An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
David Hume et al
Part 4 out of 4
independently of the existence of any object, 20.
a kind of philosophy, 113 (v. _Miracles, Providence_).
19, 41 (v. _Similarity_).
and idea of power, 53 n.
A. antecedent to study and philosophy, such as Descartes' universal
doubt of our faculties, would be incurable: in a more
moderate sense it is useful, 116 (cf. 129-30);
extravagant attempts of, to destroy reason by reasoning, 124.
No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything
at all, 116;
admits of no answer and produces no conviction, 122 n. (cf. 34, 126,
B. _As to the Senses_, 117-123.
The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be
corrected by Reason, 117;
more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external
objects is baseless, and that the objects we see are nothing
but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other
even this philosophy is hard to justify; it appeals neither to
natural instinct, nor to experience, for experience tells
nothing of objects which perceptions resemble, 119;
the appeal to the _veracity of God_ is useless, 120;
and scepticism is here triumphant, 121.
_The distinction between primary and secondary qualities_ is useless,
for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions, 122;
and Berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by
abstraction is impossible, 122, 122 n;
if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there
is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth
arguing about, 123.
C. _As to Reason_, 124-130.
Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant, 124;
objection to _abstract reasoning_ because it asserts infinite
divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense,
and infinite divisibility of time, 125;
yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism
becomes sceptical about itself, 125.
Popular objections to _moral reasoning_ about matter of fact, based
on weakness of understanding, variation of judgement, and
disagreement among men, confuted by action, 126;
philosophical objections, that we only experience conjunction and
that inference is based on custom, 127;
excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by
the most trivial event in life, 128.
Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective
and as producing caution and modesty, 129;
and as limiting understanding to proper objects, 130;
all reasoning which is not either abstract, about quantity and
number, or experimental, about matters of fact, is sophistry
and illusion, 132.
D. In _Religion_ (v. _Miracles_, _Providence_).
132 (v. _Reason_, (d); _Scepticism_, C).
counteracting causes, 47, 67.
outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of
thinking--must be corrected by reason, 117.
Scepticism concerning, 117 (v. _Scepticism_, B).
basis of all arguments from experience, 31 (cf. 115).
a supposed primary quality, 122.
and body, 52.
and time, 124 f.
an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference
to its cause, 115 (cf. 113).
6 (v. _Providence_).
science of, 132 (v. _God_, _Providence_).
argument against real presence, 86.
and space, 124 f.
8, 17 (v. _Scepticism_).
limits of human, 7;
operations of, to be classified, 8;
opp. experience, 28;
weakness of, 126 (v. _Reason_, _Scepticism_).
as ground of distinction between virtues and talents, 130.
theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole,' 79, 80.
compounds materials given by senses, 13;
influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of
power; for we are not conscious of any power in our will,
only of sequence of motions on will, 52;
so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas, 53.
Of God, cannot be used to explain motion, 57.
Freedom of (v. _Necessity_).
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