Ethics
by
Aristotle
Part 6 out of 6
it ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what
we may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.
First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there may
be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities we
have collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy
Communities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some
are well and others ill managed, for after such inquiry, we shall be the
better able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of Constitution
is best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and what laws and
customs.
To this let us now proceed.
NOTES
P 2, l. 16. For this term, as here employed, our language contains no
equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.
There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in
which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication "The
science of Society," and this includes everything which can bear at
all upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, "Quicquid agunt
homines nostri est farrago libelli." It is in this view that it is
fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.
The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is "Moral
Philosophy." Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the
Rhetoric (1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti
prosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise
the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of
Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the
larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building
of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the
field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of
a [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each,
and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and
most complete development.
The third sense is "The detail of Civil Government," which Aristotle
expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.
P 3, l. 23. Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some
definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the
best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in
the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by
education. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and
wisest man of one's acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a
difficult case of conduct.
Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.
P 3, l. 35. In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it is
said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only insatiable,
but indiscriminate in its objects, [Greek: pantachothen].
P 4, l. 30. [Greek: 'Archae] is a word used in this treatise in various
significations. The primary one is "beginning or first cause," and this
runs through all its various uses.
"Rule," and sometimes "Rulers," are denoted by this term the initiative
being a property of Rule.
"Principle" is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most
characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means "starting-point."
Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve ([Greek: ou eneka]), and
that of Action ([Greek: othen ae kenaesis]). I desire praise of men this
then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be
attained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning
of Action.
The beginnings of Resolve, '[Greek: Archai] or Motives, when formally
stated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the [Greek:
sullagismoi ton prakton], i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be
analysed.
Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the
Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.
Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:
Whatever gains human praise is to be done;
Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:
[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.
The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and
this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
P. 5, l 1. The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the
signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima
aplos]
I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as
denoting respectively what _is_ and what _may_ be known. All truth
is [Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we
individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek:
gnorima aemin] which _we have received as true_. From this appears
immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study
of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work
principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon
as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do.
The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the
fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the
first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right
the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as
little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he
should ask.
But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect.
10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so
denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed
before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed
before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meet
with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and
laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin]
Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage,
which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume
principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says,
"We must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes
either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with
particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in
habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a
fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will
be no want of the reason for the fact in addition"
The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai]
occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of "principles."
Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.
P 6, l. 1. Or "prove themselves good," as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25,
[Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported
by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d' upo ton epieikon kai
eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri
auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton
krisei]
P 6, l. 11. [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement
by any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to
mean any dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.
P 6, l. 13. A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because
containing miscellaneous questions.
P 6, l. 15. It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle
refers to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest
happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the
reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that
is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek: theoria]
cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the first, men
would have been for making the experiment at once, without the trouble
of self-discipline.
P 6, l. 22. Or, as some think, "many theories have been founded on
them."
P. 8, l. 1. The list ran thus--
[Greek:
to peras to apeiron | to euthu
to perisson to artion | to phos
to en to plethos | to tetragonon
to dexion to aristeron | to aeremoun
to arren to thelu | to agathon
]
P 8, l. 2. Plato's sister's son.
P 9, l. 9. This is the capital defect in Aristotle's eyes, who being
eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not
necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by
enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way
of stating facts, and leads to no action.
P. 10, l. 34. _i.e._ the identification of Happiness with the Chief
Good.
P. 11, l. 11. _i.e._ without the capability of addition.
P. 11, l. 14. And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the
Chief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the
Chief Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden
tagathon an eiae o meta tenos ton kath' auto agathon airetoteron
ginetai.]
P. 12, l. 9. _i.e._ as working or as quiescent.
P. 13, 1. 14. This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations,
in the Topics, I. chap. ix.
P. 13, l. 19. Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral
senses. "Fire burns," is an instance of the former, "Treason is odious,"
of the latter.
P. 14, l. 27. I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of
this word, because though "habitus" may be equivalent to all the senses
of [Greek: exis], "habit" is not, at least according to our colloquial
usage we commonly denote by "habit" a state formed by habituation.
P. 14, l. 35. Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this
passage is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them
depend grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered,
however, that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known
meaning also the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point
of the passage seems more completely brought out.
P. 15 l. 16. "Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection
to goodness." (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure
in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of
perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure being
as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness then
implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its object
present, and pleasure continually result.
P. 15, l. 32. In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that
external circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness
not that Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to
be identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have
a fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].
P. 16, l. 18. It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he
considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct
gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to
self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore
that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to
come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other
reasons why we should think with him.
P. 16, l. 26. This term is important, what has been maimed was once
perfect; he does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being
born incapable of virtue, and so of happiness.
P. 17, l. 3. But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work
to do?
P. 18, l. 6. The supposed pair of ancestors.
P. 18, l. 12. Solon says, "Call no man happy till he is dead." He must
mean either, The man when dead _is_ happy (a), or, The man when dead
_may be said to have been happy_ (b). If the former, does he mean
positive happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness ([Greek: B])?
_We_ cannot allow (a), Men's opinions disallow ([Greek: B]), We revert
now to the consideration of (b).
P. 18, l. 36. The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion
commonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive
that Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is
changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we
have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.
P. 20, l. 12. The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of
course, dressed his actors _for their parts;_ not according to their
fancies or his own.
Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable
paraphrase on this.
"Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by
proportion with that which every man's estate in this present life
requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth
wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work,
rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then
the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for men
of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior condition
many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely they are
blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what their
station and place asketh, though they have no more."
P. 20, l. 18. Always bearing in mind that man "never continueth in one
stay."
P. 20, l. 11. The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must
be in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will
be true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends:
and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be
liable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to
presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.
P. 21, l. 18. This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which
are either so _in esse_ or _in posse_.
If _in esse_, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Those
_in posse_, here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. Thus
Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to
support villainy. Money in like way.
P. 22, l. 4. Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards
adopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in
the Tenth Book) of irreproachable character.
P. 22, l. 13. See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.
P. 24, l. 23. The unseen is at least as real as the seen.
P. 24, l. 29. The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here
used in their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he
who has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to
keep them under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly
prevail over his reason and previous good resolutions.
By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state
in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek:
sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the
remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till they
are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and the
man in it [Greek: akolastos].
P. 25, l. 2. This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek:
echein logon tinos], really denotes substituting that person's [Greek:
logos] for one's own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control
or perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own
impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical
truths as part of the mental furniture, _i.e._ knowing them.
P 25, l. 16. [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian],
and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and
Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the
latter, but only for exerting and using the former.
P. 26, l. 2. Which we call simply virtue.
P. 26, l. 4. For nature must of course supply the capacity.
P. 26, l. 18. Or "as a simple result of nature."
P. 28, l. 12. This is done in the Sixth Book.
P. 28, l. 21. It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular
details of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule
can be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler's
Sermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit. P. 29, l.
32. The words [Greek: akolastos] and [Greek: deilos] are not used here
in their strict significations to denote confirmed states of vice the
[Greek: enkrates] necessarily feels pain, because he must always be
thwarting passions which are a real part of his nature, though this pain
will grow less and less as he nears the point of [Greek: sophrosyne] or
perfected Self-Mastery, which being attained the pain will then, and
then only, cease entirely. So a certain degree of fear is necessary to
the _formation_ of true courage. All that is meant here is, that no
habit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain
altogether vanishes.
P. 30, l. 18. Virtue consists in the due regulation of _all_ the parts
of our nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as
such have their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their
extirpation. It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be
rare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being the
legitimate result of the law that "passive impressions weaken as active
habits are strengthened, by repetition." If musical instruments are
making discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in
either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive
enjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out,
Aristotle would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know
not), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to
fall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly
say, _Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant_. See on this point Bishop
Butler's fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline
in the first part of his Analogy.
P. 32, l. 16. I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our
word _act_ is so commonly interchanged with _action_. [Greek: Praxis]
(action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the
performance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be
right when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed
by his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be _good_ though the
[Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does
what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of
course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error),
but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis] _right_. No
repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler
on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted above,
sect. 11. "And in like manner as habits belonging to the body," etc.
P. 32, l. 32. Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue,
Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].
P. 33, l. 15. That is, not for _merely having_ them, because we did not
make ourselves.
See Bishop Butler's account of our nature as containing "particular
propensions," in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in
the Preface to the Sermons. P. 34, l. 14. This refers to the division of
quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the Categories. Those Quantities are called
by Aristotle Continuous whose parts have position relatively to one
another, as a line, surface, or solid, those discrete, whose parts
have no such relation, as numbers themselves, or any string of words
grammatically unconnected.
P. 34, l. 27. Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually
called progression), when they increase or decrease by a common
difference thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, or _vice
versa_, 10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.
P. 36, l. 3. The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may
be perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may
suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide,
but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go
out of himself for direction.
P. 37, l. 8. This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply
that this treatise is rather a collection of notes of a _viva voce_
lecture than a set formal treatise. "The table" of virtues and vices
probably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience.
P. 37,1. 23. Afterwards defined as "All things whose value is measured
by money"
P. 38, l. 8. We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated
by Horace's use of the term _hiatus_:
[Sidenote: A P 138] "Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?"
Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come,
if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or
fruitless and unmeaning _hiatus_; the transference to the present
subject is easy.
P. 38, l. 22. In like manner _we_ talk of laudable ambition, implying of
course there may be that which is not laudable.
P. 40, l. 3. An expression of Bishop Butler's, which corresponds exactly
to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.
P. 41, l. 9. That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must
be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en
to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.
P. 42, l. 22. "[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb," says the Scholiast
on the Phaedo, "used of those who do anything safely and cautiously
inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about
then: preparations for the second cautiously," and he then alludes to
this passage.
P. 42, l. 31. That is, you must allow for the _recoil_."Naturam expellas
furca tamen usque recurret."
P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines
entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding
pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.
The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen
comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no
difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such
suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she
bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.
This exactly represents Aristotle's relation to Pleasure he does not,
with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris
would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly
evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused
had "banished all the beauty from her cheek," but, with the aged
counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness
resolves to deny himself, he "feels her sweetness, yet defies her
thrall."
P. 43, l. 20. [Greek: Aisthesis] is here used as an analogous noun, to
denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the
same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It
is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the
same analogy. We say of a transaction, that it "looks ugly," "sounds
oddly," is a "nasty job," "stinks in our nostrils," is a "hard dealing."
P. 46, l. 16. A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos],
because "particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt,
the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified
at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle." But he is
responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed,
he "might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure
state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the
moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus
withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily
arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his
integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by
being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his
security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral
principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things
are implied in the notion of virtuous habits." (From the chapter
on Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this
disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third
chapter of this Book.
P. 47, l. 7. Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral
Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in
Bishop Butler's manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two
principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest,
and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon
II.)
P. 47, l. 7. Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not
of the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of
_i.e._ incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution
to have been depraved, _i.e._ shows Conscience to be perverted, or the
sight of Self-love to be impaired.
P. 48, l. 18. [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and
effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result
are [Greek: eneka] that result.
From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from
present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,
these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, but
_designed_ causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or
final cause.
It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a
contradiction in terms to speak of a man's being ignorant of his own
Motive of action.
When the man "drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel
between the joints of the harnesss" (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek:
eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of
[Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King's death was _in fact the
result_, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the
King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.
P. 48, l. 22 Bishop Butler would agree to this he says of settled
deliberate anger, "It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of
virtue and vice, of moral good and evil." See the whole Sermon on
Resentment.
P. 48, l 23. Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here,
by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no
following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have
used our word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, "What man
is he that lusteth to live?"
P. 48, l 28. The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon
the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_
case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the
passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker's seems to
intend al 81 ir/jdLeis as a separate argument but if so, the argument
would be a mere _petitio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell's reading
in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the
last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell's
reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
P. 50, l ii. _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind
is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and
constitute character, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but
when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in
Moral Choice.
"Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason?
When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason."
P. 53, 1. 4. The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a
mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added
to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications
that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a
finished or systematic one.
P. 53, 1. 17. Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of
the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his
choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object
of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so
distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one
chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta],
the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
P. 53, 1. 22. Compare Bishop Butler's "System of Human Nature," in the
Preface to the Sermons.
P. 53, 1. 33. These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai--bouleusin],
contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action.
The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz.
Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has
for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind,
the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite
extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the
two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word
[Greek: orexis] means literally "a grasping at or after" now as this
physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act,
consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and
denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite
movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are
recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into
[Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].
The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as
the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance
and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course
to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds
to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the
mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is
naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of
goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being
debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the
Will, which causes the owner's hands to throw overboard his goods: the
act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so
denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In
a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for
no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently
there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
P. 54, 1. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti
d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan
oiaetho einai agathon)]
P 56, 1. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because
it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be
controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at
which gravitation operates irretrievably, "there is a certain bound to
imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no
place for repentance in the natural course of things." Bishop Butler's
Analogy, First Part, chap 11.
P 58, 1. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under
certain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what
circumstances we will have to act under.
P. 59, 1. 19. "Moral Courage" is our phrase.
P 61, 1. 6. The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except
by a paraphrase.
"The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with
the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of
bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords
with Courage, _i.e._ Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which
implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are
denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of
each separate act of bravery is honour."
P 62, 1. 14. For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of
danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious
kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.
P 63, 1. 11. This may merely mean, "who give strict orders" not to
flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is
capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
P 63, 1. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes
aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
P 63, 1. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent
confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So
Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens.
P. 64, 1. 5. In Coronea in Boeotia, on the occasion of the citadel being
betrayed to some Phocians. "The regulars" were Boeotian troops, the
[Greek: politika] Coroneans.
P. 64, 1. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed
up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then
carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while
to imitate.
P. 68, 1. 8. The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as
here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis
todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai
aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].
P. 97, 1. 2. Perhaps "things which reflect credit on them" as on page
95.
P. 100, 1. 12. Book VII.
P. 101, 1. 11. Each term is important to make up the character of
Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral
choice.
P. 102, 1. 1. But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two
senses, "to love" and "to kiss," [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I.
chap. XIII. 5.
P. 102, 1. 6. _Things_ are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name
in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is
_close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There
is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], "equivocal" being
applied to a term and not to its various significates.
P. 102, 1. 24. See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen
echei kai tagatha k.t.l.]
P. 104, 1. 10. A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as
confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt
to touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his
virtue to his own person.
P. 105, 1. 5. See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.
P. 105, 1. 31. Cardwell's text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon],
yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates
law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the
unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particular _i.e._ as
whole to part. There is a reading which also alters the words within the
parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.
P. 106, 1. 19. There are two reasons why the characters are not
necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry
out the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty,
so therefore _pro tanto_ is he.
Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that
he does the _facts_ of a good man but for the perfection of his own
individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly
in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.
The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the
distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III.
chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler's first Sermon.
P. 107, 1. 17. Terms used for persons.
P. 107, 1. 34. By [Greek:----] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50,
etc, by [Greek:----] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.
P 108, 1 14. The profits of a mercantile transaction (say L1000) are to
be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real
point to be settled); then,
A B . 400 600.
A 400 : . B 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to
make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).
A+400 : B+600 : : A B. This represents the actual distribution; its
fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.
P. 109, 1. 10. _i.e._ Corrective Justice is wrought out by subtraction
from the wrong doer and addition to the party injured.
P. 110, 1. 3. Her Majesty's "Justices."
P. 111, 1. 1. I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be
out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not
being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at
liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he
put them where they made the best sense.
P. 111, 1. 8. This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not
pretend to be able to get it out of the words.
P 111, 1. 27. This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but
not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck
wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and
in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two
offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and
another against the office.
P. 112, 1. 5. [Greek:----] denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a
gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness
on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the
kindness.
P. 113, 1. 33. The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only
had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to
have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most
valuable, and _vice versa_.
Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:----] at
[Greek:----], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before
Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the
wares as between the persons, _i.e._ the ratio of equality.
If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring
into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai
ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.
Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be
the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist
will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both
[Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr.
shoes = 1 house.
Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house--_wrong_.
----- ----- 100 pr. shoes : 1 house--_right_
----- ----- 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house--_wrong_.
P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is
a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less
share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the
sufferer, of injury.
P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, _i.e._
numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the
meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that
is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.
P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell's reading ([Greek: kineton ou
mentoi pan]) "but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally
variable, but certainly all Just is not such." The sense of the passage
is not affected by the reading. In Bekker's text we must take [Greek:
kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], _i.e._ "we admit there
is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still," etc. With
Cardwell's, [Greek: kineton] will mean "which not only _does_ but
naturally _may_ vary."
P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by
enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these
heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act
_materially_ unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the
agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.
P. 121, l. 13. "As distinct from pain or loss." Bishop Butler's Sermon
on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].
P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell
as quoted in Cardwell's Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The
Paraphrast gives it as follows:
"But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels
himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor],
but the other does not."
P. 122, l.18. As when a man is "_justified_ at the Grass Market,"
_i.e._ hung. P. 125, 1. 36. Where the stock of good is limited, if any
individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than
his share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all this
cannot happen.
P. 128,1 24. The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the
law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally
equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the
loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but _one_
party.
P, 129, 1. 25. So in the Politics, 1. 2. _Hae men gar psuchae tou
somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen
kai despotikaev._ Compare also Bishop Butler's account of human nature
as a system--of the different authority of certain principles, and
specially the supremacy of Conscience.
P. 130, 1. 8. I understand the illustration to be taken from the process
of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for
instance, in a building.
P. 131, 1 8. Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent
matter.
P. 131, 1. 13. One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in
common language, _he has a turn for_ Mathematics, _i e_ something in his
mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the
bump denoting this aptitude.
P. 131, 1. 21. And therefore the question resolves itself into this,
"What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty
of Reason." See the description of _apetae_ II. 5.
P. 131, 1. 33. _praxis_ is here used in its strict and proper meaning.
P. 131,1. 34. That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which
Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act
accordingly.
The question at issue always is, _Is this Good?_ because the Will is
only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always
_Aye or No_, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former
case, and retracted in the later.
So far as what must take place in _every_ Moral Action, right or wrong,
the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a
good Moral Choice, _i e._. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye
when it ought.
The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect
but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the
direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in
accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is
out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]--video meliora
proboque, Deteriora sequor.
P. 132, l. 9. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth
itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek:
eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek:
episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two
methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to _act_
([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to _make_ ([Greek: techne]).
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If
necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]),
or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),
Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell's notes.)
P. 133, l. 20. The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which
are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, _i.e._
the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and
children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.
P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus
have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That
difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis]
before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the
mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the
suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate
stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before
any Action can take place.
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler
observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral
Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite
nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves
do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general,
fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler's
Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.
P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior.
Analytics II. 25, defines it to be "the proving the inherence of the
major term in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss
in fig. 1) through the minor term." He presupposes a Syllogism in the
first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of
course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by
Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. "If
of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is
coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of
that which is thus coextensive." The fact of this coextensiveness must
be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive
Faculty. We will take Aldrich's instance. All Magnets attract iron \ A B
C are Magnets | Presupposed Syllogism reasoning A B C attract iron. /
from an universal.
A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)
All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive
faculty)
All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by
taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)
Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C
attract iron.
But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the
term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract
iron.
Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says
in the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek:
noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above)
as composed of all the Individuals.
If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it
would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple
Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps
cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again
out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity
depends _entirely_ upon the quality of the particular mind which
performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of
Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It
may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which
exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss _literally_ false.
It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction _as the
term is used by Aristotle_, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I.
1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
P 133 1 32. The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is
impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a
perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to
relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae]
draws its conclusions they are to be "true, first principles incapable
of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it,
and causes of it." (See the appendix to this Book.)
P 134 1 12. This is the test of correct logical division, that the
_membra dividentia_ shall be opposed, _i.e._ not included the one by the
other. P. 134, l. 13. The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be
this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just
as it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek:
phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art,
and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are
somehow connected to prove that connection to be "coextensiveness," we
predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition,
which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific
property. See the Topics, 1. vi.
P. 135, l. 2. See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the
popular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek:
ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen
hoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]--Luke xvi. 8.
P. 135, l. 5. Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath' ekasta
pepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1.
P. 135, l. 35. The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as
claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right,
and that of being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable
Self-Love are the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally
supreme and "Conscience and Self-Love, _if we understand our true
happiness_, always lead us the same way." Bishop Butler, end of Sermon
III.
And again:
"If by _a sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is
upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the
principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea
itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be
improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is
there for Moralists to disclaim this principle." From the note on
sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.
P. 136, l. 6. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the
following--Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d' exis to
ommati touto k. t. l]--vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.]
vii. 9.--[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]--iii. 7 _ad
finem_. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]
P. 136, l. 15. This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art
does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom.
In popular language we use the term "wiser man," as readily as "better
artist" really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation
to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous
epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.
P. 136, l. 17. He would be a _better Chymist_ who should poison
intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that
"Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum." P. 137,
l. 13. The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old
Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:----] here. "Then wrought
Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every _wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put
wisdom and understanding_ to know how to work all manner of work for the
service of the Sanctuary" Exodus xxxvi. i.
P. 137 l. 27. [Greek:----] and [Greek:----], (in the strict sense, for it
is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of
the whole function [Greek:----], [Greek:----] takes in conclusions, drawn
by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek:
----] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these
principles by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek:
----] might exist independent of [Greek:----], but not this without that.
Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living
being [Greek:----]. There are three branches of [Greek:----] according
to Greek Philosophy, [Greek:----], [Greek:----], [Greek:----]. Science is
perhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.
P 137, l. 29. [Greek:----] is here used in its most extensive sense,
[Greek:----] would be its chief Instrument.
P. 138, l. 16. The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:----].
P. 139, l. 16. In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom
is employed there will be general principles, and the application of
them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the
operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil
Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular
functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there
are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of
them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when
Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.
P. 139, l. 27. [Greek:----], "our mere Operatives in Public business."
(Chalmers.)
P. 139, l. 32. Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self,
(which is [Greek:----] proper) or not-Self, _i.e._ either one's
family=[Greek:----], or one's community=[Greek:----], but here the
supreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:----],
the latter [Greek:----] proper, whose functions are deliberation and
the administration of justice.
P. 140, l. 16. But where can this be done, if there be no community?
see Horace's account of the way in which his father made him reap
instruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv.
105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler's
first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence
in _fact_ of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence _i.e._ love of
others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise,
chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].
P. 140, l. 17. More truly "implied," namely, that Practical Wisdom
results from experience.
P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply because
suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in
hand.
P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei].
(Book 1. chap. viii.)
P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are
last arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we
have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one
extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives
this sense, "Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of
sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind." In a passage so
utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth
while to take much trouble about such a point.
P. 141, l. 25. The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1.
xxiv.), "a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider
of it."
The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation
the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All
that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the
sun. The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the
side next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and
correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on
the side next to the sun.
P. 141, l. 34. Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental
act.
P. 142, l. 19. The End does not sanctify the Means.
P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others;
and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends
but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the
Great End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand
End, but to the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as
being right means to the Grand End of all. P. 142,1. 34. The relative
[Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek:
eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction
would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti
telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].
P. 143,1 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of
this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which
connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
P. 144, 1 i. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.
[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae,
and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is
[Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness
informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not
actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so
proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?
he is then [Greek: euboulos]--is he passing under review the suggestions
of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]--is he judging of the acts of others?
he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness--is he
applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek:
nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]--while in each and all he is
[Greek: phronimos]?
P. 144, 1. 7. See note, on p. 140.
P 144 1.19. There are cases where we must simply accept or reject
without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to
all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are
simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these
cases within the province of [Greek: nous], _i.e._ he calls by this name
the Faculty which attains Truth in each.
P. 144, 1. 25. _i.e._ of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
P 144,1 27. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of
fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism
is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss
(_i.e._ by [Greek: ethismos]).
All that is pleasant is to be done,
This is pleasant,
This is to be done
By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, _i.e._ on the suggestions
of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss.
Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is
firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification
of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein
aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress
towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of
previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to
[Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the
right one. Book VII. 8 and 5. P. 145, l. 4. The _consequentia_ is this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of
reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What
makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience,
and _therefore_, etc.
P. 145, l. 22. This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek:
euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in
the Topics, I. xiii. 10,
{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiaetikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]
{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon],
{ [Greek: to de saemantikon].
Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
P. 146, l. 11. Healthiness is the formal cause of health.
Medicine is the efficient.
See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hae hygieia kai ho iatros
homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
P. 146, l. 17. [Greek: phronaesis] is here used in a partial sense
to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of
Practical Wisdom.
P. 146, l. 19. This is another case of an observation being thrown in
_obiter_, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
P. 146, l. 22. See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
P. 147, l. 6. The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because
the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. "Up to
anything" is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too
nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
P. 147, l. 13. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
"This particular action is------."
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein--ti
gar dei prattein hae mae, to telos autaes estin] i.e. [Greek: taes
phronaeseos].--(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
P. 147, l. 19. "Look asquint on the face of truth." Sir T. Browne,
Religio Medici.
P. 147, l. 26. The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as
governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no
single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards
these Virtues.
P. 147, l. 30. Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X.
[Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek taes aretaes].
P. 148, l. 10. It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronaesis] is used
throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense
of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual
Element of it. P. 152, 1. 1. The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto
given represents rather what men _may be_ than what they _are_. In this
book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary,
every day development.
P. 152, 1. 17. This illustrates the expression, "_Deceits_ of the
Flesh."
P. 156, 1. 12. Another reading omits the [Greek:----]; the meaning of
the whole passage would be exactly the same--it would then run, "if he
had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, _i.e._ if he were
now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of
conviction."
P. 158, 1. 4. Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:----]
[Greek----]
P. 158, 1. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular,
others not.
P 158, 1. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott's "Red
Gauntlet."
P. 159, 1. 23. That is, as I understand it, either the major or the
minor premise, it is true, that "all that is sweet is pleasant," it is
true also, that "this is sweet," what is contrary to Right Reason is the
bringing in this minor to the major _i.e._ the universal maxim,
forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the
maxim in his mind "All excess is to be avoided," at a certain time his
[Greek:----] tells him "This glass is excess." As a matter of mere
reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion "This glass is to be
avoided," and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly
abstain. But [Greek:----], being a simple tendency towards indulgence
suggests, in place of the minor premise "This is excess," its own
premise "This is sweet," this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or
principle ('[Greek:----]), "All that is sweet is to be tasted," and so,
by strict logical sequence, proves "This glass is to be tasted."
The solution then of the phaenomenon of [Greek:----] is this that
[Greek:----], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the
suggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:----] i.e. [Greek:----]
easily defeats [Greek:----]. The [Greek:----], an hour before he is in
temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim "All that is sweet
is to be tasted" to "All excess is to be avoided." The [Greek:----]
would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):
Quae virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo
Discite, _non inter lances mensasque nitentes_
Verum hic _impransi_ mecum disquirite
Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. "Look not thou upon the wine when it is
red," etc. P. 160, l. 2. [Greek: oron]. Aristotle's own account of this
word (Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis],
but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the
proposition itself is really indicated by it.
P. 161, l. 16. The Greek would give "avoids excessive pain," but this is
not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant
for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below
[Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
P. 162, l. 11. Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy,
Part I chap v sect. iv.
P. 162, l. 35. That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
P. 165, l. 4 Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on
[Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler's Sermon on
Resentment.
P. 166, l. 7. The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the
concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,
[Footnote: [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from
which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in the
Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
Actions of Lust are more unjust
P. 168, l. 3. [Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of
opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation
which substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all
difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae
proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker,
because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.
I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek:
malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not
[Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.
The [Greek: akolastos] _deliberately_ pursues pleasure and declines pain
if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under
[Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not
quite properly.
Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts
caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then
of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be
fitly given respectively.
P. 169, l. 29. "If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying,
we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician
who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a
mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first
symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish" Sewell, Sermons to
Young Men (Sermon xii.)
P. 170, 1. 6. Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes
his Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the
powerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does
not act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason.
His actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and
note on page 128.
P. 171, 1. 17. Let a man be punctual _on principle_ to any one
engagement in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his
others in their due places relatively to this one; and so will often
wear an appearance of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.
P. 172, 1. 21. Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action,
which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.
See Bishop Butler's first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of
note on p. 129.
P. 179, 1. 4. Abandoning Bekker's punctuation and reading [Greek: mae
agathon], yields a better sense.
"Why will he want it on the supposition that it is not good? He can live
even with Pain because," etc.
P. 179, 1. 25. [Greek: pheugei] may be taken perhaps as equivalent
to [Greek: pheugouoi] and so balance [Greek: chairouoi]. But compare
Chapter VIII (Bekker).
P. 183, 1. 6. "Owe no man anything, but to _love_ one another for he
that loveth another _hath fulfilled the Law_." Romans XIII. 8.
P. 183, I. 20. [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from
Hesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].
P. 184, I. 33. In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that
she
"two stone bottles found,
To hold the liquor that she _loved_,
And keep it safe and sound."
P. 187, 1. 24. Cardwell's reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta
loipa] is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker's.
P. 192, 1. 34. The Great man will have a right to look for more
Friendship than he bestows, but the Good man _can_ feel Friendship only
for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.
P. 195, 1. 12. See note on page 68, 1. 8.
P. 202, 1. 28. See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek:
tauton].
P. 203, 1. 35. "For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one
ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity." P. 206,
1. 10. Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise
the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.
P. 217, 1. 10. "Neither the Son of man, that He should _repent_."
Numbers xxiii. 19.
"In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment
of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use."
Whately, Logic, iii. 10.
P. 218, 1. 17. "I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is
that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to
many guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall
command him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and
another to the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come
upstairs, and another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant,
how would he be distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad
condition of nay soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto
sin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to
the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs,
and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to
themselves as to Virtue." (Fuller's Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix't
Contemplations, viii.)
P. 235, 1. 14. See note, p. 43.
P. 235, 1. 24. See Book II. chap. ix.
P. 237, 1. 3. See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.
P. 238, 1. 2. The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that
there is no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon],
and therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its
participation in that.
P. 238, 1. 9. See note on page 136, 1. 15.
P. 238, 1. 24. Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds: [sidenote:Categories, chap xi.]From not being to being . . . . Generation
From being to not being . . . . Destruction
From being to being more . . . . Increase
From being to being less . . . . Diminution
From being here to being there . . Change of Place
From being in this way to being in that Alteration
P. 238, 1 31. _A_ may go to sleep quicker than _B_, but cannot _do more
sleep_ in a given time.
P. 239, 1. 3. Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton
somaton, k. t. l.]
P. 241, 1. 6. Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].
P. 241, 1. 9. That is, subordinate Movements are complete before
the whole Movement is. P. 242, 1. 7. Pleasure is so instantaneous a
sensation, that it cannot be conceived divisible or incomplete; the
longest continued Pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, so
rapid as to give the appearance of a stream, of light.
P. 245, 1. 18. A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by
the [Greek: allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek:
oikeia lupae] of gout in the feet.
P. 249, 1. 12. I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to
hamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the
depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to connect
an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.
P. 250, 1. 12. Bishop Butler, _contra_ (Sermon XV.).
"Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least attend
to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it,
which is the entertainment of the mind." The two statements may however
be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean, that the
pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is from the
minor hindrances which attend on _learning_.
Footnote P. 250, 1. 30. The clause immediately following indicates that
Aristotle felt this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness
having been all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but
the statement illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6,
1. 15.
P. 251, 1. 7. That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy
aggregate, but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said
of Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.
P. 252, 1. 22. See note, page 146, 1. 17.
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