The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, v6
by
Abraham Lincoln
Part 2 out of 9
Ordered:
1st. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell,
including the troops now under Brigadier-General Sturgis at
Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the
Army of Virginia.
2d. The command of the Army of Virginia is specially assigned to
Major-General John Pope, as commanding general. The troops of the
Mountain Department, heretofore under command of General Fremont,
shall constitute the First Army Corps, under the command of General
Fremont; the troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under General
Banks, shall constitute the Second Army Corps, and be commanded by
him; the troops under the command of General McDowell, except those
within the fortifications and city of Washington, shall form the
Third Army Corps, and be under his command.
3d. The Army of Virginia shall operate in such manner as, while
protecting western Virginia and the national capital from danger or
insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the
rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the
direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to
relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond.
4th. When the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia shall be
in position to communicate and directly co-operate at or before
Richmond, the chief command, while so operating together, shall be
governed, as in like cases, by the Rules and Articles of War.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK:
The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it
absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you
immediately to detach 25,000 of your force and forward it by the
nearest and quickest route by way of Baltimore and Washington to
Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of
Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio River. But in detaching your force
the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you
to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against
Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the
forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are left to
your own judgment.
The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative
by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond
yesterday, the full extent of which is not yet known.
You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch, stating the day
and hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so
that we may take measures to aid in river and railroad
transportation.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.
WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.
GENERAL BURNSIDE:
I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to
General McClellan.
A. LINCOLN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June, 28, 1862
MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Newbern:
We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in
large force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We
are not advised of his exact condition, but the President directs
that you shall send him all the reinforcements from your command to
the James River that you can safely do without abandoning your own
position. Let it be infantry entirely, as he said yesterday that he
had cavalry enough.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as
we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next
day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed
reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did
not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and
your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a
drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not
being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy
concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been
upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week
ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come
in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor
the government is to blame. Please tell at once the present
condition and aspect of things.
A. LINCOLN
TO SECRETARY SEWARD.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862
HON. W. H. SEWARD.
MY DEAR SIR:--My view of the present condition of the war is about as
follows:
The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the
Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in
Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon
will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all
the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know
of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large
part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let
us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc.
What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the
Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A
reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for
its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new
troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan
directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any
other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I
expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or
am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake
me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force
were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so
hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the
new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because
such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28,1862.
GENERAL DIX:
Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every
nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way
you can. Report to me.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.
WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28, 1862.
FLAG-OFFICER GOLDS BOROUGH, Fort Monroe:
Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House, and is
driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with
gunboats at or near that place. McClellan's main force is between
the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate
with him and support him there.
A. LINCOLN
To GOVERNOR MORTON.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
June 28, 1862.
GOVERNOR O. P. MORTON, Indianapolis, Ind:
Your despatch of to-day is just received. I have no recollection of
either John R. Cravens or Cyrus M. Allen having been named to me for
appointment under the tax law. The latter particularly has been my
friend, and I am sorry to learn that he is not yours. No appointment
has been or will be made by me for the purpose of stabbing you.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 29, 1862.6 P.M.
HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Astor House, New York:
Not much more than when you left. Fulton of Baltimore American is
now with us. He left White House at 11 A.M. yesterday. He
conversed fully with a paymaster who was with Porter's force during
the fight of Friday and fell back to nearer McClellan's quarters just
a little sooner than Porter did, seeing the whole of it; stayed on
the Richmond side of the Chickahominy over night, and left for White
House at 5 A.M. Saturday. He says Porter retired in perfect order
under protection of the guns arranged for the purpose, under orders
and not from necessity; and with all other of our forces, except what
was left on purpose to go to White House, was safely in pontoons over
the Chickahominy before morning, and that there was heavy firing on
the Richmond side, begun at 5 and ceased at 7 A.M. Saturday. On the
whole, I think we have had the better of it up to that point of time.
What has happened since we still know not, as we have no
communication with General McClellan. A despatch from Colonel
Ingalls shows that he thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at
Richmond to-day, and will be to-morrow. We have no means of knowing
upon what Colonel Ingalls founds his opinion. Confirmed about saving
all property. Not a single unwounded straggler came back to White
House from the field, and the number of wounded reaching there up to
11 A.M. Saturday was not large.
A. LINCOLN.
To what the President has above stated I will only add one or two
points that may be satisfactory for you to know.
First. All the sick and wounded were safely removed
Second. A despatch from Burnside shows that he is from White House;
not a man left behind in condition to afford efficient support, and
is probably doing so.
Third. The despatch from Colonel Ingalls impresses me with the
conviction that the movement was made by General McClellan to
concentrate on Richmond, and was successful to the latest point of
which we have any information.
Fourth. Mr. Fulton says that on Friday night, between twelve and one
o'clock, General McClellan telegraphed Commodore Goldsborough that
the result of the movement was satisfactory to him.
Fifth. From these and the facts stated by the President, my
inference is that General McClellan will probably be in Richmond
within two days.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
[Unfortunately McClellan did not do any of the things he was ordered,
and that it was very likely possible to do. It is still some
mystery what he was doing all these days other than hiding in the
woods and staying out of communication so he would not receive any
more uncomfortable orders. This was another place where the North
was close to wining the war and did not. D.W.]
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 30, 1862.
HON. WM. H. SEWARD, New York:
We are yet without communication with General McClellan, and this
absence of news is our point of anxiety. Up to the latest point to
which we are posted he effected everything in such exact accordance
with his plan, contingently announced to us before the battle began,
that we feel justified to hope that he has not failed since. He had
a severe engagement in getting the part of his army on this side of
the Chickahominy over to the other side, in which the enemy lost
certainly as much as we did. We are not dissatisfied with this, only
that the loss of enemies does not compensate for the loss of friends.
The enemy cannot come below White House; certainly is not there now,
and probably has abandoned the whole line. Dix's pickets are at New
Kent Court-House.
A. LINCOLN.
CALL FOR TROOPS.
NEW YORK, June 30, 1862.
TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE SEVERAL STATES:
The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth by the national
forces has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and
about Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible
delay; in fact, there will soon be no formidable insurgent force
except at Richmond. With so large an army there, the enemy can
threaten us on the Potomac and elsewhere. Until we have
re-established the national authority, all these places must be held,
and we must keep a respectable force in front of WASHINGTON. But
this, from the diminished strength of our army by sickness and
casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the
struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with
energy and success. Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our
military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by
proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To
accomplish the object stated we require without delay 150,000 men,
including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus
reinforced our gallant army will be enabled to realize the hopes and
expectations of the government and the people.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 30, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:
Is it not probable that the enemy has abandoned the line between
White House and McClellan's rear? He could have but little object to
maintain it, and nothing to subsist upon. Would not Stoneman better
move up and see about it? I think a telegraphic communication can at
once be opened to White House from Williamsburg. The wires must be
up still.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, JUNE 30, 1862. 3 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:
Your telegram of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition
must not on any account be given up. The President regards that and
the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important
movements of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the
capture of Richmond. He is not pleased with the tardiness of the
movement toward Chattanooga, and directs that no force be sent here
if you cannot do it without breaking up the operations against that
point and East Tennessee. Infantry only are needed; our cavalry and
artillery are strong enough. The first reports from Richmond were
more discouraging than the truth warranted. If the advantage is not
on our side, it is balanced. General McClellan has moved his whole
force on the line of the James River, and is supported there by our
gunboats; but he must be largely strengthened before advancing, and
hence the call on you, which I am glad you answered so promptly. Let
me know to what point on the river you will send your forces, so as
to provide immediately for transportation.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
WASHINGTON, D.C., June 30, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry; no artillery or cavalry; but
please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important
to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the
expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or
east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important as
the taking and holding of Richmond.
A. LINCOLN.
CALL FOR 300,000 VOLUNTEERS, JULY 1, 1862.
June 28, 1861.
The undersigned, governors of States of the Union, impressed with the
belief that the citizens of the States which they respectively
represent are of one accord in the hearty desire that the recent
successes of the Federal arms may be followed up by measures which
must insure the speedy restoration of the Union, and believing that,
in view of the present state of the important military movements now
in progress, and the reduced condition of our effective forces in the
field, resulting from the usual and unavoidable casualties in the
service, the time has arrived for prompt and vigorous measures to be
adopted by the people in support of the great interests committed to
your charge, respectfully request, if it meets with your entire
approval, that you at once call upon the several States for such
number of men as may be required to fill up all military
organizations now in the field, and add to the armies heretofore
organized such additional number of men as may, in your judgment, be
necessary to garrison and hold all the numerous cities and military
positions that have been captured by our armies, and to speedily
crush the rebellion that still exists in several of the Southern
States, thus practically restoring to the civilized world our great
and good government. All believe that the decisive moment is near at
hand, and to that end the people of the United States are desirous to
aid promptly in furnishing all reinforcements that you may deem
needful to sustain our government.
ISRAEL WASHBURN, JR., Governor of Maine.
H. S. BERRY, Governor of New Hampshire.
FREDERICK HOLBROOK, Governor of Vermont.
WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, Governor of Connecticut.
E. D. MORGAN, Governor of New York.
CHARLES S. OLDEN, Governor of New Jersey.
A. G. CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania.
A. W. BRADFORD, Governor of Maryland.
F. H. PIERPOINT, Governor of Virginia.
AUSTIN BLAIR, Governor of Michigan.
J. B. TEMPLE, President Military Board of Kentucky.
ANDREW JOHNSON, Governor of Tennessee.
H. R. GAMBLE, Governor of Missouri.
O. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana.
DAVID TODD, Governor of Ohio.
ALEXANDER RAMSEY, Governor of Minnesota.
RICHARD YATES, Governor of Illinois.
EDWARD SALOMON, Governor of Wisconsin.
THE PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
July 1, 1862
GENTLEMEN:--Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to
me in so patriotic a manner by you, in the communication of the
twenty-eighth day of June, I have decided to call into the service an
additional force of 300,000 men. I suggest and recommend that the
troops should be chiefly of infantry. The quota of your State would
be ______ . I trust that they may be enrolled without delay, so as
to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and
satisfactory conclusion. An order fixing the quotas of the
respective States will be issued by the War Department to-morrow.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
PROCLAMATION CONCERNING TAXES IN
REBELLIOUS STATES, JULY 1, 1862.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
Whereas in and by the second section of an act of Congress passed on
the 7th day of June, A. D. 1862, entitled "An act for the collection
of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts within the United
States, and for other purposes," it is made the duty of the President
to declare, on or before the first day of July then next following,
by his proclamation, in what States and parts of States insurrection
exists:
Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that the
States of South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana,
Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and the
State of Virginia except the following counties-Hancock, Brooke,
Ohio, Marshall, Wetzel, Marion, Monongalia, Preston, Taylor,
Pleasants, Tyler, Ritchie, Doddridge, Harrison, Wood, Jackson, Wirt,
Roane, Calhoun, Gilmer, Barbour, Tucker, Lewis, Braxton, Upsbur,
Randolph, Mason, Putnam, Kanawha, Clay, Nicholas, Cabell, Wayne,
Boone, Logan, Wyoming, Webster, Fayette, and Raleigh-are now in
insurrection and rebellion, and by reason thereof the civil authority
of the United States is obstructed so that the provisions of the "Act
to provide increased revenue from imports, to pay the interest on the
public debt, and for other purposes," approved August 5, 1861, can
not be peaceably executed; and that the taxes legally chargeable upon
real estate under the act last aforesaid lying within the States and
parts of States as aforesaid, together with a penalty of 50 per
centum of said taxes, shall be a lien upon the tracts or lots of the
same, severally charged, till paid.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed..............
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
F. W. SEWARD, Acting Secretary of State.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, JULY 1, 1862.
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
I most cordially recommend that Captain Andrew H. Foote, of the
United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his
eminent services in Organizing the flotilla on the western Waters,
and for his gallantry at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island Number
Ten, and at various other places, whilst in command of the naval
forces, embracing a period of nearly ten months.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, D. C. July 1, 1862
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, JULY 1,1862. 3.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we
had a million of men, We could not get them to you in time. We have
not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the
enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair.
Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events,
even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough
in the country, and will bring it out.
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., July 2, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
Your despatch of Tuesday morning induces me to hope your army is
having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a moment.
When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor
under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing
your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of
WASHINGTON, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included
in and about WASHINGTON 75,000 men. Now, please be assured I have
not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Fremont's in
the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and all
in WASHINGTON, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000.
With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of
your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of
sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is
simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you
have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can,
please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like
manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are
not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try
just now. Save the army, material and personal, and I will
strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The
governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I
accept.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WASHINGTON, D.C. July 2, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself
received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad
for some reinforcements from you. Still do not send a man if in your
judgment it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or
will force you to give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga
expedition.
Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation
without endangering the Service in your department.
A. LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 2, 1862.
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, an
act entitled "An act to provide for additional medical officers of
the volunteer service," without my approval.
My reason for so doing is that I have approved an act of the same
title passed by Congress after the passage of the one first mentioned
for the express purpose of correcting errors in and superseding the
same, as I am informed.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS.
(Private and Confidential.)
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 3, 1862.10.30 A.M.
GOVERNOR WASHBURN, Maine [and other governors] I should not want the
half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000
additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the
war in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new
men in a month, I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same
month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and
new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you
will have to send. Time is everything. Please act in view of this.
The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is
thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 3, 1862
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that
yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All
accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for
it.
On the 28th we sent General Burnside an order to send all the force
he could spare to you. We then learned that you had requested him to
go to Goldsborough; upon which we said to him our order was intended
for your benefit, and we did not wish to be in conflict with your
views.
We hope you will have help from him soon. Today we have ordered
General Hunter to send you all he can spare. At last advices General
Halleck thinks he cannot send reinforcements without endangering all
he has gained.
A. LINCOLN, President
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 4, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General
Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive
within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to
that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I
suppose), and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very
soon, and about 5000 from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I
can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances
the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army
first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must.
You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt,
and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion that
with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned above
you can hold your present position--provided, and so long as, you can
keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably
confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as
soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any
apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the
river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your
attention.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
P.S.--If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not
restrained from doing so.
A.L.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 4, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning
any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even
10,000 infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is
certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in
our hands from the late Corinth army.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.
WASHINGTON CITY, July 4,1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:
Send forward the despatch to Colonel Hawkins and this also. Our
order and General McClellan's to General Burnside being the same, of
course we wish it executed as promptly as possible.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1862. 9 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 P.M.
yesterday gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and
officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated.
If you can hold your present position, we shall have the enemy yet.
A. LINCOLN
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 6, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi.
MY DEAR SIR:--This introduces Governor William Sprague, of Rhode
Island. He is now Governor for the third time, and senator-elect of
the United States.
I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to
go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your
force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be
exceedingly glad of this if, in your judgment, it could be without
endangering positions and operations in the southwest; and I now
repeat what I have more than once said by telegraph: "Do not come or
send a man if, in your judgment, it will endanger any point you deem
important to hold, or endangers or delays the Chattanooga
expedition."
Still, please give my friend, Governor Sprague, a full and fair
hearing.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
MEMORANDUM OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL
McCLELLAN AND OTHER OFFICERS DURING A VISIT TO THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC AT HARRISON'S LANDING, VIRGINIA.
July 9, 1862.
THE PRESIDENT: What amount of force have you now?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: About 80,000, can't vary much, certainly 75,000.
THE PRESIDENT:[to the corps commanders]
What is the whole amount of your corps with you now.
GENERAL SUMNER: About 15,000.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: 15,000 for duty.
GENERAL KEYES: About 12,500.
GENERAL PORTER: About 23,000--fully 20,000 fit for duty.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: About 15,000.
THE PRESIDENT: What is likely to be your condition as to health in
this camp?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: Better than in any encampment since landing at
Fortress Monroe.
PRESIDENT LINCOLN:[to the corps commanders]
In your present encampment what is the present and prospective
condition as to health?
GENERAL SUMNER: As good as any part of Western Virginia.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Excellent for health, and present health
improving.
GENERAL KEYES: A little improved, but think camp is getting worse.
GENERAL PORTER: Very good.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: Not good.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the enemy now?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: From four to five miles from us on all the roads--
I think nearly the whole army--both Hills, Longstreet, Jackson,
Magruder, Huger.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] Where and in what condition
do you believe the enemy to be now?
GENERAL SUMNER: I think they have retired from our front; were very
much damaged, especially in their best troops, in the late actions,
from superiority of arms.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Don't think they are in force in our vicinity.
GENERAL KEYES: Think he has withdrawn, and think preparing to go to
WASHINGTON.
GENERAL PORTER: Believe he is mainly near Richmond. He feels he dare
not attack us here.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: I learn he has withdrawn from our front and think
that is probable.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] What is the aggregate of
your killed, wounded, and missing from the attack on the 26th ultimo
till now?
GENERAL SUMNER: 1175.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Not large 745.
GENERAL KEYES: Less than 500.
GENERAL PORTER: Over 5000.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: Not over 3000.
THE PRESIDENT: If you desired could you remove the army safely?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: It would be a delicate and very difficult matter.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] If it were desired to get
the army away, could it be safely effected?
GENERAL SUMNER: I think we could, but I think we give up the cause if
we do.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Perhaps we could, but I think it would be
ruinous to the country.
GENERAL KEYES: I think it could if done quickly.
GENERAL PORTER: Impossible--move the army and ruin the country.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: I think we could, and that we had better--think
Rappahannock the true line.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] Is the army secure in its
present position?
GENERAL SUMNER: Perfectly so, in my judgment.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: I think it is safe.
GENERAL KEYES: With help of General B. [Burnside] can hold position.
GENERAL PORTER: Perfectly so. Not only, but we are ready to begin
moving forward.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: Unless river can be closed it is.
ORDER MAKING HALLECK GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 11,1862.
Ordered, That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command
the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and
that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the
positions and operations within the department now under his charge.
A. LINCOLN
ORDER CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST BRANCH
OF THE PACIFIC RAILROAD.
Whereas, in the judgment of the President, the public safety does
require that the railroad line called and known as the Southwest
Branch of the Pacific Railroad in the State of Missouri be repaired,
extended, and completed from Rolla to Lebanon, in the direction to
Springfield, in the said State, the same being necessary to the
successful and economical conduct of the war and to the maintenance
of the authority of the government in the Southwest:
Therefore, under and in virtue of the act of Congress entitled "An
act to authorize the President of the United States in certain cases
to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines, and for other
purposes," approved January 31, 1862, it is ordered, That the portion
of the said railroad line which reaches from Rolla to Lebanon be
repaired, extended, and completed, so as to be made available for the
military uses of the government, as speedily as may be. And,
inasmuch as upon the part of the said line from Rolla to the stream
called Little Piney a considerable portion of the necessary work has
already been done by the railroad company, and the road to this
extent may be completed at comparatively small cost, it is ordered
that the said line from Rolla to and across Little Piney be first
completed, and as soon as possible.
The Secretary of War is charged with the execution of this order.
And to facilitate the speedy execution of the work, he is directed,
at his discretion, to take possession and control of the whole or
such part of the said railroad line, and the whole or such part of
the rolling stock, offices, shops, buildings, and all their
appendages and appurtenances, as he may judge necessary or convenient
for the early completion of the road from Rolla to Lebanon.
Done at the city of WASHINGTON, July 11, 1862.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
WASHINGTON, D C., July 11, 1862
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I recommend that the thanks of Congress be given to the following
officers of the United States Navy:
Captain James L. Lardner, for meritorious conduct at the battle of
Port Royal and distinguished services on the coast of the United
States against the enemy.
Captain Charles Henry Davis, for distinguished services in conflict
with the enemy at Fort Pillow, at Memphis, and for successful
operations at other points in the waters of the Mississippi River.
Commander John A. Dahlgren, for distinguished services in the line of
his profession, improvements in ordnance, and zealous and efficient
labors in the ordnance branch of the service.
Commander Stephen C. Rowan, for distinguished services in the waters
of North Carolina, and particularly in the capture of Newbern, being
in chief command of the naval forces.
Commander David D. Porter, for distinguished services in the
conception and preparation of the means used for the capture of the
forts below New Orleans, and for highly meritorious conduct in the
management of the mortar flotilla during the bombardment of Forts
Jackson and St. Philip.
Captain Silas H. Stringharn, now on the retired list, for
distinguished services in the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clark.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862.
HON. ANDREW JOHNSON.
MY DEAR SIR:--Yours of yesterday is received. Do you not, my good
friend, perceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in
the West? I do not suppose you desire this. You only wish to
control in your own localities; but this you must know may derange
all other posts. Can you not, and will you not, have a full
conference with General Halleck? Telegraph him, and meet him at such
place as he and you can agree upon. I telegraph him to meet you and
confer fully with you.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:
Governor Johnson, at Nashville, is in great trouble and anxiety about
a raid into Kentucky. The governor is a true and valuable man--
indispensable to us in Tennessee. Will you please get in
communication with him, and have a full conference with him before
you leave for here? I have telegraphed him on the subject.
A. LINCOLN.
APPEAL TO BORDER-STATE REPRESENTATIVES IN FAVOR OF
COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION.
July 12, 1862.
GENTLEMEN:--After the adjournment of Congress now very near, I shall
have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that
you of the border States hold more power for good than any other
equal number of members, I feel it a duty which I cannot justifiably
waive to make this appeal to you. I intend no reproach or complaint
when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the
resolution in the gradual-emancipation message of last March, the war
would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is
yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the
States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no
event will the States you represent ever join their proposed
confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But
you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them
so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution
within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have
overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as
their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break
that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more
forever. Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration
and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is
exclusively your own, when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask,
Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge?
Discarding punctilio and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and
looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you
do better in any possible event? You prefer that the constitutional
relation of the States to the nation shall be practically restored
without disturbance of the institution; and if this were done, my
whole duty in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of
office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to
accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war cannot be avoided.
If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner
attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere
friction and abrasion--by the mere incidents of the war. It will be
gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its
value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people
to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures
substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in
any other event! How much better to thus save the money which else we
sink forever in war! How much better to do it while we can, lest the
war ere long render us pecuniarily unable to do it! How much better
for you as seller, and the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out
that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both
the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting one another's
throats! I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at
once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization
can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be
large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the
freed people will not be so reluctant to go.
I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned--one which threatens
division among those who, united, are none too strong. An instance
of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and
I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his
agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be
free. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I
repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm
from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in
repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offence, to many whose
support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end
of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is
increasing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me, and,
much more, can relieve the country in this important point.
Upon these considerations, I have again begged your attention to the
message of March last. Before leaving the Capital, consider and
discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as
such I pray you consider this proposition; and, at the least, commend
it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would
perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I
beseech you that you do in nowise omit this. Our common country is
in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to
bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is
saved to the world; its beloved history and cherished memories are
vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered
inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege
is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to
link your own names therewith forever.
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
MY DEAR SIR:--I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your
army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out
86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe
23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your
battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. No
more than 5000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still
alive and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit
for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I
have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go
into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you,
and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for
the future?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
They are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.
WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862.
GENERAL J. T. BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:
Your several despatches received. You should call on General
Halleck. Telegraph him at once. I have telegraphed him that you are
in trouble.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862.
GENERAL J. T. BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:
We cannot venture to order troops from General Buell. We know not
what condition he is in. He maybe attacked himself. You must call
on General Halleck, who commands, and whose business it is to
understand and care for the whole field If you cannot telegraph to
him, send a messenger to him. A dispatch has this moment come from
Halleck at Tuscombia, Alabama.
A. LINCOLN.
ACT OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
July 4, 1862.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Herewith is the draft of the bill to compensate any State which may
abolish slavery within its limits, the passage of which,
substantially as presented, I respectfully and earnestly recommend.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled:--That whenever the
President of the United States shall be satisfied that any State
shall have lawfully abolished slavery within and through-out such
State, either immediately or gradually, it shall be the duty of the
President, assisted by the Secretary of the Treasury, to prepare and
deliver to each State an amount of six per cent. interest-bearing
bonds of the United States equal to the aggregate value at ______
dollars per head of all the slaves within such State, as reported by
the census of 1860; the whole amount for any one State to be
delivered at once if the abolishment be immediate, or in equal annual
instalments if it be gradual, interest to begin running on each bond
at the time of delivery, and not before.
And be it further enacted, That if any State, having so received any
such bonds, shall at any time afterwards by law reintroduce or
tolerate slavery within its limits, contrary to the act of
abolishment upon which such bonds shall have been received, said
bonds so received by said State shall at once be null and void, in
whosesoever hands they may be, and such State shall refund to the
United States all interest which may have been paid on such bonds.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 14, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
I am very anxious--almost impatient--to have you here. Have due
regard to what you leave behind. When can you reach here?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, July 14, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
General Burnside's force is at Newport News, ready to move, on short
notice, one way or the other, when ordered.
A. LINCOLN.
TO SOLOMON FOOT.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 15, 1862.
HON. SOLOMON FOOT, President pro tempore of the Senate.
SIR:--Please inform the Senate that I shall be obliged if they will
postpone the adjournment at least one day beyond the time which I
understand to be now fixed for it.
Your obedient servant,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
[The same message was addressed to Hon. Galusha A. Grow Speaker of
the House of Representatives.]
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
July 17, 1862.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES:
I have inadvertently omitted so long to inform you that in March last
Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, of New York, gratuitously presented to the
United States the ocean steamer Vanderbilt, by many esteemed the
finest merchant ship in the world. She has ever since been and still
is doing valuable service to the government. For the patriotic act
of making this magnificent and valuable present to the country I
recommend that some suitable acknowledgment be made.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
July 17, 1862.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES:
Considering the bill for "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish
treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of
rebels, and for other purposes," and the joint resolution explanatory
of said act as being substantially one, I have approved and signed
both.
Before I was informed of the passage of the resolution I had prepared
the draft of a message stating objections to the bill becoming a law,
a copy of which draft is herewith transmitted.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, the
bill for an act entitled "An act to suppress treason and rebellion,
to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other
purposes," together with my objections to its becoming a law.
There is much in the bill to which I perceive no objection. It is
wholly prospective, and touches neither person nor property of any
loyal citizen, in which particulars it is just and proper. The first
and second sections provide for the conviction and punishment of
persons Who shall be guilty of treason and persons who shall "incite,
set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection
against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or
shall give aid and comfort thereto, or shall engage in or give aid
and comfort to any such existing rebellion or insurrection." By fair
construction persons within these sections are not to be punished
without regular trials in duly constituted courts, under the forms
and all the substantial provisions of law and of the Constitution
applicable to their several cases. To this I perceive no objection,
especially as such persons would be within the general pardoning
power and also the special provision for pardon and amnesty contained
in this act.
It is also provided that the slaves of persons convicted under these
sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of
expression rather than a substantial objection in this. It is
startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and
yet if it were said the ownership of the slave had first been
transferred to the nation and that Congress had then liberated him
the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. The
traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as
justly as he does any other property, and he forfeits both to the
government against which be offends. The government, so far as there
can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the question
for Congress in regard to them is, "Shall they be made free or be
sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in
advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as
I am informed, she is the owner of some slaves by escheat, and has
sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other
States. Indeed, I do not believe it will be physically possible for
the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual
slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it which
could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force.
In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill.
Another matter involved in these two sections, and running through
other parts of the act, will be noticed hereafter.
I perceive no objection to the third or fourth sections.
So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be
considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do
no injustice to the persons embraced within them, is clear. That
those who make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of
it, is too obviously just to be called in question. To give
governmental protection to the property of persons who have abandoned
it, and gone on a crusade to overthrow the same government, is
absurd, if considered in the mere light of justice. The severest
justice may not always be the best policy. The principle of seizing
and appropriating the property of the persons embraced within these
sections is certainly not very objectionable, but a justly
discriminating application of it would be very difficult and, to a
great extent, impossible. And would it not be wise to place a power
of remission somewhere, so that these persons may know they have
something to lose by persisting and something to gain by desisting?
[A man without hope is a most dangerous man--he has nothing to lose!]
I am not sure whether such power of remission is or is not in section
thirteen. Without any special act of Congress, I think our military
commanders, when--in military phrase, "they are within the enemy's
country," should, in an orderly manner, seize and use whatever of
real or personal property may be necessary or convenient for their
commands; at the same time preserving, in some way, the evidence of
what they do.
What I have said in regard to slaves, while commenting on the first
and second sections, is applicable to the ninth, with the difference
that no provision is made in the whole act for determining whether a
particular individual slave does or does not fall within the classes
defined in that section. He is to be free upon certain conditions
but whether those conditions do or do not pertain to him no mode of
ascertaining is provided. This could be easily supplied.
To the tenth section I make no objection. The oath therein required
seems to be proper, and the remainder of the section is substantially
identical with a law already existing.
The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary power
upon the executive. Without the law, I have no hesitation to go as
far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient.
And I am ready to say now--I think it is proper for our military
commanders to employ, as laborers, as many persons of African descent
as can be used to advantage.
The twelfth and thirteenth sections are something better than
unobjectionable; and the fourteenth is entirely proper, if all other
parts of the act shall stand.
That to which I chiefly object pervades most parts of the act, but
more distinctly appears in the first, second, seventh, and eighth
sections. It is the sum of those provisions which results in the
divesting of title forever.
For the causes of treason and ingredients of treason, not amounting
to the full crime, it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives
of the guilty parties; whereas the Constitution of the United States
declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood
or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." True,
there is to be no formal attainder in this case; still, I think the
greater punishment cannot be constitutionally inflicted, in a
different form, for the same offence.
With great respect I am constrained to say I think this feature of
the act is unconstitutional. It would not be difficult to modify it.
I may remark that the provision of the Constitution, put in language
borrowed from Great Britain, applies only in this country, as I
understand, to real or landed estate.
Again, this act in rem forfeits property for the ingredients of
treason without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal
hearing given him in any proceeding. That we may not touch property
lying within our reach, because we cannot give personal notice to an
owner who is absent endeavoring to destroy the government, is
certainly not satisfactory. Still, the owner may not be thus
engaged; and I think a reasonable time should be provided for such
parties to appear and have personal hearings. Similar provisions are
not uncommon in connection with proceedings in rem.
For the reasons stated, I return the bill to the House in which it
originated.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 21, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
This is Monday. I hope to be able to tell you on Thursday what is to
be done with Burnside.
A. LINCOLN.
ORDER IN REGARD TO BEHAVIOR OF ALIENS
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 21, 1862.
The following order has been received from the President of the
United States:
Representations have been made to the President by the ministers of
various foreign powers in amity with the United States that subjects
of such powers have during the present insurrection been obliged or
required by military authorities to take an oath of general or
qualified allegiance to this government. It is the duty of all
aliens residing in the United States to submit to and obey the laws
and respect the authority of the government. For any proceeding or
conduct inconsistent with this obligation and subversive of that
authority they may rightfully be subjected to military restraints
when this may be necessary. But they cannot be required to take an
oath of allegiance to this government, because it conflicts with the
duty they owe to their own sovereigns. All such obligations
heretofore taken are therefore remitted and annulled. Military
commanders will abstain from imposing similar obligations in future,
and will in lieu thereof adopt such other restraints of the character
indicated as they shall find necessary, convenient, and effectual for
the public safety. It is further directed that whenever any order
shall be made affecting the personal liberty of an alien reports of
the same and of the causes thereof shall be made to the War
Department for the consideration of the Department of State.
By order of the Secretary of War:
L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.
ORDER AUTHORIZING EMPLOYMENT OF "CONTRABANDS."
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 22, 1862.
Ordered:
1. That military commanders within the States of Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas,
and Arkansas in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or
personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several
commands as supplies or for other military purposes; and that while
property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be
destroyed in wantonness or malice.
2. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers
within and from said States so many persons of African descent as can
be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them
reasonable wages for their labor.
3. That as to both property and persons of African descent accounts
shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities
and amounts and from whom both property and such persons shall have
come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases;
and the several departments of this government shall attend to and
perform their appropriate parts toward the execution of these orders.
By order of the President:
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
WARNING TO REBEL SYMPATHIZERS
PROCLAMATION, JULY 25, 1862.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled "An
act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to
seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes,"
approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint resolution
explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln,
President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all
persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease
participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing
rebellion or any rebellion against the Government of the United
States and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States,
on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and by said sixth
section provided.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of July, A.D.
1862, and of the independence of the United States the
eighty-seventh.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
HOLD MY HAND WHILST THE ENEMY STABS ME
TO REVERDY JOHNSON.
(Private.)
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 26, 1862.
HON. REVERDY JOHNSON.
MY DEAR SIR:--Yours of the 16th is received...........
You are ready to say I apply to friends what is due only to enemies.
I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends who would hold
my hands while my enemies stab me. This appeal of professed friends
has paralyzed me more in this struggle than any other one thing. You
remember telling me, the day after the Baltimore mob in April, 1861,
that it would crush all Union feeling in Maryland for me to attempt
bringing troops over Maryland soil to Washington. I brought the
troops notwithstanding, and yet there was Union feeling enough left
to elect a Legislature the next autumn, which in turn elected a very
excellent Union United States senator! I am a patient man--always
willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to
give ample time for repentance. Still, I must save this government,
if possible. What I cannot do, of course, I will not do; but it may
as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this
game leaving any available card unplayed.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO CUTHBERT BULLITT.
(Private.)
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 28, 1862.
CUTHBERT BULLITT, Esq., New Orleans, Louisiana.
SIR:--The copy of a letter addressed to yourself by Mr. Thomas J.
Durant has been shown to me. The writer appears to be an able, a
dispassionate, and an entirely sincere man. The first part of the
letter is devoted to an effort to show that the secession ordinance
of Louisiana was adopted against the will of a majority of the
people. This is probably true, and in that fact may be found some
instruction. Why did they allow the ordinance to go into effect?
Why did they not assert themselves? Why stand passive and allow
themselves to be trodden down by minority? Why did they not hold
popular meetings and have a convention of their own to express and
enforce the true sentiment of the State? If preorganization was
against them then, why not do this now that the United States army is
present to protect them? The paralysis--the dead palsy--of the
government in this whole struggle is that this class of men will do
nothing for the government, nothing for themselves, except demanding
that the government shall not strike its open enemies, lest they be
struck by accident!
Mr. Durant complains that in various ways the relation of master and
slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it
particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an
act of Congress, while constitutional guaranties are suspended on the
plea of military necessity. The truth is, that what is done and
omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military
necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we
can get neither in sufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or
drive from our lines slaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be
ignorant of the pressure in this direction, nor of my efforts to hold
it within bounds till he and such as he shall have time to help
themselves.
I am not posted to speak understandingly on all the police
regulations of which Mr. Durant complains. If experience shows any
one of them to be wrong, let them be set right. I think I can
perceive in the freedom of trade which Mr. Durant urges that he would
relieve both friends and enemies from the pressure of the blockade.
By this he would serve the enemy more effectively than the enemy is
able to serve himself. I do not say or believe that to serve the
enemy is the purpose, of Mr. Durant, or that he is conscious of any
purpose other than national and patriotic ones. Still, if there were
a class of men who, having no choice of sides in the contest, were
anxious only to have quiet and comfort for themselves while it rages,
and to fall in with the victorious side at the end of it without loss
to themselves, their advice as to the mode of conducting the contest
would be precisely such as his is. He speaks of no duty--apparently
thinks of none--resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious
to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and
passage without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a
pump, but to be merely passengers--deadheads at that--to be carried
snug and dry throughout the storm, and safely landed right side up.
Nay, more: even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred
passengers receive an accidental wound. Of course the rebellion will
never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there
will neither help to do it nor permit the government to do it without
their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what
is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough
angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. The
people of Louisiana who wish protection to person and property have
but to reach forth their hands and take it. Let them in good faith
reinaugurate the national authority, and set up a State government
conforming thereto under the Constitution. They know how to do it
and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army
will be withdrawn so soon as such State government can dispense with
its presence; and the people of the State can then, upon the old
constitutional terms, govern themselves to their own liking. This is
very simple and easy.
If they will not do this--if they prefer to hazard all for the sake
of destroying the government--it is for them to consider whether it
is probable I will surrender the government to save them from losing
all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I
will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war
where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk
squirts charged with rose water? Would you deal lighter blows rather
than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any
available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do
more than I can, and I shall do all I can, to save the government,
which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall
do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious
dealing.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO LOYAL GOVERNORS.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
July 28, 1862.
GOVERNORS OF ALL LOYAL STATES:
It would be of great service here for us to know, as fully as you can
tell, what progress is made and making in recruiting for old
regiments in your State. Also about what day the first regiments can
move with you, what the second, what the third, and so on. This
information is important to us in making calculations. Please give
it as promptly and accurately as you call.
A. LINCOLN.
BROKEN EGGS CANNOT BE MENDED
EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO AUGUST BELMONT.
July 31, 1862.
Broken eggs cannot be mended; but Louisiana has nothing to do now but
to take her place in the Union as it was, barring the already broken
eggs. The sooner she does so, the smaller will be the amount of that
which will be past mending. This government cannot much longer play
a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those
enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years
trying to destroy the government, and if they fail, still come back
into the Union unhurt. If they expect in any contingency to ever
have the Union as it was, I join with the writer in saying, "Now is
the time."
How much better it would have been for the writer to have gone at
this, under the protection of the army at New Orleans, than to have
sat down in a closet writing complaining letters northward!
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO COUNT GASPARIN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
August 4, 1863.
TO COUNT A. DE GASPARIN.
DEAR SIR--Your very acceptable letter, dated Orbe, Canton de Vaud,
Switzerland, 18th of July, 1862, is received. The moral effect was
the worst of the affair before Richmond, and that has run its course
downward. We are now at a stand, and shall soon be rising again, as
we hope. I believe it is true that, in men and material, the enemy
suffered more than we in that series of conflicts, while it is
certain that he is less able to bear it.
With us every soldier is a man of character, and must be treated with
more consideration than is customary in Europe. Hence our great
army, for slighter causes than could have prevailed there, has
dwindled rapidly, bringing the necessity for a new call earlier than
was anticipated. We shall easily obtain the new levy, however. Be
not alarmed if you shall learn that we shall have resorted to a draft
for part of this. It seems strange even to me, but it is true, that
the government is now pressed to this course by a popular demand.
Thousands who wish not to personally enter the service are
nevertheless anxious to pay and send substitutes, provided they can
have assurance that unwilling persons, similarly situated, will be
compelled to do likewise. Besides this, volunteers mostly choose to
enter newly forming regiments, while drafted men can be sent to fill
up the old ones, wherein man for man they are quite doubly as
valuable.
You ask, "Why is it that the North with her great armies so often is
found with inferiority of numbers face to face with the armies of the
South?" While I painfully know the fact, a military man, which I am
not, would better answer the question. The fact I know has not been
overlooked, and I suppose the cause of its continuance lies mainly in
the other facts that the enemy holds the interior and we the exterior
lines, and that we operate where the people convey information to the
enemy, while he operates where they convey none to us.
I have received the volume and letter which you did me the honor of
addressing to me, and for which please accept my sincere thanks. You
are much admired in America for the ability of your writings, and
much loved for your generosity to us and your devotion to liberal
principles generally.
You are quite right as to the importance to us, for its bearing upon
Europe, that we should achieve military successes, and the same is
true for us at home as well as abroad. Yet it seems unreasonable
that a series of successes, extending through half a year, and
clearing more than 100,000 square miles of country, should help us so
little, while a single half-defeat should hurt us so much. But let
us be patient.
I am very happy to know that my course has not conflicted with your
judgment of propriety and policy I can only say that I have acted
upon my best convictions, without selfishness or malice, and that by
the help of God I shall continue to do so.
Please be assured of my highest respect and esteem.
A. LINCOLN.
SPEECH AT A WAR MEETING,
WASHINGTON, AUGUST 6, 1862
FELLOW CITIZENS: I believe there is no precedent for my appearing
before you on this occasion, but it is also true that there is no
precedent for your being here yourselves, and I offer in
justification of myself and of you that, upon examination, I have
found nothing in the Constitution against it. I, however, have an
impression that; there are younger gentlemen who will entertain you
better and better address your understanding than I will or could,
and therefore I propose but to detain you a moment longer. I am very
little inclined on any occasion to say anything unless I hope to
produce some good by it. The only thing I think of just now not
likely to be better said by some one else is a matter in which we
have heard some other persons blamed for what I did myself There has
been a very widespread attempt to have a quarrel between General
McClellan and the Secretary of War Now, I occupy a position that
enables me to believe that these two gentlemen are not nearly so deep
in the quarrel as some presuming to be their friends. General
McClellan's attitude is such that in the very selfishness of his
nature he cannot but wish to be successful--and I hope he will--and
the Secretary of War is precisely in the same situation. If the
military commanders in the field cannot be successful, not only the
Secretary of War, but myself, for the time being the master of both,
cannot but be failures. I know General McClellan wishes to be
successful, and I know he does not wish it any more than the
Secretary of War for him, and both of them together no more than I
wish it. Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men General
McClellan has had, and those who would disparage him say he has had a
very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War
insist that General McClellan has had a very small number. The basis
for this is, there is always a wide difference, and on this occasion
perhaps a wider one, between the grand total on McClellan's rolls and
the men actually fit for duty; and those who would disparage him talk
of the grand total on paper, and those who would disparage the
Secretary of War talk of those at present fit for duty. General
McClellan has sometimes asked for things that the Secretary of War
did not give him. General McClellan is not to blame for asking for
what he wanted and needed, and the Secretary of War is not to blame
for not giving when he had none to give. And I say here, so far as I
know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one thing at any time in
my power to give him. I have no accusation against him. I believe
he is a brave and able man, and I stand here, as justice requires me
to do, to take upon myself what has been charged on the Secretary of
War as withholding from him. I have talked longer than I expected to
do, and now I avail myself of my privilege of saying no more.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., August 12, 1862.
GOVERNOR ANDREW, Boston, Mass.:
Your despatch saying "I can't get those regiments off because I can't
get quick work out of the V. S. disbursing officer and the paymaster"
is received. Please say to these gentlemen that if they do not work
quickly I will make quick work with them. In the name of all that is
reasonable, how long does it take to pay a couple of regiments? We
were never more in need of the arrival of regiments than now--even
to-day.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR CURTIN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., August 12, 1862.
GOVERNOR CURTIN, Harrisburg, Penn.:
It is very important for some regiments to arrive here at once. What
lack you from us? What can we do to expedite matters? Answer.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 12, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL CURTIS, St. Louis, Missouri:
Would the completion of the railroad some distance farther in the
direction of Springfield, Mo., be of any military advantage to you?
Please answer.
A. LINCOLN.
ADDRESS ON COLONIZATION TO A DEPUTATION OF COLORED MEN.
WASHINGTON, Thursday, August 14, 1862.
This afternoon the President of the United States gave an audience to
a committee of colored men at the White House. They were introduced
by Rev. J. Mitchell, Commissioner of Emigration, E. M. Thomas, the
chairman, remarked that they were there by invitation to hear what
the Executive had to say to them.
Having all been seated, the President, after a few preliminary
observations, informed them that a sum of money had been appropriated
by Congress, and placed at his disposition, for the purpose of aiding
the colonization, in some country, of the people, or a portion of
them, of African descent, thereby making it his duty, as it had for a
long time been his inclination, to favor that cause. And why, he
asked, should the people of your race be colonized, and where? Why
should they leave this country? This is, perhaps, the first question
for proper consideration. You and we are different races. We have
between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other
two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss; but this
physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think.
Your race suffer very greatly, many of them, by living among us,
while ours suffer from your presence. In a word, we suffer on each
side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason, at least, why we
should be separated. You here are free men, I suppose.
[A voice--"Yes, sir!"]
Perhaps you have long been free, or all your lives. Your race are
suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any
people. But even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far
removed from being placed on an equality with the white race. You
are cut off from many of the advantages which the other race enjoys.
The aspiration of men is to enjoy equality with the best when free,
but on this broad continent not a single man of your race is made the
equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best,
and the ban is still upon you. I do not propose to discuss this, but
to present it as a fact, with which we have to deal. I cannot alter
it if I would. It is a fact about which we all think and feel alike,
I and you. We look to our condition. Owing to the existence of the
two races on this continent, I need not recount to you the effects
upon white men, growing out of the institution of slavery.
I believe in its general evil effects on the white race. See our
present condition--the country engaged in war--white men cutting one
another's throats--none knowing how far it will extend--and then
consider what we know to be the truth: But for your race among us
there could not be war, although many men engaged on either side do
not care for you one way or the other. Nevertheless I repeat,
without the institution of slavery and the colored race as a basis,
the war could not have an existence. It is better for us both,
therefore, to be separated. I know that there are free men among
you, who, even if they could better their condition, are not as much
inclined to go out of the country as those who, being slaves, could
obtain their freedom on this condition. I suppose one of the
principal difficulties in the way of colonization is that the free
colored man cannot see that his comfort would be advanced by it. You
may believe that you can live in WASHINGTON, or elsewhere in the
United States, the remainder of your life, as easily, perhaps more
so, than you can in any foreign Country; and hence you may come to
the conclusion that you have nothing to do with the idea of going to
a foreign country.
This is (I speak in no unkind sense) an extremely selfish view of the
case. You ought to do something to help those who are not so
fortunate as yourselves. There is an unwillingness on the part of
our people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain
with us. Now, if you could give a start to the white people, you
would open a wide door for many to be made free. If we deal with
those who are not free at the beginning, and whose intellects are
clouded by slavery, we have very poor material to start with. If
intelligent colored men, such as are before me, would move in this
matter, much might be accomplished.
It is exceedingly important that we have men at the beginning capable
of thinking as white men, and not those who have been systematically
oppressed. There is much to encourage you. For the sake of your
race you should sacrifice something of your present comfort for the
purpose of being as grand in that respect as the white people. It is
a cheering thought throughout life that something can be done to
ameliorate the condition of those who have been subject to the hard
usages of the world. It is difficult to make a man miserable while
he feels he is worthy of himself and claims kindred to the great God
who made him. In the American Revolutionary war sacrifices were made
by men engaged in it, but they were cheered by the future. General
WASHINGTON himself endured greater physical hardships than if he had
remained a British subject, yet he was a happy man because he had
engaged in benefiting his race, in doing something for the children
of his neighbors, having none of his own.
The colony of Liberia has been in existence a long time. In a
certain sense it is a success. The old President of Liberia,
Roberts, has just been with me--the first time I ever saw him. He
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