier would require something more
than the average treatise on Christian ethics to convince him that a
lie to an enemy in war time is justifiable as a "lie of necessity," on
the ground of its profitableness.
In dealing with the sick, however desirable it may be, in any
instance, to conceal from a patient his critical condition, the
difference must always be observed between truthful statements that
conceal that which the physician, or other speaker, has a right to
conceal, and statements that are not strictly true, or that are made
for the explicit purpose of deceiving the patient. It is a physician's
duty to conceal from a patient his sense of the grave dangers
disclosed to his professional eye, and which he is endeavoring to meet
successfully. And, in wellnigh every case, it is possible for him to
give truthful answers that will conceal from his patient what he ought
to conceal; for the best physician does not know the future, and his
professional guesses are not to be put forward as if they were assured
certitudes.
If, indeed, it were generally understood, as many ethical writers are
disposed to claim, that physicians are ready to lie as a help to their
patients' recovery, physicians, as a class, would thereby be deprived
of the power of encouraging their patients by words of sincere and
hearty confidence. There are physicians whose most hopeful assurances
are of little or no service to their patients, because those
physicians are known to be willing to lie to a patient in an
emergency; and how can a timid patient be sure that his case does not
present such an emergency? Therefore it is that a physician's habit of
lying to his patients as a means of cure would cause him to lose the
power of aiding by truthful assurances those patients who most needed
help of this sort.
It is poor policy, as policy, to venture a lie in behalf of a single
patient, at the cost of losing the power to make the truth beneficial
to a hundred patients whose lives may be dependent on wise words of
encouragement. And the policy is still poorer as policy, when it is in
the line of an unmistakable sin. And many a good physician like many
a good soldier, repudiates the idea of a "lie of necessity" in his
profession.
Since lying is sinful because a lie is always a lie unto God, the fact
that a lie is spoken to an insane person or to a would-be criminal
does not make it any the less a sin in God's sight. And it is held by
some of the most eminent physicians to the insane that lying to the
insane is as poor policy as it is bad morals, and that it is never
justifiable, and therefore is never a "necessity" in that sphere.[1]
[Footnote 1: See, for example, the views of Dr. Thomas S. Kirkbride,
physician-in-chief and superintendent of the Pennsylvania Hospital
for the Insane, in the Report of that institution for 1883, at pages
74-76. In speaking of the duty of avoiding deception in dealings with
the insane, he said: "I never think it right to speak anything but the
truth."]
So also in dealing with the would-be criminal, a lie is not
justifiable in order to save one's life, or one's possessions that are
dearer than life, nor yet to prevent the commission of a crime or to
guard the highest interests of those whom we love. Yet concealment of
that which ought to be concealed is as truly a duty when disclosure
would lead to crime, or would imperil the interests of ourselves or
others, as it is in all the ordinary affairs of life; but lying as a
means of concealment is not to be tolerated in such a case any more
than in any other case.
If a robber, with a pistol in his hand, were in a man's bedroom at
night, it would not be wrong for the defenseless inmate to remain
quiet in his bed, in concealment of the fact that he was awake, if
thereby he could save his life, at the expense of his property. If a
would-be murderer were seeking his victim, and a man who knew this
fact were asked to tell of his whereabouts, it would be that man's
duty to conceal his knowledge at this point by all legitimate means.
He might refuse to speak, even though his own life were risked
thereby; for it were better to die than to lie. And so in many another
emergency.
A lie being a sin _per se_, no price paid for it, nor any advantage to
be gained from it, would make it other than a sin. The temptation to
look at it as a "necessity" may, indeed, be increased by increasing
the supposed cost of its refusal; but it is a temptation to
wrong-doing to the last. It was a heathen maxim, "Do right though the
heavens fall," and Christian ethics ought not to have a lower standard
than that of the best heathen morality.
Duty toward God cannot be counted out of this question. God himself
cannot lie. God cannot justify or approve a lie. Hence it follows that
he who deliberately lies in order to secure a gain to himself, or to
one whom he loves, must by that very act leave the service of God, and
put himself for the time being under the rule of the "father of
lies." Thus in an emergency which seems to a man to justify a "lie of
necessity" that man's attitude toward God might be indicated in this
address to him: "Lord, I should prefer to continue in your service,
and I would do so if you were able and willing to help me. But I find
myself in an emergency where a lie is a 'necessity,' and so I must
avail myself of the help of 'the father of lies.' If I am carried
through this crisis by his help, I shall be glad to resume my position
in your service." The man whose whole moral nature recoils from this
position, will not be led into it by the best arguments of Christian
philosophers in favor of the "lie of necessity."
VI.
CENTURIES OF DISCUSSION.
Because of the obvious gain in lying in times of extremity, and
because of the manifest peril or cost of truth-telling in an
emergency, attempts have been made, by interested or prejudiced
persons, all along the ages, to reconcile the general duty of adhering
to an absolute standard of right, with the special inducements, or
temptations, to depart from that standard for the time being. It has
been claimed by many that the results of a lie would, under certain
circumstances, justify the use of a lie,--the good end in this case
justifying the bad means in this case. And the endeavor has also been
made to show that what is called a lie is not always a lie. Yet there
have ever been found stalwart champions of the right, ready to insist
that a lie is a sin _per se_, and therefore not to be justified by any
advantage or profit in its utterance.
Prominent in the earlier recorded discussions of the centuries
concerning the admissibility of the lie, are those of the Jewish
Talmudists and of the Christian Fathers. As in the Bible story the
standard of right is recognized as unvariable, even though such Bible
characters as Abraham and Jacob and David, and Ananias and Sapphira,
fail to conform to it in personal practice; so in the records of the
Talmud and the Fathers there are not wanting instances of godly men
who are ready to speak in favor of a departure from the strictest
requirement of the law of truth, even while the great sweep of
sentiment is seen to be in favor of the line that separates the lie
from the truth eternally.
Hamburger, a recognized Jewish authority in this sphere, represents
the teachings of the Talmud as even more comprehensive and explicit
than the Bible itself, in favor of the universal duty of truthfulness.
He says: "Mosaism, with its fundamental law of holiness, has
established the standard of truthfulness with incomparable
definiteness and sharpness (see Lev. 19: 2, 12, 13, 34-37).
Truthfulness is here presented as derived directly from the principle
of holiness, and to be practiced without regard to resulting benefit
or injury to foe or to friend, to foreigner or to countryman. In this
moral loftiness these Mosaic teachings as to truthfulness pervade the
whole Bible. In the Talmud they receive a profounder comprehension and
a further development. Truthfulness toward men is represented as a
duty toward God; and, on the other hand, any departure from it is a
departure from God."[1]
[Footnote 1: Hamburger's _Real-Encyclopadie fuer Bibel und Talmud_, I.,
art. "Truthfulness" (_Wahrhaftigkeit_).]
As specimen illustrations of the teachings of the Talmud on this
theme, Hamburger quotes these utterances from its pages: "He who
alters his word, at the same time commits idolatry." "Three are hated
of God: he who speaks with his mouth otherwise than as he feels with
his heart; he who knows of evidence against any one, and does not
disclose it," etc. "Four cannot appear before God: the scorner, the
hypocrite, the liar, and the slanderer." "'A just measure thou shalt
keep;' that is, we should not think one thing in our heart, and speak
another with our mouth." "Seven commit the offense of theft: he who
steals [sneaks into] the good will of another; he who invites his
friend to visit him, and does not mean it in his heart; he who offers
his neighbor presents, knowing beforehand that he will not receive
them," etc.
And Hamburger adds: "Every lie, therefore, however excellent the
motive, is decidedly forbidden.... In the tract Jebamoth, 63, Raba
blames his son for employing a 'lie of necessity' _(nothluege)_ to
restore peace between his father and his mother.... It is clear that
the Talmud decidedly rejects the principle that 'the end justifies the
means.'"[1]
[Footnote 1: Compare also art. "Falseness" _(Falscheit)_.]
On the other hand, Hamburger cites Rabbi Ishmael, one of the
Talmudists, as teaching that a Jew might transgress even the
prohibition of idolatry (and lying is, according to Talmudic teaching,
equivalent to idolatry) in order to save his life, provided the act
was not done in public. In support of his position, Rabbi Ishmael
cited the declaration concerning the statutes of Moses in Leviticus
18: 5, "which if a man do he shall live in them," and added by way of
explanation: "He [the Israelite] is to live through the law, but is
not to die through it."[1]
[Footnote 1: See Hamburger's _Real-Encyc_., II., art. "Ismael R."]
And Isaac Abohab, an eminent Spanish rabbi, in his _Menorath
Hammaor_[1] gives other illustrations from the Talmud of the advocacy
of special exceptions to the strict law of truthfulness, with a good
purpose in view, notwithstanding the sweeping claim to the contrary
by Hamburger. He says: "Only when it is the intention to bring about
peace between men, may anything be altered in discourse; as is taught
in the tract Jebamoth. Rabbi Ilai says, in the name of Rabbi Jehuda,
son of Rabbi Simeon: 'One may alter something in discourse for the
sake of establishing harmony.'... Rabbi Nathan says: 'This indeed is a
duty.'... Rabbi Ishmael taught: 'Peace is of such importance that for
its sake God even alters facts.'" In each of these cases the rabbi
cited misapplies a Bible passage in support of his position.
[Footnote 1: See German translation by R.J. Fuerstenthal, Discourse
II., I.]
Isaac Abohab adds: "In like manner the rabbis say that one may praise
a bride in the presence of her bridegroom, and say that she
is handsome and devout, when she is neither, if the intention
predominates to make her attractive in the eyes of her bridegroom.
Nevertheless a man is not to tell lies even in trifling matters, lest
lying should come to be a habit with him, as is warned against in the
tract Jebamoth."
Thus it would appear that there were discussions on this subject
among the rabbis of the Talmud, and that while there were those who
advocated the "lie of necessity," as a matter of personal gain or as a
means of good to others, there were those who stood firmly against any
form of the lie, or any falsity, as in itself at variance with the
very nature of God, and with the plain duty of God's children.
Among the Christian Fathers it was much the same as among the Jewish
rabbis, in discussions over this question. The one unvarying standard
was recognized, by the clearest thinkers, as binding on all for
always; yet there were individuals inclined to find a reason for
exceptions in the practical application of this standard. The phase of
the question that immediately presented itself to the early Christians
was, whether it were allowable for a man to deny to a pagan enemy that
he was a Christian, or that one whom he held dear was a Christian,
when the speaking of the truth would cost him his life, or cost the
life of one whom he loved.
There were those who held that the duty to speak the truth was merely
a social obligation, and that when a man showed himself as an enemy
of God and of his fellows, he shut himself out from the pale of this
social obligation; moreover, that when such a man could be deterred
from crime, and at the same time a Christian's life could be
preserved, by the telling of an untruth, a falsehood would be
justifiable. If the lie were told in private under such circumstances,
it was by such persons considered different from a public denial of
one's faith. But, on the other hand, the great body of Christians,
in the apostolic age, and in the age early following, acted on the
conviction that a lie is a sin _per se_, and that no emergency could
make a lie a necessity. And it was in fidelity to this conviction that
the roll of Christian martyrs was so gloriously extended.
Justin Martyr, whose Apologies in behalf of the Christians are the
earliest extant, speaks for the best of the class he represents when
he says: "It is in our power, when we are examined, to deny that we
are Christians; but we would not live by telling a lie."[1] And again:
"When we are examined, we make no denial, because we are not conscious
of any evil, but count it impious not to speak the truth in all
things, which also we know is pleasing to God."[2] There was no
thought in such a mind as Justin Martyr's, or in the minds of his
fellow-martyrs, that any life was worth saving at the cost of a lie in
God's sight.
[Footnote 1: First Apology, Chapter 8.]
[Footnote 2: Second Apology, Chapter 4.]
There were many temptations, and great ones, to the early Christians,
to evade the consequences of being known as refusers to worship the
gods of the Romans; and it is not to be wondered at that many poor
mortals yielded to those temptations. Exemption from punishment could
be purchased by saying that one had offered sacrifices to the gods,
or by accepting a certificate that such sacrifice had been made, even
when such was not the fact; or, again, by professing a readiness to
sacrifice, without the intention of such compliance, or by permitting
a friend to testify falsely as to the facts; and there were those who
thought a lie of this sort justifiable, for the saving of their lives,
when they would not have openly renounced their Christian faith.[1]
There was much discussion over these practices in the writings of the
Fathers; but while there was recognized a difference between open
apostasy and the tolerance of a falsehood in one's behalf, it was held
by the church authorities that a lie was always sinful, even though
there were degrees in modes of sinning.
[Footnote 1: See Smith and Cheetham's _Dictionary of Christian
Antiquities_, art. "Libelli." See also Bingham's _Antiquities of the
Christian Church_, Book XVI., Chap. 13, Section 5; also Book XVI.,
Chap. 3, Section 14; with citations from Tertullian, Origen, and
Cyprian.]
Ringing words against all forms of lying were spoken by some of the
Christian Fathers. Says the Shepherd of Hermas: "Love the truth, and
let nothing but truth proceed from your mouth, that the spirit which
God has placed in your flesh may be found truthful before all men; and
the Lord, who dwelleth in you, will be glorified, because the Lord is
truthful in every word, and in him is no falsehood. They, therefore,
who lie, deny the Lord, and rob him, not giving back to him the
deposit which they have received. For they received from him a spirit
free from falsehood. If they give him back this spirit untruthful,
they pollute the commandment of the Lord, and become robbers."[1]
[Footnote 1: Book II., Commandment Third. _The Ante-Nicene Fathers_
(Am. ed.), II., 21.]
Tertullian names among "sins of daily committal, to which we all
are liable," the "sin" of "lying, from bashfulness [or modesty], or
'necessity.'"[1] Origen also speaks of the frequency of "lying, or of
idle talking;"[2] as if possibly its frequency were in some sense an
excuse for it. And Origen specifically claimed that the apostles
Peter and Paul agreed together to deceive their hearers at Antioch by
simulating a dissension between themselves, when in reality they were
agreed.[3] Origen also seemed to approve of false speaking to those
who were not entitled to know all the truth; as when he says of the
cautious use of falsehood, "a man on whom necessity imposes the
responsibility of lying is bound to use very great care, and to use
falsehood as he would a stimulant or a medicine, and strictly to
preserve its measure, and not go beyond the bounds observed by Judith
in her dealings with Holofernes, whom she overcame by the wisdom with
which she dissembled her words."[4]
[Footnote 1: "On Modesty," Chap. 19. _The Ante-Nicene Fathers_, XIV.,
97.]
[Footnote 2: Origen's Commentaries on Matthew, Tract VI., p. 60; cited
in Bingham's _Antiq. of Chr. Ch_., Book XVI., Chap. 3.]
[Footnote 3: Gal. 2: 11-14. A concise statement of the influence
of this teaching of Origen on the patristic interpretations of the
passage in Galatians, is given by Lightfoot in his commentary on
Galatians, sixth edition, pp. 128-132.]
[Footnote 4: Quoted from the sixth book of Origen's Miscellanies by
Jerome, in his Apology against Rufinus, Book I., sec. 18. See _The Nicene
and Post-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am. ed.), III., 492. See,
also, Neander's _Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik_, pp. 160, 167.]
There were Christian Fathers who found it convenient to lie, in their
own behalf or in behalf of others; and it was quite natural for such
mortals to seek to find an excuse for lies that "seemed so necessary"
for their purposes. When Gregory of Nyssa, in his laudable effort to
bring about a reconciliation between his elder brother Basil and their
uncle, was "induced to practice a deceit which was as irreconcilable
with Christian principles as with common sense,"[1] he was ready to
argue in defense of such a course.
[Footnote 1: Moore's _Life of S. Gregory of Nyssa. The Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers_, second series (Am. ed.), V., 5.]
So again, when his brother Basil was charged with falsehood in a
comparatively "trivial" matter, (where, in fact, he had merely been
in error unintentionally,) Gregory falls back upon the comforting
suggestion, that as to lying, in one way or another everybody is at
fault; "accordingly, we accept that general statement which the Holy
Spirit uttered by the Prophet, 'Every man is a liar.'"[1] Gregory
protests against the "solemn reflections on falsehood" by Eunomius, in
this connection, and his seeing equal heinousness in it whether in
great or very trivial matters. "Cease," he says, "to bid us think it
of no account to measure the guilt of a falsehood by the slightness
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