The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 6.
Ulysses S. Grant

Part 4 out of 4

on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before
going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the
enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you
can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry
may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one
army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The
signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a
cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in
such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except
as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan
advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found
the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line
across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of
getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and
fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main
line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and
Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of
an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably.
The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our
extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be
penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General
Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and
turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the
enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week
before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The
enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that
it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at
once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General
Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.
On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting
possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To
accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,
which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the
2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back
upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d
corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with
heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan
advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five
Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced
the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him
back towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed
great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the
main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed
his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of
the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of
wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture
he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back
slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one
division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.
Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions
of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.
Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,
because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and
precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April,
General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his
strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between
five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin
relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The report
of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind
lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling
upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from
his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this,
General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the
morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.
General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping
everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing
many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by
two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division
of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near
Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,
and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while
General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General
Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's
main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his
inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,
returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's
lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's
corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the
most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially
shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The
enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,
where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement
ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened
by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station
towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front
of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our
hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main
road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy
evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. On
the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed
for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General
Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for
Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along
that road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville
Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court
House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of
General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached
Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the
following communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach
Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him
last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at
twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number
one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at
Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so,
push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job
with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to
strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able
to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic
points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west
of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his
cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his
reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,
while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon
several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord
advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of
infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the
head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and
detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.
This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to
get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy
immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan
struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of
artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th
corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,
which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among
whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and
General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except
one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;
the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on
Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road. It was soon found
that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so
close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common
bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately
crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at
Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I
addressed him the following communication from Farmville:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern
Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my
duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of
blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate
States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville
the following:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate
your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition
of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.

To this I immediately replied:

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,
asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that peace
being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon
--namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for
taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until
properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable
to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the
surrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade
followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the
cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed by
General Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's
advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was
unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General
Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from
there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train,
and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During
this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight
received the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of
yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be
frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender
of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object
of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.
I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the
Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration
of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the
old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and
immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to
treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day
could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am
equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains
the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well
understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that
most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of
millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our
difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I
subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corps
reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate
effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown
in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of
hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the
following from General Lee:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the picket-line,
whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were
embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender
of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer
contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is
set forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and
men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be
designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers
as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not
to take up arms against the Government of the United States until
properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like
parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public
property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers
appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of
the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each
officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be
disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their
paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the terms
of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As
they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the
8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper
officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin,
and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox
Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed,
and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army
immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his
example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately
under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and
their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly
against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh,
which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The
day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and
General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a
suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject
to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the
President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your
instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the
morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your
orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the
termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th
another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th,
which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army
upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the
20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the
railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force striking
it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying
the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually
destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for
Greensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and
destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between
Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along
it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and
defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen
pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four
prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he
destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.
Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for
a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama,
commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps,
Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to
Fish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved
from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving
thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General
Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from
Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially
invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a
part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night the
enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the
9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. These
successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to
approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was
evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of
the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting
of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until
March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April,
General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near
Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred
prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the
Cahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of
Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,
destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast
quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4th
he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the
Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to
General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the
14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five
steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on
Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted
and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand five
hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the
navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public
property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four
guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the
20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one
thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General
Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to
make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him
on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby
all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby
Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas,
and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on
the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General
Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. This
surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the
rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of
first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate
plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the
government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them
arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been
surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had
surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio
Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to
defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting
great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final
triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly
set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and
brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not
as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully
refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East
fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference
in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in
battle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in
the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant
of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of
the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the
Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old
antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendid
achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all
sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too
much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have
followed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud
record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other
for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over
every foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope
for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however
mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S.
GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to
General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to
the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have
more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming the
return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,
so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered his
services, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.

(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and
General Worth.--PUBLISHERS.

(*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a
great many years before the Mexican war to have established in
the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of
the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. He
recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his
annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any
hearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he made
assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied
by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and
appointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum
thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,
sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled
the fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fund
were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded
in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some
$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the
war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to
have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury
of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he
had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of the
Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,

The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never
had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,
Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high
office. It made also governors of States, members of the
cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both
in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war in
a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican
war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results
to those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the side
of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort
whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a
Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the
fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few
people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.
W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in
the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from
General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. At
the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates
had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's
landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near
Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew.
Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might
happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his
position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends
it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg
landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile
west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our
right rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises
General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his
letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter
was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the
4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and
suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a
company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at
the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that
they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and
from the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has
been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at
the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more
experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,
would take the particular road that he did start upon in the
absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent
dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found
that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front
and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very
much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back
had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up
to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the
road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff
officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am
not competent to say just what order the General actually

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at
Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and
a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace
early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the
Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road
which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right
than the River road.



(*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote
for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,
who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some
unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because
of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history,
also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice
to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a
point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the
6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the
passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep
in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only
marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the
rain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle of
the second day and did as good service as its position
allowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a
conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest
commendation from division commanders in the Army of the
Tennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes
mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a family
which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these
circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook
injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent
one would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do
any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I
am always willing to make the fullest admission.

(*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from the
time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my
recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were
promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th
Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,
M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and
John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate
battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,
the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his
vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew
her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.
With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the
New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf
and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade
on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of
Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied
me to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and that
of some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move I
proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect
that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river
to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated
on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman
came up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he would
like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut
the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move
I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position
voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or
a long time--to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country,
with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points
strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an
axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an
enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would
guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out
all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign
proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to
make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground
could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there
and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being
always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I
said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that
was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad
from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To
this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the
lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election
went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary
enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and
conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far
as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of
supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor
supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us
was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was
lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had
to go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,
embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and
asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals
upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I
did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was
not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned
between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I
remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and
consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a
copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of
my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between
us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply
friendly advice which the relations between us fully
justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a
success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered
by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression
which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's
prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(*14) Meant Edward's Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.


Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to
Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in
person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further
instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly
desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad
between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from
communication with the South, but being confronted by a large
force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is
to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to
Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,
if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above
Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or


CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.


All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being
provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the
mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot
be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you
understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him
strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a
crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of
Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the
heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your
chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern
extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The
troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your
left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend
fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of
one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This
division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the
most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your
effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your
advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and
moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The
junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will
be at once established between the two armies by roads on the
south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on
those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily
held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have
there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's
corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at
Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday
night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower
down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness
for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will
be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one
hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry
soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see
that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You
will call on the engineer department for such preparations as
you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery
over the creek.


(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform
after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying
the ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.


General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel
with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel
and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have
instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will
be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the
rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the
left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's
position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small
force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where
he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with
all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable



(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,
December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.


Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga
is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,
my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,
courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great
difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you


President U. S.

(*19) General John G. Foster.

(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,
subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General
Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The
scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running
nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the
names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at
Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and
Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the
government at Washington.

December 29, 1863.


General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be
granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible
that Schofield will be sent to your command.


(*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.


April 4, 1864.

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me
to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts
of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For
your information I now write you my programme, as at present
determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up
his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to
turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the
navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New
Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to
hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the
number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number
necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less
than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand
men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations
against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him
to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate
against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This
will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.
F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore
the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,
increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five
thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,
wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,
under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the
other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to
move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will
be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand
men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up
and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but
simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave
you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,
as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the
18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is
concentrating now. None will move from their places of
rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to
move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct
is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have
difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to
where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do
not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I
can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad
Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move
directly to his front. In this way he must get through to
inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from
one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words,
if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one
else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,

April 9, 1864.

Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations
for the coming campaign, the following is communicated
confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and
towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn
over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the
navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and
to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to
move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other
movements. From the scattered condition of his command,
however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans
before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same
time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army
being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate
aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to
Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of
the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his
front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making
preparations for it. Two columns of his command will make south
at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from
ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the
other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under
Brig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach
the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,
and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and
return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join
you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward
to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries
would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to
within easy hauling distance of every position the army could
occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if
he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather
interior to the one I would have to take in following. A
movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all
that was done would have to be done with the supplies and
ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter
plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies
possible to take with us was considered. The country over which
we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that
we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West
Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of
four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an
attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he
was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's
raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,
and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself
into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him
before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at
Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of
the Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passage
southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting
Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South
Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000
men into the field directly to his front. The force will be
commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,
Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from
the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous
with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,
there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in
doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above
or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the
other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is
cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on
a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done
whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from
Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the
other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies
until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more
fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce
you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after
the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from
Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable
you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and
transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall
back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and
yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.
What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing
baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a
regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should
be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and
ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division
headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make
arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded
to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this
contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there
is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made
for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred
rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the
amount would be sufficient.



(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of
the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave
our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and
estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and
General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman
the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and
was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity of
forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my
two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,
representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and
three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the




MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.

Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.


Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)
Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's "
" Eppa Hunton's "
" Wm. R. Terry's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)
Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade
" E. M. Law's (c) "
" John Bratton's "

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)
Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade
" B. G. Humphreys' "
" Goode Bryan's "
" Kershaw's (Old) "

Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)
" John Pegram 's " (f)
" Gordon's " (g)
Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's "

Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)
" Geo H. Stewart's " (h)
" L. A. Stafford's " (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.
Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)
" Geo. Dole's " (k)
" S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
" C. A. Battle's "
" R. D. Johnston's " (f)

Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)
Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.
Mahone's "
Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m)
" A. R. Wright's "
" Joseph Finegan's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.
Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)
" James H. Lane's "
" Sam'l McCowan's "
" Alfred M. Scale's "

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)
Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.
" John R. Cooke's "
" D. McRae's "
" J. J. Archer's "
" H. H. Walker's "

_unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade
" L. L. Lomax's "

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.
Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.
" P. M. B. Young's "
" Thomas L. Rosser's "

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.
Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.
" J. R. Chambliss's "

Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

Cabell's Battalion.
Manly's Battery.
1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.
Carleton's Battery.
Calloway's Battery.

Haskell's Battalion.
Branch's Battery.
Nelson's "
Garden's "
Rowan "

Huger's Battalion.
Smith's Battery.
Moody "
Woolfolk "
Parker's "
Taylor's "
Fickling's "
Martin's "

Gibb's Battalion.
Davidson's Battery.
Dickenson's "
Otey's "


Braxton's Battalion.
Lee Battery.
1st Md. Artillery.
Stafford "
Alleghany "

Cutshaw's Battalion.
Charlotteville Artillery.
Staunton "
Courtney "

Carter's Battalion.
Morris Artillery.
Orange "
King William Artillery.
Jeff Davis "

Nelson's Battalion.
Amherst Artillery.
Milledge "
Fluvauna "

Brown's Battalion.
Powhatan Artillery.
2d Richmond Howitzers.
3d " "
Rockbridge Artillery.
Salem Flying Artillery.


Cutt's Battalion.
Ross's Battery.
Patterson's Battery.
Irwin Artillery.

Richardson's Battalion.
Lewis Artillery.
Donaldsonville Artillery.
Norfolk Light "
Huger "

Mclntosh 's Battalion.
Johnson's Battery.
Hardaway Artillery.
Danville "
2d Rockbridge Artillery.

Pegram's Battalion.
Peedee Artillery.
Fredericksburg Artillery.
Letcher "
Purcell Battery.
Crenshaw's Battery.

Poague's Battalion.
Madison Artillery.
Albemarle "
Brooke "
Charlotte "

(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at
above date.
(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also
contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by
Colonel P. D. Bowles.
(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not

Organization of the Army of the Valley District.
(e) Constituting York's Brigade.
(f) In Ramseur's Division.
(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and
containing 12th Georgia Battalion.
(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's
(i) Grimes' Brigade.
(k) Cook's "

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;
name not indicated.
(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four
brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not
(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,
Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in the
artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.

May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and
6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in
a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.
will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with
Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and
vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as
close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any
diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any
opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my
mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely
successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been
heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.


May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under
cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the
enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against the
enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible
vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let
your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost
secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,
in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the
direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you
and General Hancock with instructions to render you every
assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold
their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage
of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will
push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.


May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and
four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work,
including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of
artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the
last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a
company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division
(Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from
the enemy.


(*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for
gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days'
battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and
Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.
S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York
Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,
to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.
S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His
services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this
recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the
claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but
recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also
ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth
Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General
Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.
He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I
have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by
promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the
honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally
gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at
this time without seeing both.


(*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's
right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg
road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox
Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little
River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps
and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford
and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th
corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges
above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are
held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army
with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of
the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short
distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and
near to the enemy.

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter
of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the
enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on
account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by
the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna
River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to
the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined
therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near
Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and
leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,
belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of
that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river
and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark
this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced
march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The
balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and
follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw
from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of
the right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we
now take show it, and the action of his army shows it
unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments
cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE
over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be
mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already
assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have
forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling
of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and
Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north
of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to
import rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effected
at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on
down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it
advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port
Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change
at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there
in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to
hold it.


(*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,
suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it
vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful
point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you
are in the course of an hour.


(*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be
impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would
protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that
road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long
vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our
strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of
his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My
idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible
north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of
communication on the north side of the James River to transfer
the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or
follow him south if he should retreat.

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it
of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now
have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or
feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where
in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.
Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to
make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of
the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by
the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable
circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be
sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about
Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this
is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James
River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to
City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on
north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and
most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest
class ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all
sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the
canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be
lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make
the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south
side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels
can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our
army is not only confident of protecting itself without
intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever
and whenever he can be found without this protection.


(*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.


Commanding Dept. W. Va.

General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with
instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence
there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way
as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and
of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.
According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your
guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It
would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for
a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the
enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met
as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see,
in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of
your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route
should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have so
understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The
direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you
in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately
turn east by the most practicable road. From thence move
eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely
and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan. After the work
laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,
proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in
General Sheridan's instructions.

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed
back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem
it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.
Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.




Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |
Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|
North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |
Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold
Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |
Total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |

(*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864. 11 A.M.

Washington, D. C.

* * * * * * *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned
their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt
expected troops from north of the James River to take their
place before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage of
this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road
between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain
possession of.

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their
commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the
last five days. Day and night has been all the same, no delays
being allowed on any account.


(*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from
Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from
an attack there. The chances they think will be better on
Burnside's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to
concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's
line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully
impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond
the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating
it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they
should not succeed in breaking through.

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery
possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front
during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the
support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought
on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,
ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and
infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in
readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or
to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One
thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. If
they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it
to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they
should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without
waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can
co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five
thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce
you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox
and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not
attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy
the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if

* * * * * * *

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at
Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up....


(*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.

(*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.

(*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

Nashville Tenn.

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will
lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to
abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is
all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he
fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster
employees, citizens, etc.


CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.--1.30 P.M.

Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville
with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at
Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to
Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy
where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the
best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer
incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily
disposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion to
attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no


CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to
where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be
getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after
Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens
him in all possibility as much as it does you.


CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864--4 P.M.

Nashville, Tenn.

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your
cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign
back to the Ohio River.


CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

Nashville, Tenn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the
enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are
scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the
contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat
to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of
States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he
should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except
in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities
ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the
enemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means at
your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that
will resound from one end of the land to the other.


CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.--4 P.M.

Nashville, Tenn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be
witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you
will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let
there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn
battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he
retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of
his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day
announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or


WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from
Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go
no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is
entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many
privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for
future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take
them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now


(*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,
March 24th, Appendix.

(*43) See Appendix.

(*44) NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender
inserted at this place, was copied from the original document
furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.
Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time
of the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold
order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations
and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of
General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General
Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to
General Grant. The original was then transcribed by General
Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the
original document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and
Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the
form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor
of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and
General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and
handed it to General Grant.


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