Reflections; Or Sentences and Moral Maxims
Francois Duc De La Rochefoucauld

Part 3 out of 3

world. (1665, No. 250.)

LI.--Truth is foundation and the reason of the per-
fection of beauty, for of whatever stature a thing may
be, it cannot be beautiful and perfect unless it be
truly that she should be, and possess truly all that she
should have (1665, No. 260.)

[Beauty is truth, truth beauty.{--John Keats, "Ode on a
a Grecian Urn," (1820), Stanza 5}]

LII.--There are fine things which are more bril-
liant when unfinished than when finished too much.
(1665, No. 262.)

LIII.--Magnanimity is a noble effort of pride which
makes a man master of himself, to make him master
of all things. (1665, No. 271.)

LIV.--Luxury and too refined a policy in states are
a sure presage of their fall, because all parties looking
after their own interest turn away from the public
good. (1665, No. 282.)

LV.--Of all passions that which is least known to
us is idleness; she is the most ardent and evil of all,
although her violence may be insensible, and the evils
she causes concealed; if we consider her power
attentively we shall find that in all encounters she
makes herself mistress of our sentiments, our in-
terests, and our pleasures; like the (fabled) Remora,
she can stop the greatest vessels, she is a hidden rock,
more dangerous in the most important matters than
sudden squalls and the most violent tempests. The
repose of idleness is a magic charm which suddenly
suspends the most ardent pursuits and the most
obstinate resolutions. In fact to give a true notion of
this passion we must add that idleness, like a beati-
tude of the soul, consoles us for all losses and fills the
vacancy of all our wants. (1665, No. 290.)

LVI.--We are very fond of reading others' characters,
but we do not like to be read ourselves. (1665, No. 296.)

LVII.--What a tiresome malady is that which forces
one to preserve your health by a severe regimen.
(IBID, No. 298.)

LVIII.--It is much easier to take love when one is
free, than to get rid of it after having taken it. (1665,
No. 300.)

LIX.--Women for the most part surrender them-
selves more from weakness than from passion. Whence
it is that bold and pushing men succeed better than
others, although they are not so loveable. (1665, No.

LX.--Not to love is in love, an infallible means of
being beloved. (1665, No. 302.)

LXI.--The sincerity which lovers and mistresses ask
that both should know when they cease to love each
other, arises much less from a wish to be warned of
the cessation of love, than from a desire to be assured
that they are beloved although no one denies it.
(1665, No. 303.)

LXII.--The most just comparison of love is that of
a fever, and we have no power over either, as to its
violence or its duration. (1665, No. 305.)

LXIII.--The greatest skill of the least skilful is to
know how to submit to the direction of another.
(1665, No. 309.)

LXIV.--We always fear to see those whom we love
when we have been flirting with others. (16{74}, No.

LXV.--We ought to console ourselves for our faults
when we have strength enough to own them. (16{74},
No. 375.)

{The date of the previous two maxims is incorrectly cited
as 1665 in the text. I found this date immediately suspect
because the translators' introduction states that the 1665
edition only had 316 maxims. In fact, the two maxims only
appeared in the fourth of the first five editions (1674).}



* (June 1871) to assign a name to the magnificent collection
of books in Paris, the property of the nation.>

LXVI.--Interest is the soul of self-love, in as much
as when the body deprived of its soul is without sight,
feeling or knowledge, without thought or movement,
so self-love, riven so to speak from its interest, neither
sees, nor hears, nor smells, nor moves; thus it is that
the same man who will run over land and sea for his
own interest becomes suddenly paralyzed when en-
gaged for that of others; from this arises that sudden
dulness and, as it were, death, with which we afflict
those to whom we speak of our own matters; from this
also their sudden resurrection when in our narrative
we relate something concerning them; from this we
find in our conversations and business that a man
becomes dull or bright just as his own interest is near
to him or distant from him. (LETTER TO MADAME DE
SABLE, MS., FOL. 211.)

LXVII.--Why we cry out so much against maxims
which lay bare the heart of man, is because we fear
that our own heart shall be laid bare. (MAXIM 103,
MS., fol. 310.*)

* Maxims previously given, sometimes the author has care-
fully polished them; at other times the words are identical.
Our numbers will indicate where they are to be found in
the foregoing collection.>

LXVIII.--Hope and fear are inseparable. (TO
MADAME DE SABLE, MS., FOL. 222, MAX. 168.)

LXIX.--It is a common thing to hazard life to escape
dishonour; but, when this is done, the actor takes
very little pain to make the enterprise succeed in
which he is engaged, and certain it is that they who
hazard their lives to take a city or to conquer a pro-
vince are better officers, have more merit, and wider
and more useful, views than they who merely expose
themselves to vindicate their honour; it is very com-
mon to find people of the latter class, very rare to
find those of the former. (LETTER TO M. ESPRIT, MS.,
FOL. 173, MAX. 219.)

LXX.--The taste changes, but the will remains the
same. (TO MADAME DE SABLE, FOL. 223, MAX. 252.)

LXXI.--The power which women whom we love
have over us is greater than that which we have over
ourselves. (TO THE SAME, MS., FOL. 211, MAX. 259)

LXXII.--That which makes us believe so easily that
others have defects is that we all so easily believe
what we wish. (TO THE SAME, MS., FOL. 223, MAX. 397.)

LXXIII.--I am perfectly aware that good sense and
fine wit are tedious to every age, but tastes are not
always the same, and what is good at one time will
not seem so at another. This makes me think that
few persons know how to be old. (TO THE SAME,
FOL. 202, MAX. 423.)

LXXIV.--God has permitted, to punish man for his
original sin, that he should be so fond of his self-love,
that he should be tormented by it in all the actions
of his life. (MS., FOL. 310, MAX. 494.)

LXXV.--And so far it seems to me the philosophy
of a lacquey can go; I believe that all gaity in that state
of life is very doubtful indeed. (TO MADAME DE SABLE,
FOL. 161, MAX. 504.)

[In the maxim cited the author relates how a footman
about to be broken on the wheel danced on the scaffold.
He seems to think that in his day the life of such servants
was so miserable that their merriment was very doubtful.]


[The fifty following Maxims are taken from the Sixth
Edition of the PENSEES DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, published
by Claude Barbin, in 1693, more than twelve years after
the death of the author (17th May, 1680). The reader
will find some repetitions, but also some very valuable

LXXVI.--Many persons wish to be devout; but
no one wishes to be humble.

LXXVII.--The labour of the body frees us from
the pains of the mind, and thus makes the poor happy.

LXXVIII.--True penitential sorrows (mortifica-
tions) are those which are not known, vanity renders
the others easy enough.

LXXIX.--Humility is the altar upon which God
wishes that we should offer him his sacrifices.

LXXX.--Few things are needed to make a wise man
happy; nothing can make a fool content; that is why
most men are miserable.

LXXXI.--We trouble ourselves less to become
happy, than to make others believe we are so.

LXXXII.--It is more easy to extinguish the first
desire than to satisfy those which follow.

LXXXIII.--Wisdom is to the soul what health is to
the body.

LXXXIV.--The great ones of the earth can neither
command health of body nor repose of mind, and
they buy always at too dear a price the good they can

LXXXV.--Before strongly desiring anything we
should examine what happiness he has who possesses it.

LXXXVI.--A true friend is the greatest of all
goods, and that of which we think least of acquiring.

LXXXVII.--Lovers do not wish to see the faults of
their mistresses until their enchantment is at an end.

LXXXVIII.--Prudence and love are not made for
each other; in the ratio that love increases, prudence

LXXXIX.--It is sometimes pleasing to a husband
to have a jealous wife; he hears her always speaking
of the beloved object.

XC.--How much is a woman to be pitied who is at
the same time possessed of virtue and love!

XCI.--The wise man finds it better not to enter
the encounter than to conquer.

[Somewhat similar to Goldsmith's sage--
"Who quits {a} world where strong temptations try,
And since 'tis hard to co{mbat}, learns to fly."]

XCII.--It is more necessary to study men than

["The proper study of mankind is man."--Pope
{ESSAY ON MAN, (1733), EPISTLE II, line 2}.]

XCIII.--Good and evil ordinarily come to those who
have most of one or the other.

XCIV.--The accent and character of one's native
country dwells in the mind and heart as on the tongue.

XCV.--The greater part of men have qualities
which, like those of plants, are discovered by chance.

XCVI.--A good woman is a hidden treasure; he
who discovers her will do well not to boast about it.
(SEE MAXIM 368.)

XCVII.--Most women do not weep for the loss
of a lover to show that they have been loved so much
as to show that they are worth being loved. (SEE
MAXIM 362.)

XCVIII.--There are many virtuous women who
are weary of the part they have played. (SEE MAXIM

XCIX.--If we think we love for love's sake we
are much mistaken. (SEE MAXIM 374.)

C.--The restraint we lay upon ourselves to be con-
stant, is not much better than an inconstancy. (SEE
MAXIMS 369, 381.)

CI.--There are those who avoid our jealousy, of
whom we ought to be jealous. (SEE MAXIM 359.)

CII.--Jealousy is always born with love, but does
not always die with it. (SEE MAXIM 361.)

CIII.--When we love too much it is difficult to
discover when we have ceased to be beloved.

CIV.--We know very well that we should not talk
about our wives, but we do not remember that it is
not so well to speak of ourselves. (SEE MAXIM 364.)

CV.--Chance makes us known to others and to our-
selves. (SEE MAXIM 345.)

CVI.--We find very few people of good sense, ex-
cept those who are of our own opinion. (SEE MAXIM

CVII.--We commonly praise the good hearts of
those who admire us. (SEE MAXIM 356.)

CVIII.--Man only blames himself in order that he
may be praised.

CIX.--Little minds are wounded by the smallest
things. (SEE MAXIM 357.)

CX.--There are certain faults which placed in a good
light please more than perfection itself. (SEE MAXIM

CXI.--That which makes us so bitter against those
who do us a shrewd turn, is because they think them-
selves more clever than we are. (SEE MAXIM 350.)

CXII.--We are always bored by those whom we
bore. (SEE MAXIM 352.)

CXIII.--The harm that others do us is often less
than that we do ourselves. (SEE MAXIM 363.)

CXIV.--It is never more difficult to speak well
than when we are ashamed of being silent.

CXV.--Those faults are always pardonable that we
have the courage to avow.

CXVI.--The greatest fault of penetration is not
that it goes to the bottom of a matter--but beyond it.
(SEE MAXIM 377.)

CXVII.--We give advice, but we cannot give the
wisdom to profit by it. (SEE MAXIM 378.)

CXVIII.--When our merit declines, our taste de-
clines also. (SEE MAXIM 379.)

CXIX.--Fortune discovers our vices and our vir-
tues, as the light makes objects plain to the sight.
(SEE MAXIM 380.)

CXX.--Our actions are like rhymed verse-ends
(BOUTS-RIMES) which everyone turns as he pleases. (SEE
MAXIM 382.)

CXXI.--There is nothing more natural, nor more
deceptive, than to believe that we are beloved.

CXXII.--We would rather see those to whom we
have done a benefit, than those who have done us one.

CXXIII.--It is more difficult to hide the opinions
we have than to feign those which we have not.

CXXIV.--Renewed friendships require more care
than those that have never been broken.

CXXV.--A man to whom no one is pleasing is
much more unhappy than one who pleases nobody.


I. On Confidence.

Though sincerity and confidence have many
points of resemblance, they have yet many
points of difference.

Sincerity is an openness of heart, which
shows us what we are, a love of truth, a dis-
like to deception, a wish to compensate our faults and
to lessen them by the merit of confessing them.

Confidence leaves us less liberty, its rules are
stricter, it requires more prudence and reticence, and
we are not always free to give it. It relates not only
to ourselves, since our interests are often mixed up
with those of others; it requires great delicacy not to
expose our friends in exposing ourselves, not to draw
upon their goodness to enhance the value of what we

Confidence always pleases those who receive it. It
is a tribute we pay to their merit, a deposit we commit
to their trust, a pledge which gives them a claim upon
us, a kind of dependence to which we voluntarily
submit. I do not wish from what I have said to
depreciate confidence, so necessary to man. It is
in society the link between acquaintance and
friendship. I only wish to state its limits to make
it true and real. I would that it was always sincere,
always discreet, and that it had neither weakness nor
interest. I know it is hard to place proper limits on
being taken into all our friends' confidence, and taking
them into all ours.

Most frequently we make confidants from vanity, a
love of talking, a wish to win the confidence of others,
and make an exchange of secrets.

Some may have a motive for confiding in us, towards
whom we have no motive for confiding. With them we
discharge the obligation in keeping their secrets and
trusting them with small confidences.

Others whose fidelity we know trust nothing to
us, but we confide in them by choice and inclina-

We should hide from them nothing that concerns
us, we should always show them with equal truth, our
virtues and our vices, without exaggerating the one
or diminishing the other. We should make it a rule
never to have half confidences. They always embarrass
those who give them, and dissatisfy those who receive
them. They shed an uncertain light on what we want
hidden, increase curiosity, entitling the recipients to
know more, giving them leave to consider themselves
free to talk of what they have guessed. It is far
safer and more honest to tell nothing than to be
silent when we have begun to tell. There are other
rules to be observed in matters confided to us, all are
important, to all prudence and trust are essential.

Everyone agrees that a secret should be kept intact,
but everyone does not agree as to the nature and
importance of secresy. Too often we consult our-
selves as to what we should say, what we should leave
unsaid. There are few permanent secrets, and the
scruple against revealing them will not last for ever.

With those friends whose truth we know we have
the closest intimacy. They have always spoken unre-
servedly to us, we should always do the same to them.
They know our habits and connexions, and see too
clearly not to perceive the slightest change. They
may have elsewhere learnt what we have promised not
to tell. It is not in our power to tell them what has
been entrusted to us, though it might tend to their
interest to know it. We feel as confident of them
as of ourselves, and we are reduced to the hard fate of
losing their friendship, which is dear to us, or of being
faithless as regards a secret. This is doubtless the
hardest test of fidelity, but it should not move an
honest man; it is then that he can sacrifice himself
to others. His first duty is to rigidly keep his trust
in its entirety. He should not only control and
guard his and his voice, but even his lighter
talk, so that nothing be seen in his conversation or
manner that could direct the curiosity of others towards
that which he wishes to conceal.

We have often need of strength and prudence
wherewith to oppose the exigencies of most of our
friends who make a claim on our confidence, and
seek to know all about us. We should never allow
them to acquire this unexceptionable right. There
are accidents and circumstances which do not fall in
their cognizance; if they complain, we should endure
their complaints and excuse ourselves with gentleness,
but if they are still unreasonable, we should sacrifice
their friendship to our duty, and choose between two
inevitable evils, the one reparable, the other irre-

II. On Difference of Character.

Although all the qualities of mind may be united in
a great genius, yet there are some which are special
and peculiar to him; his views are unlimited; he
always acts uniformly and with the same activity;
he sees distant objects as if present; he compre-
hends and grasps the greatest, sees and notices the
smallest matters; his thoughts are elevated, broad,
just and intelligible. Nothing escapes his observation,
and he often finds truth in spite of the obscurity that
hides her from others.

A lofty mind always thinks nobly, it easily creates
vivid, agreeable, and natural fancies, places them in
their best light, clothes them with all appropriate
adornments, studies others' tastes, and clears away
from its own thoughts all that is useless and dis-

A clever, pliant, winning mind knows how to avoid
and overcome difficulties. Bending easily to what it
wants, it understands the inclination and temper it is
dealing with, and by managing their interests it
advances and establishes its own.

A well regulated mind sees all things as they should
be seen, appraises them at their proper value, turns
them to its own advantage, and adheres firmly to its
own opinions as it knows all their force and weight.

A difference exists between a working mind and a
business-like mind. We can undertake business with-
out turning it to our own interest. Some are clever
only in what does not concern them, and the reverse
in all that does. There are others again whose
cleverness is limited to their own business, and who
know how to turn everything to their own advantage.

It is possible to have a serious turn of mind, and
yet to talk pleasantly and cheerfully. This class of
mind is suited to all persons in all times of life.
Young persons have usually a cheerful and satirical
turn, untempered by seriousness, thus often making
themselves disagreeable.

No part is easier to play than that of being always
pleasant; and the applause we sometimes receive in
censuring others is not worth being exposed to the
chance of offending them when they are out of

Satire is at once the most agreeable and most dan-
gerous of mental qualities. It always pleases when it
is refined, but we always fear those who use it too
much, yet satire should be allowed when unmixed
with spite, and when the person satirised can join in
the satire.

It is unfortunate to have a satirical turn without
affecting to be pleased or without loving to jest. It
requires much adroitness to continue satirical with-
out falling into one of these extremes.

Raillery is a kind of mirth which takes possession
of the imagination, and shows every object in an
absurd light; wit combines more or less softness or

There is a kind of refined and flattering raillery that
only hits the faults that persons admit, which under-
stands how to hide the praise it gives under the ap-
pearance of blame, and shows the good while feigning
a wish to hide it.

An acute mind and a cunning mind are very dis-
similar. The first always pleases; it is unfettered, it
perceives the most delicate and sees the most impercep-
tible matters. A cunning spirit never goes straight, it
endeavours to secure its object by byeways and short
cuts. This conduct is soon found out, it always gives
rise to distrust and never reaches greatness.

There is a difference between an ardent and a
brilliant mind, a fiery spirit travels further and faster,
while a brilliant mind is sparkling, attractive, accu-

Gentleness of mind is an easy and accommodating
manner which always pleases when not insipid.

A mind full of details devotes itself to the manage-
ment and regulation of the smallest particulars it
meets with. This distinction is usually limited to
little matters, yet it is not absolutely incompatible
with greatness, and when these two qualities are
united in the same mind they raise it infinitely above

The expression "BEL ESPRIT" is much perverted, for
all that one can say of the different kinds of mind
meet together in the "BEL ESPRIT." Yet as the epithet
is bestowed on an infinite number of bad poets and
tedious authors, it is more often used to ridicule than
to praise.

There are yet many other epithets for the mind
which mean the same thing, the difference lies in the
tone and manner of saying them, but as tones and
manner cannot appear in writing I shall not go into
distinctions I cannot explain. Custom explains this
in saying that a man has wit, has much wit, that he
is a great wit; there are tones and manners which
make all the difference between phrases which seem
all alike on paper, and yet express a different order of

So we say that a man has only one kind of wit, that
he has several, that he has every variety of wit.

One can be a fool with much wit, and one need not
be a fool even with very little wit.

To have much mind is a doubtful expression. It
may mean every class of mind that can be mentioned,
it may mean none in particular. It may mean that
he talks sensibly while he acts foolishly. We may
have a mind, but a narrow one. A mind may be
fitted for some things, not for others. We may have
a large measure of mind fitted for nothing, and one is
often inconvenienced with much mind; still of this
kind of mind we may say that it is sometimes pleasing
in society.

Though the gifts of the mind are infinite, they can,
it seems to me, be thus classified.

There are some so beautiful that everyone can see
and feel their beauty.

There are some lovely, it is true, but which are

There are some which are lovely, which all the
world admire, but without knowing why.

There are some so refined and delicate that few are
capable even of remarking all their beauties.

There are others which, though imperfect, yet are
produced with such skill, and sustained and managed
with such sense and grace, that they even deserve to
be admired.

III. On Taste.

Some persons have more wit than taste, others have
more taste than wit. There is greater vanity and
caprice in taste than in wit.

The word taste has different meanings, which it is
easy to mistake. There is a difference between the
taste which in certain objects has an attraction for
us, and the taste that makes us understand and
distinguish the qualities we judge by.

We may like a comedy without having a sufficiently
fine and delicate taste to criticise it accurately. Some
tastes lead us imperceptibly to objects, from which
others carry us away by their force or intensity.

Some persons have bad taste in everything, others
have bad taste only in some things, but a correct and
good taste in matters within their capacity. Some
have peculiar taste, which they know to be bad, but
which they still follow. Some have a doubtful taste,
and let chance decide, their indecision makes them
change, and they are affected with pleasure or weari-
ness on their friends' judgment. Others are always
prejudiced, they are the slaves of their tastes, which
they adhere to in everything. Some know what is
good, and are horrified at what is not; their opinions
are clear and true, and they find the reason for their
taste in their mind and understanding.

Some have a species of instinct (the source of which
they are ignorant of), and decide all questions that
come before them by its aid, and always decide

These follow their taste more than their intelligence,
because they do not permit their temper and self-love
to prevail over their natural discernment. All they
do is in harmony, all is in the same spirit. This
harmony makes them decide correctly on matters, and
form a correct estimate of their value. But speaking
generally there are few who have a taste fixed and
independent of that of their friends, they follow
example and fashion which generally form the stand-
ard of taste.

In all the diversities of taste that we discern, it is
very rare and almost impossible to meet with that sort
of good taste that knows how to set a price on the
particular, and yet understands the right value that
should be placed on all. Our knowledge is too limited,
and that correct discernment of good qualities which
goes to form a correct judgment is too seldom to be
met with except in regard to matters that do not
concern us.

As regards ourselves our taste has not this all-
important discernment. Preoccupation, trouble, all
that concern us, present it to us in another aspect.
We do not see with the same eyes what does and
what does not relate to us. Our taste is guided by
the bent of our self-love and temper, which supplies
us with new views which we adapt to an infinite
number of changes and uncertainties. Our taste is
no longer our own, we cease to control it, without our
consent it changes, and the same objects appear to us
in such divers aspects that ultimately we fail to per-
ceive what we have seen and heard.

IV. On Society.

In speaking of society my plan is not to speak of
friendship, for, though they have some connection,
they are yet very different. The former has more
in it of greatness and humility, and the greatest
merit of the latter is to resemble the former.

For the present I shall speak of that particular
kind of intercourse that gentlemen should have with
each other. It would be idle to show how far society
is essential to men: all seek for it, and all find it, but
few adopt the method of making it pleasant and

Everyone seeks to find his pleasure and his advan-
tage at the expense of others. We prefer ourselves
always to those with whom we intend to live, and
they almost always perceive the preference. It is
this which disturbs and destroys society. We should
discover a means to hide this love of selection since it
is too ingrained in us to be in our power to destroy.
We should make our pleasure that of other persons, to
humour, never to wound their self-love.

The mind has a great part to do in so great a work,
but it is not merely sufficient for us to guide it in the
different courses it should hold.

The agreement we meet between minds would not
keep society together for long if she was not governed
and sustained by good sense, temper, and by the con-
sideration which ought to exist between persons who
have to live together.

It sometimes happens that persons opposite in tem-
per and mind become united. They doubtless hold
together for different reasons, which cannot last for
long. Society may subsist between those who are our
inferiors by birth or by personal qualities, but those
who have these advantages should not abuse them.
They should seldom let it be perceived that they
serve to instruct others. They should let their con-
duct show that they, too, have need to be guided and
led by reason, and accommodate themselves as far as
possible to the feeling and the interests of the others.

To make society pleasant, it is essential that each
should retain his freedom of action. A man should
not see himself, or he should see himself without
dependence, and at the same time amuse himself. He
should have the power of separating himself without
that separation bringing any change on the society.
He should have the power to pass by one and the
other, if he does not wish to expose himself to occa-
sional embarrassments; and he should remember that
he is often bored when he believes he has not the
power even to bore. He should share in what he
believes to be the amusement of persons with whom
he wishes to live, but he should not always be liable
to the trouble of providing them.

Complaisance is essential in society, but it should
have its limits, it becomes a slavery when it is extreme.
We should so render a free consent, that in following
the opinion of our friends they should believe that they
follow ours.

We should readily excuse our friends when their
faults are born with them, and they are less than
their good qualities. We should often avoid to show
what they have said, and what they have left unsaid.
We should try to make them perceive their faults, so
as to give them the merit of correcting them.

There is a kind of politeness which is necessary in
the intercourse among gentlemen, it makes them
comprehend badinage, and it keeps them from using
and employing certain figures of speech, too rude and
unrefined, which are often used thoughtlessly when
we hold to our opinion with too much warmth.

The intercourse of gentlemen cannot subsist without
a certain kind of confidence; this should be equal on
both sides. Each should have an appearance of
sincerity and of discretion which never causes the
fear of anything imprudent being said.

There should be some variety in wit. Those who
have only one kind of wit cannot please for long
unless they can take different roads, and not both use
the same talents, thus adding to the pleasure of
society, and keeping the same harmony that different
voices and different instruments should observe in
music; and as it is detrimental to the quiet of society,
that many persons should have the same interests,
it is yet as necessary for it that their interests should
not be different.

We should anticipate what can please our friends,
find out how to be useful to them so as to exempt them
from annoyance, and when we cannot avert evils,
seem to participate in them, insensibly obliterate
without attempting to destroy them at a blow, and
place agreeable objects in their place, or at least such
as will interest them. We should talk of subjects
that concern them, but only so far as they like, and
we should take great care where we draw the line.
There is a species of politeness, and we may say a
similar species of humanity, which does not enter too
quickly into the recesses of the heart. It often takes
pains to allow us to see all that our friends know,
while they have still the advantage of not knowing
to the full when we have penetrated the depth of the

Thus the intercourse between gentlemen at once
gives them familiarity and furnishes them with an
infinite number of subjects on which to talk freely.

Few persons have sufficient tact and good sense
fairly to appreciate many matters that are essential
to maintain society. We desire to turn away at a
certain point, but we do not want to be mixed up
in everything, and we fear to know all kinds of

As we should stand at a certain distance to view
objects, so we should also stand at a distance to observe
society; each has its proper point of view from which
it should be regarded. It is quite right that it
should not be looked at too closely, for there is hardly
a man who in all matters allows himself to be seen as
he really is.

V. On Conversation.

The reason why so few persons are agreeable in con-
versation is that each thinks more of what he desires
to say, than of what the others say, and that we
make bad listeners when we want to speak.

Yet it is necessary to listen to those who talk, we
should give them the time they want, and let them say
even senseless things; never contradict or interrupt
them; on the contrary, we should enter into their mind
and taste, illustrate their meaning, praise anything
they say that deserves praise, and let them see we
praise more from our choice than from agreement
with them.

To please others we should talk on subjects they
like and that interest them, avoid disputes upon in-
different matters, seldom ask questions, and never let
them see that we pretend to be better informed than
they are.

We should talk in a more or less serious manner,
and upon more or less abstruse subjects, according to
the temper and understanding of the persons we talk
with, and readily give them the advantage of deciding
without obliging them to answer when they are not
anxious to talk.

After having in this way fulfilled the duties of
politeness, we can speak our opinions to our listeners
when we find an opportunity without a sign of pre-
sumption or opinionatedness. Above all things we
should avoid often talking of ourselves and giving
ourselves as an example; nothing is more tiresome
than a man who quotes himself for everything.

We cannot give too great study to find out the
manner and the capacity of those with whom we talk,
so as to join in the conversation of those who have
more than ourselves without hurting by this prefer-
ence the wishes or interests of others.

Then we should modestly use all the modes above-
mentioned to show our thoughts to them, and make
them, if possible, believe that we take our ideas from

We should never say anything with an air of
authority, nor show any superiority of mind. We
should avoid far-fetched expressions, expressions hard
or forced, and never let the words be grander than
the matter.

It is not wrong to retain our opinions if they are
reasonable, but we should yield to reason, wherever
she appears and from whatever side she comes, she
alone should govern our opinions, we should follow
her without opposing the opinions of others, and
without seeming to ignore what they say.

It is dangerous to seek to be always the leader of the
conversation, and to push a good argument too hard,
when we have found one. Civility often hides half its
understanding, and when it meets with an opinionated
man who defends the bad side, spares him the disgrace
of giving way.

We are sure to displease when we speak too long
and too often of one subject, and when we try to turn
the conversation upon subjects that we think more
instructive than others, we should enter indifferently
upon every subject that is agreeable to others, stop-
ping where they wish, and avoiding all they do not
agree with.

Every kind of conversation, however witty it may
be, is not equally fitted for all clever persons; we
should select what is to their taste and suitable to
their condition, their sex, their talents, and also choose
the time to say it.

We should observe the place, the occasion, the
temper in which we find the person who listens to us,
for if there is much art in speaking to the purpose,
there is no less in knowing when to be silent. There
is an eloquent silence which serves to approve or to
condemn, there is a silence of discretion and of respect.
In a word, there is a tone, an air, a manner, which
renders everything in conversation agreeable or dis-
agreeable, refined or vulgar.

But it is given to few persons to keep this secret
well. Those who lay down rules too often break
them, and the safest we are able to give is to listen
much, to speak little, and to say nothing that will ever
give ground for regret.

VI. Falsehood.

We are false in different ways. There are some
men who are false from wishing always to appear what
they are not. There are some who have better faith,
who are born false, who deceive themselves, and who
never see themselves as they really are; to some is
given a true understanding and a false taste, others
have a false understanding and some correctness in
taste; there are some who have not any falsity
either in taste or mind. These last are very rare, for
to speak generally, there is no one who has not some
falseness in some corner of his mind or his taste.

What makes this falseness so universal, is that as
our qualities are uncertain and confused, so too, are
our tastes; we do not see things exactly as they are,
we value them more or less than they are worth, and
do not bring them into unison with ourselves in a
manner which suits them or suits our condition or

This mistake gives rise to an infinite number of
falsities in the taste and in the mind. Our self-love
is flattered by all that presents itself to us under the
guise of good.

But as there are many kinds of good which affect
our vanity and our temper, so they are often followed
from custom or advantage. We follow because the
others follow, without considering that the same feeling
ought not to be equally embarrassing to all kinds of
persons, and that it should attach itself more or less
firmly, according as persons agree more or less with
those who follow them.

We dread still more to show falseness in taste than
in mind. Gentleness should approve without preju-
dice what deserves to be approved, follow what
deserves to be followed, and take offence at nothing.
But there should be great distinction and great
accuracy. We should distinguish between what is
good in the abstract and what is good for ourselves,
and always follow in reason the natural inclination
which carries us towards matters that please us.

If men only wished to excel by the help of their
own talents, and in following their duty, there would
be nothing false in their taste or in their conduct.
They would show what they were, they would judge
matters by their lights, and they would attract by their
reason. There would be a discernment in their views,
in their sentiments, their taste would be true, it would
come to them direct, and not from others, they would
follow from choice and not from habit or chance. If
we are false in admiring what should not be admired,
it is oftener from envy that we affix a value to
qualities which are good in themselves, but which do
not become us. A magistrate is false when he flatters
himself he is brave, and that he will be able to be bold
in certain cases. He should be as firm and stedfast
in a plot which ought to be stifled without fear of
being false, as he would be false and absurd in fighting
a duel about it.

A woman may like science, but all sciences are not
suitable for her, and the doctrines of certain sciences
never become her, and when applied by her are always

We should allow reason and good sense to fix the
value of things, they should determine our taste
and give things the merit they deserve, and the im-
portance it is fitting we should give them. But
nearly all men are deceived in the price and in the
value, and in these mistakes there is always a kind of

VII. On Air and Manner.

There is an air which belongs to the figure and
talents of each individual; we always lose it when
we abandon it to assume another.

We should try to find out what air is natural to us
and never abandon it, but make it as perfect as we can.
This is the reason that the majority of children please.
It is because they are wrapt up in the air and manner
nature has given them, and are ignorant of any other.
They are changed and corrupted when they quit
infancy, they think they should imitate what they
see, and they are not altogether able to imitate it. In
this imitation there is always something of falsity and
uncertainty. They have nothing settled in their man-
ner and opinions. Instead of being in reality what
they want to appear, they seek to appear what they
are not.

All men want to be different, and to be greater than
they are; they seek for an air other than their own,
and a mind different from what they possess; they
take their style and manner at chance. They make
experiments upon themselves without considering
that what suits one person will not suit everyone,
that there is no universal rule for taste or manners,
and that there are no good copies.

Few men, nevertheless, can have unison in many
matters without being a copy of each other, if each
follow his natural turn of mind. But in general a
person will not wholly follow it. He loves to imitate.
We often imitate the same person without perceiving
it, and we neglect our own good qualities for the good
qualities of others, which generally do not suit us.

I do not pretend, from what I say, that each should
so wrap himself up in himself as not to be able
to follow example, or to add to his own, useful and
serviceable habits, which nature has not given him.
Arts and sciences may be proper for the greater part
of those who are capable for them. Good manners and
politeness are proper for all the world. But, yet
acquired qualities should always have a certain agree-
ment and a certain union with our own natural
qualities, which they imperceptibly extend and in-
crease. We are elevated to a rank and dignity above
ourselves. We are often engaged in a new profession
for which nature has not adapted us. All these con-
ditions have each an air which belong to them, but
which does not always agree with our natural manner.
This change of our fortune often changes our air and
our manners, and augments the air of dignity, which
is always false when it is too marked, and when it is
not united and amalgamated with that which nature
has given us. We should unite and blend them to-
gether, and thus render them such that they can
never be separated.

We should not speak of all subjects in one
tone and in the same manner. We do not march
at the head of a regiment as we walk on a pro-
menade; and we should use the same style in which
we should naturally speak of different things in the
same way, with the same difference as we should walk,
but always naturally, and as is suitable, either at
the head of a regiment or on a promenade. There
are some who are not content to abandon the air and
manner natural to them to assume those of the rank
and dignities to which they have arrived. There are
some who assume prematurely the air of the dignities
and rank to which they aspire. How many lieutenant-
generals assume to be marshals of France, how many
barristers vainly repeat the style of the Chancellor
and how many female citizens give themselves the
airs of duchesses.

But what we are most often vexed at is that no one
knows how to conform his air and manners with his
appearance, nor his style and words with his thoughts
and sentiments, that every one forgets himself and how
far he is insensibly removed from the truth. Nearly
every one falls into this fault in some way. No one
has an ear sufficiently fine to mark perfectly this kind
of cadence.

Thousands of people with good qualities are dis-
pleasing; thousands pleasing with far less abilities,
and why? Because the first wish to appear to be what
they are not, the second are what they appear.

Some of the advantages or disadvantages that we
have received from nature please in proportion as
we know the air, the style, the manner, the senti-
ments that coincide with our condition and our
appearance, and displease in the proportion they are
removed from that point.



Ability, 162, 165, 199, 245, 283, 288. SEE Cleverness
-------, Sovereign, 244.
Absence, 276.
Accent, country, 342, XCIV.
Accidents, 59, 310.
Acquaintances, 426. SEE FRIENDS.
Acknowledgements, 225.
Actions, 1, 7, 57, 58, 160, 161, 382, 409, CXX.
Actors, 256.
Admiration, 178, 294, 474.
Adroitness of mind, R.2.
Adversity, 25.
--------- of Friends, XV.
Advice, 110, 116, 283, 378, CXVII.
Affairs, 453, R 2.
Affectation, 134, 493.
Affections, 232.
Afflictions, 233, 355, 362, 493, XCVII, XV.
Age, 222, 405, LXXIII. SEE Old Age.
Agreeableness, 255, R.5.
Agreement, 240.
Air, 399, 495, R.7.
--- Of a Citizen, 393.
Ambition, 24, 91, 246, 293, 490.
Anger, XXX.
Application, 41, 243.
Appearances, 64, 166, 199, 256, 302, 431, 457, R.7.
-----------, Conformity of Manners with, R.7.
Applause, 272.
Approbation, 51, 280.
Artifices, 117, 124, 125, 126, R.2.
Astonishment, 384.
Avarice, 167, 491, 492.

Ballads, 211.
Beauty, 240, 474, 497, LI.
------ of the Mind, R.2.
Bel esprit defined, R.2.
Benefits, 14, 298, 299, 301, CXXII.
Benefactors, 96, 317, CXXII.
Blame, CVIII.
Blindness, XIX.
Boasting, 141, 307.
Boredom, 141, 304, 352. SEE Ennui.
Bouts rimes, 382, CXX.
Bravery, 1, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 365,
504. SEE Courage and Valour.
Brilliancy of Mind, R.2.
Brilliant things, LII.

Capacity, 375.
Caprice, 45.
Chance, 57, 344, XCV. SEE Fortune.
Character, LVI, R.2.
Chastity, 1. SEE Virtue of Women.
Cheating, 114, 127.
Circumstances, 59, 470.
Civility, 260.
Clemency, 15, 16.
Cleverness, 162, 269, 245, 399.
Coarseness, 372.
Comedy, 211, R.3.
Compassion, 463. SEE Pity.
Complaisance, 481, R.4.
Conduct, 163, 227, 378, CXVII.
Confidants, whom we make, R.1.
Confidence, 239, 365, 475, XLIX, R.1, R.4.
Confidence, difference from Sincerity
----------, defined, R.1.
Consolation, 325.
Constancy, 19, 20, 21, 175, 176, 420.
Contempt, 322.
-------- of Death, 504.
Contentment, LXXX.
Contradictions, 478.
Conversation, 139, 140, 142, 312, 313, 314, 364, 391,
421, CIV, R.5.
Copies, 133.
Coquetry, 241. SEE Flirtation.
Country Manner, 393.
------- Accent, 342.
Courage, 1, 214, 215, 216, 219, 221, XLII. SEE Bravery.
Covetousness, opposed to Reason, 469
Cowardice, 215, 480.
Cowards, 370.
Crimes, 183, 465, XXXV, XXXVII.
Cunning, 126, 129, 394, 407.
Curiosity, 173.

Danger, XLII.
Death, 21, 23, 26.
-----, Contempt of, 504.
Deceit, 86, 117, 118, 124, 127, 129, 395, 434. SEE ALSO
Deception, CXXI.
Decency, 447.
Defects, 31, 90, 493, LXXII. SEE Faults.
Delicacy, 128, R.2.
Dependency, result of Confidence, R.1.
Designs, 160, 161.
Desires, 439, 469, LXXXII, LXXXV.
Despicable Persons, 322.
Detail, Mind given to, R.2.
Details, 41, 106.
Devotion, 427.
Devotees, 427.
Devout, LXXVI.
Differences, 135.
Dignities, R.7.
Discretion, R.5.
Disguise, 119, 246, 282.
Disgrace, 235, 412.
Dishonour, 326, LXIX.
Distrust, 84, 86, 335.
Divination, 425.
Doubt, 348.
Docility, R.4.
Dupes, 87, 102.

Education, 261.
Elevation, 399, 400, 403.
Eloquence, 8, 249, 250.
Employments, 164, 419, 449.
Enemies, 114, 397, 458, 463.
Ennui, 122, 141, 304, 312, 352, CXII, R.2.
Envy, 27, 28, 280, 281, 328, 376, 433, 476, 486.
Epithets assigned to the Mind, R.2.
Esteem, 296.
Establish, 56, 280.
Evils, 121, 197, 269, 454, 464, XCIII.
Example, 230.
Exchange of secrets, R.1.
Experience, 405.
Expedients, 287.
Expression, refined, R.5.

Faculties of the Mind, 174.
Failings, 397, 403.
Falseness, R.6.
---------, disguised, 282.
---------, kinds of, R.6.
Familiarity, R,4.
Fame, 157.
Farces, men compared to, 211.
Faults, 37, 112, 155, 184, 190, 194, 196, 251, 354, 365,
372, 397, 403, 411, 428, 493, 494, V, LXV, CX,
Favourites, 55.
Fear, 370, LXVIII.
Feeling, 255.
Ferocity, XXXIII.
Fickleness, 179, 181, 498.
Fidelity, 247.
--------, hardest test of, R.1.
-------- in love, 331, 381, C.
Figure and air, R.7.
Firmness, 19, 479.
Flattery, 123, 144, 152, 198, 320, 329.
Flirts, 406, 418.
Flirtation, 107, 241, 277, 332, 334, 349, 376, LXIV.
Follies, 156, 300, 408, 416.
Folly, 207, 208, 209, 210, 231, 300, 310, 311, 318,
Fools, 140, 210, 309, 318, 357, 414, 451, 456,
-----, old, 444.
-----, witty, 451, 456.
Force of Mind, 30, 42,
, 237.
Forgetfulness, XXVI.
Forgiveness, 330.
Fortitude, 19. SEE Bravery.
Fortune, 1, 17, 45, 52, 53, 58, 60, 61, 154, 212, 227, 323,
343, 380, 391, 392, 399, 403, 435, 449, IX., CXIX.
Friends, 84, 114, 179, 235, 279, 315, 319, 428.
-------, adversity of, XV.
-------, disgrace of, 235.
-------, faults of, 428.
-------, true ones, LXXXVI.
Friendship, 80, 81, 83, 376, 410, 427, 440, 441, 473,
----------, defined, 83.
----------, women do not care for, 440.
----------, rarer than love, 473.
Funerals, XXXVIII.

Gallantry, 100. SEE Flirtation.
--------- of mind, 100.
Generosity, 246.
Genius, R.2.
Gentleness, R.6.
Ghosts, 76.
Gifts of the mind, R.2.
Glory, 157, 198, 221, 268.
Good, 121, 185, 229, 238, 303, XCIII.
----, how to be, XLVII.
Goodness, 237, 275, 284, XLVI.
Good grace, 67, R.7.
Good man, who is a, 206.
God nature, 481.
Good qualities, 29, 90, 337, 365, 397, 462.
Good sense, 67, 347, CVI.
Good taste, 258.
----------, rarity of, R.3.
----, women, 368, XCVI.
Government of others, 151.
Grace, 67.
Gracefulness, 240.
Gratitude, 223, 224, 225, 279, 298, 438, XLIII.
Gravity, 257.
Great men, what they cannot acquire, LXXXIV.
Great minds, 142.
Great names, 94.
Greediness, 66.

Habit, 426.
Happy, who are, 49.
Happiness, 48, 61, VII, LXXX, LXXXI.
hatred, 338.
Head, 102, 108.
Health, 188, LVII.
Heart, 98, 102, 103, 108, 478, 484.
Heroes, 24, 53, 185.
Honesty, 202, 206.
Honour, 270.
Hope, 168, LXVIII.
Humility, 254, 358, LXXVI, LXXIX
Humiliation, 272.
Humour, 47. SEE Temper.
Hypocrisy, 218.
--------- of afflictions, 233.

Idleness, 169, 266, 267, 398, 482, 487, XVIII., LV.
Ills, 174. SEE Evils.
Illusions, 123.
Imagination, 478.
Imitation, 230, XLIV, R.5.
Impertinence, 502.
Impossibilities, 30.
Incapacity, 126.
Inclination, 253, 390.
Inconsistency, 135.
Inconstancy, 181.
Inconvenience, 242.
Indifference, 172, XXIII.
Indiscretion, 429.
Indolence. SEE Idleness, and Laziness.
Infidelity, 359, 360, 381, 429.
Ingratitude, 96, 226, 306, 317.
Injuries, 14.
Injustice, 78.
Innocence, 465.
Instinct, 123.
Integrity, 170.
Interest, 39, 40, 66, 85, 172, 187, 232, 253, 305, 390.
Interests, 66.
Intrepidity, 217, XL.
Intrigue, 73.
Invention, 287.

Jealousy, 28, 32, 324, 336, 359, 361, 446, 503, CII.
Joy, XIV.
Judges, 268.
Judgment, 89, 97, 248.
-------- of the World, 212, 455.
Justice, 78, 458, XII.

Kindness, 14, 85.
Knowledge, 106.

Labour of Body, effect of, LXXVII.
Laments, 355.
Laziness, 367. SEE Idleness.
Leader, 43.
Levity, 179, 181.
Liberality, 167, 263.
Liberty in Society, R.4.
Limits to Confidence, R.1.
Little Minds, 142.
Love, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 136, 259, 262,
274, 286, 296, 321, 335, 336, 348, 349, 351, 353,
361, 371, 374, 385, 395, 396, 402, 417, 418, 422,
430, 440, 441, 459, 466, 471, 473, 499, 500, 501,
---- defined, 68.
----, Coldness in, LX.
----, Effect of absence on, 276.
---- akin to Hate, 111.
---- of Women, 466, 471, 499.
----, Novelty in, 274.
----, Infidelity in, LXIV.
----, Old age of, 430.
----, Cure for, 417, 459.
Loss of Friends, XLV.
Lovers, 312, 362, LXXXVII, XCVII.
Lunatic, 353.
Luxury, LIV.
Lying, 63.

Madmen, 353, 414.
Malady, LVII.
Magistrates, R.6.
Magnanimity, 248, LIII.
----------- defined, 285.
Malice, 483.
Manners, R.7.
Mankind, 436, XXXVI.
Marriages, 113.
Maxims, LXVII.
Mediocrity, 375.
Memory, 89, 313.
Men easier to know than Man, 436.
Merit, 50, 92, 95, 153, 156, 165, 166, 273, 291, 379,
401, 437, 455, CXVIII.
Mind, 101, 103, 265, 357, 448, 482, CIX.
Mind, Capacities of, R.2.
Miserable, 49.
Misfortunes, 19, 24, 174, 325.
----------- of Friends. XV.
----------- of Enemies, 463.
Mistaken people, 386.
Mistrust, 86.
Mockery, R.2.
Moderation, 17, 18, 293, 308, III, IV.
Money, Man compared to, XXXII.
Motives, 409.

Names, Great, 94.
Natural goodness, 275.
Natural, to be, 431.
-------, always pleasing, R.7.
Nature, 53, 153, 189, 365, 404.
Negotiations, 278.
Novelty in study, 178.
------- in love, 274.
------- in friendship, 426.

Obligations, 299, 317, 438. SEE Benefits and Gratitude.
Obstinacy, 234, 424.
--------- its cause, 265.
Occasions. SEE Opportunities.
Old Age, 109, 210, 418, 423, 430, 461.
Old Men, 93.
Openness of heart, R.1.
Opinions, 13, 234, CXXIII, R.5.
Opinionatedness, R.5.
Opportunities, 345, 453, CV.

Passions, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 122, 188, 266, 276, 404,
422, 443, 460, 471, 477, 484, 485, 486, 500, II.
Peace of Mind, VIII.
Penetration, 377, 425, CXVI.
Perfection, R.2.
Perseverance, 177.
Perspective, 104.
Persuasion, 8.
Philosophers, 46, 54, 504, XXI.
Philosophy, 22.
---------- of a Footman, 504, LXXV.
Pity, 264.
Pleasing, 413, CXXV.
--------, Mode of, XLVIII, R.5.
--------, Mind a, R.2.
Point of view, R.4.
Politeness, 372, R.5.
Politeness of Mind, 99.
Praise, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 272, 356,
Preoccupation, 92, R.3.
Pride, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 228, 234, 239, 254, 267, 281,
450, 462, 463, 472, VI, XIX.
Princes, 15, 320.
Proceedings, 170.
Productions of the Mind, R.2.
Professions, 256.
Promises, 38.
Proportion, R.6.
Propriety, 447.
--------- in Women, XXXIV.
Prosperity, 25.
Providence, XXXIX.
Prudence, 65, LXXXVIII, R.1.

Qualities, 29, 162, 397, 470, 498, R.6, R.7.
---------, Bad, 468.
---------, Good, 88, 337, 462.
---------, Great, 159, 433.
---------, of Mind, classified, R.20.
Quarrels, 496,
Quoting oneself, R.5.

Raillery, R.2, R.4.
Rank, 401.
Reason, 42, 105, 325, 365, 467, 469, XX, R.6.
Recollection in Memory{, 313}.
Reconciliation, 82.
Refinement, R.2.
Regret, 355.
Relapses, 193.
Remedies, 288.
-------- for love 459.
Remonstrances, 37.
Repentance, 180.
Repose, 268.
Reproaches, 148.
Reputation, 268, 412.
Resolution, L.
Revenge, 14.
Riches, 54.
Ridicule, 133, 134, 326, 418, 422.
Rules for Conversation, R.5.
Rusticity, 393.

Satire, 483, R.2, R.4.
Sciences, R.6.
Secrets, XVI, R.1.
-------, How they should be kept, R.1.
Self-deceit, 115, 452.
Self-love, 2, 3, 4, 228, 236, 247, 261, 262, 339, 494, 500,
--------- in love, 262.
Self-satisfaction, 51.
Sensibility, 275.
Sensible People, 347, CVI.
Sentiment, 255, R.6.
Severity of Women, 204, 333.
Shame, 213, 220.
Silence, 79, 137, 138, CXIV.
Silliness. SEE Folly.
Simplicity, 289.
Sincerity, 62, 316, 366, 383, 457.
---------, Difference between it and Confidence, R.1.
---------, defined, R.1.
--------- of Lovers, LXI.
Skill, LXIV.
Sobriety, XXV.
Society, 87, 201, R.4.
-------, Distinction between it and Friendship, R.IV.
Soul, 80, 188, 194.
Souls, Great, XXXI.
Sorrows, LXXVIII.
Stages of Life, 405.
Strength of mind, 19, 20, 21, 504.
Studies, why new ones are pleasing, 178.
-------, what to study, XCII.
Subtilty, 128.
Sun, 26.

Talents, 468.
-------, latent, 344, XCV.
Talkativeness, 314.
Taste, 13, 109, 252, 390, 467, CXX, R.3, R.6.
-----, good, 258, R.3.
-----, cause of diversities in, R.3.
-----, false, R.3.
Tears, 233, 373.
Temper, 47, 290, 292.
Temperament, 220, 222, 297, 346.
Times for speaking, R.5.
Timidity, 169, 480.
Titles, XXXII.
Tranquillity, 488.
Treachery, 120, 126.
Treason, 120.
Trickery, 86, 350, XCI. SEE Deceit.
Trifles, 41.
Truth, 64, LI.
Tyranny, R.1.

Understanding, 89.
Untruth, 63. SEE Lying.
Unhappy, CXXV.

Valour, 1, 213, 214, 215, 216. SEE Bravery and Courage.
Vanity, 137, 158, 200, 232, 388, 389, 443, 467, 483.
Variety of mind, R.4.
Vice, 182, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 195, 218, 253, 273,
380, 442, 445, XXIX.
Violence, 363, 369, 466, CXIII.
Victory, XII.
Virtue, 1, 25, 169, 171, 182, 186, 187, 189, 200, 218,
253, 380, 388, 442, 445, 489, XXIX.
Virtue of Women, 1, 220, 367, XCVIII.
Vivacity, 416.

Weakness, 130, 445.
Wealth, Contempt of, 301.
Weariness. SEE Ennui.
Wicked people, 284.
Wife jealous sometimes desirable, LXXXIX.
Will, 30.
Wisdom, 132, 210, 231, 323, {4}44, LXXXIII.
Wise Man, who is a, 203, XCI.
Wishes, 295.
Wit, 199, 340, 413, 415, 421, 502.
Wives, 364, CIV.
Woman, 131, 204, 205, 220, 241, 277, 332, 333, 334,
340, 346, 362, 367, 368, 418, 429, 440, 466, 471,
474, LXX, XC.
Women, Severity of, 333.
-----, Virtue of, 205, 220, XC.
-----, Power of, LXXI.
Wonder, 384.
World, 201.
-----, Judgment of, 268.
-----, Approbation of, 201.
-----, Establishment in, 56.
-----, Praise and censure of, 454.

Young men, 378, 495.
Youth, 271, 341.


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