The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, v5
by
Abraham Lincoln
Part 5 out of 8
rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be
exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself,
and I should, under existing circumstances, favor rather than oppose
a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I will
venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in
that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves,
instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions
originated by others not especially chosen for the purpose, and which
might not be precisely such as they would wish to either accept or
refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution which
amendment, however, I have not seen--has passed Congress, to the
effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the
domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held
to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart
from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments so far as to
say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional
law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable.
The chief magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and
they have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of
the States. The people themselves can do this also if they choose;
but the executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is
to administer the present government, as it came to his hands, and to
transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successors.
Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice
of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our
present differences is either party without faith of being in the
right? If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and
justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that
truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this
great tribunal of the American people.
By the frame of the government under which we live, this same people
have wisely given their public servants but little power for
mischief; and have, with equal wisdom, provided for the return of
that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the
people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any
extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the
government in the short space of four years.
My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole
subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be
an object to hurry any of you in hot haste to a step which you would
never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking
time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are
now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on
the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the
new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to
change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied
hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good
reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism,
Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken
this favored land, are still competent to adjust in the best way all
our present difficulty.
In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is
the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail
you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the
aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the
government, while I shall have the most solemn one to "preserve,
protect, and defend" it.
I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not
be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break, our
bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from
every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and
hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of
the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better
angels of our nature.
REFUSAL OF SEWARD RESIGNATION
TO WM. H. SEWARD.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 4, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:--Your note of the 2d instant, asking to withdraw your
acceptance of my invitation to take charge of the State Department,
was duly received. It is the subject of the most painful solicitude
with me, and I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the
withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should;
and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction.
Please consider and answer by 9 A.M. to-morrow.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
REPLY TO THE PENNSYLVANIA DELEGATION,
WASHINGTON, MARCH 5, 1861
Mr. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN OF THE PENNSYLVANIAN DELEGATION:--As I
have so frequently said heretofore, when I have had occasion to
address the people of the Keystone, in my visits to that State, I can
now but repeat the assurance of my gratification at the support you
gave me at the election, and at the promise of a continuation of that
support which is now tendered to me.
Allusion has been made to the hope that you entertain that you have a
President and a government. In respect to that I wish to say to you
that in the position I have assumed I wish to do more than I have
ever given reason to believe I would do. I do not wish you to
believe that I assume to be any better than others who have gone
before me. I prefer rather to have it understood that if we ever
have a government on the principles we profess, we should remember,
while we exercise our opinion, that others have also rights to the
exercise of their opinions, and that we should endeavor to allow
these rights, and act in such a manner as to create no bad feeling.
I hope we have a government and a President. I hope, and wish it to
be understood, that there may he no allusion to unpleasant
differences.
We must remember that the people of all the States are entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several
States. We should bear this in mind, and act in such a way as to say
nothing insulting or irritating. I would inculcate this idea, so
that we may not, like Pharisees, set ourselves up to be better than
other people.
Now, my friends, my public duties are pressing to-day, and will
prevent my giving more time to you. Indeed, I should not have left
them now, but I could not well deny myself to so large and
respectable a body.
REPLY TO THE MASSACHUSETTS DELEGATION,
WASHINGTON, MARCH 5, 1861
I am thankful for this renewed assurance of kind feeling and
confidence, and the support of the old Bay State, in so far as you,
Mr. Chairman, have expressed, in behalf of those whom you represent,
your sanction of what I have enunciated in my inaugural address.
This is very grateful to my feelings. The object was one of great
delicacy, in presenting views at the opening of an administration
under the peculiar circumstances attending my entrance upon the
official duties connected with the Government. I studied all the
points with great anxiety, and presented them with whatever of
ability and sense of justice I could bring to bear. If it met the
approbation of our good friends in Massachusetts, I shall be
exceedingly gratified, while I hope it will meet the approbation of
friends everywhere. I am thankful for the expressions of those who
have voted with us; and like every other man of you, I like them as
certainly as I do others. As the President in the administration of
the Government, I hope to be man enough not to know one citizen of
the United States from another, nor one section from another. I
shall be gratified to have good friends of Massachusetts and others
who have thus far supported me in these national views still to
support me in carrying them out.
TO SECRETARY SEWARD
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, MARCH 7, 1861
MY DEAR SIR:--Herewith is the diplomatic address and my reply. To
whom the reply should be addressed--that is, by what title or style--
I do not quite understand, and therefore I have left it blank.
Will you please bring with you to-day the message from the War
Department, with General Scott's note upon it, which we had here
yesterday? I wish to examine the General's opinion, which I have not
yet done.
Yours very truly
A. LINCOLN.
REPLY TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1861
Mr. FIGANIERE AND GENTLEMEN OF THE DIPLOMATIC BODY:--Please accept my
sincere thanks for your kind congratulations. It affords me pleasure
to confirm the confidence you so generously express in the friendly
disposition of the United States, through me, towards the sovereigns
and governments you respectively represent. With equal satisfaction
I accept the assurance you are pleased to give, that the same
disposition is reciprocated by your sovereigns, your governments, and
yourselves.
Allow me to express the hope that these friendly relations may remain
undisturbed, arid also my fervent wishes for the health and happiness
of yourselves personally.
TO SECRETARY SEWARD
EXECUTIVE MANSION, MARCH 11,1861
HON. SECRETARY OF STATE.
DEAR SIR:--What think you of sending ministers at once as follows:
Dayton to England; Fremont to France; Clay to Spain; Corwin to
Mexico?
We need to have these points guarded as strongly and quickly as
possible. This is suggestion merely, and not dictation.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
TO J. COLLAMER
EXECUTIVE MANSION, MARCH 12, 1861
HON. JACOB COLLAMER.
MY DEAR SIR:--God help me. It is said I have offended you. I hope
you will tell me how.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
March 14, 1861.
DEAR SIR:--I am entirely unconscious that you have any way offended
me. I cherish no sentiment towards you but that of kindness and
confidence.
Your humble servant,
J. COLLAMER
[Returned with indorsement:]
Very glad to know that I have n't.
A. LINCOLN.
TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, MARCH 13, 1861
HON. P. M. G.
DEAR SIR:--The bearer of this, Mr. C. T. Hempstow, is a Virginian who
wishes to get, for his son, a small place in your Dept. I think
Virginia should be heard, in such cases.
LINCOLN.
NOTE ASKING CABINET OPINIONS ON FORT SUMTER.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, MARCH 15, 1861
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF WAR.
MY DEAR SIR:--Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort
Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it? Please
give me your opinion in writing on this question.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
[Same to other members of the Cabinet.]
ON ROYAL ARBITRATION OF AMERICAN BOUNDARY LINE
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
The Senate has transmitted to me a copy of the message sent by my
predecessor to that body on the 21st of February last, proposing to
take its advice on the subject of a proposition made by the British
Government through its minister here to refer the matter in
controversy between that government and the Government of the United
States to the arbitrament of the King of Sweden and Norway, the King
of the Netherlands, or the Republic of the Swiss Confederation.
In that message my predecessor stated that he wished to present to
the Senate the precise questions following, namely:
"Will the Senate approve a treaty referring to either of the
sovereign powers above named the dispute now existing between the
governments of the United States and Great Britain concerning the
boundary line between Vancouver's Island and the American continent?
In case the referee shall find himself unable to decide where the
line is by the description of it in the treaty of June 15, 1846,
shall he be authorized to establish a line according to the treaty as
nearly as possible? Which of the three powers named by Great Britain
as an arbiter shall be chosen by the United States?"
I find no reason to disapprove of the course of my predecessor in
this important matter; but, on the contrary, I not only shall receive
the advice of the Senate thereon cheerfully, but I respectfully ask
the Senate for their advice on the three questions before recited
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, March 16, 1861
AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS
TO SECRETARY SEWARD.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, MARCH 18, 1861
HON. SECRETARY OF STATE.
MY DEAR SIR:--I believe it is a necessity with us to make the
appointments I mentioned last night--that is, Charles F. Adams to
England, William L. Dayton to France, George P. Marsh to Sardinia,
and Anson Burlingame to Austria. These gentlemen all have my highest
esteem, but no one of them is originally suggested by me except Mr.
Dayton. Mr. Adams I take because you suggested him, coupled with his
eminent fitness for the place. Mr. Marsh and Mr. Burlingame I take
because of the intense pressure of their respective States, and their
fitness also.
The objection to this card is that locally they are so huddled up--
three being in New England and two from a single State. I have
considered this, and will not shrink from the responsibility. This,
being done, leaves but five full missions undisposed of--Rome, China,
Brazil, Peru, and Chili. And then what about Carl Schurz; or, in
other words, what about our German friends?
Shall we put the card through, and arrange the rest afterward? What
say you?
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
TO G. E. PATTEN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 19, 1861.
TO MASTER GEO. EVANS PATTEN.
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:--I did see and talk with Master Geo. Evans
Patten last May at Springfield, Ill.
Respectfully,
A. LINCOLN.
[Written because of a denial that any interview with young Patten,
then a schoolboy, had ever taken place.]
RESPONSE TO SENATE INQUIRY RE. FORT SUMTER
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:--I have received a copy of the
resolution of the Senate, passed on the 25th instant, requesting me,
if in my opinion not incompatible with the public interest, to
communicate to the Senate the despatches of Major Robert Anderson to
the War Department during the time he has been in command of Fort
Sumter. On examination of the correspondence thus called for, I
have, with the highest respect for the Senate, come to the conclusion
that at the present moment the publication of it would be
inexpedient.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
WASHINGTON, MARCH 16, 1861
PREPARATION OF FIRST NAVAL ACTION
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR
EXECUTIVE MANSION, MARCH 29, 1861
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF WAR.
SIR:--I desire that an expedition to move by sea be got ready to sail
as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to memorandum
attached, and that you cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy for
that object.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
[Inclosure.]
Steamers Pocahontas at Norfolk, Paunee at Washington, Harriet Lane at
New York, to be under sailing orders for sea, with stores, etc., for
one month. Three hundred men to be kept ready for departure from on
board the receiving-ships at New York. Two hundred men to be ready to
leave Governor's Island in New York. Supplies for twelve months for
one hundred men to be put in portable shape, ready for instant
shipping. A large steamer and three tugs conditionally engaged.
TO ______ STUART.
WASHINGTON, March 30, 1861
DEAR STUART:
Cousin Lizzie shows me your letter of the 27th. The question of
giving her the Springfield post-office troubles me. You see I have
already appointed William Jayne a Territorial governor and Judge
Trumbull's brother to a land-office. Will it do for me to go on and
justify the declaration that Trumbull and I have divided out all the
offices among our relatives? Dr. Wallace, you know, is needy, and
looks to me; and I personally owe him much.
I see by the papers, a vote is to be taken as to the post-office.
Could you not set up Lizzie and beat them all? She, being here, need
know nothing of it, so therefore there would be no indelicacy on her
part. Yours as ever,
TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE NEW YORK NAVY-YARD.
NAVY DEPT., WASHINGTON, April 1, 1861
TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE NAVY-YARD,
Brooklyn, N. Y.
Fit out the Powhatan to go to sea at the earnest possible moment
under sealed orders. Orders by a confidential messenger go forward
to-morrow.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
TO LIEUTENANT D. D. PORTER
EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861
LIEUTENANT D. D. PORTER, United States Navy.
SIR:--You will proceed to New York, and with the least possible
delay, assuming command of any naval steamer available, proceed to
Pensacola Harbor, and at any cost or risk prevent any expedition from
the mainland reaching Fort Pickens or Santa Rosa Island.
You will exhibit this order to any naval officer at Pensacola, if you
deem it necessary, after you have established yourself within the
harbor, and will request co-operation by the entrance of at least one
other steamer.
This order, its object, and your destination will be communicated to
no person whatever until you reach the harbor of Pensacola.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
Recommended, WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
RELIEF EXPEDITION FOR FORT SUMTER
ORDER TO OFFICERS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY.
WASHINGTON, EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.
All officers of the army and navy to whom this order may be exhibited
will aid by every means in their power the expedition under the
command of Colonel Harvey Brown, supplying him with men and material,
and co-operating with him as he may desire.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
ORDER TO CAPTAIN SAMUEL MERCER.
(Confidential.)
WASHINGTON CITY,
April 1, 1861
SIR:--Circumstances render it necessary to place in command of your
ship (and for a special purpose) an officer who is fully informed and
instructed in relation to the wishes of the Government, and you will
therefore consider yourself detached. But in taking this step the
Government does not in the least reflect upon your efficiency or
patriotism; on the contrary, have the fullest confidence in your
ability to perform any duty required of you. Hoping soon to be able
to give you a better command than the one you now enjoy, and trusting
that you will have full confidence in the disposition of the
Government toward you,
I remain, etc.,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
SECRETARY SEWARD'S BID FOR POWER
MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY SEWARD,
APRIL 1, 1861
Some thoughts for the President's Consideration,
First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet
without a policy either domestic or foreign.
Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been
unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet
applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and
more grave matters.
Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for
both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the
administration, but danger upon the country.
Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But
how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving
foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.
Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular,
and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this
idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must
CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT
SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION:
In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to
one of patriotism or union.
The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a
slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper
manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by the
Union men in the South.
I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the
issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the
necessity.
For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the
ports in the gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations
to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under
martial law.
This will raise distinctly the question of union or disunion. I
would maintain every fort and possession in the South.
FOR FOREIGN NATIONS,
I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at
once.
I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send
agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous
continental spirit of independence on this continent against European
intervention.
And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and
France,
Would convene Congress and declare war against them.
But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution
of it.
For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct
it incessantly.
Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active
in it, or Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted,
debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.
It is not in my especial province; But I neither seek to evade nor
assume responsibility.
REPLY TO SECRETARY SEWARD'S MEMORANDUM
EXECUTIVE MANSION, APRIL 1, 1861
HON. W. H. SEWARD.
MY DEAR SIR:--Since parting with you I have been considering your
paper dated this day, and entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's
Consideration." The first proposition in it is, "First, We are at
the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy either
domestic or foreign."
At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said: "The power
confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property
and places belonging to the Government, and to Collect the duties and
imposts." This had your distinct approval at the time; and, taken in
connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing
him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the
forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the
single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.
Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort Sumter would
be done on a slavery or a party issue, while that of Fort Pickens
would be on a more national and patriotic one.
The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings
a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that
time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers
and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that
we had no foreign policy.
Upon your Closing propositions--that,
"Whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of
it.
"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct
it incessantly.
"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active
in it, or,
"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on
it must end, and all agree and abide"--
I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general
line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its
being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of
unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I
wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the
Cabinet.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
REPLY TO A COMMITTEE FROM THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION, APRIL 13, 1861
HON. WILLIAM BALLARD PRESTON, ALEXANDER H.
H. STUART, GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, Esq.
GENTLEMEN:--As a committee of the Virginia Convention now in Session,
you present me a preamble and resolution in these words:
"Whereas, in the opinion of this Convention, the uncertainty which
prevails in the public mind as to the policy which the Federal
Executive intends to pursue toward the seceded States is extremely
injurious to the industrial and commercial interests of the country,
tends to keep up an excitement which is unfavorable to the adjustment
of pending difficulties, and threatens a disturbance of the public
peace: therefore
"Resolved, that a committee of three delegates be appointed by this
Convention to wait upon the President of the United States, present
to him this preamble and resolution, and respectfully ask him to
communicate to this Convention the policy which the Federal Executive
intends to pursue in regard to the Confederate States.
"Adopted by the Convention of the State of Virginia, Richmond, April
8, 1861."
In answer I have to say that, having at the beginning of my official
term expressed my intended policy as plainly as I was able, it is
with deep regret and some mortification I now learn that there is
great and injurious uncertainty in the public mind as to what that
policy is, and what course I intend to pursue. Not having as yet
seen occasion to change, it is now my purpose to pursue the course
marked out in the inaugural address. I commend a careful
consideration of the whole document as the best expression I can give
of my purposes.
As I then and therein said, I now repeat: "The power confided to me
will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places
belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts;
but beyond what is necessary for these objects, there will be no
invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." By
the words "property and places belonging to the Government," I
chiefly allude to the military posts and property which were in the
possession of the Government when it came to my hands.
But if, as now appears to be true, in pursuit of a purpose to drive
the United States authority from these places, an unprovoked assault
has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to
repossess, if I can, like places which had been seized before the
Government was devolved upon me. And in every event I shall, to the
extent of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true
that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall perhaps
cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the States
which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of
actual war against the Government justifies and possibly demands
this.
I scarcely need to say that I consider the military posts and
property situated within the States which claim to have seceded as
yet belonging to the Government of the United States as much as they
did before the supposed secession.
Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not attempt to
collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of
the country; not meaning by this, however, that I may not land a
force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon a border of the
country.
From the fact that I have quoted a part of the inaugural address, it
must not be inferred that I repudiate any other part, the whole of
which I reaffirm, except so far as what I now say of the mails may be
regarded as a modification.
PROCLAMATION CALLING FOR 75,000 MILITIA, AND CONVENING CONGRESS IN
EXTRA SESSION, APRIL 15, 1861.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past
and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the
States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers
vested in the marshals bylaw:
Now, therefore, I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States,
in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws,
have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia
of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of
seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, and to
cause the laws to be duly executed.
The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the
State authorities through the War Department.
I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this
effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our
National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government; and to
redress wrongs already long enough endured.
I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces
hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places,
and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every
event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects
aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or
interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens
in any part of the country.
And I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid
to disperse and retire peacefully to their respective abodes within
twenty days from date.
Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an
extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me
vested by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress.
Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at
their respective chambers, at twelve o'clock noon, on Thursday, the
fourth day of July next, then and there to consider and determine
such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may
seem to demand.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this fifteenth day of April, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the
independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.
PROCLAMATION OF BLOCKADE, APRIL 19, 1861
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
Whereas an insurrection against the Government of the United States
has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and the laws of the
United States for the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually
executed therein conformably to that provision of the Constitution
which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States:
And Whereas a combination of persons engaged in such insurrection
have threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize the
bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels, and
property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in commerce
on the high seas, and in waters of the United States:
And Whereas an executive proclamation has been already issued
requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly proceedings to
desist therefrom, calling out a militia force for the purpose of
repressing the same, and convening Congress in extraordinary session
to deliberate and determine thereon:
Now, therefore, I, Abraham LINCOLN, President of the United States,
with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and to the
protection of the public peace, and the lives and property of quiet
and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until
Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the said unlawful
proceedings, or until the same shall have ceased, have further deemed
it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States
aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the
law of nations in such case provided. For this purpose a competent
force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels
from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such
blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave either of
the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of
the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her register the fact and
date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to
enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to
the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her
cargo, as prize, as may be deemed advisable.
And I hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the
pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense,
shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo
on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the
United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of April, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the
independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.
TO GOVERNOR HICKS AND MAYOR BROWN.
WASHINGTON, April 20, 1861
GOVERNOR HICKS AND MAYOR BROWN.
GENTLEMEN:--Your letter by Messrs. Bond, Dobbin, and Brune is
received. I tender you both my sincere thanks for your efforts to
keep the peace in the trying situation in which you are placed.
For the future troops must be brought here, but I make no point of
bringing them through Baltimore. Without any military knowledge
myself, of course I must leave details to General Scott. He hastily
said this morning in the presence of these gentlemen, "March them
around Baltimore, and not through it." I sincerely hope the General,
on fuller reflection, will consider this practical and proper, and
that you will not object to it. By this a collision of the people of
Baltimore with the troops will be avoided, unless they go out of
their way to seek it. I hope you will exert your influence to
prevent this.
Now and ever I shall do all in my power for peace consistently with
the maintenance of the Government.
Your obedient servant,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
TO GOVERNOR HICKS.
WASHINGTON, April 20, 1861
GOVERNOR HICKS:
I desire to consult with you and the Mayor of Baltimore relative to
preserving the peace of Maryland. Please come immediately by special
train, which you can take at Baltimore; or, if necessary, one can be
sent from here. Answer forthwith.
LINCOLN.
ORDER TO DEFEND FROM A MARYLAND INSURRECTION
ORDER TO GENERAL SCOTT.
WASHINGTON, April 25, 1861
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SCOTT.
MY DEAR SIR--The Maryland Legislature assembles to-morrow at
Annapolis, and not improbably will take action to arm the people
of that State against the United States. The question has been
submitted to and considered by me whether it would not be
justifiable, upon the ground of necessary defense, for you, as
General in Chief of the United States Army, to arrest or disperse the
members of that body. I think it would not be justifiable nor
efficient for the desired object.
First. They have a clearly legal right to assemble, and we cannot
know in advance that their action will not be lawful and peaceful,
and if we wait until they shall have acted their arrest or dispersion
will not lessen the effect of their action.
Secondly. We cannot permanently prevent their action. If we arrest
them, we cannot long hold them as prisoners, and when liberated they
will immediately reassemble and take their action; and precisely the
same if we simply disperse them--they will immediately reassemble in
some other place.
I therefore conclude that it is only left to the Commanding General
to watch and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their
people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt and
efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the bombardment
of their cities and, in the extremist necessity, the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.
Your obedient servant, ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
PROCLAMATION OF BLOCKADE, APRIL 27, 1861
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
Whereas, for the reasons assigned in my proclamation of the
nineteenth instant, a blockade of the ports of the States of South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas was ordered to be established:
And whereas, since that date, public property of the United States
has been seized, the collection of the revenue obstructed, and duly
commissioned officers of the United States, while engaged in
executing the orders of their superiors, have been arrested and held
in custody as prisoners, or have been impeded in the discharge of
their official duties, without due legal process, by persons claiming
to act under authorities of the States of Virginia and North
Carolina:
An efficient blockade of the ports of those States will also be
established
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this twenty seventh day of April, in
the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of
the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
REMARKS TO A MILITARY COMPANY, WASHINGTON,
APRIL 27, 1861
I have desired as sincerely as any man, and I sometimes think more
than any other man, that our present difficulties might be settled
without the shedding of blood. I will not say that all hope has yet
gone; but if the alternative is presented whether the Union is to be
broken in fragments and the liberties of the people lost, or blood be
shed, you will probably make the choice with which I shall not be
dissatisfied.
LOCALIZED REPEAL OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
TO GENERAL SCOTT.
TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of
the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any
military line which is now or which shall be used between the City of
Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which
renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the
public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at
the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that
writ.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, April 17, 1861
MILITARY ENROLLMENT OF ST. LOUIS CITIZENS
FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR
WAR DEPARTMENT, April 30, 1861
TO CAPTAIN NATHANIEL LYON.
CAPT. NATHANIEL LYON,
Commanding Department of the West.
SIR:--The President of the United States directs that you enroll in
the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of Saint
Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore enlisted,
ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority
of the United States; for the protection of the peaceful inhabitants
of Missouri; and you will, if deemed necessary for that purpose by
yourself, by Messrs. Oliver F. Ferny, John How, James O. Broadhead,
Samuel T. Glover, J. Wilzie, Francis P. Blair, Jr., proclaim martial
law in the city of Saint Louis.
The additional force hereby authorized shall be discharged in part or
in whole, if enlisted. As soon as it appears to you and the
gentlemen above mentioned that there is no danger of an attempt on
the part of the enemies of the Government to take military possession
of the city of Saint Louis, or put the city in control of the
combination against the Government of the United States; and whilst
such additional force remains in the service the same shall be
governed by the Rules and Articles of War, and such special
regulations as you may prescribe. I shall like the force hereafter
directed to be enrolled to be under your command.
The arms and other military stores in the Saint Louis Arsenal not
needed for the forces of the United States in Missouri must be
removed to Springfield, or some other safe place of deposit in the
State of Illinois, as speedily as practicable, by the ordnance
officers in charge at Saint Louis.
(Indorsement.)
It is revolutionary times, and therefore I do not object to the
irregularity of this. W. S.
Approved, April 30, 1861. A. LINCOLN.
Colonel Thomas will make this order.
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
CONDOLENCE OVER FAILURE OF FT. SUMTER RELIEF
TO GUSTAVUS V. FOX.
WASHINGTON, D.C., May 1, 1861
CAPTAIN G. V. Fox.
MY DEAR SIR:--I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt
to provision Fort Sumter should be the source of any annoyance to
you.
The practicability of your plan was not, in fact, brought to a test.
By reason of a gale, well known in advance to be possible and not
improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached
the ground; while, by an accident for which you were in no wise
responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were deprived of
a war vessel, with her men, which you deemed of great importance to
the enterprise.
I most cheerfully and truly declare that the failure of the
undertaking has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities you
developed in the effort have greatly heightened you in my estimation.
For a daring and dangerous enterprise of a similar character you
would to-day be the man of all my acquaintances whom I would select.
You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be
advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if it
should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our
anticipation is justified by the result.
Very truly your friend,
A. LINCOLN.
PROCLAMATION CALLING FOR 42,034 VOLUNTEERS,
MAY 3, 1861
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
A Proclamation..
Whereas existing exigencies demand immediate and adequate measures
for the protection of the National Constitution and the preservation
of the National Union by the suppression of the insurrectionary
combinations now existing in several States for opposing the laws of
the Union and obstructing the execution thereof, to which end a
military force in addition to that called forth by my proclamation of
the 15th day of April in the present year appears to be indispensably
necessary:
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States
and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy thereof and of the
militia of the several States when called into actual service, do
hereby call into the service of the United States 42,034 volunteers
to serve for the period of three years, unless sooner discharged, and
to be mustered into service as infantry and cavalry. The proportions
of each arm and the details of enrollment and organization will be
made known through the Department of War.
And I also direct that the Regular Army of the United States be
increased by the addition of eight regiments of infantry, one
regiment of cavalry, and one regiment of artillery, making altogether
a maximum aggregate increase of 22,714 officers and enlisted men, the
details of which increase will also be made known through the
Department of War.
And I further direct the enlistment for not less than one or more
than three years of 18,000 seamen, in addition to the present force,
for the naval service of the United States. The details of the
enlistment and organization will be made known through the Department
of the Navy.
The call for volunteers hereby made and the direction for the
increase of the Regular Army and for the enlistment of seamen hereby
given, together with the plan of organization adopted for the
volunteer and for the regular forces hereby authorized, will be
submitted to Congress as soon as assembled.
In the meantime I earnestly invoke the co-operation of all good
citizens in the measures hereby adopted for the effectual suppression
of unlawful violence, for the impartial enforcement of constitutional
laws, and for the speediest possible restoration of peace and order,
and with these of happiness and prosperity, throughout our country.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my band and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed................
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
COMMUNICATION WITH VICE-PRESIDENT
TO VICE-PRESIDENT HAMLIN.
WASHINGTON, D.C., May 6, 1861
HON. H. HAMLIN, New York.
MY DEAR SIR:-Please advise me at the close of each day what troops
left during the day, where going, and by what route; what remaining
at New York, and what expected in the next day. Give the numbers, as
near as convenient, and what corps they are. This information,
reaching us daily, will be very useful as well as satisfactory.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
ORDER TO COLONEL ANDERSON,
MAY 7, 1861
TO ALL WHO SHALL SEE THESE PRESENTS, GREETING:
Know ye that, reposing special trust and confidence in the
patriotism, valor, fidelity, and ability of Colonel Robert Anderson,
U. S. Army, I have empowered him, and do hereby empower him, to
receive into the army of the United States as many regiments of
volunteer troops from the State of Kentucky and from the western part
of the State of Virginia as shall be willing to engage in the Service
of the United States for the term of three years, upon the terms and
according to the plan proposed by the proclamation of May 3, 1861,
and General Orders No. 15, from the War Department, of May 4, 1861.
The troops whom he receives shall be on the same footing in every
respect as those of the like kind called for in the proclamation
above cited, except that the officers shall be commissioned by the
United States. He is therefore carefully and diligently to discharge
the duty hereby devolved upon him by doing and performing all manner
of things thereunto belonging.
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this 7th day of May,
A. D. 1861, and in the eighty-fifth year of the independence of the
United States.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War,
PROCLAMATION SUSPENDING THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN FLORIDA, MAY 10, 1861.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
Whereas an insurrection exists in the State of Florida, by which the
lives, liberty, and property of loyal citizens of the United States
are endangered:
And whereas it is deemed proper that all needful measures should be
taken for the protection of such citizens and all officers of the
United States in the discharge of their public duties in the State
aforesaid:
Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham LINCOLN, President of the
United States, do hereby direct the commander of the forces of the
United States on the Florida coast to permit no person to exercise
any office or authority upon the islands of Key West, the Tortugas,
and Santa Rosa, which may be inconsistent with the laws and
Constitution of the United States, authorizing him at the same time,
if he shall find it necessary, to suspend there the writ of habeas
corpus, and to remove from the vicinity of the United States
fortresses all dangerous or suspected persons.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.....................
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
TO SECRETARY WELLES.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, May 11, 1861
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
SIR:-Lieut. D. D. Porter was placed in command of the steamer
Powhatan, and Captain Samuel Mercer was detached therefrom, by my
special order, and neither of them is responsible for any apparent or
real irregularity on their part or in connection with that vessel.
Hereafter Captain Porter is relieved from that special service and
placed under the direction of the Navy Department, from which he will
receive instructions and to which he will report.
Very respectfully,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S CORRECTIONS OF A DIPLOMATIC DESPATCH WRITTEN BY
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MINISTER ADAMS
NO. 10.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
WASHINGTON, May 21, 1861
SIR:---Mr. Dallas, in a brief despatch of May 2d (No. 333), tells us
that Lord John Russell recently requested an interview with him on
account of the solicitude which his lordship felt concerning the
effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the
President. In that conversation the British secretary told Mr.
Dallas that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy
were then in London, that Lord John Russell had not yet seen them,
but that he was not unwilling to see them unofficially. He further
informed Mr. Dallas that an understanding exists between the British
and French governments which would lead both to take one and the same
course as to recognition. His lordship then referred to the rumor of
a meditated blockade by us of Southern ports, and a discontinuance of
them as ports of entry. Mr. Dallas answered that he knew nothing on
those topics, and therefore
(The President's corrections, both in notes and text, are in
caps. All matter between brackets was to be marked out.)
could say nothing. He added that you were expected to arrive in two
weeks. Upon this statement Lord John Russell acquiesced in the
expediency of waiting for the full knowledge you were expected to
bring.
Mr. Dallas transmitted to us some newspaper reports of ministerial
explanations made in Parliament.
You will base no proceedings on parliamentary debates further than to
seek explanations when necessary and communicate them to this
department. [We intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever
issue may arise between us and Great Britain.]
The President [is surprised and grieved] regrets that Mr. Dallas did
not protest against the proposed unofficial intercourse between the
British Government and the missionaries of the insurgents [as well as
against the demand for explanations made by the British Government].
It is due, however, to Mr. Dallas to say that our instructions had
been given only to you and not to him, and that his loyalty and
fidelity, too rare in these times [among our late representatives
abroad, are confessed and] are appreciated.
Intercourse of any kind with the so-called commissioners is liable to
be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them.
Such intercourse would be none the less [wrongful] hurtful to us for
being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because
we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by
it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless if
it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and direct
recognition. It is left doubtful here whether the proposed
unofficial intercourse has yet actually begun. Your own [present]
antecedent instructions are deemed explicit enough, and it is hoped
that you have not misunderstood them. You will in any event desist
from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official, with
the British Government, so long as it shall continue intercourse of
either kind with the domestic enemies of this country [confining
yourself to a delivery of a copy of this paper to the Secretary of
State. After doing this.] When intercourse shall have been arrested
for this cause, you will communicate with this department and receive
further directions.
Lord John Russell has informed us of an understanding between the
British and French governments that they will act together in regard
to our affairs. This communication, however, loses something of its
value from the circumstance that the communication was withheld until
after knowledge of the fact had been acquired by us from other
sources. We know also another fact that has not yet been officially
communicated to us--namely, that other European States are apprised
by France and England of their agreement, and are expected to concur
with or follow them in whatever measures they adopt on the subject of
recognition. The United States have been impartial and just in all
their conduct toward the several nations of Europe. They will not
complain, however, of the combination now announced by the two
leading powers, although they think they had a right to expect a more
independent, if not a more friendly, course from each of them. You
will take no notice of that or any other alliance. Whenever the
European governments shall see fit to communicate directly with us,
we shall be, as heretofore, frank and explicit in our reply.
As to the blockade, you will say that by [the] our own laws [of
nature] and the laws of nature and the laws of nations, this
Government has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An exclusion
of commerce from national ports which have been seized by the
insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is the proper means to
that end. You will [admit] not insist that our blockade is [not] to
be respected if it be not maintained by a competent force; but
passing by that question as not now a practical, or at least an
urgent, one, you will add that [it] the blockade is now, and it will
continue to be so maintained, and therefore we expect it to be
respected by Great Britain. You will add that we have already
revoked the exequatur of a Russian consul who had enlisted in the
military service of the insurgents, and we shall dismiss or demand
the recall of every foreign agent, consular or diplomatic, who shall
either disobey the Federal laws or disown the Federal authority.
As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Confederacy, it is
not to be made a subject of technical definition. It is, of course,
[quasi] direct recognition to publish an acknowledgment of the
sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is [quasi] direct
recognition to receive its ambassadors, ministers, agents, or
commissioners officially. A concession of belligerent rights is
liable to be construed as a recognition of them. No one of these
proceedings will [be borne] pass [unnoticed] unquestioned by the
United States in this case.
Hitherto recognition has been moved only on the assumption that the
so-called Confederate States are de facto a self-sustaining power.
Now, after long forbearance, designed to soothe discontent and avert
the need of civil war, the land and naval forces of the United States
have been put in motion to repress the insurrection. The true
character of the pretended new State is at once revealed. It is seen
to be a power existing in pronunciamento only, It has never won a
field. It has obtained no forts that were not virtually betrayed
into its hands or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a
single port on the coast nor any highway out from its pretended
capital by land. Under these circumstances Great Britain is called
upon to intervene and give it body and independence by resisting our
measures of suppression. British recognition would be British
intervention to create within our own territory a hostile state by
overthrowing this republic itself. [When this act of intervention is
distinctly performed, we from that hour shall cease to be friends,
and become once more, as we have twice before been forced to be,
enemies of Great Britain.]
As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent service, you will
say that this is a question exclusively our own. We treat them as
pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by our
citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great Britain
shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents, and give them
shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the laws of nations afford
an adequate and proper remedy [and we shall avail ourselves of it.
And while you need not say this in advance, be sure that you say
nothing inconsistent with it.]
Happily, however, her Britannic Majesty's government can avoid all
these difficulties. It invited us in 1856 to accede to the
declaration of the Congress of Paris, of which body Great Britain was
herself a member, abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and
forever. You already have our authority to propose to her our
accession to that declaration. If she refuse to receive it, it can
only be because she is willing to become the patron of privateering
when aimed at our devastation.
These positions are not elaborately defended now, because to
vindicate them would imply a possibility of our waiving them.
1 We are not insensible of the grave importance of
1 (Drop all from this line to the end, and in lieu of it write, "This
paper is for your own guidance only, and not [sic] to be read or
shown to any one.)
(Secretary Seward, when the despatch was returned to him, added an
introductory paragraph stating that the document was strictly
confidential. For this reason these last two paragraphs remained as
they are here printed.)
this occasion. We see how, upon the result of the debate in which we
are engaged, a war may ensue between the United States and one, two,
or even more European nations. War in any case is as exceptionable
from the habits as it is revolting from the sentiments of the
American people. But if it come, it will be fully seen that it
results from the action of Great Britain, not our own; that Great
Britain will have decided to fraternize with our domestic enemy,
either without waiting to hear from you our remonstrances and our
warnings, or after having heard them. War in defense of national
life is not immoral, and war in defense of independence is an
inevitable part of the discipline of nations.
The dispute will be between the European and the American branches of
the British race. All who belong to that race will especially
deprecate it, as they ought. It may well be believed that men of
every race and kindred will deplore it. A war not unlike it between
the same parties occurred at the close of the last century. Europe
atoned by forty years of suffering for the error that Great Britain
committed in provoking that contest. If that nation shall now repeat
the same great error, the social convulsions which will follow may
not be so long, but they will be more general. When they shall have
ceased, it will, we think, be seen, whatever may have been the
fortunes of other nations, that it is not the United States that will
have come out of them with its precious Constitution altered or its
honestly obtained dominion in any degree abridged. Great Britain has
but to wait a few months and all her present inconveniences will
cease with all our own troubles. If she take a different course, she
will calculate for herself the ultimate as well as the immediate
consequences, and will consider what position she will hold when she
shall have forever lost the sympathies and the affections of the only
nation on whose sympathies and affections she has a natural claim.
In making that calculation she will do well to remember that in the
controversy she proposes to open we shall be actuated by neither
pride, nor passion, nor cupidity, nor ambition; but we shall stand
simply on the principle of self-preservation, and that our cause will
involve the independence of nations and the rights of human nature.
I am, Sir, respectfully your obedient servant,
W. H. S.
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., etc,
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
EXECUTIVE MANSION, May 21, 1861.
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
MY DEAR SIR:--Why cannot Colonel Small's Philadelphia regiment be
received? I sincerely wish it could. There is something strange
about it. Give these gentlemen an interview, and take their
regiment.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GOVERNOR MORGAN.
WASHINGTON, May 12, 1861
GOVERNOR E. D. MORGAN, Albany, N.Y.
I wish to see you face to face to clear these difficulties about
forwarding troops from New York.
A. LINCOLN.
TO CAPTAIN DAHLGREEN.
EXECUTIVE, MANSION, May 23, 1863.
CAPT. DAHLGREEN.
MY DEAR SIR:--Allow me to introduce Col. J. A. McLernand, M.C. of my
own district in Illinois. If he should desire to visit Fortress
Monroe, please introduce him to the captain of one of the vessels in
our service, and pass him down and back.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
LETTER OF CONDOLENCE TO ONE OF FIRST CASUALTIES
TO COLONEL ELLSWORTH'S PARENTS,
WASHINGTON, D.C., May 25, 1861
TO THE FATHER AND MOTHER
OF COL. ELMER E. ELLSWORTH.
MY DEAR SIR AND MADAME:--In the untimely loss of your noble son, our
affliction here is scarcely less than your own. So much of promised
usefulness to one's country, and of bright hopes for one's self and
friends, have never been so suddenly dashed as in his fall. In size,
in years, and in youthful appearance a boy only, his power to command
men was surpassingly great. This power, combined with a fine
intellectual and indomitable energy, and a taste altogether military,
constituted in him, as seemed to me, the best natural talent in that
department I ever knew. And yet he was singularly modest and
deferential in social intercourse. My acquaintance with him began
less than two years ago; yet, through the latter half of the
intervening period, it was as intense as the disparity of our ages
and my engrossing engagements would permit. To me he appeared to
have no indulgences or pastimes, and I never heard him utter a
profane or an intemperate word. What was conclusive of his good
heart, he never forgot his parents. The honors he labored for so
laudably, and for which, in the sad end, he so gallantly gave his
life, he meant for them no less than for himself.
In the hope that it may be no intrusion upon the sacredness of your
sorrow, I have ventured to address you this tribute to the memory of
my young friend and your brave and early fallen son.
May God give you the consolation which is beyond all early power.
Sincerely your friend in common affliction,
A. LINCOLN.
TO COLONEL BARTLETT.
WASHINGTON, May 27, 1861
COL. W. A. BARTLETT, New York.
The Naval Brigade was to go to Fort Monroe without trouble to the
government, and must so go or not at all.
A. LINCOLN.
MEMORANDUM ABOUT INDIANA REGIMENTS.
WASHINGTON, JUNE 11, 1861
The government has already accepted ten regiments from the State of
Indiana. I think at least six more ought to be received from that
State, two to be those of Colonel James W. McMillan and Colonel
William L. Brown, and the other four to be designated by the Governor
of the State of Indiana, and to be received into the volunteer
service of the United States according to the "Plan of Organization"
in the General Orders of the War Department, No.15. When they report
to Major-General McClellan in condition to pass muster according to
that order, and with the approval of the Secretary of War to be
indorsed hereon, and left in his department, I direct that the whole
six, or any smaller number of such regiments, be received.
A. LINCOLN.
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, JUNE 13, 1861
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
MY DEAR SIR:--There is, it seems, a regiment in Massachusetts
commanded by Fletcher Webster, and which HON. Daniel Webster's old
friends very much wish to get into the service. If it can be
received with the approval of your department and the consent of the
Governor of Massachusetts I shall indeed be much gratified. Give Mr.
Ashmun a chance to explain fully.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, JUNE 13, 1861
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
MY DEAR SIR--I think it is entirely safe to accept a fifth regiment
from Michigan, and with your approbation I should say a regiment
presented by Col. T. B. W. Stockton, ready for service within two
weeks from now, will be received. Look at Colonel Stockton's
testimonials.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 17, 1861
HON. SECRETARY Of WAR.
MY DEAR SIR:--With your concurrence, and that of the Governor of
Indiana, I am in favor of accepting into what we call the three
years' service any number not exceeding four additional regiments
from that State. Probably they should come from the triangular
region between the Ohio and Wabash Rivers, including my own old
boyhood home. Please see HON. C. M. Allen, Speaker of the Indiana
House of Representatives, and unless you perceive good reason to the
contrary, draw up an order for him according to the above.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, JUNE 17,1861
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
MY DEAR SIR:--With your concurrence, and that of the Governor of
Ohio, I am in favor of receiving into what we call the three years'
service any number not exceeding six additional regiments from that
State, unless you perceive good reasons to the contrary. Please see
HON. John A. Gurley, who bears this, and make an order corresponding
with the above.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO N. W. EDWARDS
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 19, 1861
Hon. N. W. EDWARDS
MY DEAR SIR:
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When you wrote me some time ago in reference to looking up something
in the departments here, I thought I would inquire into the thing and
write you, but the extraordinary pressure upon me diverted me from
it, and soon it passed out of my mind. The thing you proposed, it
seemed to me, I ought to understand myself before it was set on foot
by my direction or permission; and I really had no time to make
myself acquainted with it. Nor have I yet. And yet I am unwilling,
of course, that you should be deprived of a chance to make something,
if it can be done without injustice to the Government, or to any
individual. If you choose to come here and point out to me how this
can be done I shall not only not object, but shall be gratified to be
able to oblige you.
Your friend as ever
A. LINCOLN.
TO SECRETARY CAMERON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 20, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:--Since you spoke to me yesterday about General J. H.
Lane, of Kansas, I have been reflecting upon the subject, and have
concluded that we need the service of such a man out there at once;
that we had better appoint him a brigadier-general of volunteers
to-day, and send him off with such authority to raise a force (I
think two regiments better than three, but as to this I am not
particular) as you think will get him into actual work quickest.
Tell him, when he starts, to put it through not to be writing or
telegraphing back here, but put it through.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
[Indorsement.]
General Lane has been authorized to raise two additional regiments of
volunteers.
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary o f War.
TO THE KENTUCKY DELEGATION.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 29, 1861.
GENTLEMEN OF THE KENTUCKY DELEGATION WHO ARE FOR THE UNION:
I somewhat wish to authorize my friend Jesse Bayles to raise a
Kentucky regiment, but I do not wish to do it without your consent.
If you consent, please write so at the bottom of this.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
We consent:
R. MALLORY.
H. GRIDER.
G. W. DUNLAP.
J. S. JACKSON.
C. A. WICKLIFFE.
August 5, 1861.
I repeat, I would like for Col. Bayles to raise a regiment of cavalry
whenever the Union men of Kentucky desire or consent to it.
A. LINCOLN.
ORDER AUTHORIZING GENERAL SCOTT TO SUSPEND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
JULY 2, 1861
TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES:
You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of
the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any
military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of
New York and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders
it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public
safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the
point where resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ.
Given under my hand and the seal of the United States at the city of
Washington, this second day of July, A.D. 1861, and of the
independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
TO SECRETARY SEWARD.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, JULY 3, 1861
HON. SECRETARY OF STATE.
MY DEAR SIR:--General Scott had sent me a copy of the despatch of
which you kindly sent one. Thanks to both him and you. Please
assemble the Cabinet at twelve to-day to look over the message and
reports.
And now, suppose you step over at once and let us see General Scott
(and) General Cameron about assigning a position to General Fremont.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION,
JULY 4, 1861.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:--Having
been convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the
Constitution, your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of
legislation.
At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago,
the functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally
suspended within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of
the Post-Office Department.
Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dockyards,
custom-houses, and the like, including the movable and stationary
property in and about them, had been seized, and were held in open
hostility to this government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor,
and Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter, in
Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. The forts thus seized had been
put in improved condition, new ones had been built, and armed forces
had been organized and were organizing, all avowedly with the same
hostile purpose.
The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in
and near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike
preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by
well-protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the
best of its own, and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one.
A disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had
somehow found their way into these States, and had been seized to be
used against the government. Accumulations of the public revenue
lying within them had been seized for the same object. The navy was
scattered in distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within
the immediate reach of the government. Officers of the Federal army
and navy had resigned in great numbers; and of those resigning a
large proportion had taken up arms against the government.
Simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the purpose to sever
the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance with this
purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in each of these States,
declaring the States respectively to be separated from the national
Union. A formula for instituting a combined government of these
States had been promulgated; and this illegal organization, in the
character of confederate States, was already invoking recognition,
aid, and intervention from foreign powers.
Finding this condition of things, and believing it to be an
imperative duty upon the incoming executive to prevent, if possible,
the consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a
choice of means to that end became indispensable. This choice was
made and was declared in the inaugural address. The policy chosen
looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to
any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and
property not already wrested from the government, and to collect the
revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the
ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at government
expense, to the very people who were resisting the government; and it
gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people,
or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might
constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was
forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the
government on foot.
On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in
office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter,
written on the 28th of February and received at the War Department on
the 4th of March, was by that department placed in his hands. This
letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer that
reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for
his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions,
and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of
less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined men. This
opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and
their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major
Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before
Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson
in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting
with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and at the end of
four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion as
before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient
force was then at the control of the government, or could be raised
and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the
fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view, this
reduced the duty of the administration in the case to the mere matter
of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.
It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the
circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under
which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many
it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home
it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its
adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad;
that in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated. This
could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and
ere it would be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last
would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the
country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military
necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing
of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens. This
order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route
by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one
week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the
officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been
transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of
the late administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too
vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the
troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be
reached at Fort Sumter was impossible--rendered so by the near
exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution
against such a conjuncture, the government had, a few days before,
commenced preparing an expedition as well adapted as might be to
relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately
used, or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated
case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it
forward. As had been intended in this contingency, it was also
resolved to notify the governor of South Carolina that he might
expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort; and that, if
the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw
in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an
attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon
the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.
It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter
was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the
assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no
possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew--they were
expressly notified--that the giving of bread to the few brave and
hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be
attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke
more. They knew that this government desired to keep the garrison in
the fort, not to assail them, but merely to maintain visible
possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate
dissolution--trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion,
and the ballot-box for final adjustment; and they assailed and
reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object--to drive out the
visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to
immediate dissolution. That this was their object the executive well
understood; and having said to them in the inaugural address, "You
can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors," he
took pains not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep
the case so free from the power of ingenious sophistry that the world
should not be able to misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort
Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that point was reached.
Then and thereby the assailants of the government began the conflict
of arms, without a gun in sight or in expectancy to return their
fire, save only the few in the fort sent to that harbor years before
for their own protection, and still ready to give that protection in
whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have
forced upon the country the distinct issue, "immediate dissolution or
blood."
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States.
It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a
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