The Bullitt Mission to Russia
by
William C. Bullitt
Part 2 out of 3
investigation to make a definite statement of the position of the
Soviet Government. He was opposed by Trotski and the generals, but
without much difficulty got the support of the majority of the
executive council, and the statement of the position of the Soviet
Government which was handed to me was finally adopted unanimously.
My discussion of this proposal with the leaders of the Soviet
Government was so detailed that I feel sure of my ground in saying
that it does not represent the minimum terms of the Soviet Government,
and that I can point out in detail wherein it may be modified without
making it unacceptable to the Soviet Government. For example, the
clause under article 5--"and to their own nationals who have been or
may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia"--is certainly not
of vital importance. And the clause under article 4, in regard to
admission of citizens of the soviet republics of Russia into the
allied and associated countries, may certainly be changed in such a
way as to reserve all necessary rights to control such immigration to
the allied and associated countries, and to confine it to persons who
come on legitimate and necessary business, and to exclude definitely
all possibility of an influx of propagandists.
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are respectfully submitted:
1. No government save a socialist government can be set up
in Russia to-day except by foreign bayonets, and any
governments so set up will fall the moment such support is
withdrawn. The Lenin wing of the communist party is to-day
as moderate as any socialist government which can control
Russia.
2. No real peace can be established in Europe or the world
until peace is made with the revolution. This proposal of
the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace
with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis--perhaps
a unique opportunity.
3. If the blockade is lifted and supplies begin to be
delivered regularly to soviet Russia, a more powerful hold
over the Russian people will be established than that given
by the blockade itself--the hold given by fear that this
delivery of supplies may be stopped. Furthermore, the
parties which oppose the communists in principle but are
supporting them at present will be able to begin to fight
against them.
4. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that a
proposal following the general lines of the suggestion of
the Soviet Government should be made at the earliest
possible moment, such changes being made, particularly in
article 4 and article 5, as will make the proposal
acceptable to conservative opinion in the allied and
associated countries.
Very respectfully submitted.
WILLIAM C. BULLITT.
* * * * *
APPENDIX TO REPORT
TRANSPORT
_Locomotives_.--Before the war Russia had 22,000 locomotives.
Destruction by war and ordinary wear and tear have reduced the number
of locomotives in good order to 5,500. Russia is entirely cut off from
supplies of spare parts and materials for repair, facilities for the
manufacture of which do not exist in Russia. And the Soviet Government
is able only with the greatest difficulty to keep in running order the
few locomotives at its disposal.
_Coal_.--Soviet Russia is entirely cut off from supplies of coal.
Kolchak holds the Perm mining district, although Soviet troops are now
on the edge of it. Denikin still holds the larger part of the Donetz
coal district and has destroyed the mines in the portion of the
district which he has evacuated. As a result of this, locomotives,
electrical power plants, etc., must be fed with wood, which is
enormously expensive and laborious and comparatively ineffectual.
_Gasoline_.--There is a total lack of gasoline, due to the British
occupation of Baku. The few automobiles in the cities which are kept
running for vital Government business are fed with substitute
mixtures, which causes them to break down with great frequency and to
miss continually. Almost the entire fleet on the great inland waterway
system of Russia was propelled by gasoline. As a result the Volga and
the canals, which are so vital a part of Russia's system of
transportation, are useless.
FOOD
Everyone is hungry in Moscow and Petrograd, including the people's
commissaries themselves. The daily ration of Lenin and the other
commissaries is the same as that of a soldier in the army or of a
workman at hard labor. In the hotel which is reserved for Government
officials the menu is the following: Breakfast--A quarter to half a
pound of black bread, which must last all day, and tea without sugar.
Dinner--A good soup, a small piece of fish, for which occasionally a
diminutive piece of meat is substituted, a vegetable, either a potato
or a bit of cabbage, more tea without sugar. Supper--What remains of
the morning ration of bread and more tea without sugar.
Occasionally sugar, butter, and chickens slip through from the Ukraine
and are sold secretly at atrocious prices--butter, for example, at 140
roubles a pound. Whenever the Government is able to get its hands on
any such "luxuries" it turns them over to the schools, where an
attempt is made to give every child a good dinner every day.
The food situation has been slightly improved by the rejoining of
Ukraine to Great Russia, for food is relatively plentiful in the
south; but no great improvement in the situation is possible because
of the lack of transport.
MANAGEMENT
Such supplies as are available in Soviet Russia are being utilized
with considerable skill. For example, in spite of the necessity of
firing with wood, the Moscow-Petrograd express keeps up to its
schedule, and on both occasions when I made the trip it took but 13
hours, compared to the 12 hours of prewar days.
The food control works well, so that there is no abundance alongside
of famine. Powerful and weak alike endure about the same degree of
starvation.
The Soviet Government has made great efforts to persuade industrial
managers and technical experts of the old regime to enter its service.
Many very prominent men have done so. And the Soviet Government pays
them as high as $45,000 a year for their services, although Lenin gets
but $1,800 a year. This very anomalous situation arises from the
principle that any believing communist must adhere to the scale of
wages established by the government, but if the government considers
it necessary to have the assistance of any anticommunist, it is
permitted to pay him as much as he demands.
All meetings of workmen during work hours have been prohibited, with
the result that the loafing which was so fatal during the Kerensky
regime has been overcome and discipline has been restored in the
factories as in the army.
SOCIAL CONDITIONS
_Terror_.--The red terror is over. During the period of its power the
extraordinary commission for the suppression of the counter
revolution, which was the instrument of the terror, executed about
1,500 persons in Petrograd, 500 in Moscow, and 3,000 in the remainder
of the country--5,000 in all Russia. These figures agree with those
which were brought back from Russia by Maj. Wardwell, and inasmuch as
I have checked them from Soviet, anti-Soviet, and neutral sources I
believe them to be approximately correct. It is worthy of note in this
connection that in the white terror in southern Finland alone,
according to official figures, Gen. Mannerheim executed without trial
12,000 working men and women.
_Order_.--One feels as safe in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow as
in the streets of Paris or New York. On the other hand, the streets of
these cities are dismal, because of the closing of retail shops whose
functions are now concentrated in a few large nationalized "department
stores." Petrograd, furthermore, has been deserted by half its
population; but Moscow teems with twice the number of inhabitants it
contained before the war. The only noticeable difference in the
theaters, opera, and ballet is that they are now run under the
direction of the department of education, which prefers classics and
sees to it that working men and women and children are given an
opportunity to attend the performances and that they are instructed
beforehand in the significance and beauties of the productions.
_Morals_.--Prostitutes have disappeared from sight, the economic
reasons for their career having ceased to exist. Family life has been
absolutely unchanged by the revolution. I have never heard more
genuinely mirthful laughter than when I told Lenin, Tchitcherin, and
Litvinov that much of the world believed that women had been
"nationalized." This lie is so wildly fantastic that they will not
even take the trouble to deny it. Respect for womanhood was never
greater than in Russia to-day. Indeed, the day I reached Petrograd was
a holiday in honor of wives and mothers.
_Education_.--The achievements of the department of education under
Lunacharsky have been very great. Not only have all the Russian
classics been reprinted in editions of three and five million copies
and sold at a low price to the people, but thousands of new schools
for men, women, and children have been opened in all parts of Russia.
Furthermore, workingmen's and soldiers' clubs have been organized in
many of the palaces of yesteryear, where the people are instructed by
means of moving pictures and lectures. In the art galleries one meets
classes of working men and women being instructed in the beauties of
the pictures. The children's schools have been entirely reorganized,
and an attempt is being made to give every child a good dinner at
school every day. Furthermore, very remarkable schools have been
opened for defective and over-nervous children. On the theory that
genius and insanity are closely allied, these children are taught from
the first to compose music, paint pictures, sculpt and write poetry,
and it is asserted that some very valuable results have been achieved,
not only in the way of productions but also in the way of restoring
the nervous systems of the children.
_Morale_.--The belief of the convinced communists in their cause is
almost religious. Never in any religious service have I seen higher
emotional unity than prevailed at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet
in celebration of the foundation of the Third Socialist
Internationale. The remark of one young man to me when I questioned
him in regard to his starved appearance is characteristic. He replied
very simply: "I am ready to give another year of starvation to our
revolution."
STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES
The following statement was made to me by Volsky, leader of the right
social revolutionaries, the largest opposition party:
"Intervention of any kind will prolong the regime of the Bolsheviki by
compelling us, like all honorable Russians, to drop opposition and
rally round the Soviet Government in defense of the revolution. With
regard to help to individual groups or governments fighting against
soviet Russia, we see no difference between such intervention and the
sending of troops. If the allies come to an agreement with the Soviet
Government, sooner or later the peasant masses will make their will
felt and they are alike against the bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviki.
"If by any chance Kolchak and Denikin were to win, they would have to
kill in tens of thousands where the Bolsheviki have had to kill in
hundreds and the result would be the complete ruin and collapse of
Russia into anarchy. Has not the Ukraine been enough to teach the
allies that occupation by non-Bolshevik troops merely turns into
Bolsheviki those of the population who were not Bolsheviki before? It
is clear to us that the Bolshiviki are really fighting against
bourgeois dictatorship, We are, therefore, prepared to help them in
every possible way.
"Grandmother Ekaterina Constantinovna Breshkovskaya has no sort of
authority, either from the assembly of members of the all Russian
constituent assembly or from the party of social revolutionaries. Her
utterances in America, if she is preaching intervention, represent her
personal opinions which are categorically repudiated by the party of
social revolutionaries, which has decisively expressed itself against
the permissibility of intervention, direct or indirect."
Volsky signed this latter statement: "V. Volsky, late president of the
assembly of members of the all Russian constituent assembly."
Martov, leader of the Menshiviki, stated: "The Menshiviki are against
every form of intervention, direct or indirect, because by providing
the incentive to militarization it is bound to emphasize the least
desirable qualities of the revolution. Further, the needs of the army
overwhelm all efforts at meeting the needs of social and economic
reconstruction. Agreement with the Soviet Government would lessen the
tension of defense and would unmuzzle the opposition, who, while the
Soviet Government is attacked, are prepared to help in its defense,
while reserving until peace their efforts to alter the Bolshevik
regime.
"The forces that would support intervention must be dominated by those
of extreme reaction because all but the reactionaries are prepared
temporarily to sink their differences with the Bolsheviki in order to
defend the revolution as a whole."
Martov finally expressed himself as convinced that, given peace, life
itself and the needs of the country will bring about the changes he
desires.
ARMY
The soviet army now numbers between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 troops of
the line. Nearly all these soldiers are young men between the ages of
17 and 27. The morale of regiments varies greatly. The convinced
communists, who compose the bulk of the army, fight with crusading
enthusiasm. Other regiments, composed of patriots but noncommunists,
are less spirited; other regiments composed of men who have entered
the army for the slightly higher bread ration are distinctly
untrustworthy. Great numbers of officers of the old army are occupying
important executive posts in the administration of the new army, but
are under control of convinced communist supervisors. Nearly all the
lower grade officers of the army are workmen who have displayed
courage in the ranks and have been trained in special officer schools.
Discipline has been restored and on the whole the spirit of the army
appears to be very high, particularly since its recent successes. The
soldiers no longer have the beaten dog-like look which distinguished
them under the Czar but carry themselves like freemen and curiously
like Americans. They are popular with the people.
I witnessed a review of 15,000 troops in Petrograd. The men marched
well and their equipment of shoes, uniforms, rifles, and machine guns
and light artillery was excellent. On the other hand they have no big
guns, no aeroplanes, no gas shells, no liquid fire, nor indeed, any of
the more refined instruments of destruction.
The testimony was universal that recruiting for the army is easiest in
the districts which having once lived under the soviet were over run
by anti-soviet forces and then reoccupied by the Red Army.
Trotski is enormously proud of the army he has created, but it is
noteworthy that even he is ready to disband the army at once if peace
can be obtained in order that all the brains and energy it contains
may be turned to restoring the normal life of the country.
LENIN'S PRESTIGE
The hold which Lenin has gained on the imagination of the Russian
people makes his position almost that of a dictator. There is already
a Lenin legend. He is regarded as almost a prophet. His picture,
usually accompanied by that of Karl Marx, hangs everywhere. In Russia
one never hears Lenin and Trotski spoken of in the same breath as is
usual in the western world. Lenin is regarded as in a class by
himself. Trotski is but one of the lower order of mortals.
When I called on Lenin at the Kremlin I had to wait a few minutes
until a delegation of peasants left his room. They had heard in their
village that Comrade Lenin was hungry. And they had come hundreds of
miles carrying 800 poods of bread as the gift of the village to Lenin.
Just before them was another delegation of peasants to whom the report
had come that Comrade Lenin was working in an unheated room. They came
bearing a stove and enough firewood to heat it for three months. Lenin
is the only leader who receives such gifts. And he turns them into the
common fund.
Face to face Lenin is a very striking man--straightforward and direct,
but also genial and with a large humor and serenity.
CONCESSIONS
The Soviet Government recognizes very clearly the undesirability of
granting concessions to foreigners and is ready to do so only because
of necessity. The members of the Government realize that the lifting
of the blockade will be illusory unless the Soviet Government is able
to establish credits in foreign countries, particularly the United
States and England, so that goods may be bought in those countries.
For Russia to-day is in a position to export only a little gold, a
little platinum, a little hemp, flax, and wood. These exports will be
utterly inadequate to pay for the vast quantity of imports which
Russia needs. Russia must, therefore, obtain credit at any price. The
members of the Soviet Government realize fully that as a preliminary
step to the obtaining of credit the payment of foreign debts must be
resumed and, therefore, are ready to pay such debts. But even though
these debts are paid the members of the Soviet Government believe that
they will not be able to borrow money in foreign countries on any mere
promise to pay. They believe, therefore, that they will have to grant
concessions in Russia to foreigners in order to obtain immediate
credit. They desire to avoid this expedient if in any way it shall be
possible, but if absolutely necessary they are ready to adopt it in
order to begin the restoration of the normal life of the country.
Senator KNOX. To whom did you hand that report?
Mr. BULLITT. I handed copies of this personally to Secretary Lansing,
Col. House, Gen. Bliss and Mr. Henry White, and I handed a second
copy, for the President, to Mr. Lansing. Secretary Lansing wrote on
it, "Urgent and immediate"; put it in an envelope, and I took it up to
the President's house.
Senator KNOX. At the same time that you handed in this report, did you
hand them the proposal of the Soviet Government?
Mr. BULLITT. The proposal of the Soviet Government is appended to this
report.
Senator KNOX. It is a part of the report?
Mr. BULLITT. It is a part of the report which I have already read.
There comes first an appendix explaining the statements which I have
just read, and giving the evidence I have for them.
Senator KNOX. Was there any formal meeting of the peace conference, or
of representatives of the great powers, to act upon this suggestion
and upon your report?
Mr. BULLITT. It was acted upon in a very lengthy, long-drawn-out
manner.
Immediately on my return I was first asked to appear before the
American Commission. First, the night I got back I had a couple of
hours with Col. House, in which I went over the whole matter. Col.
House was entirely and quite decidedly in favor of making peace, if
possible, on the basis of this proposal.
The next morning I was called before the other Commissioners, and I
talked with Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. Henry White all the
morning and most of the afternoon. We had a long discussion, at the
end of which it was the sense of the commissioners' meeting that it
was highly desirable to attempt to bring about peace on that basis.
BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE
The next morning I had breakfast with Mr. Lloyd George at his
apartment. Gen. Smuts and Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Philip Kerr were
also present, and we discussed the matter at considerable length, I
brought Mr. Lloyd George the official text of the proposal, the same
official one, in that same envelop, which I have just shown to you. He
had previously read it, it having been telegraphed from Helsingfors.
As he had previously read it, he merely glanced over it and said,
"That is the same one I have already read," and he handed it to Gen.
Smuts, who was across the table, and said, "General, this is of the
utmost importance and interest, and you ought to read it right away."
Gen. Smuts read it immediately, and said he thought it should not be
allowed to lapse; that it was of the utmost importance. Mr. Lloyd
George, however, said that he did not know what he could do with
British public opinion. He had a copy of the Daily Mail in his hand,
and he said, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing
how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?" The Daily Mail was
roaring and screaming about the whole Russian situation. Then Mr.
Lloyd George said, "Of course all the reports we get from people we
send in there are in this same general direction, but we have got to
send in somebody who is known to the whole world as a complete
conservative, in order to have the whole world believe that the report
he brings out is not simply the utterance of a radical." He then said,
"I wonder if we could get Lansdowne to go?" Then he immediately
corrected himself and said, "No; it would probably kill him." Then he
said, "I wish I could send Bob Cecil, but we have got to keep him for
the league of nations." And he said to Smuts, "It would be splendid if
you could go, but, of course, you have got the other job," which was
going down to Hungary. Afterwards he said he thought the most
desirable man to send was the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Robert
Cecil's brother; that he would be respectable enough and well known
enough so that when he came back and made the same report it would go
down with British public opinion. Mr. Lloyd George then urged me to
make public my report. He said it was absolutely necessary to have
publicity given to the actual conditions in Russia, which he
recognized were as presented.
I saw Mr. Balfour that afternoon with Sir Eric Drummond, who at that
time was acting as his secretary. He is now secretary of the league of
nations. We discussed the entire matter. Sir William Wiseman told me
afterward that Mr. Balfour was thoroughly in favor of the proposition.
Well, to cut the story short, first the President referred the matter
to Col. House. He left his decision on the matter with Col. House, as
was his usual course of procedure in most such matters. Mr. Lloyd
George also agreed in advance to leave the preparation of the proposal
to Col. House; that is, he said he would be disposed to go at least as
far as we would and would follow the lead of the President and Col.
House. Col. House thereupon asked me to prepare a reply to this
proposal, which I did.
Col. House in the meantime had seen Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Orlando had
expressed himself as entirely in favor of making peace on this basis,
at least so Col. House informed me at the time. The French, I believe,
had not yet been approached formally on the matter.
Senator KNOX. By the way, right here, you say Mr. Lloyd George advised
you to make your report public. Did you make it public?
Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. Mr. Lloyd George desired me to make it public
for the enlightenment that he thought it might give to public opinion.
Senator KNOX. But you did not do it?
BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED
Mr. BULLITT. I attempted to. I prepared a statement for the press
based on my report, giving the facts, which I submitted to the
commission to be given out. No member of the commission was ready to
take the responsibility for publicity in the matter and it was
referred to the President. The President received it and decided that
he did not want it given out. He thought he would rather keep it
secret, and in spite of the urgings of the other commissioners he
continued to adhere to that point of view, and my report has never
been made public until this moment.
Col. House asked me to prepare a declaration of policy, a statement
based on this proposal of the Soviet Government. It was to be an
ironclad declaration which we knew in advance would be accepted by the
Soviet Government if we made it, and he thought that the President and
Mr. Lloyd George would put it through.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you attend that meeting of the commission when
that report was considered by the American Commission?
Mr. BULLITT. I first handed each member of the commission my report. I
had appeared before them and discussed my mission for an entire day.
They sat in the morning and in the afternoon.
Senator BRANDEGEE. I wondered whether you were present when the
President thought it would be better not to give it out, not to make
it public.
Mr. BULLITT. No, sir; I was not. Then upon order of Col. House, to
whom the matter had been referred, I prepared this declaration of
policy. I prepared it in conjunction with Mr. Whitney Shepherdson, who
was Col. House's assistant secretary, and also versed in international
law. I do not know that this is of any importance, aside from the fact
that it is almost the only direct proposition to accept their proposal
which was prepared. Col. House took this and held it under advisement
and discussed it, I believe, with the President and other persons.
The CHAIRMAN. It had better be printed.
The document referred to is as follows:
A PROPOSED DECLARATION OF POLICY TO BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE
ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS AND AN OFFER OF AN ARMISTICE
The representatives of the States assembled in conference at Paris
recently extended an invitation to the organized groups in Russia to
lay down their arms and to send delegates to Prince's Island. These
delegates were asked to "confer with the representatives of the
associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to
ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people and
bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which
Russia may work out her own purposes and happy cooperative relations
may be established between her people and the other peoples of the
world." The truce of arms was not declared, and the meeting did not
take place.
The people of Russia are laboring to-day to establish the system of
government under which they shall live. Their task is one of
unparalleled difficulty, and should not be further complicated by the
existence of misapprehensions among the Russian people or throughout
the world. Therefore, the representatives of the associated powers,
now sitting in the conference of Paris, have determined to state
publicly what they had in mind to say through their delegates to
Prince's Island concerning the policies which govern their relations
with the Russian people.
They wish to make it plain that they do not intend to interfere in any
way with the solution of the political, social, or economic problems
of Russia. They believe that the peace of the world will largely
depend upon a right settlement of these matters; but they equally
recognize that any right settlement must proceed from the Russian
people themselves, unembarrassed by influence or direction from
without. On the other hand, the associated powers desired to have it
clearly understood that they can have no dealings with any Russian
Government which shall invade the territory of its neighbors or seek
to impose its will upon other peoples by force. The full authority and
military power of the associated governments will stand in the way of
any such attempt.
The task of creating a stable government demands all the great
strength of Russia, healed of the famine, misery, and disease which
attend and delay the reconstruction. The associated powers have
solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of
Europe. Their efforts, begun in Belgium and in northern France during
the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to
the Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads of
food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an
impartial hand. Industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point
where it was broken off by war. These measures of relief will be
continued until peace is signed and until nations are once more able
to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce.
It is the earnest desire of the associated peoples similarly to
assuage the distress of millions of men and women in Russia and to
provide them with such physical conditions as will make life possible
and desirable. Relief can not be effectively rendered, however, except
by the employment of all available transportation facilities and the
active cooperation of those exercising authority within the country.
These requisites can not be assured while Russia is still at war.
The allied and associated governments, therefore, propose an agreement
between themselves and all governments now exercising political
authority within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including
Finland, together with Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia,
Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, that hostilities against one another
shall cease on all fronts within these territories on April ---- at
noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of
this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind
whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long
as the armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice shall
be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent. The allied and
associated Governments propose that such of these Governments as are
willing to accept the terms of this armistice shall send not more than
three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts,
to ---- where they shall meet on April ---- with representatives of
the allied and associated Governments in conference to discuss peace,
upon the basis of the following principles:
(1) All signatory Governments shall remain, as against each
other, in full control of the territories which they occupy
at the moment when the armistice becomes effective; subject
only to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the
conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these
territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change
their Government.
(2) The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full
security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the
citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons
comply with the laws of the country to which they seek
admittance, and provided also that they do not interfere or
attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics
of that country.
(3) The right to send official representatives enjoying full
liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several
signatories to each other.
(4) A general amnesty shall be granted by the various
signatories to all political or military opponents,
offenders, and prisoners who are so regarded because of
their association or affiliation with another signatory,
provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of
the land.
(5) Nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the
country of another shall be given all possible facilities
for repatriation.
(6) The allied and associated Governments shall immediately
withdraw their armed forces and further military support
from the territory of the former Russian Empire, including
Finland, and the various Governments within that territory
shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces
according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be
agreed upon by the conference.
(7) Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as
against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be
established, subject to a program of equitable distribution
of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be
agreed upon by the conference.
(8) Provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual
exchange of transit and port privileges among the several
signatories.
(9) The conference shall be competent to discuss and
determine any other matter which bears upon the problem of
establishing peace within the territory of the former
Russian Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment
of international relations among the signatories.
NOTE.--If it is desirable to include a specific reference to
Russia's financial obligations, the following clause (8 bis)
would be acceptable to the Soviet Government at least: "The
governments which have been set up on the territory of the
former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their
responsibility for the financial obligations of the former
Russian Empire to foreign States parties to this agreement
and to the nationals of such States. Detailed arrangements
for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by
the conference, regard being had to the present financial
situation of Russia."
Senator BRANDEGEE. Was this brought to the attention of the President?
Mr. BULLITT. The first night after I got in Col. House went to the
telephone and called up the President right away and told him that I
was in, and that he thought this was a matter of the utmost
importance, and that it would seem to be an opportunity to make peace
in a section of the world where there was no peace; in fact, where
there were 23 wars. The President said he would see me the next
evening down at Col. House's office, as I remember it. The next
evening, however, the President had a headache and he did not come.
The following afternoon Col. House said to me that he had seen the
President and the President had said he had a one-track mind and was
occupied with Germany at present, and he could not think about Russia,
and that he had left the Russian matter all to him, Col. House.
Therefore I continued to deal with Col. House directly on it inasmuch
as he was the delegate of the President, and Lloyd George, in the
matter. I used to see Col. House every day, indeed two or three times
a day, on the subject, urging him to obtain action before April 10,
which, as you will recall, was the date when this proposal was to
expire.
NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA
Meanwhile Mr. Hoover and Mr. Auchincloss had the idea of approaching
peace with Russia by a feeding proposition, and they had approached
Mr. Fridjof Nansen, the Arctic explorer, and got him to write and send
the following letter to the President. You doubtless have seen his
letter to the President.
PARIS, April 3, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The present food situation in Russia,
where hundreds of thousands of people are dying monthly from
sheer starvation and disease, is one of the problems now
uppermost in all men's minds. As it appears that no solution
of this food and disease question has so far been reached in
any direction, I would like to make a suggestion from a
neutral point of view for the alleviation of this gigantic
misery on purely humanitarian grounds.
It would appear to me possible to organize a purely
humanitarian commission for the provisioning of Russia, the
foodstuffs and medical supplies to be paid for, perhaps, to
some considerable extent by Russia itself, the justice of
distribution to be guaranteed by such a commission, the
membership of the commission to be comprised of Norwegian,
Swedish, and possibly Dutch, Danish, and Swiss
nationalities. It does not appear that the existing
authorities in Russia would refuse the intervention of such
a commission of wholly nonpolitical order, devoted solely to
the humanitarian purpose of saving life. If thus organized
upon the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission, it would
raise no question of political recognition or negotiations
between the Allies with the existing authorities in Russia.
I recognize keenly the large political issues involved, and
I would be glad to know under what conditions you would
approve such an enterprise and whether such commission could
look for actual support in finance, shipping, and food and
medical supplies from the United States Government.
I am addressing a similar note to Messrs. Orlando,
Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. Believe me, my dear Mr.
President,
Yours, most respectfully,
FRIDJOF NANSEN.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT,
II Place des Etats-Unis, Paris.
Senator KNOX, I think that was published in nearly all the papers.
Mr. BULLITT. Yes. In it he proposed that a commission should be formed
at once for the feeding of Russia, because of the frightful conditions
of starvation and so on. Col. House decided that it would be an easier
way to peace if we could get there via the feeding plan, under the
guise of a purely humanitarian plan, if we could slide in that way
instead of by a direct, outright statement inviting these people to
sit down and make peace. Therefore he asked me to prepare a reply to
the Nansen letter, which I have here.
PARIS, FRANCE, April 4, 1919. Suggested reply to Dr.
Nansen by the President of the United States and the
premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy:
DEAR MR. NANSEN: It is the earnest desire of the allied and
associated Governments, and of the peoples for whom they
speak, to assuage the distress of the millions of men,
women, and children who are suffering in Russia. The
associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to
relieve the stricken regions of Europe. Their efforts, begun
in Belgium and in Northern France during the course of the
war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to the
Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads
of food are moved into the interior and there are
distributed with an impartial hand. Industry is awakened,
and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by
war. These measures of relief will be continued until
nations are once more able to provide for their needs
through the normal channels of commerce.
The associated peoples desire and deem it their duty
similarly to assist in relieving the people of Russia from
the misery, famine, and disease which oppress them. In view
of the responsibilities which have already been undertaken
by the associated Governments they welcome the suggestion
that the neutral States should take the initiative in the
matter of Russian relief and, therefore, are prepared to
state in accordance with your request, the conditions under
which they will approve and assist a neutral commission for
the provisioning of Russia.
The allied and associated Governments and all Governments
now exercising political authority within the territory of
the former Russian Empire, including Finland, together with
Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and
Afghanistan, shall agree that hostilities against one
another shall cease on all fronts within these territories
on April 20 at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be
begun during the period of this armistice, and that no
troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be
transferred to or within these territories so long as the
armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice
shall be for two weeks unless extended by mutual consent.
The allied and associated Governments propose that such of
these Governments as are willing to accept the terms of this
armistice, shall send not more than three representatives
each, together with necessary technical experts, to
Christiania, where they shall meet on April 25 with
representatives of the allied and associated Governments in
conference to discuss peace 'and the provisioning of Russia,
upon the basis of the following principles:
1. All signatory Governments shall remain, as
against each other, in full control of the
territories which they occupy at the moment when
the armistice becomes effective, subject to such
rectifications as may be agreed upon by the
conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these
territories shall themselves voluntarily determine
to change their government.
2. The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation,
and full security shall be accorded by the several
signatories to the citizens of each other;
provided, however, that such persons comply with
the laws of the country to which they seek
admittance, and provided also-that they do not
interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with
the domestic politics of that country.
3. The right to send official representatives
enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be
accorded by the several signatories to one
another.
4. A general amnesty shall be granted by the
various signatories to all political or military
opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so
treated because of their association or
affiliation with another signatory, provided that
they have not otherwise violated the laws of the
land.
5. Nationals of one signatory residing or detained
in the country of another shall be given all
possible facilities for repatriation.
6. The allied and associated Governments will
immediately withdraw their armed forces and
further military support from the territory of the
former Russian Empire, including Finland and the
various Governments within that territory shall
effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces
according to a scheme of demobilization and
control to be agreed upon by the conference.
7. Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory
as against another shall be lifted and trade
relations shall be established, subject to a
program of equitable distribution of supplies and
utilization of transport facilities to be agreed
upon by the conference in consultation with
representatives of those neutral States which are
prepared to assume the responsibility for the
provisioning of Russia.
8. Provision shall be made by the conference for a
mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among
the several signatories.
9. The Governments which have been set up on the
territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland
shall recognize their responsibility for the
financial obligations of the former Russian Empire
to foreign States parties to this agreement and to
the nationals of such States. Detailed
arrangements for discharging these obligations
shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard
being had to the present financial situation of
Russia.
10. The conference shall be competent to discuss and
determine any other matter which bears upon the
provisioning of Russia, the problem of establishing
peace within the territory of the former Russian
Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment of
international relations among the signatories.
Mr. BULLITT. I also prepared at the orders of Col. House------
Senator KNOX. What attitude did you take toward the Nansen proposal?
Mr. BULLITT. At first I opposed it. I was in favor of the original
plan.
Senator KNOX. You were in favor of the original plan?
Mr. BULLITT. I was in favor of direct, straightforward action in the
matter. However, I found that there was no use in kicking against the
pricks, that I was unable to persuade the commission that my point of
view was the correct one. Therefore at the request of Col. House I
wrote out a reply to Dr. Nansen, in which I embodied a peace proposal
so that it would have meant a peace conference via Nansen, which was
what was desired.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Was that letter delivered to Nansen?
Mr. BULLITT. No. I gave this reply of mine to Col. House. Col. House
read it and said he would approve it, but that before he gave it to
the President and to Lloyd George as his solution of the way to deal
with this Russian matter, he wished it considered by his international
law experts, Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, and it was thereupon
turned over that afternoon to Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller. Does the
Senator desire this document?
Senator KNOX. I do not regard it as material. It was not accepted?
Mr. BULLITT. It was not accepted. What happened in regard to this was
that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, to correct its legal language,
produced a proposition which was entirely different, which left out
all possibility of the matter coming to a peace conference, and was
largely an offer to feed Russia provided Russia put all her railroads
in the hands of the allied and associated Governments. I have that as
well.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you object to having that put in the record,
Senator Knox?
Senator KNOX. No.
Senator BRANDEGEE. I would like to have that put in.
(The document referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)
(AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL)
Draft of proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson
and the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy
in reply to Mr. Nansen's letter:
DEAR SIR: The situation of misery and suffering in Russia
which is described in your letter of April 3 is one which
appeals to the sympathies of all peoples of the world.
Regardless of political differences or shades of thought,
the knowledge that thousands and perhaps millions of men,
and above all of women and children lack the food and the
necessities which make life endurable is one which is
shocking to humanity.
The Governments and the peoples whom we represent, without
thought of political, military or financial advantage, would
be glad to cooperate in any proposal which would relieve the
existing situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a
commission as you propose, purely humanitarian in its
purpose, would offer a practical means of carrying out the
beneficent results which you have in view and could not
either in its conception or its operation be considered as
having in view any other aim than "the humanitarian purpose
of saving life."
It is true that there are great difficulties to be overcome,
political difficulties owing to the existing situation in
Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the
existing de facto governments of Russia are all willing as
the Governments and peoples whom we represent to see succor
and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no
political difficulties will remain as obstacles thereto.
There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and
transport which we have mentioned and also the problem of
distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can
ourselves safely hope to solve in connection with the advice
and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The
problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to
meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral
Governments.
The difficulties of transport in Russia can in large degree
only be overcome in Russia itself. So far as possible, we
would endeavor to provide increased means of transportation;
but we would consider it essential in any such scheme of
relief that control of transportation in Russia, so far as
was necessary in the distribution of relief supplies, should
be placed wholly under such a commission as is described in
your letter and should to the necessary extent be freed from
any governmental or private control whatsoever.
The real human element in the situation, even supposing all
these difficulties to be surmounted, is the problem of
distribution, the problem of seeing that the food reaches
the starving, the medicines the sick, the clothing the
naked. Subject to the supervision of such a commission, this
is a problem which should be solely under the control of the
people of Russia themselves so far as it is humanly possible
to put it under their control. It is not a question of class
or of race or of politics but a question of human beings in
need, and these human beings in each locality should be
given, as under the regime of the Belgian relief commission,
the fullest opportunity to advise the commission upon the
methods and the personnel by which their community is to be
relieved. Under no other circumstances could it be believed
that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian and not
political, and still more important, under no other
conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.
That such a course would involve cessation of hostilities by
Russian troops would of course mean a cessation of all
hostilities on the Russian fronts. Indeed, relief to Russia
which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be
futile, and would be impossible to consider.
Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that
your plan could be successfully carried into effect and we
should be prepared to give it our full support.
Senator KNOX. What I am anxious to get at is to find out what became
of your report.
Senator FALL. I should like to know whether Col. House approved Mr.
Auchincloss's and Mr. Miller's report, or the report of the witness.
Mr. BULLITT. I should like to have this clear, and if I can read just
this one page I shall be greatly obliged. On this proposition I wrote
the following memorandum to Mr. Auchincloss [reading]:
APRIL 4, 1919.
Memorandum for Mr. Auchincloss:
DEAR GORDON: I have studied carefully the draft of the reply
to Dr. Nansen which you have prepared. In spirit and
substance your letter differs so radically from the reply
which I consider essential that I find it difficult to make
any constructive criticism. And I shall refrain from
criticizing your rhetoric.
There are two proposals in your letter, however, which are
obviously unfair and will not, I am certain, be accepted by
the Soviet Government.
1. The life of Russia depends upon its railroads;
and your demand for control of transportation by
the commission can hardly be accepted by the
Soviet Government which knows that plots for the
destruction of railroad bridges were hatched in
the American consulate in Moscow. You are asking
the Soviet Government to put its head in the
lion's mouth. It will not accept. You must
moderate your phrases.
2. When you speak of the "cessation of hostilities
by Russian troops," you fail to speak of
hostilities by troops of the allied and associated
Governments, a number of whom, you may recall,
have invaded Russia. Furthermore, your phrase does
not cover Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Poles, etc. In
addition, you say absolutely nothing about the
withdrawal of the troops of the allied and
associated Governments from Russian territory.
And, most important, you fail to say that troops
and military supplies will cease to be sent into
the territory of the former Russian Empire. You
thereby go a long way toward proving Trotsky's
thesis: That any armistice will simply be used by
the Allies as a period in which to supply tanks,
aeroplanes, gas shells, liquid fire, etc., to the
various antisoviet governments. As it stands, your
armistice proposal is absolutely unfair, and I am
sure that it will not be accepted by the Soviet
Government.
Very respectfully, yours,
WILLIAM C. BULLITT.
Senator NEW. Otherwise you had no fault to find with it?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes. The morning after Col. House had told me he wished
to submit this proposition to his international law experts, I came as
usual to his office about 9.40, and Mr. Auchincloss was on his way to
the President with his proposal, the Auchincloss-Miller proposal, as
Col. House's proposal. But I got that stopped. I went in to Col.
House, and Col. House told Mr. Auchincloss not to take it up to the
President, and asked me if I could doctor up the reply of Mr.
Auchincloss and Mr. Miller to the Nansen letter so that it might
possibly be acceptable to the Soviet Government. I thereupon rewrote
the Auchincloss-Miller letter, but I was forced to stick very closely
to the text. I was told that I could cut things out if I wished to,
but to stick very closely to the text, which I did. I drew this
redraft of their letter, under protest at the whole business. My
redraft of their letter was finally the basis of the reply of the four
to Nansen. I have both these documents here, my reply--and the four
took that reply--and with the changes----
The CHAIRMAN. What four--the successors of the ten?
Mr. BULLITT. The successors of the 10, sir, took the reply------
The CHAIRMAN. Who were the four at that moment?
Mr. BULLITT. M. Orlando, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and the
President. This extremely mild proposition, which really had almost no
chance of life, was, you will see, in no sense a reply to these
proposals of the Soviet Government. This is my attempt to doctor up
the Auchincloss-Miller proposition. In spite of every effort I could
make to obtain definite action on it, the reply was made to me that
this reply to the Nansen proposal would be a sufficient reply to that
proposal of the Soviet Government. [Reading:]
DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in
your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all
peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men,
women, and children lack the food and the necessities, which
make life endurable.
The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad
to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or
financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve
this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a
commission as you propose would offer a practical means of
achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could
not, either in its conception or its operation, be
considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian
purpose of saving life."
There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties,
owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply
and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as
willing as the Governments and the peoples whom we represent to see
succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no
political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the
difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and
also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of
supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice
and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of
transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the
assistance of your own and other neutral Governments. The problem of
transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the
people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and
supervision of your commission.
Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be
solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The
people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the
Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your
commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community
is to be relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed that
the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under
no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.
That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within
the territory of the former Russian Empire is obvious. And the
cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete
suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all
sorts to and within these territories. Indeed, relief to Russia which
did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would
be impossible to consider.
Under such conditions as we have outlined we believe that your plan
could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared
to give it our full support.
REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON, PREMIERS CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, AND
ORLANDO, TO DR. NANSEN, APRIL 17, 1919
DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in
your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all
peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men,
women, and children lack the food and the necessities which
make life endurable.
The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad
to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or
financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve
this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a
commission as you propose would offer a practical means of
achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could
not, either in its conception or its operation, be
considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian
purpose of saving life."
There are great difficulties to be overcome, political
difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and
difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing
local governments of Russia are as willing as the
Governments and people whom we represent to see succor and
relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political
obstacle will remain.
There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply,
finance, and transport which we have mentioned? and also the
problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of
supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with
the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you
propose. The problem of finance would seem to us to fall
upon the Russian authorities. The problem of transport of
supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance
of your own and other neutral governments whose interests
should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far
less. The problems of transport in Russia and of
distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia
themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of
your commission.
Subject to your supervision, the problem of distribution
should be solely under the control of the people of Russia
themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as
under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the
fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the
methods and the personnel by which their community is to be
relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed
that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not
political; under no other condition could it be certain that
the hungry would be fed.
That such a course would involve cessation of all
hostilities within definitive lines in the territory of
Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would,
necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer
of troops and military material of all sorts to and within
Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not
mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would
be impossible to consider.
Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that
your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we
should be prepared to give it our full support.
V.E. ORLANDO.
D. LLOYD GEORGE.
WOODROW WILSON.
G. CLEMENCEAU.
Senator KNOX. I want the reply of Auchincloss to Nansen to go into the
record.
The CHAIRMAN. Let all that correspondence be printed in the record.
Senator KNOX. Dr. Nansen's proposition, and then the reply,
(The letters referred to are inserted above.)
Mr. BULLITT. The Nansen letter was written in Mr. Hoover's office.
Nansen made the proposition. I wrote the original of a reply to Dr.
Nansen, which I believe would have led to peace. Col. House indicated
his approval of it, but wished to have it considered from the
international legal standpoint, which was then done by Mr. Auchincloss
and Mr. Miller, who proposed a reply that had no resemblance to my
proposal. I then objected to that as it was on its way to the
President. It was not sent to the President, and I was ordered to try
to doctor it up. I attempted to doctor it up and produced a doctored
version which was finally made the basis of the reply, with the change
of two or three words which made it even worse and even more
indefinite, so that the Soviet Government could not possibly conceive
it as a genuine peace proposition. It left the whole thing in the air.
Senator KNOX. We would like to have you see that these documents to
which you have just now referred are inserted in the record in the
sequence in which you have named them.
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I shall be at the service of the committee in that
regard.
Senator HARDING. Lest I missed something while I was out of the room I
am exceedingly curious to know why the Soviet proposal was not given
favorable consideration.
Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt has stated that.
KOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL
Mr. BULLITT. The principal reason was entirely different. The fact was
that just at this moment, when this proposal was under consideration,
Kolchak made a 100-mile advance. There was a revolt of peasants in a
district of Russia which entirely cut off supplies from the Bolshevik
army operating against Kolchak. Kolchak made a 100-mile advance, and
immediately the entire press of Paris was roaring and screaming on the
subject, announcing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks;
and therefore everyone in Paris, including, I regret to say members of
the American commission, began to grow very lukewarm about peace in
Russia, because they thought Kolchak would arrive in Moscow and wipe
out the Soviet Government.
Senator KNOX. And the proposal which you brought back from Russia,
that is the Soviet proposal, was abandoned and dropped, after this
last document to which you have just referred.
Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was. May I say this, that April 10 was the final
date when their proposition was open. I had attempted every day and
almost every night to obtain a reply to it. I finally requested the
commission to send the following telegram to Tchitcherin.
I proposed to send this telegram to the American consul at Helsingfors
[reading]:
APRIL 10, 1919.
AMERICAN CONSUL, Helsingfors:
Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to
Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with
following message for Tchitcherin:
"Action leading to food relief via neutrals likely within
week.--Bullitt."
AMMISSION.
The commission considered that matter, and this is the official minute
of their meeting [reading]:
AMERICAN MISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE,
[No. 211.] April 10, 1919.
To: The Commissioners, for action.
Subject: Telegram to Tchitcherin.
_Statement_.--Action by the council of four on the reply to
Mr. Nansen was prevented yesterday by French objection to a
minor clause in the President's letter. It is hoped that
agreement in this matter may be reached to-day or to-morrow,
but it is quite possible that agreement may not be reached
for several days.
To-day, April 10, the pledge of the Soviet Government to
accept a proposal of the sort outlined in its statement of
March 14 expires. No indication has been given the Soviet
Government that its statement was ever placed before the
conference of Paris or that any change of policy in regard
to Russia is contemplated. In view of the importance which
the Soviet Government placed upon its statement, I fear that
this silence and the passing of April 10 will be interpreted
as a definite rejection of the peace effort of the Soviet
Government and that the Soviet Government will at once issue
belligerent political statements and orders for attacks on
all fronts, including Bessarabia and Archangel. It is
certain that if the soviet troops should enter Bessarabia or
should overcome the allied forces at Archangel, the
difficulty of putting through the policy which is likely to
be adopted within the next few days would be greatly
increased. I feel that if the appended telegram should be
sent at once to Tchitcherin, no large offensive movements by
the soviet armies would be undertaken for another week, and
no provocative political statements would be issued.
I therefore respectfully suggest that the appended telegram
should be sent at once.
Respectfully submitted.
WILLIAM C. BULLITT.
APRIL 10, 1919.
At the meeting of the commissioners this morning the above memorandum
was read in which Mr. Bullitt requested that a telegram be sent to the
American consul at Helsingfors, instructing the latter to send a
message through reliable sources to Tchitcherin respecting Mr.
Lansing's contemplated scheme for relief in Russia. After some
discussion the commissioners redrafted the telegram in question to
read as follows:
"Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to
Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with
following message for Tchitcherin, sent on my personal
responsibility: 'Individuals of neutral States are
considering organization for feeding Russia. Will perhaps
decide something definite within a week.'--Bullitt."
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Assistant to Mr. White.
I believe that telegram was dispatched. I do not know.
Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I want to ask you a question. You have told
us that you went to Russia with instructions from the Secretary of
State, Mr. Lansing, with a definition of the American policy by Mr.
House, with the approval of Lloyd George, who approved of your
mission, of the purposes for which you were being sent. Now, tell us
whether or not to your knowledge your report and the proposal of the
Soviet Government was ever formally taken up by the peace conference
and acted on?
Mr. BULLITT. It was never formally laid before the peace conference,
which I believe met only six times during the course of the entire
proceedings of what is called the peace conference.
LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT
Senator KNOX. Did not Mr. Lloyd George in a speech to Parliament
assert that he had never received the proposal with which you returned
from Russia? Have you a copy of his speech?
Mr. BULLITT. About a week after I had handed to Mr. Lloyd George the
official proposal, with my own hands, in the presence of three other
persons, he made a speech before the British Parliament, and gave the
British people to understand that he knew nothing whatever about any
such proposition. It was a most egregious case of misleading the
public, perhaps the boldest that I have ever known in my life. On the
occasion of that statement of Mr. Lloyd George, I wrote the President.
I clipped his statement from a newspaper and sent it to the President,
and I asked the President to inform me whether the statement of Mr.
Lloyd George was true or untrue. He was unable to answer, inasmuch as
he would have had to reply on paper that Mr. Lloyd George had made an
untrue statement. So flagrant was this that various members of the
British mission called on me at the Crillon, a day or so later, and
apologized for the Prime Minister's action in the case.
Senator KNOX. Have you a copy of Lloyd George's remarks in the
Parliament?
Mr. BULLITT. I have a copy.
Senator KNOX. Suppose you read it?
Mr. BULLITT. It is as follows:
Mr. CLYNES. Before the right honorable gentleman comes to the next
subject, can he make any statement on the approaches or
representations alleged to have been made to his Government by persons
acting on behalf of such government as there is in Central Russia?
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all except what have
appeared in the papers.
Mr. CLYNES. I ask the question because it has been repeatedly alleged.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all. Constantly there
are men coming and going to Russia of all nationalities, and they
always come back with their tales of Russia. But we have made no
approach of any sort.
I have only heard reports of others having proposals which they assume
have come from authentic quarters, but these have never been put
before the peace conference by any member, and therefore we have not
considered them.
I think I know what my right honorable friend refers to. There was
some suggestion that a young American had come back from Russia with a
communication. It is not for me to judge the value of this
communication, but if the President of the United States had attached
any value to it he would have brought it before the conference, and he
certainly did not.
It was explained to me by the members of the British delegation who
called on me, that the reason for this deception was that although
when Lloyd George got back to London he intended to make a statement
very favorable to peace with Russia, he found that Lord Northcliffe,
acting through Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times, and Mr.
Winston Churchill, British secretary for war, had rigged the
conservative majority of the House of Commons against him, and that
they were ready to slay him then and there if he attempted to speak
what was his own opinion at the moment on Russian policies.
MR. BULLITT RESIGNS
Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, you resigned your relations with the State
Department and the public service, did you not?
Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir.
Senator KNOX. When?
Mr. BULLITT. I resigned on May 17.
Senator KNOX. For what reason?
Mr. BULLITT. Well, I can explain that perhaps more briefly than in any
other way by reading my letter of resignation to the President, which
is brief.
Senator KNOX. Very well, we would like to hear it.
The CHAIRMAN. Before that letter is read, you did not see the
President and had no knowledge of his attitude in regard to your
report?
Mr. BULLITT. None whatever, except as it was reported to me by Col.
House. Col. House, as I said before, reported to me that he thought in
the first place that the President favored the peace proposal; in the
second place, that the President could not turn his mind to it,
because he was too occupied with Germany, and finally--well, really, I
have no idea what was in the President's mind.
Senator KNOX. There never was another effort to secure an audience
with the President for you after those first two that you say Col.
House made?
Mr. BULLITT. No; not at all. Meetings with the President were always
arranged through Col. House.
In my letter of resignation to the President, which was dated May 17,
1919, I said:
MAY 17, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have submitted to-day to the
Secretary of State my resignation as an assistant in the
Department of State, attache to the American commission to
negotiate peace. I was one of the millions who trusted
confidently and implicitly in your leadership and believed
that you would take nothing less than "a permanent peace"
based upon "unselfish and unbiased justice." But our
Government has consented now to deliver the suffering
peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and
dismemberments--a new century of war. And I can convince
myself no longer that effective labor for "a new world
order" is possible as a servant of this Government.
Russia, "the acid test of good will," for me as for you, has
not even been understood. Unjust decisions of the conference
in regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hungary, East
Prussia, Danzig, the Saar Valley, and the abandonment of the
principle of the freedom of the seas make new international
conflicts certain. It is my conviction that the present
league of nations will be powerless-to prevent these wars,
and that the United States will be involved in them by the
obligations undertaken in the covenant of the league and in
the special understanding with France. Therefore the duty of
the Government of the United States to its own people and to
mankind is to refuse to sign or ratify this unjust treaty,
to refuse to guarantee its settlements by entering the
league of nations, to refuse to entangle the United States
further by the understanding with France.
That you personally opposed most of the unjust settlements,
and that you accepted them only under great pressure, is
well known. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that if you
had made your fight in the open, instead of behind closed
doors, you would have carried with you the public opinion of
the world, which was yours; you would have been able to
resist the pressure and might have established the "new
international order based upon broad and universal
principles of right and justice" of which you used to speak.
I am sorry that you did not fight our fight to the finish
and that you had so little faith in the millions of men,
like myself, in every nation who had faith in you.
Very sincerely, yours,
WILLIAM C. BULLITT.
To the honorable WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States.
Senator KNOX. Did you ever get a reply to that letter?
Mr. BULLITT. I did not, sir. The only intimation I had in regard to it
was that Mr. Close, secretary of the President, with whom I was
lunching, said to me that the President had read my letter and had
said that he would not reply. In connection with that I wrote Col.
House a letter at the same time as follows:
MAY 17, 1919.
MY DEAR COL. HOUSE: Since you kindly lent me the text of the
proposed treaty of peace, I have tried to convince myself
that some good might come of it and that I ought to remain
in the service of the Department of State to labor for its
establishment.
It is with sincere regret that I have come to the conviction
that no good ever will issue from a thing so evil and that
those who care about a permanent peace should oppose the
signature and ratification of it, and of the special
understanding with France.
I have therefore submitted my resignation to the Secretary
of State and have written the appended note to the
President. I hope you will bring it to his attention; not
because he will care what I may think, but because I have
expressed the thoughts which are in the minds of many young
and old men in the commission--thoughts which the President
will have to reckon with when the world begins to reap the
crop of wars the seeds of which have here been sown.
I feel sure that you will agree that I am right in acting on
my conviction and I hope that this action will in no way
affect the relationship between us which has always been so
delightful and stimulating to me.
With my sincerest personal regards, I am, Very respectfully,
yours,
WILLIAM C. BULLITT.
To the honorable EDWARD M. HOUSE,
Hotel Crillon, Paris.
Senator KNOX. Did you get a reply to that?
Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent for me, and after that we had a
conversation. That was the only reply that I had. I had a conversation
with Col. House on the whole matter, and we thrashed it all out.
Senator KNOX. Was anything said during this conversation which you
feel willing or disposed to tell us, which will be important?
Mr. BULLITT. I made a record of the conversation. Inasmuch as the
conversations which I had with various members of the commission on
the occasion of my resignation touched on a number of important
issues, I kept a record of those conversations, that is, those I had
at the time when I resigned. They are the only conversations of which
I made records, and I made them simply because we did deal more or
less with the entire question of the peace treaty. On the other hand,
they are personal conversations, and I hesitate to repeat them, unless
the committee considers it particularly important.
Senator KNOX. I would not press you on the personal conversations
which you had with Col. House after you resigned. I leave the matter
to your own judgment. I wondered whether there might have been
something which transpired which you would care to tell us; but I
withdraw that suggestion. I should like to ask you this one question:
I suppose your letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was merely formal?
Mr. BULLITT. My letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was a formal
letter.
Senator KNOX. You certainly got a reply to that.
Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. I wrote a formal letter and I got a formal
reply, and the Secretary sent for me the same afternoon and explained
that he only sent me a formal reply because it was necessary, because
of the form in which I had put my resignation, and particularly
because I had appended to my note my letter to the President. We then
discussed various other matters in connection with the treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?
Senator KNOX. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, you put into the record or read here, I
think, some extracts from the minutes of the Council of Ten?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at any of these meetings?
Mr. BULLITT. I was not, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The Council of Ten was the first body that was dealing
with the treaty generally, the important body? It was not a special
commission?
Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. It was the main body of the conference.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was the main body, and was the one that
subsequently became the Council of Five, and then the Council of Four,
and I think at one time a Council of Three?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, there were records of these meetings, were
there not?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what disposition was made of those records?
Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, there were a number of copies for each
delegation, and I presume that there must be a number of copies in
this country at the present time; perhaps not.
The CHAIRMAN. You say each delegate had a copy?
Mr. BULLITT. Each plenipotentiary had a copy, and the Secretary of the
American Commission had a copy, I believe, and the assistant
secretaries had copies; certainly one of the assistant secretaries,
Mr. Leland Harrison; and Mr. Grew had a copy.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Lansing have copies while he served on the
Council of Ten?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; well, I am quite sure that he did. I am sure
that I have seen copies on the desk of the Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, they were furnished regularly to every member of
the conference?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. We have found some difficulty in getting them; that is
the reason I asked.
Senator KNOX. I am informed--perhaps Mr. Bullitt can tell us--that
there is a complete set of minutes in the hands of some individual in
this country. Do you know anything about that--perhaps Auchincloss &
Miller?
Mr. BULLITT. I could not be certain in regard to the matter, but I
should certainly be under the impression that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr.
Miller have copies of the minutes; perhaps not. Perhaps Mr.
Auchincloss has left his with Col. House. He would have Col. House's
copies. Perhaps they are in this country, perhaps not. But Mr.
Auchincloss and Mr. Miller perhaps have those minutes in their files.
The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly there are a number, at least, of those
records in existence.
Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That must be the case.
Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. Also records of the meetings of the
American Commission.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know whether or not they are in the State
Department--any of these minutes or records in our State Department?
Mr. BULLITT. I should presume that in the normal course of events they
would be certainly among Mr. Lansing's papers, which were very
carefully kept. He had an excellent secretariat.
The CHAIRMAN. Did any member of our delegation, any member of the
council of 10, express to you any opinions about the general character
of this treaty?
Mr. BULLITT. Well, Mr. Lansing, Col. House, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. White
had all expressed to me very vigorously their opinions on the subject.
The CHAIRMAN. Were they enthusiastically in favor of it?
Mr. BULLITT. I regret to say, not.
As I say, the only documents of the sort that I have are the memoranda
of the discussions that I had after I resigned, when we thrashed over
the whole ground.
The CHAIRMAN. Those memoranda of consultations that you had after you
resigned you prefer not to publish? I am not asking you to do so.
Mr. BULLITT. I think it would be out of the way.
The CHAIRMAN. I quite understand your position. I only wanted to
know--I thought it might be proper for you to say whether or not their
opinions which you heard them express were favorable to the series of
arrangements, I would call them, that were made for the consideration
of this treaty.
Mr. BULLITT. It is no secret that Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr.
Henry White objected very vigorously to the numerous provisions of the
treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. It is known that they objected to Shantung. That, I
think, is public information. I do not know that it is public
information that they objected to anything else.
Mr. BULLITT. I do not think that Secretary Lansing is at all
enthusiastic about the league of nations as it stands at present. I
have a note of a conversation with him on the subject, which, if I
may, I will just read, without going into the rest of that
conversation, because it bears directly on the issue involved.
This was a conversation with the Secretary of State at 2.30 on May 19.
The Secretary sent for me. It was a long conversation, and Mr. Lansing
in the course of it said:
Mr. Lansing then said that he personally would have strengthened
greatly the judicial clauses of the league of nations covenant, making
arbitration compulsory. He also said that he was absolutely opposed to
the United States taking a mandate in either Armenia or
Constantinople; that he thought that Constantinople should be placed
under a local government, the chief members of which were appointed by
an international committee.
This is a matter, it seems to me, of some importance in regard to the
whole discussion, and therefore I feel at liberty to read it, as it is
not a personal matter.
The CHAIRMAN. This is a note of the conversation made at the time?
Mr. BULLITT. This is a note which I immediately dictated after the
conversation. [Reading:]
Mr. Lansing then said that he, too, considered many parts of
the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with
Shantung and the league of nations. He said: "I consider
that the league of nations at present is entirely useless.
The great powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the
world to suit themselves. England and France in particular
have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted,
and the league of nations can do nothing to alter any of the
unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of
the members of the league, and the great powers will never
give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker
peoples."
We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate.
Mr. Lansing said: "I believe that if the Senate could only understand
what this treaty means, and if the American people could really
understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they
will ever understand what it lets them in for." He expressed the
opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really understand the treaty--
[Laughter.] May I reread it?
He expressed the opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really
understand the treaty, and that Mr. Lodge would; but that Mr. Lodge's
position would become purely political, and therefore ineffective.
[Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. I do not mind.
Mr. BULLITT (reading):
He thought, however, that Mr. Knox might instruct America in the real
meaning of it.
[Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. He has made some very valuable efforts in the direction.
Mr. BULLITT. I beg to be excused from reading any
more of these conversations.
Senator BRANDEGEE. We get the drift.
[Laughter.]
I want to ask one or two questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read any of these minutes of the meetings
of the American commission?
Mr. BULLITT. Of the American commission itself?
Senator BRANDEGEE. Yes.
Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. I have on one or two occasions glanced at them
but I never have read them carefully.
Senator BRANDEGEE. They were accessible to you at the time, were they?
Mr. BULLITT. They were, sir.
Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated, if I recall your testimony correctly,
that when the proposition was made that the legislative bodies of the
contracting parties should have representation in the assembly, the
President objected to that?
Mr. BULLITT. The President--if I may explain again--approved in
principle, but said that he did not see how the thing could be worked
out, and he felt that the assembly of delegates, or whatever it is
called in the present draft, gave sufficient representation to the
peoples of the various countries.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know what his objection was to the
legislative bodies of the contracting parties having representation on
the assembly?
Mr. BULLITT. The President believed, I think--in fact, it was so
stated to me by Col. House, who discussed the matter with me--that it
would make too unwieldy a central organ for the league.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you understand why it would be any more unwieldy
if Congress should appoint the delegates than if the President should?
Mr. BULLITT. It would necessitate a larger central body if
representation was to be given to the important political parties of
the various countries. It would have necessitated a body of, say, 10
representatives from the United States--5 from the Republican party
and 5 from the; Democratic Party, in the assembly of the league, which
would become a large body.
Senator BRANDEGEE. The idea was that the political parties of the
country should be represented?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, the political viewpoints should be represented so
that you would get some connection between the central assembly of the
league and the true opinion of the countries.
Senator BRANDEGEE. When you went across to Paris on the _George
Washington_ with the President do you know whether he had with him at
that time any draft for a league of nations or any memorandum that he
showed to you of discussed with you?
Mr. BULLITT. The President outlined to several of us one evening, or
rather one afternoon, the conception he had at the time of the league
of nations. I did not see any formal draft that he had, but the
President made a statement before the council of 10, in one of these
minutes from which I have been reading, stating that he had first--and
in fact I think I know it from other sources--that he had first
received the Phillimore report, that then it had been rewritten by
Col. House and that he had rewritten Col. House's report, and after he
had discussed his rewriting with Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts, he had
rewritten it again.
Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated substantially that the only part of the
league draft which was laid before the Peace Conference which the
President had his way about, was Article 10. Did you make some such
statement as that?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.
Senator BRANDEGEE. The President stated to us that that was
practically what he had submitted to the Niagara conference here when
the ABC powers from South America were discussing the Mexican
question. He had then considered it as an article for American use on
this continent.
Do you know what the attitude of Gen Smuts was as to article 10 as
proposed by the President?
Mr. BULLITT. I do not, sir. Again, full minutes of the discussions and
conclusions reached of all these meetings of the committee on the
league of nations were kept.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read the various other plans that were
proposed or suggested over there for a league of nations?
Mr. BULLITT. I have read some of them, sir.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Did the others have anything similar to what is now
article 10 in the treaty pending in the Senate?
Mr. BULLITT. I really can not say. I am sorry, but I have forgotten. I
should not care to testify on that.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know from what you heard while you were
there in your official capacity whether the other nations were anxious
to have article 10 in the covenant for the league?
Mr. BULLITT. The French were not only anxious for it, but I believe
were anxious greatly to strengthen it. They desired immediately a
league army to be established, and I believe also to be stationed in
Alsace-Lorraine and along the Rhine, in addition to article 10. I can
not say for certain about the others.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, we had before us at one of our hearings a
representative of the Egyptian people. Do you know anything about
that, when it was done, or any discussions about it? I mean the
clauses that appear in regard to the British protectorate.
Mr. BULLITT. You mean our agreement to recognize the British
protectorate in Egypt?
The CHAIRMAN. It was recognized by this treaty in those clauses.
Mr. BULLITT. Yes; but we gave a sort of assent before the treaty
formally came out, did we not? I recall the morning it was done. It
was handled by Sir William Wiseman, who was the confidential
representative that Lloyd George and Balfour had constantly with Col.
House and the President. He was a sort of extra confidential foreign
office. It was all done, if I recall his statement correctly, in the
course of one morning. The President was informed that the Egyptian
nationalists were using his 14 points as meaning that the President
thought that Egypt should have the right to control her own destinies,
and therefore have independence, and that they were using this to
foment revolution; that since the President had provoked this trouble
by the 14 points, they thought that he should allay it by the
statement that we would recognize the British protectorate, and as I
remember Sir William Wiseman's statement to me that morning, he said
that he had only brought up the matter that morning and that he had
got our recognition of the British protectorate before luncheon.
The CHAIRMAN. The President made some public statement?
Mr. BULLITT. I am not certain in regard to the further developments of
it. I recall that incident, that it was arranged through Sir William
Wiseman, and that it took only a few minutes.
Senator KNOX. That was a good deal of time to devote to a little
country like Egypt.
Mr. BULLITT. I do not know. You should know, sir, you have been
Secretary of State.
Senator KNOX. We never chewed them up that fast.
Senator NEW. Mr. Bullitt, what, if anything, was said with reference
to the Irish question, with which you are familiar?
Mr. BULLITT. At the conference? I do not believe the Irish question
was ever brought up before the conference or discussed. There was
considerable said on the side, attempts to let down the Walsh mission
easily without antagonizing the Irish vote in this country.
[Laughter.] I think that is the only consideration that Ireland
received.
Senator NEW. There was a cheerful willingness to do that, was there
not?
Mr. BULLITT. I think so.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further that anybody desires to ask
Mr. Bullitt? We are very much obliged to you indeed, Mr. Bullitt.
Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, if I may just say--I do not know whether it
is a matter of first interest to the Senators or not--but on this trip
with me to Russia there was Capt. Pettit, and at the same time the
journalist, Lincoln Steffens, and I have documents which they prepared
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