The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius

Part 1 out of 7

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[Transcriber's Note: The paper edition of this book has Latin and English
pages facing each other. This version of the text uses alternating Latin
and English sections, with the English text slightly indented.]










In preparing the text of the _Consolatio_ I have used the apparatus in
Peiper's edition (Teubner, 1871), since his reports, as I know in the case
of the Tegernseensis, are generally accurate and complete; I have depended
also on my own collations or excerpts from various of the important
manuscripts, nearly all of which I have at least examined, and I have also
followed, not always but usually, the opinions of Engelbrecht in his
admirable article, _Die Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius_ in the
_Sitzungsberichte_ of the Vienna Academy, cxliv. (1902) 1-60. The
present text, then, has been constructed from only part of the material
with which an editor should reckon, though the reader may at least assume
that every reading in the text has, unless otherwise stated, the authority
of some manuscript of the ninth or tenth century; in certain orthographical
details, evidence from the text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ has been used
without special mention of this fact. We look to August Engelbrecht for the
first critical edition of the _Consolatio_ at, we hope, no distant

The text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ is based on my own collations of all
the important manuscripts of these works. An edition with complete
_apparatus criticus_ will be ready before long for the Vienna
_Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum_. The history of the
text of the _Opuscula Sacra_, as I shall attempt to show elsewhere, is
intimately connected with that of the _Consolatio_.



Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, of the famous Praenestine family of the
Anicii, was born about 480 A.D. in Rome. His father was an ex-consul; he
himself was consul under Theodoric the Ostrogoth in 510, and his two sons,
children of a great grand-daughter of the renowned Q. Aurelius Symmachus,
were joint consuls in 522. His public career was splendid and honourable,
as befitted a man of his race, attainments, and character. But he fell
under the displeasure of Theodoric, and was charged with conspiring to
deliver Rome from his rule, and with corresponding treasonably to this end
with Justin, Emperor of the East. He was thrown into prison at Pavia, where
he wrote the _Consolation of Philosophy_, and he was brutally put to death
in 524. His brief and busy life was marked by great literary achievement.
His learning was vast, his industry untiring, his object unattainable--
nothing less than the transmission to his countrymen of all the works of
Plato and Aristotle, and the reconciliation of their apparently divergent
views. To form the idea was a silent judgment on the learning of his day;
to realize it was more than one man could accomplish; but Boethius
accomplished much. He translated the [Greek: Eisagogae] of Porphyry, and
the whole of Aristotle's _Organon_. He wrote a double commentary on the
[Greek: Eisagogae] and commentaries on the _Categories_ and the _De
Interpretatione_ of Aristotle, and on the _Topica_ of Cicero. He also
composed original treatises on the categorical and hypothetical syllogism,
on Division and on Topical Differences. He adapted the arithmetic of
Nicomachus, and his textbook on music, founded on various Greek
authorities, was in use at Oxford and Cambridge until modern times. His
five theological _Tractates_ are here, together with the _Consolation of
Philosophy_, to speak for themselves.

Boethius was the last of the Roman philosophers, and the first of the
scholastic theologians. The present volume serves to prove the truth of
both these assertions.

The _Consolation of Philosophy_ is indeed, as Gibbon called it, "a golden
volume, not unworthy of the leisure of Plato or of Tully." To belittle its
originality and sincerity, as is sometimes done, with a view to saving the
Christianity of the writer, is to misunderstand his mind and his method.
The _Consolatio_ is not, as has been maintained, a mere patchwork of
translations from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Rather it is the supreme
essay of one who throughout his life had found his highest solace in the
dry light of reason. His chief source of refreshment, in the dungeon to
which his beloved library had not accompanied him, was a memory well
stocked with the poetry and thought of former days. The development of the
argument is anything but Neoplatonic; it is all his own.

And if the _Consolation of Philosophy_ admits Boethius to the company of
Cicero or even of Plato, the theological _Tractates_ mark him as the
forerunner of St. Thomas. It was the habit of a former generation to regard
Boethius as an eclectic, the transmitter of a distorted Aristotelianism, a
pagan, or at best a luke-warm Christian, who at the end cast off the faith
which he had worn in times of peace, and wrapped himself in the philosophic
cloak which properly belonged to him. The authenticity of the _Tractates_
was freely denied. We know better now. The discovery by Alfred Holder, and
the illuminating discussion by Hermann Usener,[1] of a fragment of
Cassiodorus are sufficient confirmation of the manuscript tradition, apart
from the work of scholars who have sought to justify that tradition from
internal evidence. In that fragment Cassiodorus definitely ascribes to his
friend Boethius "a book on the Trinity, some dogmatic chapters, and a book
against Nestorius."[2] Boethius was without doubt a Christian, a Doctor and
perhaps a martyr. Nor is it necessary to think that, when in prison, he put
away his faith. If it is asked why the _Consolation of Philosophy_ contains
no conscious or direct reference to the doctrines which are traced in the
_Tractates_ with so sure a hand, and is, at most, not out of harmony with
Christianity, the answer is simple. In the _Consolation_ he is writing
philosophy; in the _Tractates_ he is writing theology. He observes what
Pascal calls the orders of things. Philosophy belongs to one order,
theology to another. They have different objects. The object of philosophy
is to understand and explain the nature of the world around us; the object
of theology is to understand and explain doctrines delivered by divine
revelation. The scholastics recognized the distinction,[3] and the
corresponding difference in the function of Faith and Reason. Their final
aim was to co-ordinate the two, but this was not possible before the
thirteenth century. Meanwhile Boethius helps to prepare the way. In the
_Consolation_ he gives Reason her range, and suffers her, unaided, to
vindicate the ways of Providence. In the _Tractates_ Reason is called in to
give to the claims of Faith the support which it does not really lack.[4]
Reason, however, has still a right to be heard. The distinction between
_fides_ and _ratio_ is proclaimed in the first two _Tractates_. In the
second especially it is drawn with a clearness worthy of St. Thomas
himself; and there is, of course, the implication that the higher authority
resides with _fides_. But the treatment is philosophical and extremely
bold. Boethius comes back to the question of the substantiality of the
divine Persons which he has discussed in Tr. I. from a fresh point of view.
Once more he decides that the Persons are predicated relatively; even
Trinity, he concludes, is not predicated substantially of deity. Does this
square with catholic doctrine? It is possible to hear a note of challenge
in his words to John the Deacon, _fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge_.
Philosophy states the problem in unequivocal terms. Theology is required to
say whether they commend themselves.

One object of the scholastics, anterior to the final co-ordination of the
two sciences, was to harmonize and codify all the answers to all the
questions that philosophy raises. The ambition of Boethius was not so
soaring, but it was sufficiently bold. He set out, first to translate, and
then to reconcile, Plato and Aristotle; to go behind all the other systems,
even the latest and the most in vogue, back to the two great masters, and
to show that they have the truth, and are in substantial accord. So St.
Thomas himself, if he cannot reconcile the teaching of Plato and Aristotle,
at least desires to correct the one by the other, to discover what truth is
common to both, and to show its correspondence with Christian doctrine. It
is reasonable to conjecture that Boethius, if he had lived, might have
attempted something of the kind. Were he alive to-day, he might feel more
in tune with the best of the pagans than with most contemporary philosophic

In yet one more respect Boethius belongs to the company of the schoolmen.
He not only put into circulation many precious philosophical notions,
served as channel through which various works of Aristotle passed into the
schools, and handed down to them a definite Aristotelian method for
approaching the problem of faith; he also supplied material for that
classification of the various sciences which is an essential accompaniment
of every philosophical movement, and of which the Middle Ages felt the
value.[5] The uniform distribution into natural sciences, mathematics and
theology which he recommends may be traced in the work of various teachers
up to the thirteenth century, when it is finally accepted and defended by
St. Thomas in his commentary on the _De Trinitate_.

A seventeenth-century translation of the _Consolatio Philosophiae_ is here
presented with such alterations as are demanded by a better text, and the
requirements of modern scholarship. There was, indeed, not much to do, for
the rendering is most exact. This in a translation of that date is not a
little remarkable. We look for fine English and poetry in an Elizabethan;
but we do not often get from him such loyalty to the original as is here

Of the author "I.T." nothing is known. He may have been John Thorie, a
Fleming born in London in 1568, and a B.A. of Christ Church, 1586. Thorie
"was a person well skilled in certain tongues, and a noted poet of his
times" (Wood, _Athenae Oxon._ ed. Bliss, i. 624), but his known
translations are apparently all from the Spanish.[6]

Our translator dedicates his "Five books of Philosophical Comfort" to the
Dowager Countess of Dorset, widow of Thomas Sackville, who was part author
of _A Mirror for Magistrates_ and _Gorboduc_, and who, we learn from I.T.'s
preface, meditated a similar work. I.T. does not unduly flatter his
patroness, and he tells her plainly that she will not understand the
philosophy of the book, though the theological and practical parts may be
within her scope.

The _Opuscula Sacra_ have never before, to our knowledge, been translated.
In reading and rendering them we have been greatly helped by two mediaeval
commentaries: one by John the Scot (edited by E.K. Rand in Traube's
_Quellen und Untersuchungen_, vol. i. pt. 2, Munich, 1906); the other by
Gilbert de la Porree (printed in Migne, _P.L._ lxiv.). We also desire to
record our indebtedness in many points of scholarship and philosophy to Mr.
E.J. Thomas of Emmanuel College.

Finally, thanks are due to Mr. Dolson for the suggestion in the footnote on
the preceding page, and also to Professor Lane Cooper of Cornell University
for many valuable corrections as this reprint was passing through the


_October, 1926._

[1] _Anecdoton Holderi_, Leipzig, 1877.

[2] _Scripsit librum de sancta trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica et
librum contra Nestorium._ On the question of the genuineness of Tr. IV. _De
fide catholica_ see note _ad loc_.

[3] Cp. H. de Wulf, _Histoire de la Philosophie medievale_ (Louvain and
Paris 1915), p. 332.

[4] See below, _De Trin_. vi. _ad fin_.

[5] Cp. L. Baur, _Gundissalinus: de divisione_, Muenster, 1905.

[6] Mr. G. Bayley Dolson suggests with greater probability that I.T. was
John Thorpe (fl. 1570-1610), architect to Thomas Sackville, Earl of Dorset.
Cf. _American Journal of Philology_, vol. xlii. (1921), p. 266.


_Editio Princeps_:

Collected Works (except _De fide catholica_). Joh. et Greg. de
Gregoriis. Venice, 1491-92.

_De consolatione philosophiae_. Coburger. Nuernberg, 1473.

_De fide catholica_. Ed. Ren. Vallinus. Leyden, 1656.

_Latest Critical Edition_:

_De consolatione philosophiae_ and Theological Tractates. R.
Peiper. Teubner, 1871.


_De consolatione philosophiae_.

Alfred the Great. Ed. W.J. Sedgefield. Oxford, 1899 and 1900.

Chaucer. Ed. W.W. Skeat in Chaucer's Complete Works. Vol. ii. Oxford,

H.R. James. _The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius_. London,
1897; reprinted 1906.

Judicis de Mirandol. _La Consolation philosophique de Boece_.
Paris, 1861.

_Illustrative Works_:

A. Engelbrecht. _Die Consolatio Phil. der B._ Sitzungsberichte der
Koen. Akad. Vienna, 1902.

Bardenhewer, _Patrologie_ (Boethius und Cassiodor, pp. 584 sqq.).
Freiburg im Breslau, 1894.

Haurean. _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique._ Vol. i. Paris,

Hildebrand. _Boethius und seine Stellung zum Christentum._
Regensburg, 1885.

Hodgkin. _Italy and her Invaders._ Vols. iii. and iv. Oxford, 1885.

Ch. Jourdain. (1) _De l'origine des traditions sur le christianisme de
Boece_; (2) _Des commentaires inedits sur La Consolation de la
philosophie_. (Excursions historiques et philosophiques a travers le
moyen age.) Paris, 1888.

Fritz Klingner. _De Boethii consolatione_, Philol. Unters. xxvii.
Berlin, 1921.

F.D. Maurice. _Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy._ Vol. i. London,

F. Nitzsch. _Das System des B._ Berlin, 1860.

E.K. Rand. _Der dem B. zugeschriebene Traktat de Fide catholica_
(Jahrbuch fuer kl. Phil. xxvi.). 1901.

Semeria. _Il Cristianesimo di Sev. Boezio rivendicato_, Rome, 1900.

M. Schanz. _Gesch. der roem. Litteratur._ Teil iv. Boethius. Berlin,

H.F. Stewart. _Boethius: an Essay._ Edinburgh, 1891.

Usener. _Anecdoton Holderi._ Leipsic, 1877.






Investigatam diutissime quaestionem, quantum nostrae mentis igniculum lux
diuina dignata est, formatam rationibus litterisque mandatam offerendam
uobis communicandamque curaui tam uestri cupidus iudicii quam nostri
studiosus inuenti. Qua in re quid mihi sit animi quotiens stilo cogitata
commendo, tum ex ipsa materiae difficultate tum ex eo quod raris id est
uobis tantum conloquor, intellegi potest. Neque enim famae iactatione et
inanibus uulgi clamoribus excitamur; sed si quis est fructus exterior, hic
non potest aliam nisi materiae similem sperare sententiam. Quocumque igitur
a uobis deieci oculos, partim ignaua segnities partim callidus liuor
occurrit, ut contumeliam uideatur diuinis tractatibus inrogare qui talibus
hominum monstris non agnoscenda haec potius quam proculcanda proiecerit.
Idcirco stilum breuitate contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae
disciplinis nouorum uerborum significationibus uelo, ut haec mihi tantum
uobisque, si quando ad ea conuertitis oculos, conloquantur; ceteros uero
ita submouimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiuerint ad ea etiam legenda
uideantur indigni. Sane[7] tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae
rationis intuitus ad diuinitatis ualet celsa conscendere. Nam ceteris
quoque artibus idem quasi quidam finis est constitutus, quousque potest uia
rationis accedere. Neque enim medicina aegris semper affert salutem; sed
nulla erit culpa medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri oportebat omiserit.
Idemque in ceteris. At quantum haec difficilior quaestio est, tam facilior
esse debet ad ueniam. Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est, an ex beati
Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos uenientia fructus
extulerint. Ac de proposita quaestione hinc sumamus initium.

[7] sed ne _codices optimi_.




I have long pondered this problem with such mind as I have and all the
light that God has lent me. Now, having set it forth in logical order
and cast it into literary form, I venture to submit it to your judgment,
for which I care as much as for the results of my own research. You will
readily understand what I feel whenever I try to write down what I think
if you consider the difficulty of the topic and the fact that I discuss
it only with the few--I may say with no one but yourself. It is indeed
no desire for fame or empty popular applause that prompts my pen; if
there be any external reward, we may not look for more warmth in the
verdict than the subject itself arouses. For, apart from yourself,
wherever I turn my eyes, they fall on either the apathy of the dullard
or the jealousy of the shrewd, and a man who casts his thoughts before
the common herd--I will not say to consider but to trample under foot,
would seem to bring discredit on the study of divinity. So I purposely
use brevity and wrap up the ideas I draw from the deep questionings of
philosophy in new and unaccustomed words which speak only to you and to
myself, that is, if you deign to look at them. The rest of the world I
simply disregard: they cannot understand, and therefore do not deserve
to read. We should not of course press our inquiry further than man's
wit and reason are allowed to climb the height of heavenly knowledge.[8]
In all the liberal arts we see the same limit set beyond which reason
may not reach. Medicine, for instance, does not always bring health to
the sick, though the doctor will not be to blame if he has left nothing
undone which he ought to do. So with the other arts. In the present case
the very difficulty of the quest claims a lenient judgment. You must
however examine whether the seeds sown in my mind by St. Augustine's
writings[9] have borne fruit. And now let us begin our inquiry.

[8] Cf. the discussion of human _ratio_ and divine _intellegentia_ in
_Cons. v._ pr. 4 and 5.

[9] e.g. Aug. _De Trin._


Christianae religionis reuerentiam plures usurpant, sed ea fides pollet
maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter uniuersalium praecepta regularum,
quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius
cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanauit, catholica uel uniuersalis
uocatur. Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate sententia est: "Pater," inquiunt,
"deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus." Igitur pater filius spiritus
sanctus unus non tres dii. Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. Eos
enim differentia comitatur qui uel augent uel minuunt, ut Arriani qui
gradibus meritorum trinitatem uariantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem
diducunt. Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; praeter alteritatem
enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest. Trium namque rerum uel
quotlibet tum genere tum specie tum numero diuersitas constat; quotiens
enim idem dicitur, totiens diuersum etiam praedicatur. Idem uero dicitur
tribus modis: aut genere ut idem homo quod equus, quia his idem genus ut
animal; uel specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo;
uel numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diuersum etiam
uel genere uel specie uel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam
accidentium uarietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque specie sed
suis accidentibus distant; nam uel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia
separemus, tamen locus cunctis diuersus est quem unum fingere nullo modo
possumus; duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens.
Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt.


There are many who claim as theirs the dignity of the Christian
religion; but that form of faith is valid and only valid which, both on
account of the universal character of the rules and doctrines affirming
its authority, and because the worship in which they are expressed has
spread throughout the world, is called catholic or universal. The belief
of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as follows: the
Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three Gods. The principle of this
union is absence of difference[10]: difference cannot be avoided by
those who add to or take from the Unity, as for instance the Arians,
who, by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break it up and
convert it to Plurality. For the essence of plurality is otherness;
apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. In fact, the
difference between three or more things lies in genus or species or
number. Difference is the necessary correlative of sameness. Sameness is
predicated in three ways: By genus; e.g. a man and a horse, because of
their common genus, animal. By species; e.g. Cato and Cicero, because of
their common species, man. By number; e.g. Tully and Cicero, because
they are numerically one. Similarly difference is expressed by genus,
species, and number. Now numerical difference is caused by variety of
accidents; three men differ neither by genus nor species but by their
accidents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents,[11]
still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be
regarded as the same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same
place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural
by their accidents that they are plural in number.

[10] The terms _differentia, numerus, species,_ are used expertly, as
would be expected of the author of the _In Isag. Porph. Commenta._ See
S. Brandt's edition of that work (in the Vienna _Corpus_, 1906), s.v.
_differentia,_ etc.

[11] This method of mental abstraction is employed more elaborately in
_Tr._ iii. (_vide infra_, p. 44) and in _Cons._ v. pr. 4, where the
notion of divine foreknowledge is abstracted in imagination.


Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut intellegi atque capi potest
dispiciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum uidetur, eruditi est hominis unum
quodque ut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare.

Nam cum tres sint speculatiuae partes, _naturalis_, in motu
inabstracta [Greek: anupexairetos] (considerat enim corporum formas cum
materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu
sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma
materiae coniuncta), _mathematica_, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim
formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae
cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), _theologica_, sine
motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu
caret), in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis
disciplinaliter, in diuinis intellectualiter uersari oportebit neque diduci
ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae uere forma neque
imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex
forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia, sed secundum
formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non
secundum terram quod est eius materia, sed dicitur secundum aeris figuram.
Terra quoque ipsa non secundum [Greek: apoion hulaen] dicitur, sed secundum
siccitatem grauitatemque quae sunt formae. Nihil igitur secundum materiam
esse dicitur sed secundum propriam formam. Sed diuina substantia sine
materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt
id quod sunt. Vnum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id
est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae,
sed non hoc uel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima
corporeque, corpus et anima est, non uel corpus uel anima in partem; igitur
non est id quod est. Quod uero non est ex hoc atque hoc, sed tantum est
hoc, illud uere est id quod est; et est pulcherrimum fortissimumque quia
nullo nititur. Quocirca hoc uere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo
aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subiectum fieri potest; forma
enim est, formae uero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod ceterae formae
subiectae accidentibus sunt ut humanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo
quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est; dum enim materia
subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere uidetur
humanitas. Forma uero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subiectum nec
uero inesse materiae, neque enim esset forma sed imago. Ex his enim formis
quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae uenerunt quae sunt in materia et
corpus efficiunt. Nam ceteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur formas
uocantes, dum imagines sint. Adsimulantur enim formis his quae non sunt in
materia constitutae. Nulla igitur in eo diuersitas, nulla ex diuersitate
pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo atque idcirco nec numerus.


We will now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far
as they can be grasped and understood; for it has been wisely said,[12]
in my opinion, that it is a scholar's duty to formulate his belief about
anything according to its real nature.

Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds[13]: Physics,
Mathematics, and Theology. Physics deals with motion and is not abstract
or separable (i.e. [Greek: anupexairetos]); for it is concerned with the
forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms
cannot be separated in reality from their bodies.[14] As the bodies are
in motion--the earth, for instance, tending downwards, and fire tending
upwards, form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it
is annexed.

Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it
investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from
movement, which forms, however, being connected with matter cannot be
really separated from bodies.

Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable, for
the Divine Substance is without either matter or motion. In Physics,
then, we are bound to use scientific, in Mathematics, systematical, in
Theology, intellectual concepts; and in Theology we will not let
ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations, but will simply
apprehend that Form which is pure form and no image, which is very Being
and the source of Being. For everything owes its being to Form. Thus a
statue is not a statue on account of the brass which is its matter, but
on account of the form whereby the likeness of a living thing is
impressed upon it: the brass itself is not brass because of the earth
which is its matter, but because of its form. Likewise earth is not
earth by reason of unqualified matter,[15] but by reason of dryness and
weight, which are forms. So nothing is said to be because it has matter,
but because it has a distinctive form. But the Divine Substance is Form
without matter, and is therefore One, and is its own essence. But other
things are not simply their own essences, for each thing has its being
from the things of which it is composed, that is, from its parts. It is
This _and_ That, i.e. it is the totality of its parts in
conjunction; it is not This _or_ That taken apart. Earthly man, for
instance, since he consists of soul and body, is soul _and_ body,
not soul _or_ body, separately; therefore he is not his own
essence. That on the other hand which does not consist of This and That,
but is only This, is really its own essence, and is altogether beautiful
and stable because it is not grounded in anything. Wherefore that is
truly One in which is no number, in which nothing is present except its
own essence. Nor can it become the substrate of anything, for it is pure
Form, and pure Forms cannot be substrates.[16] For if humanity, like
other forms, is a substrate for accidents, it does not receive accidents
through the fact that it exists, but through the fact that matter is
subjected to it. Humanity appears indeed to appropriate the accident
which in reality belongs to the matter underlying the conception
Humanity. But Form which is without matter cannot be a substrate, and
cannot have its essence in matter, else it would not be form but a
reflexion. For from those forms which are outside matter come the forms
which are in matter and produce bodies. We misname the entities that
reside in bodies when we call them forms; they are mere images; they
only resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter. In Him,
then, is no difference, no plurality arising out of difference, no
multiplicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number.

[12] By Cicero (_Tusc_. v. 7. 19).

[13] Cf. the similar division of philosophy in _Isag. Porph_. ed. Brandt,
pp. 7 ff.

[14] _Sb_. though they may be separated in thought.

[15] [Greek: Apoios hulae] = [Greek: to amorphon, to aeides] of
Aristotle. Cf. [Greek: oute gar hulae to eidos (hae men apoios, to de
poiotaes tis) oute ex hulaes] (Alexander Aphrod. _De Anima_, 17. 17);
[Greek: ei de touto, apoios de hae hulae, apoion an eiae soma] (id. _De
anima libri mantissa_, 124. 7).

[16] This is Realism. Cf. "Sed si rerum ueritatem atque integritatem
perpendas, non est dubium quin uerae sint. Nam cum res omnes quae uerae
sunt sine his quinque (i.e. genus species differentia propria
accidentia) esse non possint, has ipsas quinque res uere intellectas
esse non dubites." _Isag., Porph. ed, pr._ i. (M. _P.L._ lxiv. col. 19,
Brandt, pp. 26 ff.). The two passages show that Boethius is definitely
committed to the Realistic position, although in his _Comment. in
Porphyr. a se translatum_ he holds the scales between Plato and
Aristotle, "quorum diiudicare sententias aptum esse non duxi" (cp.
Haureau, _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique_, i. 120). As a fact in
the _Comment. in Porph._ he merely postpones the question, which in the
_De Trin._ he settles. Boethius was ridiculed in the Middle Ages for his


Deus uero a deo nullo differt, ne uel accidentibus uel substantialibus
differentiis in subiecto positis distent. Vbi uero nulla est differentia,
nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum. Nam
quod tertio repetitur deus, cum pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus
nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsae
sunt, si aduertamus ad res numerabiles ac non ad ipsum numerum. Illic enim
unitatum repetitio numerum facit. In eo autem numero qui in rebus
numerabilibus constat, repetitio unitatum atque pluralitas minime facit
numerabilium rerum numerosam diuersitatem. Numerus enim duplex est, unus
quidem quo numeramus, alter uero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat. Etenim
unum res est; unitas, quo unum dicimus. Duo rursus in rebus sunt ut homines
uel lapides; dualitas nihil, sed tantum dualitas qua duo homines uel duo
lapides fiunt. Et in ceteris eodem modo. Ergo in numero quo numeramus
repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum uero numero non facit
pluralitatem unitatum repetitio, uel si de eodem dicam "gladius unus mucro
unus ensis unus." Potest enim unus tot uocabulis gladius agnosci; haec enim
unitatum iteratio potius est non numeratio, uelut si ita dicamus "ensis
mucro gladius," repetitio quaedam est eiusdem non numeratio diuersorum,
uelut si dicam "sol sol sol," non tres soles effecerim, sed de uno totiens

Non igitur si de patre ac filio et spiritu sancto tertio praedicatur deus,
idcirco trina praedicatio numerum facit. Hoc enim illis ut dictum est
imminet qui inter eos distantiam faciunt meritorum. Catholicis uero nihil
in differentia constituentibus ipsamque formam ut est esse ponentibus neque
aliud esse quam est ipsum quod est opinantibus recte repetitio de eodem
quam enumeratio diuersi uidetur esse cum dicitur "deus pater deus filius
deus spiritus sanctus atque haec trinitas unus deus," uelut "ensis atque
mucro unus gladius," uelut "sol sol sol unus sol."

Sed hoc interim ad eam dictum sit significationem demonstrationemque qua
ostenditur non omnem unitatum repetitionem numerum pluralitatemque
perficere. Non uero ita dicitur "pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus" quasi
multiuocum quiddam; nam mucro et ensis et ipse est et idem, pater uero ac
filius et spiritus sanctus idem equidem est, non uero ipse. In qua re
paulisper considerandum est. Requirentibus enim: "Ipse est pater qui
filius?" "Minime," inquiunt. Rursus: "Idem alter qui alter?" Negatur. Non
est igitur inter eos in re omni indifferentia; quare subintrat numerus quem
ex subiectorum diuersitate confici superius explanatum est. De qua re
breuite*r considerabimus, si prius illud, quem ad modum de deo unum quodque
praedicatur, praemiserimus.


Now God differs from God in no respect, for there cannot be divine
essences distinguished either by accidents or by substantial differences
belonging to a substrate. But where there is no difference, there is no
sort of plurality and accordingly no number; here, therefore, is unity
alone. For whereas we say God thrice when we name the Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit, these three unities do not produce a plurality of number in
their own essences, if we think of what we count instead of what we
count with. For in the case of abstract number a repetition of single
items does produce plurality; but in the case of concrete number the
repetition and plural use of single items does not by any means produce
numerical difference in the objects counted. There are as a fact two
kinds of number. There is the number with which we count (abstract) and
the number inherent in the things counted (concrete). "One" is a thing--
the thing counted. Unity is that by which oneness is denoted. Again
"two" belongs to the class of things as men or stones; but not so
duality; duality is merely that whereby two men or two stones are
denoted; and so on. Therefore a repetition of unities[17] produces
plurality when it is a question of abstract, but not when it is a
question of concrete things, as, for example, if I say of one and the
same thing, "one sword, one brand, one blade."[18] It is easy to see
that each of these names denotes a sword; I am not numbering unities but
simply repeating one thing, and in saying "sword, brand, blade," I
reiterate the one thing and do not enumerate several different things
any more than I produce three suns instead of merely mentioning one
thing thrice when I say "Sun, Sun, Sun."

So then if God be predicated thrice of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
threefold predication does not result in plural number. The risk of
that, as has been said, attends only on those who distinguish Them
according to merit. But Catholic Christians, allowing no difference of
merit in God, assuming Him to be Pure Form and believing Him to be
nothing else than His own essence, rightly regard the statement "the
Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and this Trinity
is one God," not as an enumeration of different things but as a
reiteration of one and the same thing, like the statement, "blade and
brand are one sword" or "sun, sun, and sun are one sun."

Let this be enough for the present to establish my meaning and to show
that not every repetition of units produces number and plurality. Still
in saying "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," we are not using synonymous
terms. "Brand and blade" are the same and identical, but "Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit," though the same, are not identical. This point
deserves a moment's consideration. When they ask "Is the Father the same
as the Son?" Catholics answer "No." "Is the One the same as the Other?"
The answer is in the negative. There is not, therefore, complete
indifference between Them; and so number does come in--number which we
explained was the result of diversity of substrates. We will briefly
debate this point when we have done examining how particular predicates
can be applied to God.

[17] e.g. if I say "one, one, one," I enounce three unities.

[18] The same words are used to illustrate the same matter in the
_Comment. in Arist._ [Greek: peri hermaeneias], 2nd ed. (Meiser) 56. 12.


Decem omnino praedicamenta traduntur quae de rebus omnibus uniuersaliter
praedicantur, id est substantia, qualitas, quantitas, ad aliquid, ubi,
quando, habere, situm esse, facere, pati. Haec igitur talis sunt qualia
subiecta permiserint; nam pars eorum in reliquarum rerum praedicatione
substantia est, pa*rs in accidentium numero est. At haec cum quis i*n
diuinam uerterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantu*r quae praedicari possunt.
Ad aliquid uero omnino non potest praedicari, nam substantia in illo non
est uere substantia sed ultra substantiam; item qualitas et cetera quae
uenire queunt. Quorum ut amplior fiat intellectus exempla subdenda sunt.

Nam cum dicimus "deus," substantiam quidem significare uidemur, sed eam
quae sit ultra substantiam; cum uero "iustus," qualitatem quidem sed non
accidentem, sed eam quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam. Neque enim
aliud est quod est, aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse deo quod
iusto. Item cum dicitur "magnus uel maximus," quantitatem quidem
significare uidemur, sed eam quae sit ipsa substantia, talis qualem esse
diximus ultra substantiam; idem est enim esse deo quod magno. De forma enim
eius superius monstratum est quoniam is sit forma et unum uere nec ulla
pluralitas. Sed haec praedicamenta talia sunt, ut in quo sint ipsum esse
faciant quod dicitur, diuise quidem in ceteris, in deo uero coniuncte atque
copulate hoc modo: nam cum dicimus "substantia" (ut homo uel deus), ita
dicitur quasi illud de quo praedicatur ipsum sit substantia, ut substantia
homo uel deus. Sed distat, quoniam homo non integre ipsum homo est ac per
hoc nec substantia; quod enim est, aliis debet quae non sunt homo. Deus
uero hoc ipsum deus est; nihil enim aliud est nisi quod est, ac per hoc
ipsum deus est. Rursus "iustus," quod est qualitas, ita dicitur quasi ipse
hoc sit de quo praedicatur, id est si dicamus "homo iustus uel deus
iustus," ipsum hominem uel deum iustos esse proponimus; sed differt, quod
homo alter alter iustus, deus uero idem ipsum est quod est iustum. "Magnus"
etiam homo uel deus dicitur atque ita quasi ipse sit homo magnus uel deus
magnus; sed homo tantum magnus, deus uero ipsum magnus exsistit. Reliqua
uero neque de deo neque de ceteris praedicantur. Nam ubi uel de homine uel
de deo praedicari potest, de homine ut in foro, de deo ut ubique, sed ita
ut non quasi ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur de qua dicitur. Non enim ita
homo dicitur esse in foro quem ad modum esse albus uel longus nec quasi
circumfusus et determinatus proprietate aliqua qua designari secundum se
possit, sed tantum quo sit illud aliis informatum rebus per hanc
praedicationem ostenditur.

De deo uero non ita, nam quod ubique est ita dici uidetur non quod in omni
sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest) sed quod omnis ei locus
adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo
nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est sed non in loco. "Quando"
uero eodem praedicatur modo, ut de homine heri uenit, de deo semper est.
Hic quoque non quasi esse aliquid dicitur illud ipsum de quo hesternus
dicitur aduentus, sed quid ei secundum tempus accesserit praedicatur. Quod
uero de deo dicitur "semper est," unum quidem significat, quasi omni
praeterito fuerit, omni quoquo modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit.
Quod de caelo et de ceteris inmortalibus corporibus secundum philosophos
dici potest, at de deo non ita. Semper enim est, quoniam "semper"
praesentis est in eo temporis tantumque inter nostrarum rerum praesens,
quod est nunc, interest ac diuinarum, quod nostrum "nunc" quasi currens
tempus facit et sempiternitatem, diuinum uero "nunc" permanens neque mouens
sese atque consistens aeternitatem facit; cui nomini si adicias "semper,"
facies eius quod est nunc iugem indefessumque ac per hoc perpetuum cursum
quod est sempiternitas.

Rursus habere uel facere eodem modo; dicimus enim "uestitus currit" de
homine, de deo "cuncta possidens regit." Rursus de eo nihil quod est esse
de utrisque dictum est, sed haec omnis praedicatio exterioribus datur
omniaque haec quodam modo referuntur ad aliud. Cuius praedicationis
differentiam sic facilius internoscimus: qui homo est uel deus refertur ad
substantiam qua est aliquid, id est homo uel deus; qui iustus est refertur
ad qualitatem qua scilicet est aliquid, id est iustus, qui magnus ad
quantitatem qua est aliquid, id est magnus. Nam in ceteris praedicationibus
nihil tale est. Qui enim dicit esse aliquem in foro uel ubique, refert
quidem ad praedicamentum quod est ubi, sed non quo aliquid est uelut
iustitia iustus. Item cum dico "currit" uel "regit" uel "nunc est" uel
"semper est," refertur quidem uel ad facere uel ad tempus--si tamen interim
diuinum illud semper tempus dici potest--sed non quo aliquo aliquid est
uelut magnitudine magnum. Nam situm passionemque requiri in deo non
oportet, neque enim sunt.

Iamne patet quae sit differentia praedicationum? Quod aliae quidem quasi
rem monstrant aliae uero quasi circumstantias rei quodque illa quidem[19]
ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa uero ut non esse, sed
potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Illa igitur, quae aliquid
esse designant, secundum rem praedicationes uocentur. Quae cum de rebus
subiectis dicuntur, uocantur accidentia secundum rem; cum uero de deo qui
subiectus non est, secundum substantiam rei praedicatio nuncupatur.

[19] quidem _vulg._; quae _codd. opt._


There are in all ten categories which can be universally predicated of
things, namely, Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time,
Condition, Situation, Activity, Passivity. Their meaning is determined
by the contingent subject; for some of them denote substance in making
predication of other things, others belong to the class of accidents.
But when these categories are applied to God they change their meaning
entirely. Relation, for instance, cannot be predicated at all of God;
for substance in Him is not really substantial but supersubstantial. So
with quality and the other possible attributes, of which we must add
examples for the sake of clearness.

When we say God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance
that is supersubstantial. When we say of Him, "He is just," we mention a
quality, not an accidental quality--rather a substantial and, in fact, a
supersubstantial quality.[20] For God is not one thing because He is,
and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be God
are one and the same. So when we say, "He is great or the greatest," we
seem to predicate quantity, but it is a quantity similar to this
substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with Him to
be great and to be God are all one. Again, concerning His Form, we have
already shown that He is Form, and truly One without Plurality. The
categories we have mentioned are such that they give to the thing to
which they are applied the character which they express; in created
things they express divided being, in God, conjoined and united being--
in the following manner. When we name a substance, as man or God, it
seems as though that of which the predication is made were substance
itself, as man or God is substance. But there is a difference: since a
man is not simply and entirely man, and in virtue of this he is not
substance. For what man is he owes to other things which are not man.
But God is simply and entirely God, for He is nothing else than what He
is, and therefore is, through simple existence, God. Again we apply
just, a quality, as though it were that of which it is predicated; that
is, if we say "a just man or just God," we assert that man or God is
just. But there is a difference, for man is one thing, and a just man is
another thing. But God is justice itself. So a man or God is said to be
great, and it would appear that man is substantially great or that God
is substantially great. But man is merely great; God is greatness.

The remaining categories are not predicable of God nor yet of created
things.[21] For place is predicated of man or of God--a man is in the
market-place; God is everywhere--but in neither case is the predicate
identical with the object of predication. To say "A man is in the
market" is quite a different thing from saying "he is white or long,"
or, so to speak, encompassed and determined by some property which
enables him to be described in terms of his substance; this predicate of
place simply declares how far his substance is given a particular
setting amid other things.

It is otherwise, of course, with God. "He is everywhere" does not mean
that He is in every place, for He cannot be in any place at all--but
that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, although He
Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot anywhere be
in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. It is the same with
the category of time, as, "A man came yesterday; God is ever." Here
again the predicate of "coming yesterday" denotes not something
substantial, but something happening in terms of time. But the
expression "God is ever" denotes a single Present, summing up His
continual presence in all the past, in all the present--however that
term be used--and in all the future. Philosophers say that "ever" may be
applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal bodies. But as
applied to God it has a different meaning. He is ever, because "ever" is
with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference
between "now," which is our present, and the divine present. Our present
connotes changing time and sempiternity; God's present, abiding,
unmoved, and immoveable, connotes eternity. Add _semper_ to
_eternity_ and you get the constant, incessant and thereby
perpetual course of our present time, that is to say, sempiternity.[22]

It is just the same with the categories of condition and activity. For
example, we say "A man runs, clothed," "God rules, possessing all
things." Here again nothing substantial is asserted of either subject;
in fact all the categories we have hitherto named arise from what lies
outside substance, and all of them, so to speak, refer to something
other than substance. The difference between the categories is easily
seen by an example. Thus, the terms "man" and "God" refer to the
substance in virtue of which the subject is--man or God. The term "just"
refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz.
just; the term "great" to the quantity in virtue of which He is
something, viz. great. No other category save substance, quality, and
quantity refer to the substance of the subject. If I say of one "he is
in the market" or "everywhere," I am applying the category of place,
which is not a category of the substance, like "just" in virtue of
justice. So if I say, "he runs, He rules, he is now, He is ever," I make
reference to activity or time--if indeed God's "ever" can be described
as time--but not to a category of substance, like "great" in virtue of

Finally, we must not look for the categories of situation and passivity
in God, for they simply are not to be found in Him.

Have I now made clear the difference between the categories? Some denote
the reality of a thing; others its accidental circumstances; the former
declare that a thing is something; the latter say nothing about its
being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak, something
external. Those categories which describe a thing in terms of its
substance may be called substantial categories; when they apply to
things as subjects they are called accidents. In reference to God, who
is not a subject at all, it is only possible to employ the category of

[20] Gilbert de la Porree in his commentary on the _De Trin._ makes
Boethius's meaning clear. "Quod igitur in illo substantiam nominamus,
non est subiectionis ratione quod dicitur, sed ultra omnem quae
accidentibus est subiecta substantiam est essentia, absque omnibus quae
possunt accidere solitaria omnino." (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 1283). Cf. Aug.
_De Trin._ vii. 10.

[21] i.e. according to their substance.

[22] The doctrine is Augustine's, cf. _De Ciu. Dei_, xi. 6, xii. 16; but
Boethius's use of _sempiternitas_, as well as his word-building, seem to
be peculiar to himself. Claudianus Mamertus, speaking of applying the
categories to God, uses _sempiternitas_ as Boethius uses _aeternitas_.
Cf. _De Statu Animae_ i. 19. Apuleius seems to use both terms
interchangeably, e.g. _Asclep._ 29-31. On Boethius's distinction between
time and eternity see _Cons._ v. pr. 6, and Rand, _i er dem B. zugeschr.
Trakt. de fide_, pp. 425 ff, and Brandt in _Theol. Littzg._, 1902, p.


Age nunc de relatiuis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus
ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non uidentur secundum se facere
praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno aduentu constare perspiciuntur. Age
enim, quoniam dominus ac seruus relatiua sunt, uideamus utrumne ita sit ut
secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas seruum, abstuleris
et dominum; at non etiam si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque album, sed
interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata perit nimirum album. At in
domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non
accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus
coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato deperit seruo, constat non eam per se
domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum.

Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relatiuam quidquam rei de qua dicitur
secundum se uel addere uel minuere uel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod est
esse consistit, sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere,
nec semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei
igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod
ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister
accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter uelut albus ac
longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me
est minime uero ex sese.

Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non
faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare uel mutare queunt nullamque omnino
uariare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque
aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio uero non
praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua
dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest,
quo quidem modo id quod uix intellegi potuit interpretatum est, personarum.
Omnino enim magna regulae est ueritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias
effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut
pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis
quidem ei est productio filii, relatiua uero praedicatio patris. Ac si
meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus
processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritum
sanctum; hos, quoniam incorporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam uero
pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus uero nullas habet
differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae
uero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas.
Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et in rebus numerabilibus
repetitio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem. Trium igitur
idonee constituta est unitas.


Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing
remarks have been preliminary; for qualities which obviously arise from
the association of another term do not appear to predicate anything
concerning the substance of a subject. For instance, master and
slave[23] are relative terms; let us see whether either of them are
predicates of substance. If you suppress the term slave,[24] you
simultaneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you
suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,[25]
though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in
the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental
quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term
slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental
quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the
power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when
the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the
substance of master, but is an adventitious augmentation arising from
the possession of slaves.

It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases,
decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it
is applied. The category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the
essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and
that not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject
itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and
stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is
left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again,
if I come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not
because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because
he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me,
and not in the least on the essence of his being.

Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of
a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way.
Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have
said, have no other difference but that of relation, and if relation is
not asserted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its
substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject,
but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly
understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth
that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences
and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that God became Father
by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to
be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very substance;
however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in
mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous
discussion, we shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the
Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be
spatially different, since They are incorporeal. But since the Father is
God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and since there are in
God no points of difference distinguishing Him from God, He differs from
none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no
plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God
can be begotten of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the
repetition of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the
Three is suitably established.

[23] _Dominus_ and _seruus_ are similarly used as illustration, _In
Cat._ (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 217).

[24] i.e. which is external to the master.

[25] i.e. which is external to the whitened thing.


Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea
secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est
trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, seruata uero
unitas in eo quod est indifferentia uel substantiae uel operationis uel
omnino eius quae secundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur substantia
continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem; atque ideo sola
singillatim proferuntur atque separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem
pater qui filius non est nec idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tamen
deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem
magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. Sane sciendum est
non semper talem esse relatiuam praedicationem, ut semper ad differens
praedicetur, ut est seruus ad dominum; differunt enim. Nam omne aequale
aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem
idem est; et similis est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque
ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem. Quod si id
in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inueniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus
alteritas. Nos uero nulla imaginatione diduci sed simplici intellectu erigi
et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.

Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc uestri normam iudicii
exspectat subtilitas quaestionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime,
uestrae statuet pronuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei
fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitulante gratia diuina idonea argumentorum
adiumenta praestitimus, illuc perfecti operis laetitia remeabit unde uenit
effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas nequiuit ascendere, quantum
inbecillitas subtrahit uota supplebunt.


But since no relation can be affirmed of one subject alone, since a
predication referring to one substance is a predication without
relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is secured through the
category of relation, and the Unity is maintained through the fact that
there is no difference of substance, or operation, or generally of any
substantial predicate. So then, the category of substance preserves the
Unity, that of relation brings about the Trinity. Hence only terms
belonging to relation may be applied singly to Each. For the Father is
not the same as the Son, nor is either of Them the same as the Holy
Spirit. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each the same God, the same
in justice, in goodness, in greatness, and in everything that can be
predicated of substance. One must not forget that predicates of
relativity do not always involve relation to something other than the
subject, as slave involves master, where the two terms are different.
For equals are equal, like are like, identicals are identical, each with
other, and the relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is
a relation of identicals. A relation of this kind is not to be found in
created things, but that is because of the difference which we know
attaches to transient objects. We must not in speaking of God let
imagination lead us astray; we must let the Faculty of pure Knowledge
lift us up and teach us to know all things as far as they may be

I have now finished the investigation which I proposed. The exactness of
my reasoning awaits the standard of your judgment; your authority will
pronounce whether I have seen a straight path to the goal. If, God
helping me, I have furnished some support in argument to an article
which stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith, I shall render
joyous praise for the finished work to Him from whom the invitation
comes. But if human nature has failed to reach beyond its limits,
whatever is lost through my infirmity must be made good by my intention.

[26] Cf. _Cons._ v. pr. 4 and 5, especially in pr. 5 the passage "quare
in illius summae intellegentiae acumen si possumus erigamur."




Quaero an pater et filius ac spiritus sanctus de diuinitate substantialiter
praedicentur an alio quolibet modo; uiamque indaginis hinc arbitror esse
sumendam, unde rerum omnium manifestum constat exordium, id est ab ipsis
catholicae fidei fundamentis. Si igitur interrogem, an qui dicitur pater
substantia sit, respondetur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius
substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo
dubitauerit. Sed cum rursus colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non
plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Vna igitur substantia trium nec
separari ullo modo aut disiungi potest nec uelut partibus in unum coniuncta
est, sed est una simpliciter. Quaecumque igitur de diuina substantia
praedicantur, ea tribus oportet esse communia; idque signi erit quae sint
quae de diuinitatis substantia praedicentur, quod quaecumque hoc modo
dicuntur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singulariter praedicabuntur.
Hoc modo si dicimus: "Pater deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus
deus est," pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una
deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de diuinitate substantialiter

Ita pater ueritas est, filius ueritas est, spiritus sanctus ueritas est;
pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres ueritates sed una ueritas est. Si
igitur una in his substantia una est ueritas, necesse est ueritatem
substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incommutabilitate de iustitia de
omnipotentia ac de ceteris omnibus quae tam de singulis quam de omnibus
singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substantialiter dici. Vnde apparet
ea quae cum in singulis separatim dici conuenit nec tamen in omnibus dici
queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; qui uero iste sit,
posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc uocabulum non transmittit ad
filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantiale nomen hoc
inditum; nam si substantiale esset, ut deus ut ueritas ut iustitia ut ipsa
quoque substantia, de ceteris diceretur.

Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque cum aliis iungit sicut in deo,
sicut in ueritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non
est idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus patrem ac filium
ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa diuinitate substantialiter dici sed alio
quodam modo; si enim substantialiter praedicaretur, et de singulis et de
omnibus singulariter diceretur. Haec uero ad aliquid dici manifestum est;
nam et pater alicuius pater est et filius alicuius filius est, spiritus
alicuius spiritus. Quo fit, ut ne trinitas quidem substantialiter de deo
praedicetur; non enim pater trinitas (qui enim pater est, filius ac
spiritus sanctus non est) nec trinitas filius nec trinitas spiritus sanctus
secundum eundem modum, sed trinitas quidem in personarum pluralitate
consistit, unitas uero in substantiae simplicitate.

Quod si personae diuisae sunt, substantia uero indiuisa sit, necesse est
quod uocabulum ex personis originem capit id ad substantiam non pertinere;
at trinitatem personarum diuersitas fecit, trinitas igitur non pertinet ad
substantiam. Quo fit ut neque pater neque filius neque spiritus sanctus
neque trinitas de deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed ut dictum est ad
aliquid. Deus uero ueritas iustitia bonitas omnipotentia substantia
inmutabilitas uirtus sapientia et quicquid huiusmodi excogitari potest
substantialiter de diuinitate dicuntur. Haec si se recte et ex fide habent,
ut me instruas peto; aut si aliqua re forte diuersus es, diligentius
intuere quae dicta sunt et fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge.





The question before us is whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be
predicated of the Divinity substantially or otherwise. And I think that
the method of our inquiry must be borrowed from what is admittedly the
surest source of all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the
catholic faith. If, then, I ask whether He who is called Father is a
substance, the answer will be yes. If I ask whether the Son is a
substance, the reply will be the same. So, too, no one will hesitate to
affirm that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other
hand, I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
result is not three substances but one substance. The one substance of
the Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made up of
various parts, combined into one: it is simply one. Everything,
therefore, that is affirmed of the divine substance must be common to
the Three, and we can recognize what predicates may be affirmed of the
substance of the godhead by this sign, that all those which are affirmed
of it may also be affirmed severally of each of the Three combined into
one. For instance if we say "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the
Holy Spirit is God," then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If
then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right
be predicated substantially of the Divinity.

Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is
truth; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth.
If, then, they are one substance and one truth, truth must of necessity
be a substantial predicate. So Goodness, Immutability, Justice,
Omnipotence and all the other predicates which we apply to the Persons
singly and collectively are plainly substantial predicates. Hence it
appears that what may be predicated of each single One but not of all
Three is not a substantial predicate, but of another kind--of what kind
I will examine presently. For He who is Father does not transmit this
name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name
is not attached to Him as something substantial; for if it were a
substantial predicate, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it
would be affirmed of the other Persons.

Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does He associate it
with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the
other predicates which I have already mentioned. The Spirit too is not
the same as the Father and the Son. Hence we gather that Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the Divinity in a substantial
manner, but otherwise.[27] For if each term were predicated
substantially it would be affirmed of the three Persons both separately
and collectively. It is evident that these terms are relative, for the
Father is some one's Father, the Son is some one's Son, the Spirit is
some one's Spirit. Hence not even Trinity may be substantially[28]
predicated of God; for the Father is not Trinity--since He who is Father
is not Son and Holy Spirit--nor yet, by parity of reasoning, is the Son
Trinity nor the Holy Spirit Trinity, but the Trinity consists in
diversity of Persons, the Unity in simplicity of substance.

Now if the Persons are separate, while the Substance is undivided, it
must needs be that that term which is derived from Persons does not
belong to Substance. But the Trinity is effected by diversity of
Persons, wherefore Trinity does not belong to Substance. Hence neither
Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity can be substantially
predicated of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, Truth,
Justice, Goodness, Omnipotence, Substance, Immutability, Virtue, Wisdom
and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are applicable
substantially to divinity.

If I am right and speak in accordance with the Faith, I pray you confirm
me. But if you are in any point of another opinion, examine carefully
what I have said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason.[29]

[27] i.e. _personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).

[28] i.e. _sed personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).

[29] _Vide supra_, Introduction, p. xii.



Postulas, ut ex Hebdomadibus nostris eius quaestionis obscuritatem quae
continet modum quo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, cum non sint
substantialia bona, digeram et paulo euidentius monstrem; idque eo dicis
esse faciendum, quod non sit omnibus notum iter huiusmodi scriptionum. Tuus
uero testis ipse sum quam haec uiuaciter fueris ante complexus. Hebdomadas
uero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conseruo
quam cuiquam participo quorum lasciuia ac petulantia nihil a ioco risuque
patitur esse seiunctum.[30] Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus breuitatis
aduersus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia tum id habent commodi, quod
cum his solis qui digni sunt conloquuntur. Vt igitur in mathematica fieri
solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus
cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam.

I. Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam.
Harum duplex modus est. Nam una ita communis est, ut omnium sit hominum,
ueluti si hanc proponas: "Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae
relinquantur aequalia esse," nullus id intellegens neget. Alia uero est
doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus uenit,
ut est: "Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse," et cetera; quae non
uulgus sed docti comprobant.

II. Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at uero
quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.

III. Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo
participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid,
cum esse susceperit.

IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum
uero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.

V. Diuersum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic
enim accidens hic substantia significatur.

VI. Omne quod est[31] participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio uero
participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est
esse ut sit; est uero ut participet alio quolibet.

VII. Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet.

VIII. Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.

IX. Omnis diuersitas discors, similitudo uero appetenda est; et quod
appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc
ipsum quod appetit.

Sufficiunt igitur quae praemisimus; a prudente uero rationis interprete
suis unumquodque aptabitur argumentis.

Quaestio uero huiusmodi est. Ea quae sunt bona sunt; tenet enim communis
sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne autem tendit ad
simile. Quae igitur ad bonum tendunt bona ipsa sunt. Sed quemadmodum bona
sint, inquirendum est, utrumne participatione an substantia? Si
participatione, per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione
album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est album non est. Et de ceteris
qualitatibus eodem modo. Si igitur participatione sunt bona, ipsa per se
nullo modo bona sunt: non igitur ad bonum tendunt. Sed concessum est. Non
igitur participatione sunt bona sed substantia. Quorum uero substantia bona
est, id quod sunt bona sunt; id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse.
Esse igitur ipsorum bonum est; omnium igitur rerum ipsum esse bonum est.
Sed si esse bonum est, ea quae sunt in eo quod sunt bona sunt idemque illis
est esse quod boni esse; substantialia igitur bona sunt, quoniam non
participant bonitatem. Quod si ipsum esse in eis bonum est, non est dubium
quin substantialia cum sint bona, primo sint bono similia ac per hoc hoc
ipsum bonum erunt; nihil enim illi praeter se ipsum simile est. Ex quo fit
ut omnia quae sunt deus sint, quod dictu nefas est. Non sunt igitur
substantialia bona ac per hoc non in his est esse bonum; non sunt igitur in
eo quod sunt bona. Sed nec participant bonitatem; nullo enim modo ad bonum
tenderent. Nullo modo igitur sunt bona.

Huic quaestioni talis poterit adhiberi solutio. Multa sunt quae cum
separari actu non possunt, animo tamen et cogitatione separantur; ut cum
triangulum uel cetera a subiecta materia nullus actu separat, mente tamen
segregans ipsum triangulum proprietatemque eius praeter materiam
speculatur. Amoueamus igitur primi boni praesentiam paulisper ex animo,
quod esse quidem constat idque ex omnium doctorum indoctorumque sententia
barbararumque gentium religionibus cognosci potest. Hoc igitur paulisper
amoto ponamus omnia esse quae sunt bona atque ea consideremus quemadmodum
bona esse possent, si a primo bono minime defluxissent. Hinc intueor aliud
in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod sunt. Ponatur enim una eademque
substantia bona esse alba, grauis, rotunda. Tunc aliud esset ipsa illa
substantia, aliud eius rotunditas, aliud color, aliud bonitas; nam si haec
singula idem essent quod ipsa substantia, idem esset grauitas quod color,
quod bonum et bonum quod grauitas--quod fieri natura non sinit. Aliud
igitur tunc in eis esset esse, aliud aliquid esse, ac tunc bona quidem
essent, esse tamen ipsum minime haberent bonum. Igitur si ullo modo essent,
non a bono ac bona essent ac non idem essent quod bona, sed eis aliud esset
esse aliud bonis esse. Quod si nihil omnino aliud essent nisi bona neque
grauia neque colorata neque spatii dimensione distenta nec ulla in eis
qualitas esset, nisi tantum bona essent, tunc non res sed rerum uideretur
esse principium nec potius uiderentur, sed uideretur; unum enim solumque
est huiusmodi, quod tantum bonum aliudque nihil sit. Quae quoniam non sunt
simplicia, nec esse omnino poterant, nisi ea id quod solum bonum est esse
uoluisset. Idcirco quoniam esse eorum a boni uoluntate defluxit, bona esse
dicuntur. Primum enim bonum, quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est;
secundum uero bonum, quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum
quoque bonum est. Sed ipsum esse omnium rerum ex eo fluxit quod est primum
bonum et quod bonum tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum.
Ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum est; tunc enim in eo.

Qua in re soluta quaestio est. Idcirco enim licet in eo quod sint bona
sint, non sunt tamen similia primo bono, quoniam non quoquo modo sint res
ipsum esse earum bonum est, sed quoniam non potest esse ipsum esse rerum,
nisi a primo esse defluxerit, id est bono; idcirco ipsum esse bonum est nec
est simile ei a quo est. Illud enim quoquo modo sit bonum est in eo quod
est; non enim aliud est praeterquam bonum. Hoc autem nisi ab illo esset,
bonum fortasse esse posset, sed bonum in eo quod est esse non posset. Tunc
enim participaret forsitan bono; ipsum uero esse quod non haberent a bono,
bonum habere non possent. Igitur sublato ab his bono primo mente et
cogitatione, ista licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod essent bona esse non
possent, et quoniam actu non potuere exsistere, nisi illud ea quod uere
bonum est produxisset, idcirco et esse eorum bonum est et non est simile
substantiali bono id quod ab eo fluxit; et nisi ab eo fluxissent, licet
essent bona, tamen in eo quod sunt bona esse non possent, quoniam et
praeter bonum et non ex bono essent, cum illud ipsum bonum primum est et
ipsum esse sit et ipsum bonum et ipsum esse bonum. At non etiam alba in eo
quod sunt alba esse oportebit ea quae alba sunt, quoniam ex uoluntate dei
fluxerunt ut essent, alba minime. Aliud est enim esse, aliud albis esse;
hoc ideo, quoniam qui ea ut essent effecit bonus quidem est, minime uero
albus. Voluntatem igitur boni comitatum est ut essent bona in eo quod sunt;
uoluntatem uero non albi non est comitata talis eius quod est proprietas ut
esset album in eo quod est; neque enim ex albi uoluntate defluxerunt.
Itaque quia uoluit esse ea alba qui erat non albus, sunt alba tantum; quia
uero uoluit ea esse bona qui erat bonus, sunt bona in eo quod sunt.
Secundum hanc igitur rationem cuncta oportet esse iusta, quoniam ipse
iustus est qui ea esse uoluit? Ne hoc quidem. Nam bonum esse essentiam,
iustum uero esse actum respicit. Idem autem est in eo esse quod agere; idem
igitur bonum esse quod iustum. Nobis uero non est idem esse quod agere; non
enim simplices sumus. Non est igitur nobis idem bonis esse quod iustis, sed
idem nobis est esse omnibus in eo quod sumus. Bona igitur omnia sunt, non
etiam iusta. Amplius bonum quidem generale est, iustum uero speciale nec
species descendit in omnia. Idcirco alia quidem iusta alia aliud omnia

[30] seiunct. _Rand_; coniunct. _codd. opt._; disiunct. _vulg. Vallinus_.

[31] est _codd. inferiores; om. codd. opt._



You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure
question in my _Hebdomads_[32] concerning the manner in which
substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute
goods.[33] You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the
method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness
with what eagerness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess
I like to expound my _Hebdomads_ to myself, and would rather bury
my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert
and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is
made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that
waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret
doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks a language
understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore
followed the example of the mathematical[34] and cognate sciences and
laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that

I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it
is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible;
as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the remainders are
equal." Nobody who grasps that proposition will deny it. The other kind
is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same
class of common conceptions; as "Incorporeals cannot occupy space," and
the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.

II. Being and a concrete thing[35] are different. Simple Being awaits
manifestation, but a thing is and exists[36] as soon as it has received
the form which gives it Being.

III. A concrete thing can participate in something else; but absolute
Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is
effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has
acquired Being.

IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute
Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.

V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different;
the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.

VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being[37] through the
fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in
something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being
through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate
in something else.

VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its
particular Being.

VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one
and the same.

IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something
outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it

These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent
interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to
each point.

Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned
are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends
to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must,
however, inquire how they are good--by participation or by substance. If
by participation, they are in no wise good in themselves; for a thing
which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by
virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are
good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they
do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are
good not by participation but by substance. But those things whose
substance is good are substantially good. But they owe their actual
Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good;
therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being
is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist
and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they
are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness.
But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since
they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore
they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself.
Hence all things that are, are God--an impious assertion. Wherefore
things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does
not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that
they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they
would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good.[38]

This problem admits of the following solution.[39] There are many things
which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be
separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a
triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but
mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from
matter. Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the
presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal
consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the
religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a
moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let
us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive from
the Prime Good. This process leads me to perceive that their Goodness
and their existence are two different things. For let me suppose that
one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, and round. Then it
must be admitted that its substance, roundness, colour, and goodness are
all different things. For if each of these qualities were the same as
its substance, weight would be the same thing as colour or goodness, and
goodness would be the same as colour; which is contrary to nature. Their
Being then in that case would be one thing, their quality another, and
they would be good, but they would not have their absolute Being good.
Therefore if they really existed at all, they would not be from good nor
good, they would not be the same as good, but Being and Goodness would
be for them two different things. But if they were nothing else but good
substances, and were neither heavy, nor coloured, and possessed neither
spatial dimension nor quality, beyond that of goodness, they (or rather
it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things. For there
is one thing alone that is by nature good to the exclusion of every
other quality. But since they are not simple, they could not even exist
at all unless that which is the one sole Good willed them to be. They
are called good simply because their Being is derived from the Will of
the Good. For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the
secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good
whose absolute Being is good. But the absolute Being of all things
derives from the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness
are rightly predicated as identical. Their absolute Being therefore is
good; for thereby it resides in Him.

Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the
fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple
reason that their absolute Being is not good under all circumstances,
but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the
Prime Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is
good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime
Good is good through the fact that it exists, irrespective of all
conditions, for it is nothing else than good; but the second good if it
derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good
through the fact that it exists. For in that case it might possibly
participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the
Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have
put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good,
would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could
not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore
their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial
Good is not like its source which produces it. And unless they had
derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good
through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and
not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is
substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we
need not say that white things are white through the fact that they
exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their
whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that
because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore
in accordance with the will of the Good that they should be good through
the fact that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of
one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it
white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is
white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who
was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the
fact that they exist because One who was good willed them to be good.
Ought, then, by parity of reason, all things to be just because He is
just who willed them to be? That is not so either. For to be good
involves Being, to be just involves an act. For Him being and action are
identical; to be good and to be just are one and the same for Him. But
being and action are not identical for us, for we are not simple. For
us, then, goodness is not the same thing as justice, but we all have the
same sort of Being in virtue of our existence. Therefore all things are
good, but all things are not just. Finally, good is a general, but just
is a species, and this species does not apply to all. Wherefore some
things are just, others are something else, but all things are good.

[32] Similarly Porphyry divided the works of Plotinus into six
_Enneades_ or groups of nine.

[33] Cf. discussion on the nature of good in _Cons._ iii. m. 10 and pr.
11 (_infra_, pp. 274 ff.).

[34] On this mathematical method of exposition cf. _Cons._ iii. pr. 10
(_infra_, p. 270).

[35] _Esse_ = Aristotle's [Greek: to ti esti]; _id quod est_ = [Greek:
tode ti].

[36] _Consistere_ = [Greek: hypostaenai].

[37] _Id quod est esse_ = [Greek: to ti aen einai].

[38] Cf. the similar _reductio ad absurdum_ in _Tr._ 5 (_infra_, p. 98)
and in _Cons._ v. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).

[39] _Vide supra_, p. 6, n. _b_.


Christianam fidem noui ac ueteris testamenti pandit auctoritas; et quamuis
nomen ipsum Christi uetus intra semet continuerit instrumentum eumque
semper signauerit affuturum quem credimus per partum uirginis iam uenisse,
tamen in orbem terrarum ab ipsius nostri saluatoris mirabili manasse
probatur aduentu.

Haec autem religio nostra, quae uocatur christiana atque catholica, his
fundamentis principaliter nititur asserens: ex aeterno, id est ante mundi
constitutionem, ante omne uidelicet quod temporis potest retinere
uocabulum, diuinam patris et filii ac spiritus sancti exstitisse
substantiam, ita ut deum dicat patrem, deum filium, deum spiritum sanctum,
nec tamen tres deos sed unum: patrem itaque habere filium ex sua substantia
genitum et sibi nota ratione coaeternum, quem filium eatenus confitetur, ut
non sit idem qui pater est: neque patrem aliquando fuisse filium, ne rursus
in infinitum humanus animus diuinam progeniem cogitaret, neque filium in
eadem natura qua patri coaeternus est aliquando fieri patrem, ne rursus in
infinitum diuina progenies tenderetur: sanctum uero spiritum neque patrem
esse neque filium atque ideo in illa natura nec genitum nec generantem sed
a patre quoque procedentem uel filio; qui sit tamen processionis istius
modus ita non possumus euidenter dicere, quemadmodum generationem filii ex
paterna substantia non potest humanus animus aestimare. Haec autem ut
credantur uetus ac noua informat instructio. De qua uelut arce religionis
nostrae multi diuersa et humaniter atque ut ita dicam carnaliter sentientes
aduersa locuti sunt, ut Arrius qui licet deum dicat filium, minorem tamen
patre multipliciter et extra patris substantiam confitetur. Sabelliani
quoque non tres exsistentes personas sed unam ausi sunt affirmare, eundem
dicentes patrem esse qui filius est eundemque filium qui pater est atque
spiritum sanctum eundem esse qui pater et filius est; ac per hoc unam
dicunt esse personam sub uocabulorum diuersitate signatam.

Manichaei quoque qui duo principia sibi coaeterna et aduersa profitentur,
unigenitum dei esse non credunt. Indignum enim iudicant, si deus habere
filium uideatur, nihil aliud cogitantes nisi carnaliter, ut quia haec
generatio duorum corporum commixtione procedit, illic quoque indignum esse
intellectum huiusmodi applicare; quae res eos nec uetus facit recipere
testamentum neque in integro nouum. Nam sicut illud omnino error eorum non
recipit ita ex uirgine generationem filii non uult admittere, ne humano
corpore polluta uideatur dei fuisse natura. Sed de his hactenus; suo enim
loco ponentur sicut ordo necessarius postularit.

Ergo diuina ex aeterno natura et in aeternum sine aliqua mutabilitate
perdurans sibi tantum conscia uoluntate sponte mundum uoluit fabricare
eumque cum omnino non esset fecit ut esset, nec ex sua substantia protulit,
ne diuinus natura crederetur, neque aliunde molitus est, ne iam exstitisse
aliquid quod eius uoluntatem exsistentia propriae naturae iuuaret atque
esset quod neque ab ipso factum esset et tamen esset; sed uerbo produxit
caelos, terram creauit, ita ut caelesti habitatione dignas caelo naturas
efficeret ac terrae terrena componeret. De caelestibus autem naturis, quae
uniuersaliter uocatur angelica, quamuis illic distinctis ordinibus pulchra
sint omnia, pars tamen quaedam plus appetens quam ei natura atque ipsius
auctor naturae tribuerat de caelesti sede proiecta est; et quoniam
angelorum numerum, id est supernae illius ciuitatis cuius ciues angeli
sunt, imminutum noluit conditor permanere, formauit ex terra hominem atque
spiritu uitae animauit, ratione composuit, arbitrii libertate decorauit
eumque praefixa lege paradisi deliciis constituit, ut, si sine peccato
manere uellet, tam ipsum quam eius progeniem angelicis coetibus sociaret,
ut quia superior natura per superbiae malum ima petierat, inferior
substantia per humilitatis bonum ad superna conscenderet. Sed ille auctor
inuidiae non ferens hominem illuc ascendere ubi ipse non meruit permanere,
temptatione adhibita fecit etiam ipsum eiusque comparem, quam de eius
latere generandi causa formator produxerat, inoboedientiae suppliciis
subiacere, ei quoque diuinitatem affuturam promittens, quam sibi dum
arroganter usurpat elisus est. Haec autem reuelante deo Moysi famulo suo
comperta sunt, cui etiam humani generis conditionem atque originem uoluit
innotescere, sicut ab eo libri prolati testantur. Omnis enim diuina
auctoritas his modis constare uidetur, ut aut historialis modus sit, qui
nihil aliud nisi res gestas enuntiet, aut allegoricus, ut non illic possit
historiae ordo consistere, aut certe ex utrisque compositus, ut et secundum
historiam et secundum allegoriam manere uideatur. Haec autem pie
intelligentibus et ueraci corde tenentibus satis abundeque relucent. Sed ad
ordinem redeamus.

Primus itaque homo ante peccatum cum sua coniuge incola paradisi fuit. At
ubi aurem praebuit suasori et conditoris praeceptum neglexit attendere,
exul effectus, terram iussus excolere atque a paradisi sinu seclusus in
ignotis partibus sui generis posteritatem transposuit atque poenam quam
ipse primus homo praeuaricationis reus exceperat generando transmisit in
posteros. Hinc factum est ut et corporum atque animarum corruptio et mortis
proueniret interitus primusque mortem in Abel filio suo meruit experiri, ut
quanta esset poena quam ipse exceperit probaret in subole. Quod si ipse
primus moreretur, nesciret quodam modo ac, si dici fas est, nec sentiret
poenam suam, sed ideo expertus in altero est, ut quid sibi iure deberetur
contemptor agnosceret et dum poenam mortis sustinet, ipsa exspectatione
fortius torqueretur. Hoc autem praeuaricationis malum, quod in posteros
naturaliter primus homo transfuderat, quidam Pelagius non admittens proprii
nominis haeresim dedicauit, quam catholica fides a consortio sui mox
reppulisse probatur. Ab ipso itaque primo homine procedens humanum genus ac
multiplici numerositate succrescens erupit in lites, commouit bella,
occupauit terrenam miseriam quia[40] felicitatem paradisi in primo patre
perdiderat. Nec tamen ex his defuerunt quos sibi conditor gratiae
sequestraret eiusque placitis inseruirent; quos licet meritum naturae
damnaret, futuri tamen sacramenti et longe postmodum proferendi faciendo
participes perditam uoluit reparare naturam. Impletus est ergo mundus
humano genere atque ingressus est homo uias suas qui malitia propriae
contumaciae despexerat conditorem. Hinc uolens deus per iustum potius
hominem reparare genus humanum quam manere proteruum, poenalem multitudinem
effusa diluuii inundatione excepto Noe iusto homine cum suis liberis atque
his quae secum in arcam introduxerat interire permisit. Cur autem per arcae
lignum uoluerit iustos eripere, notum est diuinarum scripturarum mentibus
eruditis. Et quasi prima quaedam mundi aetas diluuio ultore transacta est.

Reparatur itaque humanum genus atque propriae naturae uitium, quod
praeuaricationis primus auctor infuderat, amplecti non destitit. Creuitque
contumacia quam dudum diluuii unda puniuerat et qui numerosam annorum
seriem permissus fuerat uiuere, in breuitate annorum humana aetas addicta
est. Maluitque deus non iam diluuio punire genus humanum, sed eodem
permanente eligere uiros per quorum seriem aliqua generatio commearet, ex
qua nobis filium proprium uestitum humano corpore mundi in fine concederet.
Quorum primus est Abraham, qui cum esset aetate confectus eiusque uxor
decrepita, in senectute sua repromissionis largitione habere filium
meruerunt. Hic uocatus est Isaac atque ipse genuit Iacob. Idem quoque
duodecim patriarchas non reputante deo in eorum numero quos more suo natura
produxerat. Hic ergo Iacob cum filiis ac domo sua transigendi causa
Aegyptum uoluit habitare atque illic per annorum seriem multitudo
concrescens coeperunt suspicioni esse[41] Aegyptiacis imperiis eosque
Pharao magna ponderum mole premi decreuerat et grauibus oneribus
affligebat. Tandem deus Aegyptii regis dominationem despiciens diuiso mari
rubro, quod numquam antea natura ulla cognouerat, suum transduxit exercitum
auctore Moyse et Aaron. Postea igitur pro eorum egressione altis Aegyptus
plagis uastata est, cum nollet dimittere populum. Transmisso itaque ut
dictum est mari rubro uenit per deserta eremi ad montem qui uocatur Sinai,
ibique uniuersorum conditor deus uolens sacramenti futuri gratia populos
erudire per Moysen data lege constituit, quemadmodum et sacrificiorum ritus
et populorum mores instruerentur. Et cum multis annis multas quoque gentes
per uiam debellassent, uenerunt tandem ad fluuium qui uocatur Iordanis duce
iam Iesu Naue filio atque ad eorum transitum quemadmodum aquae maris rubri
ita quoque Iordanis fluenta siccata sunt; peruentumque est ad eam ciuitatem
quae nunc Hierosolyma uocatur. Atque dum ibi dei populus moraretur, post
iudices et prophetas reges instituti leguntur, quorum post Saulem primatum
Dauid de tribu Iuda legitur adeptus fuisse. Descendit itaque ab eo per
singulas successiones regium stemma perductumque est usque ad Herodis
tempora, qui primus ex gentilibus memoratis populis legitur imperasse. Sub
quo exstitit beata uirgo Maria quae de Dauidica stirpe prouenerat, quae
humani generis genuit conditorem. Hoc autem ideo quia multis infectus
criminibus mundus iacebat in morte, electa est una gens in qua dei mandata
clarescerent, ibique missi prophetae sunt et alii sancti uiri per quorum
admonitionem ipse certe populus a tumore peruicaciae reuocaretur. Illi uero
eosdem occidentes in suae nequitiae peruersitate manere uoluerunt.

Atque iam in ultimis temporibus non prophetas neque alios sibi placitos sed
ipsum unigenitum suum deus per uirginem nasci constituit, ut humana salus
quae per primi hominis inoboedientiam deperierat per hominem deum rursus
repararetur et quia exstiterat mulier quae causam mortis prima uiro
suaserat, esset haec secunda mulier quae uitae causam humanis uisceribus
apportaret. Nec uile uideatur quod dei filius ex uirgine natus est, quoniam
praeter naturae modum conceptus et editus est. Virgo itaque de spiritu
sancto incarnatum dei filium concepit, uirgo peperit, post eius editionem
uirgo permansit; atque hominis factus est idemque dei filius, ita ut in eo
et diuinae naturae radiaret splendor et humanae fragilitatis appareret
assumptio. Sed huic tam sanae atque ueracissimae fidei exstiterant multi
qui diuersa garrirent et praeter alios Nestorius et Eutyches repertores
haereseos exstiterunt, quorum unus hominem solum, alter deum solum putauit
asserere nec humanum corpus quod Christus induerat de humanae substantiae
participatione uenisse. Sed haec hactenus.

Creuit itaque secundum carnem Christus, baptizatus est, ut qui baptizandi
formam erat ceteris tributurus, ipse primus quod docebat exciperet. Post
baptismum uero elegit duodecim discipulos, quorum unus traditor eius fuit.
Et quia sanam doctrinam Iudaeorum populus non ferebat, eum inlata manu
crucis supplicio peremerunt. Occiditur ergo Christus, iacet tribus diebus
ac noctibus in sepulcro, resurgit a mortuis, sicut ante constitutionem
mundi ipse cum patre decreuerat, ascendit in caelos ubi, in eo quod dei
filius est, numquam defuisse cognoscitur, ut assumptum hominem, quem
diabolus non permiserat ad superna conscendere, secum dei filius caelesti
habitationi sustolleret. Dat ergo formam discipulis suis baptizandi,
docendi salutaria, efficientiam quoque miraculorum atque in uniuersum
mundum ad uitam praecipit introire, ut praedicatio salutaris non iam in una
tantum gente sed orbi terrarum praedicaretur. Et quoniam humanum genus
naturae merito, quam ex primo praeuaricatore contraxerat, aeternae poenae
iaculis fuerat uulneratum nec salutis suae erat idoneum, quod eam in
parente perdiderat, medicinalia quaedam tribuit sacramenta, ut agnosceret
aliud sibi deberi per naturae meritum, aliud per gratiae donum, ut natura
nihil aliud nisi poenae summitteret, gratia uero, quae nullis meritis
attributa est, quia nec gratia diceretur si meritis tribueretur, totum quod
est salutis afferret.

Diffunditur ergo per mundum caelestis illa doctrina, adunantur populi,
instituuntur ecclesiae, fit unum corpus quod mundi latitudinem occuparet,
cuius caput Christus ascendit in caelos, ut necessario caput suum membra
sequerentur. Haec itaque doctrina et praesentem uitam bonis informat
operibus et post consummationem saeculi resurrectura corpora nostra praeter
corruptionem ad regna caelestia pollicetur, ita ut qui hic bene ipso
donante uixerit, esset in illa resurrectione beatissimus, qui uero male,
miser post munus resurrectionis adesset. Et hoc est principale religionis
nostrae, ut credat non solum animas non perire, sed ipsa quoque corpora,
quae mortis aduentus resoluerat, in statum pristinum futura de beatitudine
reparari. Haec ergo ecclesia catholica per orbem diffusa tribus modis
probatur exsistere: quidquid in ea tenetur, aut auctoritas est scripturarum
aut traditio uniuersalis aut certe propria et particularis instructio. Sed
auctoritate tota constringitur, uniuersali traditione maiorum nihilominus
tota, priuatis uero constitutionibus et propriis informationibus unaquaeque
uel pro locorum uarietate uel prout cuique bene uisum est subsistit et
regitur. Sola ergo nunc est fidelium exspectatio qua credimus affuturum
finem mundi, omnia corruptibilia transitura, resurrecturos homines ad
examen futuri iudicii, recepturos pro meritis singulos et in perpetuum
atque in aeternum debitis finibus permansuros; solumque est[42] praemium
beatitudinis contemplatio conditoris--tanta dumtaxat, quanta a creatura ad
creatorem fieri potest,--ut ex eis reparato angelico numero superna illa
ciuitas impleatur, ubi rex est uirginis filius eritque gaudium sempiternum,
delectatio, cibus, opus, laus perpetua creatoris.

[40] qui _uel_ quod _codd._

[41] suspiciones _uel_ suspicione _uel_ suspicio _uel_ subici _codd.

[42] esse _codd_.


The Christian Faith is proclaimed by the authority of the New Testament
and of the Old; but although the Old scripture[44] contains within its
pages the name of Christ and constantly gives token that He will come
who we believe has already come by the birth of the Virgin, yet the
diffusion of that faith throughout the world dates from the actual
miraculous coming of our Saviour.

Now this our religion which is called Christian and Catholic is founded
chiefly on the following assertions. From all eternity, that is, before
the world was established, and so before all that is meant by time
began, there has existed one divine substance of Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit in such wise that we confess the Father God, the Son God, and the
Holy Spirit God, and yet not three Gods but one God. Thus the Father
hath the Son, begotten of His substance and coeternal with Himself after
a manner that He alone knoweth. Him we confess to be Son in the sense
that He is not the same as the Father. Nor has the Father ever been Son,
for the human mind must not imagine a divine lineage stretching back
into infinity; nor can the Son, being of the same nature in virtue of
which He is coeternal with the Father, ever become Father, for the
divine lineage must not stretch forward into infinity. But the Holy
Spirit is neither Father nor Son, and therefore, albeit of the same
divine nature, neither begotten, nor begetting, but proceeding as well
from the Father as the Son.[45] Yet what the manner of that Procession
is we are no more able to state clearly than is the human mind able to
understand the generation of the Son from the substance of the Father.
But these articles are laid down for our belief by Old and New
Testament. Concerning which fortress and citadel[46] of our religion
many men have spoken otherwise and have even impugned it, being moved by
human, nay rather by carnal feeling. Arius, for instance, who, while
calling the Son God, declares Him to be vastly inferior to the Father
and of another substance. The Sabellians also have dared to affirm that
there are not three separate Persons but only One, saying that the
Father is the same as the Son and the Son the same as the Father and the
Holy Spirit the same as the Father and the Son; and so declaring that
there is but one divine Person expressed by different names.

The Manichaeans, too, who allow two coeternal and contrary principles,
do not believe in the Only-begotten Son of God. For they consider it a
thought unworthy of God that He should have a Son, since they entertain
the very carnal reflection that inasmuch as[47] human generation arises
from the mingling of two bodies, it is unworthy to hold a notion of this
sort in respect of the divine nature; whereas such a view finds no
sanction in the Old Testament and absolutely[48] none in the New. Yea,
their error which refuses this notion also refuses the Virgin birth of
the Son, because they would not have the God's nature defiled by the
man's body. But enough of this for the present; the points will be
presented in the proper place as the proper arrangement demands.

The divine nature then, abiding from all eternity and unto all eternity
without any change, by the exercise of a will known only to Himself,
determined of Himself to form the world, and brought it into being when
it was absolutely naught, nor did He produce it from His own substance,
lest it should be thought divine by nature, nor did He form it after any
model, lest it should be thought that anything had already come into
being which helped His will by the existence of an independent nature,
and that there should exist something that had not been made by Him and
yet existed; but by His Word He brought forth the heavens, and created
the earth[49] that so He might make natures worthy of a place in heaven,
and also fit earthly things to earth. But although in heaven all things
are beautiful and arranged in due order, yet one part of the heavenly
creation which is universally termed angelic,[50] seeking more than
nature and the Author of Nature had granted them, was cast forth from
its heavenly habitation; and because the Creator did not wish the roll
of the angels, that is of the heavenly city whose citizens the angels
are, to be diminished, He formed man out of the earth and breathed into
him the breath of life; He endowed him with reason, He adorned him with
freedom of choice and established him in the joys of Paradise, making
covenant aforehand that if he would remain without sin He would add him
and his offspring to the angelic hosts; so that as the higher nature had
fallen low through the curse of pride, the lower substance might ascend
on high through the blessing of humility. But the father of envy, loath
that man should climb to the place where he himself deserved not to
remain, put temptation before him and the consort whom the Creator had
brought forth out of his side for the continuance of the race, and laid
them open to punishment for disobedience, promising man also the gift of
Godhead, the arrogant attempt to seize which had caused his own fall.
All this was revealed by God to His servant Moses, whom He vouchsafed to
teach the creation and origin of man, as the books written by him
declare. For the divine authority is always conveyed in one of the
following ways--the historical, which simply announces facts; the
allegorical, whence historical matter is excluded; or else the two
combined, history and allegory conspiring to establish it. All this is
abundantly evident to pious hearers and steadfast believers.

But to return to the order of our discourse; the first man, before sin
came, dwelt with his consort in the Garden. But when he hearkened to the
voice of his wife and failed to keep the commandment of his Creator, he
was banished, bidden to till the ground, and being shut out from the
sheltering garden he carried abroad into unknown regions the children of
his loins; by begetting whom he transmitted to those that came after,
the punishment which he, the first man, had incurred by the sin of
disobedience. Hence it came to pass that corruption both of body and
soul ensued, and death; and this he was to taste first in his own son
Abel, in order that he might learn through his child the greatness of
the punishment that was laid upon him. For if he had died first he would
in some sense not have known, and if one may so say not have felt, his
punishment; but he tasted it in another in order that he might perceive
the due reward of his contempt, and, doomed to death himself, might be
the more sensibly touched by the apprehension of it. But this curse that
came of transgression which the first man had by natural propagation
transmitted to posterity, was denied by one Pelagius who so set up the
heresy which goes by his name and which the Catholic faith, as is known,
at once banished from its bosom. So the human race that sprang from the
first man and mightily increased and multiplied, broke into strife,
stirred up wars, and became the heir of earthly misery, because it had
lost the joys of Paradise in its first parent. Yet were there not a few
of mankind whom the Giver of Grace set apart for Himself and who were
obedient to His will; and though by desert of nature they were
condemned, yet God by making them partakers in the hidden mystery, long
afterwards to be revealed, vouchsafed to recover fallen nature. So the
earth was filled by the human race and man who by his own wanton


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